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Summary
We are currently in the midst of a century of unprecedented urban growth. Between 
1950 and 2045, the global urban population is projected to increase eightfold, to six 
billion people. While Africa is the least urbanised continent, its urban population 
is growing faster than that of any other continent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban areas 
currently contain some 424 million people, and that number is expected to double 
over the next two decades. Ghana is a regional forerunner in urbanisation, and Accra 
its main growth pole with a population growth of four percent per year and a land area 
growth of five percent. 
There is a rich academic literature on this process of African urbanisation. Largely, this 
literature focuses on the spectacular: the pressure cooker of inner-city squatter areas 
and slums, the ultra-rich in their gated communities that slice through the city, and the 
fraying social fabric of original, inner-city communities. The outskirts, that sprawling 
expanse of rather bland Sub-Saharan suburbia, have received markedly less attention. 
These areas are not part of a dominant geography of theory, nor of popular discourse. 
Yet they house the majority of Africa’s new urbanites. 
Today’s urbanisation is primarily suburbanisation. Every year, another fifty square 
kilometres around Accra begin their decades-long process of transformation to urban 
fabric. This thesis contributes to the literature by investigating this predominant but 
little studied form of urban fabric. Specifically, the thesis looks at how residents deal 
with the fact that their new neighborhoods have to be built from scratch, in the context 
of a weak state. 
The central research question is: 
How do residents of Accra’s newly developing neighbourhoods organise 
to create collective amenities for their area? 
To understand the ways in which people depend on one another in the process of urban 
fabric formation, the ways in which they are interdependent, I use the figurational 
sociology approach, founded by Norbert Elias. This relational and processual approach 
makes it easier to see how the urban fabric grows, to understand the kinds of social 
bonds that enable certain forms of local organisation to arise, and to see through what 
relations to the wider urban world they succeed in bringing in amenities. For instance, 
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the concept of the figuration allows us to see forms of organisation and connectedness 
that are not restricted to organisational boundaries: between residents, (parts of) formal 
institutions, political networks and all kinds of civil society elements more broadly.
The methodology employed by this thesis is the historical relational ethnography, where 
a local case study is understood as part of a larger institutional and historical analysis. 
The ethnography centers on a neighbourhood called Sebrepor, which I investigate 
primarily through semi-structured and unstructured interviews: with ethnic leaders, 
civil servants, religious workers, local politicians, organisers and ordinary residents. 
These interviews are augmented with informal conversations and observations, over a 
total period of ten months of fieldwork. The neighborhood case study is contextualised 
with research on historical developments and the (state) institutions and other 
elements of the larger urban fabric, which are woven through the neighbourhood. In 
other words, Sebrepor is not treated as a standalone microcosm, but as a lens on larger 
figurations and long-term developments.
The four analytical chapters focus on, respectively, Residents Associations, chiefs, 
churches and the water infrastructure. 
The first of the four empirical chapters focuses on Residents Associations (RAs). 
These are secular, task-specific organisations at the neighbourhood level formed by 
volunteer residents, working to create concrete collective amenities such as roads, 
water pipe networks and public security. Using the RAs as a focal point, I investigate 
how residents organise themselves in the early stages of neighbourhood development, 
and how this changes as larger organisations such as churches, political parties and 
government bodies become more active in the neighbourhood. In this, I specifically 
study the dynamic relationship between grassroots organising efforts and government 
provision of infrastructure.
I find that RAs drive the development of a significant chunk of neighbourhood-level 
amenities. Especially in the early stages of neighborhood formation, very few larger 
organisations are present in the area, and residents have no choice but to do the heavy 
lifting themselves. In subsequent stages, local government may amplify these efforts 
with funds and heavy machinery, but the bulk of the work remains with the RA. 
Later, as local government gets more established, promises of development are made 
and taxation structures are set up, resident organization starts to decline. Through 
processes of anonymisation, politicisation and establishment of formal institutions in 
the area, the autonomous forms of local organisation are being crowded out. 
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The findings of this chapter contribute to several research fields. First, the study of 
resident organisation in (informal) neighbourhoods growing on the urban fringe 
worldwide. Second, the study of co-production of collective amenities between 
residents and the state. And third, the study of the emergence and forms of collective 
organisation more in general.
The second empirical chapter focuses on traditional ethnic chiefs, tracing how a chief ’s 
role evolves as areas on the urban fringe are settled, densified and become part of the 
urban fabric. Although there is a substantial body of literature on chiefs in Ghana, 
there is little to no material about their positions in cities. This is an omission, as chiefs 
are crucial for questions of development. Not because all chiefs contribute actively to 
local development, but because they generally occupy a central position in the web of 
local power relations, and therefore affect to what extent organising can occur in the 
neighbourhood. 
I find that through the historical state formation process of Ghana, the institution 
of chieftaincy has evolved to a point where chiefs have a strong position in urban 
neighbourhood figurations by default. They were used as middle men by the colonial 
administration, and have retained much of that position under the successive post-
colonial regimes. Positioned as traditional local figureheads, chiefs control the most 
important resource of a city: the land. Formally, they do so in a position of custodianship, 
but in practice, many control it as their own private resource. In addition, they have 
a position as middle men between a variety of government agencies and the local 
population. Especially during the phase where government institutions are established 
in the burgeoning neighborhood, this is a crucial linchpin position. 
The chapter uses a Weberian approach to authority, showing how the traditional 
authority of the chiefs has historically become interwoven with the legal-rational 
authority of the formal state. Apart from providing an empirical study of the role of 
a traditional authority in contemporary Accra, this chapter thereby contributes to 
studies of the position of royalty and nobility in modern (democratic) constitutional 
states.
The third empirical chapter looks at churches, investigating the link between churches’ 
internal workings on the one hand, and contribution to public amenities on the other 
hand. Churches have been the central factors in building up education and medical 
infrastructure in Ghana. There is a large and well-developed body of research on 
Ghana’s religious institutions, but the literature has by and large neglected the question 
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why, how, and under what conditions religious communities develop amenities and 
how they function internally in an economic sense. 
The internal organisation and doctrine of the churches turn out to be crucial variables 
here. These, in turn, are shaped by the form of the religious field and its relations to 
the larger state figuration in the era when the church developed. A sharp increase 
of the degree of voluntarism in the religious landscape since the second half of the 
20th century has shifted the conditions of survival, continuation and expansion 
for churches. The charismatic church movement, a growing religious group whose 
doctrines and internal organisation differ radically from the previous generation of 
churches, is taking over the field. These charismatic churches are far more structured 
like business enterprises, organised for survival, expansion and financial profit in a 
competitive religious marketplace. Their internal welfare systems are more ad-hoc, 
providing less of a structural social safety net. They are generally hardly focused on 
building a broader civil society and playing a role in the state and semi-state figuration. 
Finally, their individualist ideology is less suitable for the collective action required to 
produce public goods.
In short, contrasting much of the literature: an overly active marketplace for religious 
institutions does not appear to lead to the provision of more and higher quality 
collective amenities.
The fourth empirical chapter focuses on a specific amenity, water. I interrogate the 
assumption of collectiveness of amenities, by providing an analysis of how the water 
supply of Accra’s neighbourhoods moves between processes of individualisation and 
processes of collectivisation. Specifically, I focus on the dynamics within and around 
that infrastructure between local, more or less informal, collective action, and the 
larger, citywide collective represented by the Ghana Water Company.
In the first half of the 20th century, Ghana’s water pipe infrastructure was geographically 
limited and strictly managed by the utility company. In the decades following 
independence, the network grew ever more rapidly, first primarily through top-down 
coordinated government action, but increasingly through self-help projects at the 
grassroots level (legal or not). The drastic increase in its user base and geographical 
scope caused systemic weaknesses in Accra’s piped water network. The state utility 
company responds to the uncontrolled expansion of the system with attempts to 
combat the public perception of uncontrolled sprawl, to control the network, to 
prohibit or incorporate informal extensions, and works to expand the backbone 
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of water treatment plants and mainlines. Still, the bad service is leading to elite 
abandonment: those who can afford it leave the system, choosing individual provision 
technologies such as boreholes, tankers, bottled and sachet water.
This chapter bridges two separate strands of research: theoretical approaches focusing 
on grassroots infrastructure production and more traditional top-down development 
theory. 
What general conclusions may be drawn from this thesis as a whole, with regard 
to the central question How do residents of Accra’s newly developing neighbourhoods 
organise to create collective amenities for their area? One important finding is that every 
form of organisation for collective amenities, however informal it may be, is strongly 
intertwined with the state. This applies even in a relatively weak state like Ghana. 
However, the form of interdependence varies widely. Some are like communicating 
vessels, becoming weaker as the state becomes stronger. Others, like the chiefs, rise 
and fall together with the state, even though they also compete with it for power and 
resources.
A second finding concerns the way many collectives originate in Accra’s growing newly 
urbanizing areas. For many of Accra’s organisations, subdivision and upgrading is the 
most common mode of geographical spreading. Police stations, water and electricity 
district offices and all sorts of other government structures grow in the same way: their 
spatial units swell in population, are subdivided and upgraded. The same applies to 
churches and political parties, and even to municipalities.
A third finding concerns institutional drift. Many existing institutions are partially 
reinvented as they are established in the new suburbs. The churches form a good 
example: many people moving to a new location are forced to change denomination; 
equally many take the opportunity themselves. This makes the newly growing suburbs 
an especially fertile ground for up-and-coming forms of religious organisation, such 
as the charismatic churches. In an area where everything is built from scratch, it is 
easier to try something different. Thus, the growth of the suburbs allows new religious 
models to increasingly break through the old gridlock of the religious field, through 
outright replacement and more subtle emulation.
Finally, the conclusion provides a number of further research suggestions. Policy 
recommendations are given in Appendix 1, rather than in the main body of the thesis, 
as they go beyond the academic findings of the thesis.
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Introduction
This introductory chapter starts with a section providing some background to the research theme of this thesis. Section 1.2 then introduces the research topic: the growth process 
of African suburbs. In section 1.3, I discuss the research objectives, 
research question and sub-themes. Section 1.4 is concerned with the 
theoretical framework and methodology. Section 1.5, finally, provides 
an overview of the entire book, chapter by chapter.1
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One day in July of 1994, Deborah Omeheng, market queen of the fish sellers at Tema 
Harbour and known to all as Auntie Yaa, finally gathered all her courage and took the 
leap. Deborah and her husband had spent the past decade acquiring their own plot of land 
and constructing their house. Now, at last, it was time to move in there and start building 
a new life. 
Their land was located in New Jerusalem, on the northernmost fringes of Accra. Today, that 
area is a lively neighbourhood, part of the bustling urban frontier town of Afienya. But at 
the time, New Jerusalem was a barren place made up of tangled bushes, little streams and 
dusty stretches of sand pockmarked by rocks. There were no roads; not even footpaths in 
the area. Auntie Yaa and her husband had been forced to clear the land of vegetation with 
machetes and an excavator themselves, before they could even start their construction work.
The only other house around was Mr Donkor’s. In the early years, the two pioneer 
households helped each other out in many ways; providing shelter during storms, protection 
in case of danger and sharing food when the monsoon rains cut them off from the city. 
Those first years in New Jerusalem were rough. Four years after moving to the area, Auntie 
Yaa’s husband died. Now, she was out there alone. The land was still wild, and poisonous 
snakes sometimes crept into her house, once even into her bed. Robbers roamed around 
the area, looking for isolated houses to loot. One night, she heard a knock on the door, and 
found three young guys standing on her porch. They put a gun to her head. Finding she had 
no money around, they nearly beat her up; she managed to calm them down by offering 
them all the beer she had, which she normally sold to construction crews that were working 
nearby. They drank it all and left her alone. 
To get some protection, she took in two young couples as tenants. But after four months, 
she came home to find the tenants gone and the house empty, except for some of her clothes 
and her mosquito net. When she came to report these crimes to the police, they paid little 
notice. The officers did not have the capacity to cover all those scattered houses around the 
outlying neighbourhoods, they had their hands full in the city itself. So, she called up her 
brother, who was the Member of Parliament for a nearby constituency. He used his political 
connections to get several police officers stationed in Auntie Yaa’s neighbourhood. As there 
was no police station in the area yet, those officers ended up living in her house, together 
with their wives and children. 
The land, itself, was also a cause for violence. Its ownership was disputed between the chief, 
from whom she had bought her plot, and his cousin, who felt that the chieftaincy of the area 
should have been rightfully his. Sometimes residents were drawn into the dispute and forced 
to choose sides, depending on who they had bought their land from. One day, she came 
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back from her daily work in Tema harbour to find her house had been emptied again and 
set on fire. She suspected it was the competing chief ’s men, who had been around earlier to 
threaten her. Her house had almost burned down to the ground.
This time, she did not go to the police, nor did she pray for help in the church. As she 
explained: “We have God, and then we have the local gods. Sometimes, you have to know 
who to ask for help.” So, she went to see a powerful juju master. After he had performed 
his magic, she said, all of the men who had threatened her that day and had burned down 
her house, died. One by one, from mysterious diseases, or in freak accidents. The general 
conflict between the two chiefs lasted a few more years, but it calmed down when the sitting 
chief consolidated his power within the family. 
Slowly, more people started trickling into the area. They were not many, but they were 
enough to warrant some public services. The first thing the community did was building a 
church, in 1999. Still, life was primitive. To get water, Auntie Yaa and Mr Donkor would 
enlist the help of a farmer from the nearest town, who brought two of his cows to carry 
several drums of water that could be filled up at a nearby stream. In 1999, this was still the 
best way to obtain water, as there were no standpipes nearby, nor roads for water tankers to 
drive in on. TThere was no electricity. Garbage was burned or thrown into a nearby creek. 
And they still had to keep the footpaths to their houses clear using a machete. 
To improve their living conditions, Auntie Yaa, Mr Donkor and their neighbour Mr. Narh 
formed a Residents Association. They collected money from all the residents, including those 
who were still building their houses and did not yet live there. With this money, and with the 
help of Auntie’s politically connected brother, they got the state utility companies to stretch 
water pipes and electricity wires out to the edge of their newly growing neighbourhood. 
From there, each next household paid for the extension of wires and pipes to their own lot. 
“Now, we have water, now, we have lights, come and live here!” they told friends and 
acquaintances in Accra who were also looking for their own piece of land. This new influx 
would allow them to develop the area into a real neighbourhood, with shops, schools and 
a proper police station.  It led to local representation in formal government, through the 
appointment of the neighbourhood’s own Assembly member. It  also brought about a wave 
of legal disputes over land ownership, however, led to the establishment of a number of 
very noisy churches and included a host of perceived potential criminals: those who lived 
in rental housing. 
The times when Auntie Yaa’s and Mr Donkor’s houses stood solitary in the bush are long 
gone. They are now surrounded by rental blocks and villas, and the neighbourhood is lively, 
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full of new residents and more construction crews. But Mr. Donkor still lives right there, 
about 100 meters away, hidden from Auntie’s view by a particularly large cluster of palm 
oil trees. As for the New Jerusalem Residents Association, it is long defunct. After water 
and electricity were brought in and roads were cleared to allow cars to move in, there was 
no longer enough common cause to bind the neighbours together. Auntie Yaa has become 
bitter and disillusioned, and resolved to do no more local organising. 
“The Association, they cheated me. I contributed for electricity but 
never got my connection. I contributed for water but the pipes stay dry 
for months at a time, so we have to buy from tankers. My Methodist 
church; I helped them build here but they never came to visit me during 
my sickness, so I joined another church. And these politicians, they’re 
crooks. They promise quality and deliver trash. Two weeks is how long 
their so-called ‘quality street lights’ lasted and then they burned out. I 
called them several times to lodge my complaints but they responded 
the first few times and ignored the rest of my calls. Out of desperation 
I bought my own materials and got people to fix them for me. In Ghana, 
one thing I have learnt is that if you need something done, you just have 
to do it yourself.”
1.1 Background
Although Auntie Yaa was an exceptionally resourceful and courageous pioneer, the story 
of her neighbourhood is very unexceptional. Places like New Jerusalem are the bread 
and butter of Ghana’s rapid and chaotic urban growth process. The new urban fabric 
is coming into being in a rather haphazard way, with housing construction moving far 
ahead of government planners and infrastructure. Hence, resident activity in creating 
roads, water, electricity and other collective amenities is a crucial formative factor in these 
new stretches of urban fabric. Their successes and failures in developing infrastructure, 
in the early days of these areas, will lock in the development path for quality of life in 
these cities for a long time to come. In this thesis, I study the grassroots building of 
amenities; a formative force in the newly growing cities of the global South.
Urban growth in Africa
We are currently in the midst of a century of unprecedented worldwide urban growth: 
from an urban population of 746 million in 1950 to an estimated 6 billion in 2045 
(United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, 
2018). Throughout this entire century of global urban growth, Africa has been the 
least urbanised continent, which meant the field of urban research on Africa was small. 
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However, for the past 70 years, Africa has also been the continent with the fastest growing 
urban population and it is expected to stay in that leading position for the foreseeable 
future (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, 
2018). Sub-Saharan Africa’s urban areas currently contain some 424 million people, and 
that number is expected to double over the next 20 years. It should be noted that the 
driving forces behind this urbanisation, as well as the long-term prospects for the rural-
urban population distribution, are still debated (De Brauw, Mueller, & Lee, 2014; Jiang & 
O’Neill, 2017; Potts, 2012). What is not disputed is that these cities are growing rapidly, 
the land area even faster than the population levels.
Research location
This research is set in Accra, Ghana. In principle, it could have been done in any 
rapidly growing Southern city, as the dynamics of local versus centralised organisation, 
expanding institutions, rural-urban land transformation and boundary struggles play out 
throughout the Global South. They do, however, take on a different form in each cultural, 
economic and political context. Thus, this research is as much a case study which others 
might use in comparative research, as it is an attempt to directly contribute to theory. 
Still, the choice of location is not random: Accra does provide a compelling case study. 
With an urbanisation rate of 55.4%, the highest in West Africa besides Gambia and Cape 
Verde, Ghana is a regional forerunner in the process of urbanisation (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, 2018, see figure below). 
Despite this already high level, Ghana still has an annual urban population growth of 
3.4% and it, therefore, represents a good example of ongoing rapid urbanisation. 
0
Year
Percentage urban by region and subregion
         Ghana        Western Africa          Africa
1950 1975 2000
20
18
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
ur
ba
n 
(p
er
 c
m
)
2025 2050
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Figure 1.1: the urban population of Ghana compared to Western Africa and Africa as a whole. 
Source: UN, World Urbanisation Prospects (2018).
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Within Ghana, Accra is the main growth pole, both economically and in terms of 
population and land coverage. The city’s economic growth pace is extremely rapid, 
one of the fastest in Africa (Arup International Development, 2016). Its population 
is 55% internal migrants. Its population is growing at 4% per year and its land area at 
5,3% (Angel, Parent, Civco, & Blei, 2016, see figure 1.2 below). In other words, every 
year another 50 square kilometres around Accra begin their decades-long process of 
transformation to urban fabric.
1991
2001
2014
Accra, Ghana
Figure 1.2: The expansion of the built-up area of Accra, Ghana, 1991–2014. Source: Angel et al. 
(2016), City Data Sheets.
1.2 Research theme
Growing African suburbs: a missing theme in the literature
The process of African urbanisation has not gone unnoticed. Much has been written 
about the pressure cooker of inner-city squatter areas and slums, and the tension of 
great ethnic, religious and social diversity in an extremely confined space (De Smedt, 
2009; Paller, 2014). There are tomes of work on the geographies of the ultra-rich, the 
gated communities that slice through the city and their private world of luxury. See 
Bloch (2015) for an overview; Atkinson (2013) and Webster (2002) on African cities; 
Grant (2005, 2007) and Asiedu (2009) in Ghana, specifically in Accra. The fraying 
social fabric of original, inner-city communities has been amply described, too 
(Arguello, Grant, Oteng-Ababio, & Ayele, 2013; Grant, 2006; Pellow, 2008). 
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While such extremes on the spectrum of urban forms have received much of the 
attention, something else is missing from this literature: the sprawling expanse of 
the rather bland Sub-Saharan suburbia. What about those endless outskirts, that are 
less and less densely populated as they roll further out from the centre (Angel et al., 
2016)? These areas are not part of a dominant geography of theory (Robinson, 2006; 
Roy, 2009a), nor of popular discourse. The first time I visited Accra, I brought a travel 
guide. Out of 494 pages, it spent exactly four lines on these places. It said: 
“The remainder [areas outside the ring road] – supporting the 
overwhelming majority of the city’s inhabitants – are unplanned slum-
like suburbs suffering from poor drainage and sewerage, limited road 
access, and an insufficient supply of water and electricity.” (Briggs, 
2014, p. 312). 
As far as the guidebook was concerned, these four lines contained everything you 
needed to know about Accra’s burgeoning suburbs. 
To be fair, one can see why. As the guide notes, these areas look sad, under-served, 
chaotic and non-descript. They are slum-like but lack the explosiveness of an inner-
city slum. They contain some walled villas but fall far short of the opulent extremes 
of large gated communities with their barbed-wire electrified fences, swimming pools 
and in-house fitness centres. They do not have a clear ethnic history, or a long-rooted 
community which has come under pressure in this new process of urbanisation. Let’s 
just be honest: these places seem somewhat boring. 
Yet, they house the majority of Africa’s new urbanites. Today’s urbanisation is primarily 
sub-urbanisation (Angel et al., 2016). 
In fact, these suburbs are only boring in their lack of extremes. They form a fascinating 
and highly diverse prism on the urban fabric, as a whole (Keil, 2017, p. 39). What 
happens in these non-descript areas is nothing less than the silent cultural and social 
revolution called ‘African urbanisation’. Two transformations are taking place here. 
The first concerns people, who are moving into the city, transforming themselves 
socially, culturally and economically from villagers to urbanites and urbanistas; a 
personal transformation which continues well into the second and third generation. 
This transformation has many dimensions. It takes place in churches, at the secret 
meetings of political parties, in the workplace, in tro-tro mini-buses, at weddings, on 
the streets and of course, inside homes. As these people are being transformed into 
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urban dwellers in so many ways, they collectively weave the amazingly complex social 
fabric of the city. 
The second transformation is that of an area, from quiet farmland scattered with a few 
mud huts and animals, to densely populated suburb. The areas surrounding the city are 
not, as is sometimes assumed, a tabula rasa across which the city simply rolls out. Long 
before the city came, “before politics grew here,” as one early settler put it, structures of 
ownership, stories of belonging and a logic of (land)rights grew here. According to that 
traditional narrative about Accra, the Ga-Dangbe are the locals, and the other three 
quarters of Greater Accra’s current inhabitants are guests (Ghana Statistical Service, 
2013, p. 34). But these people are not guests, of course. They are there to stay. So, they 
organise themselves somehow, to survive in this newly urbanising space. Thus, the 
rural social fabric and order is transformed, expanded, or even replaced by new forms 
of social organisation. At the same time, many elements of the existing urban fabric 
expand to the newly urbanising land, creating local divisions, franchises and branches. 
Urban fabric
The term ‘urban fabric’ is frequently used to refer to the urban morphology, the 
physical composition of buildings and the infrastructure between them. It conjures 
up an image of the city as a tapestry of concrete, steel, wood and glass that is laid 
out over the land. To me, the urban fabric is more than that. Yes, it is made up of 
buildings and physical infrastructure, such as roads, electricity cables, water pipes and 
drains. But it is also constituted of institutional webs, such as the system of districts 
and electoral areas, paramount chieftaincies and their divisional substructures, police 
and army barracks and the areas they cover, and of the networks of churches which 
may be rooted in one area but expand into nearby parts of the city. It also includes the 
political party networks, the local clusters of ‘royal families’ that form the substrate of 
the chieftaincy system and other such semi-formalised webs of power. So, for me the 
‘urban fabric’ does not just consist of the physical structures, but includes a dynamic 
web of human networks.  
Finally, the urban fabric consists of an enormous amount of personal connections; 
a dense weaving in some areas, surprisingly limited in other areas. These strands of 
connection exist within a neighbourhood between neighbours, friends, members of 
church congregations and local political party branches. They also rise above that spatial 
scale, invisible connections spanning across the entire city, between family members, 
old friends and former colleagues. For good or for ill, these informal, uncatalogued, 
invisible connections make up much of the urban fabric and importantly give shape 
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to the city. As Auntie Yaa’s story made clear, personal connections play a large role in 
the pioneer phase of neighborhood development. Those in power help their relatives 
in outlying areas to build infrastructure, security and useful connections (a set of 
practices which is often unhelpfully equated with the handing out of sinecures to 
relatives, under the term ‘nepotism’. As well as physical structures and networks, one 
cannot truly study the urban fabric without considering the major role played by social 
connections in it. 
The genesis of new urban fabric1
This thesis is not primarily a description of the components of the urban fabric. Rather, 
this is a description of the genesis of that urban fabric, in a place where previously, 
not much human fabric of any kind existed. In this sense, our way of talking about 
cities can be deceptive. We give them a name, and from that moment on, we see 
them as a distinct entity. An entity which of course changes over time, but still, which 
fundamentally remains the same in name and concept. This view is inaccurate for 
most contemporary Southern cities, which do not simply change. Rather, they are in 
a process of formation, of genesis: they are being born, right now. True, there was 
always something called Accra. Until some 150 years ago, however, that ‘something’ 
was a village. Before World War II, what we know as Accra was a small city, with a 
population of some 73.000 souls. Today, in the same vicinity but on an area of land 50 
times larger, we find a vast stretch of urban fabric that contains between four and five 
million people, which is also called Accra. In some places and some ways, this stretch 
of urban fabric still contains remnants of the village Accra and other villages that used 
to exist there, which have been consumed by the growing city. Even though it has the 
same name, it is something fundamentally different from those villages and the small 
colonial city that existed in its place. Accra today is almost entirely something new, 
which has grown on nearly barren soil. 
This process of growth of the urban fabric could be termed the ‘formation of new urban 
space.’ This definition, which is used in studies of human geography, describes space as 
something that is created by social structures that shape or underpin it. New modalities of 
1 While I use ecological metaphors throughout this thesis, it is important to note that my approach is not 
quite aligned with either the Chicago School of the early 20th century or the Urban Political Ecology 
approach. My use of ecological metaphors differs from the Chicago school most importantly in the 
sense that they looked upon the city as a more or less stable ecosystem, while I describe the growth 
of new urban fabric. As for UPE, it does not use ecological terms as a metaphor but rather to refer 
to actual combinations of plant, animal and human life-forms, whereas I use ‘growth’, ‘stretching 
branches’ and similar metaphors to describe the spatial extension of institutions and other specifically 
human-based artefacts.
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power form and new leaders emerge. Successful forms of organisation propel themselves 
from the existing urban fabric into the newly forming space. Churches spawn franchises 
there, local branches of national bureaucracies settle in, and neighbourhood-level 
power relations and activist energies are incorporated into larger political networks and 
figurations. In this process of expansion, these existing figurations and organisations are 
also transformed themselves, as they are forced to renew and adapt to the new space. 
Sometimes, very rarely, radically new forms of organisation emerge. Mostly, however, 
the growth of the urban fabric is a process of institutional evolution. 
As the urban frontier creeps outward across the countryside, the land becomes the 
most significant element in an area’s transformation to urban fabric. Particularly its 
slow and haphazard inclusion into the cadastral system fundamentally shapes the 
locally growing urban fabric. When plots of land are demarcated and formally sold for 
the first time, their institutional mode of land ownership fundamentally shifts (Scott, 
1998, p. 3; see also Wood & Fels, 1992). Before urbanisation, the land is governed by 
multiple interlocking and overlapping of claims to use, inhabit, farm and even simply 
cross land. Once the urban fabric has formed, in the place of locally negotiated space, 
is a new system which bundles all those historic land rights in an absolute private 
ownership scheme, that is backed by a centralised registry and the formal legal system.2
This transformation of the land governance system is a long and painful one. To 
be sure, it is formally governed by a clear institutionalised organising principle. 
A formally gazetted chief sells parcels of the land to individuals or businesses, on 
behalf of the local ethnic community. These parcels are subsequently registered at the 
Lands Commission, and thus have passed over into the freehold cadastral system. 
In theory, this is a clean transition process. But the complexity of unregistered sales, 
prior rights, competing and overlapping chiefs, a corrupt judicial system, competing 
government agencies and overlapping registrations at the Lands Commission make 
this a completely different picture. This arduous process is what makes the chiefs so 
powerful, even in absence (see chapter 5), what keeps Ghana’s courts flooded with 
land cases, what makes the transition to urban space extremely messy and what makes 
spatial planning nearly impossible.
2 This should not be constructed as a transition from a natural or original system into a modern one. 
Indeed, the lands under traditional authority are still part of the Ghanaian state in a very real and practical 
sense: the state’s rules shape the playing field there. The way the state has done this, beginning with the 
colonial state, is to make sure every area has a chief, and to make that chief the arbiter of the local rules 
concerning land ownership (and other local customs). Even though the state has not yet established 
most of its institutions in many rural areas, the chief’s claims to land stewardship there would generally 
be backed up by the legal system.
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Even though Ghana does not have the phenomenon of mass squatting, practical 
occupation of land does matter very much to determine land rights. A common tactic 
of new settlers is to start with impermanent structures or farms, in an area which is not 
currently in use. This is generally done with the approval and often the encouragement 
of the local chiefs and is condoned by authorities, as long as the structures are not 
permanent. This dynamic, whereby chiefs ‘invade’ their own land to claim it back, 
occurs throughout Accra, generally in areas which have somehow been claimed by 
the state (such as nature reserves or future development sites), but which have not yet 
been used. The reverse also occurs, where land is taken away from chiefs by powerful 
developers who use a combination of strong-arm tactics (‘land guards’), judicial and 
police corruption, as well as legal tactics to lay claim to a piece of land. Land guards 
are thugs employed by land speculators, chiefs and others who are trying to claim a 
portion of unoccupied land. They tend to be particularly present in the early stages 
of a settlement, when population density is low. At this stage, intimidation of those 
few individuals who have moved in can potentially win an entire stretch of land for 
the land guards’ unscrupulous employers. As the original landowners litigate, the 
developers quickly build residencies on the land and thus make their claim practically 
irreversible, leaving the original landowners with no other option than to negotiate for 
a sale (Interview Nukpenu, 2018). In either case, there are good reasons for building 
in an area without waiting for formal planners to do their work. After all, possession 
is nine-tenths of the law. 
As the urban fabric takes hold in a new space, the organisation of utilities in the area 
also shifts. In rural areas, water supply is managed by the small Community Water 
and Sanitation Agency, which mostly strikes boreholes and leaves them in the hands 
of locally organised Water Committees. As inhabitation of the area densifies, the 
Ghana Water Company comes in. This company, which only serves urban centres 
with a population of over 50.000, does not strike one-off boreholes only to leave the 
locals to manage them. It is permanently present: laying, maintaining, managing and 
continuously expanding a dense network of pipelines, through which potable water 
flows from several large water treatment plants located around the city. So, as the 
population grows in an area, networks for amenities, such as water, are developed. 
Other elements of the urban fabric also begin to appear in the newly urbanising area. 
Garbage in rural areas is burned, buried or simply thrown away, but in cities this is not 
a tenable practice. So, operators with small tricycles start to collect the waste, generally 
on a commercial basis where residents pay per collected trash bag. Security schemes 
also start to take shape, often first organised by the residents in a neighbourhood 
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watchdog organisation. These are frequently later augmented by the police or army 
patrols from a nearby base, who are convinced to extend their patrol lines in exchange 
for a payment to the crew and the officer in charge. Layer by layer, the urban fabric 
slowly develops. 
Thus, the new urban fabric slowly grows, in a place where there had only been bush 
and perhaps a few farmers. To be more precise, though, the urban fabric does not 
grow; it is painstakingly built. Every house, church, school, police station; every stretch 
of street, pipeline; every electricity pole, in many places every single streetlight has 
its own background story. A story of people who worked tenaciously to get it there; 
convincing others and gathering precious resources to make it work. This do-it-
yourself urbanisation is  particularly prevalent in a country like Ghana, where cities 
grow incredibly fast, public budgets are small and public institutions are weakly 
developed. In such a context, the public resources are completely inadequate to service 
all new neighbourhoods with even basic amenities, and the production of every piece 
of infrastructure is a struggle.
1.3 Research objectives and research question
This book aims to contribute to our understanding of the larger process of growing 
urban fabric. Within that process, this book specifically focuses on the emergence of 
social organisation in the new suburbs, and its embedding in the larger figurations of 
the existing city. The core objective of the project is to analyse how residents (manage 
or fail to) organise to realise collective amenities, under conditions of vastly insufficient 
state capacity, while faced with rapid and large-scale urbanisation. Chapters 4-7 each 
analyse a specific sub-theme of this question. A secondary objective of this work is to 
design a suitable methodology for conducting such analyses. The conclusion provides 
a summary and reflection on the findings with regards to each of these objectives, as 
well as suggesting further areas for investigation.
At its core, the book is a classical empirical case study of the settlement of new land 
at the urban edge, in a particular Southern city. It follows Jennifer Robinson’s critique 
of Western universalism and her appeal that “[c]onsideration needs to be given to the 
difference [that] the diversity of cities makes to theory” (Robinson, 2002, p. 549). It 
has been questioned whether case studies of single cities are the way forward for urban 
theory building, since they all too easily dwindle into an undue focus on idiosyncrasies 
and celebrations of particularism (Peck, 2015). However, I follow Nijman’s (2015) 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below36
stress on the importance of empirical work. This study carries neither the pretence 
of universalism, nor the suggestion of uniqueness, providing instead an empirical 
case study with modest theoretical ambitions. I hope it will facilitate scholars in their 
comparative work with other cities, or in work on general theory construction.
Research question
The central research question of this thesis is: how do residents of Accra’s newly 
developing neighbourhoods organise to create collective amenities for their area? This 
question is operationalised through four empirical sub-themes, which are discussed 
below. This section provides a brief note on the overarching lines of inquiry that 
surround this central question and on the ways each chapter approaches these.
In exploring this central question, we frequently touch on a broader category of 
organisations: those producing the types of physical, practical amenities that are best 
provided collectively. Starting from the grassroots perspective, this thesis investigates 
many kinds of such organisations, with varying degrees of formalisation, legal 
standing, and force of moral obligation, at various geographical and social scales and 
reaches of collectivity.
The thesis aims to better understand these organisations from several perspectives. 
First, it considers the most important condition affecting each form of collective 
organisation at the grassroots level: the form and degree of activity of the formal state. 
Second, it explores the overlapping of collectivities, each with their different rules, a 
different geographical scale and different driving forces. Third, this work investigates 
the urban growth process described in the most abstract terms, of subdivision and 
boundary struggles. Fourth and finally, it analyses the institutional drift that occurs 
when organisations extend themselves to the suburbs and are changed in the process. 
These lines of inquiry are explored through four analytical chapters, each focused 
on an empirical phenomenon: a type of organisation or a type of amenity. Every one 
of these empirical studies teaches us something about all of the theoretical lines of 
inquiry regarding collectives. 
Research sub-themes
The four analytical chapters of this thesis each concern a certain aspect of this research 
question. It should be noted that these chapters far from exhaust the investigation of 
the central question; it is far too broad an issue for that. It should also be noted that the 
four topics were not pre-set but have been delineated over the course of the research 
project, grounded in a growing understanding of Accra’s new neighbourhoods. They 
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were chosen based on their importance for the development of neighbourhood-level 
amenities and a lack of prior coverage in the literature.
Starting from the most local relations, those between neighbours, I ask: how does 
local grassroots organisation leads to concrete collective amenities such as roads, water 
pipe networks and public security? In this, I focus on Residents Associations: secular, 
task-specific organisations at the neighbourhood level that work to organise local 
infrastructure development. More generally, I investigate how residents organise 
themselves in the early stages of neighbourhood development and how this changes, as 
thicker strands of organisational connection develop between the neighbourhood and 
the wider urban fabric. These bodies form the platform through which a surprising 
amount of neighbourhood-level amenities are developed. They cannot be ignored.
The next focus of this investigation is the institution of chieftaincy. This is a strongly 
embedded and yet strangely undefined institution, which has gained prominence in 
neighbourhood figurations through the process of state formation. This topic was 
included not because all chiefs necessarily contribute to the organisation of local 
development, but because theirs is almost always a central position in the web of local 
power relations. Therefore, it affects the extent to which organisation can occur in the 
neighbourhood. 
Regarding the chiefs, I ask: how has the institution of chieftaincy been shaped by the 
historical state formation process, and how does chieftaincy today evolve in an urbanising 
area? The combination of approaches is necessary to gain a fuller overview of the role 
of chieftaincy in its current context. 
The third empirical chapter studies the role of churches as developers of neighborhood 
infrastructure. Churches are collective amenities in their own right, which provide 
a structure for community building and spiritual purposes. Beyond that, however, 
they are a special type of collective amenity, as they spawn the development of further 
collective amenities. Ghana’s churches, historically, channeled the energies of residents 
quite effectively towards the development of medical and educational infrastructure. 
This function, though, appears to be dwindling in recent years. I ask: what determines 
whether churches channel the collective energy gathered, in their services and their 
congregations, into durable collective amenities? 
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The internal organisation and doctrine of the churches turn out to be crucial variables 
here. These, in turn, are shaped by the form of the religious field and its relations to the 
larger state figuration, in the era when the church developed (Swaan, 1988). Again, the 
role of churches in neighborhood development is not straightforward and can only be 
truly appreciated within its current and historical setting. 
The fourth sub-theme is not an organisational form but a particular amenity: 
water. I interrogate the assumption of the collectiveness of amenities, by asking the 
question: how does the water supply of Accra’s neighbourhoods move between processes 
of individualisation and collectivization? Specifically, I focus on the dynamics within 
and around that infrastructure between local, relatively informal collective action, and 
the larger, citywide collective represented by the Ghana Water Company. This sub-
theme is also unique in that it not only investigates the conditions that affect resident 
organisation but it also explicitly focuses on how neighbourhood-level resident 
organisation ultimately affects the citywide conditions for collectivisation.
1.4 Theory and methodology
While the theoretical framework and methodology of this thesis are dealt with in 
detail by chapters 2 and 3 respectively, I provide a brief overview in this section. 
Theoretical framework
This book studies processes of local organisation for collective amenities. It does so in 
a sociological framework with anthropological, geographical and economic overtones. 
The thesis is sociological because its primary focus is social structure and process: the 
interaction of various collectivities and other institutions. The basis of the methodology 
is taken from the discipline of anthropology; it begins ethnographically, even if it does 
branch out from there in a more sociological manner. The chosen vantage points and 
the ontology explicitly include geography; spatial scales are an important element in 
the analysis, as is distance, the physicality of networks, and the fact that new space is 
being created at the urban fringe. Finally, the subject of interest of this thesis might be 
termed economic, as the entire analysis is aimed towards building an understanding 
of how and why collective amenities such as roads, schools and water pipes are, or are 
not, produced.3 Thus, this is an interdisciplinary approach to the question, with the 
3 A brief aside on disciplinary boundaries. Within sociology, and within my department, I find myself 
happily able to combine all of these methods, interests and approaches. Such open-mindedness is not 
always the standard in social sciences (Cedrini & Fontana, 2017; Hodgson, Mäki, & McCloskey, 1992) and 
should be treasured.
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hope of piecing together a fuller picture of the situation, which would be limited by the 
scope of each field, individually.  
What are the sociological influences in this work? To understand the ways in which 
people depend on one another in the formation of urban fabric and the ways in which 
they are interdependent, I use the figurational sociology approach that was founded 
by Norbert Elias and which is described in detail in chapter 2. This relational and 
processual approach makes it easier to see how the urban fabric grows. It helps us to 
understand the kinds of social bonds that enable certain forms of local organisation 
to arise, and to see through what relations to the wider urban world they succeed in 
bringing amenities into the area. The terms of figurational sociology are generally more 
open and flexible than most approaches. This allows for a more in-depth description of 
the shifting social ties, responsibilities and power-relations in the rapidly growing and 
socially transforming context of a newly developing urban neighbourhood. 
For instance, the concept of the figuration allows us to see forms of organisation and 
connectedness that are not restricted to organisational boundaries, such as those 
between residents, parts of formal institutions, political networks and other elements 
of civil society more broadly. The concept of power relations, in figurational sociology, 
is that of interdependence; a fluid and bidirectional relationship where power is not 
held exclusively by one party or the other. Finally, the figurational approach is a 
historical one. Today’s institutions and figurations cannot be understood separately 
from their historical precursors and from their own developmental processes. This 
approach touches on these elements with a degree of adaptability, which is necessary 
and appropriate for the study of constantly transforming neighborhoods in growth. 
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed overview of my theoretical approach, and sets 
out the surrounding fields of literature, under the fourth section: Related theoretical 
perspectives. 
Methodology
The analytical and empirical point of departure for each chapter is a neighbourhood 
called Sebrepor. It occupies some two square kilometres of land on the outskirts 
of Tema, where the first farmers settled some 50 years ago and which is now an 
established urban neighbourhood. Its population is ethnically, religiously and socio-
economically mixed, its political life is quite active and its residents organisations are 
somewhat more active than in most surrounding neighbourhoods, because settlement 
in Sebrepor started earlier than in other areas. 
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Figure 1.3: Sebrepor, the analytical and empirical point of departure for each chapter of this thesis.
This area functions as a lens onto the larger processes and evolving structures in the 
context of which the new residents organise themselves to build up their (collective) 
new home. At this level, I start by analysing the social structures which enable 
residents to bundle their strengths and coordinate themselves, to gather contributions, 
to apply political pressure to formal organisations and to do all those other things that 
are needed to get the collective amenities they need. The larger structures are more 
formalised and are more often discussed in research. They have their own dedicated 
officials, which makes them more visible and easier to study. For this reason, I do not 
start with them; they would too easily come to dominate and obscure the picture. 
This investigation of Sebrepor and sub-urban development in Accra took place over 
a period of 10 months of fieldwork, spread out over four separate visits to Accra. I 
investigated its neighborhood relations primarily through interviews with ethnic 
leaders, civil servants, church workers, local politicians, organisers of many kinds 
and of course, a great many ordinary residents. These interviews consisted of open 
questions, were informed by my observations walking around in these areas and were 
supported by a large amount of more informal conversations. 
The analysis, however, is not confined to the neighbourhood level, it merely starts 
there. The methodology employed by this thesis is the historical relational ethnography 
approach, in which a local case study is understood as part of a larger institutional and 
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historical analysis. For each analytical chapter, I add a comparative dimension to the 
local case study, by drawing on chiefs, churches, civil servants and citizens in other 
areas. I also include interviews with, and data of, centralised government agencies. 
Here, too, the figurational approach helps to understand the circumstances that 
preclude or erode the bonds necessary for local organisation, such as the petrification 
of institutions that no longer work, the presence of individualised commercial 
alternatives, the competition of other religious organisations, or the appearance of 
formal organisations who promise to take over the work. The neighbourhood level, 
then, is a starting point for a deeper analysis into the workings of urban development. 
It also provides a richer source of evidence to work up from than would have been the 
case if I had started from the higher institutions and moved down the scale. 
1.5 Chapters overview
What is the structure of this book? This introduction is chapter 1. Chapters 2 and 
3, respectively, set out the theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis. 
Chapters 4-7 provide the empirical analysis, each discussing a single element of the 
institutional fabric around the development of collective amenities. Chapter 8 is the
conclusion, providing the research findings, notes on the wider applicability of the 
developed methodology, and further research suggestions. Below, each of these 
chapters is described in more detail. 
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework used for this research project, which 
centres on figurational sociological theory. It starts with a description of this 
framework in general terms, including the most important criticisms, and then defines 
several terms which are especially relevant for this thesis, such as figuration, web and 
interdependence. Following this, it sketches the way this theory is used in each chapter 
and sets out the complementary strands of theory which augment the figurational 
perspective. It also provides notes on a few neighbouring schools of thought and 
discusses either how these are incorporated into this study, or, where this work really 
takes on a different perspective.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology developed for this research, the historical 
relational ethnography approach, and the concrete methods used during fieldwork. 
It first sets out why the analytical level of the neighbourhood forms the most logical 
starting point for this analysis and looks at how ‘the neighbourhood’ is conceptualised 
in research. The chapter, then, provides a discussion of the case study selection and 
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its use in each of the analytical chapters. The focus turns to the research methods and 
techniques used for data gathering. It details the grounded theory process used to 
operationalise the research question and categorizes the research design into concrete 
analytical objects and data gathering methods. From there, it closes by providing the 
rationale, description and discussion of the different methods used for gathering data.
Organisation towards the production of collective amenities starts at the grassroots 
level, as soon as the first pioneers settle in the area. That is a truism. However, this 
level of activity is generally ignored in the literature; it is a significant blind spot. In 
the neighbourhoods I have investigated, throughout Greater Accra, the early stages of 
area settlement actually play a central role in shaping the neighbourhood that will later 
grow there. The early pioneers often get a lot built. And even when the neighbourhood 
becomes more strongly embedded in formal state structures, organisation at the local 
level remains paramount in the production of collective amenities.
Chapter 4 traces this process of local organisation in depth. It traces the development 
trajectory of a single neighbourhood over the course of 50 years. The time-scale starts 
with the first settlers, who came together to face threats of material hardship and even 
expulsion. It ends with the densification of the area, accompanied by the politicisation 
and formalisation of the local networks. Thus, the chapter shows how and on what basis 
residents organise, or fail to do so. It explores how they strategically relate to the world 
outside their area, and how grassroots organisation is affected by the influx of greater 
numbers of residents and the gradual embedding of the area in webs of formal and 
centrally organised institutions. 
The chapter’s contribution to the larger project is threefold. First, it lays the foundation for 
the rest of the thesis by introducing Sebrepor, the case study neighbourhood. Second, it 
provides a rare empirical case study of evolving resident organisation in a newly growing 
neighbourhood from its beginnings. Third, it helps us to understand the conditions 
which cause Residents Associations and similar organisations to flourish or break down. 
Chapter 5 discusses the traditional chiefs, who play an important role in the 
governmental figuration of urban Ghana. Firmly institutionalised as traditional local 
leaders, with roots in the pre-colonial and colonial era, they hold sway over the land and 
often also have a powerful position within the political arena. Appointed by state fiat 
as the default custodians of all traditional areas (except those plots whose ownership is 
formally registered in the Lands Commission’s cadastral system), the chiefs control some 
80% of Ghana’s land. They have a central position in the process of settlement and area 
development, planning of zoning and infrastructure, and the transition from a complex 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 43
and largely informal system of land rights to a modern structure of freehold ownership. 
In addition, the chiefs are widely seen, addressed and expected to speak as the 
natural leaders of (assumed) local communities at the neighbourhood level. They are 
expected to keep the peace and to lead local organisational efforts. In a position of such 
high public recognition, they have great influence on the grassroots organisational 
patterns that can grow in such neighbourhoods. They impact the shape of the local 
‘civil society’ and the amenities that are developed, campaigned for, realised and 
maintained. Chapter 5 analyses what their position in Accra looks like today, how 
it was shaped through the process of state formation and how it evolves as areas on 
the urban fringe are incorporated into the urban fabric. Besides Elias, the chapter 
builds on Weberian notions of authority (Weber, 1968, p. 215) and Ananya Roy’s work 
regarding informality and the state (Roy, 2009b), to shed light on the role of chiefs in 
urbanisation. 
The next chapter takes churches as a subject of study. The first collective building that 
goes up in a new neighbourhood in Accra is generally a church; the second, a school. 
Historically, educational and medical amenities in Ghana have been largely provided 
by the churches. Chapter 6 builds on De Swaans’ (1988) depiction of churches as quasi-
statal agencies in Western Europe, showing how they had a similar role in Ghana’s 
early state formation process. Over the 20th century, religious voluntarism became 
the norm in Ghana, ushering in an era of intense religious competition. A process 
of cultural drift ensued, in which the Ghanaian churches were transformed from 
institutions working to actively shape people and doggedly build up amenities, to fast-
paced spiritual entrepreneurs. This has led to a breakdown of the church as quasi-statal 
institution, at a time when state did not have the capacity to take over all functions of 
the church. Besides building on work of De Swaan (1988), the chapter makes use of the 
religious marketplace metaphor (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987) to better place the church 
within its modern context.
The urban fabric consists not only of organisations and broader social figurations, it 
is also importantly held together by physical networks, which are discussed in the 
following chapter. In the process of Accra’s growth, these progressively expand and 
diffuse, connecting ever greater numbers of people and adding layers of complexity and 
interrelation to the urban fabric that binds them. Chapter 7 analyses the development of 
one such network: the piped water network. Again, it does so from the neighbourhood 
level, starting with the case of Sebrepor, an extreme case of self-help where residents 
built the entire neighbourhood water network with almost no involvement of the 
utility company. Still, such local distribution networks are inevitably tied into the city-
wide network for production and distribution of treated water. 
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This chapter offers a lens on a broader dynamic of suburban development. It investigates 
the co-production of amenities between local residents and larger state institutions, as 
well as casting an eye on the frictions this entails at multiple scale levels. It shows that 
what can look like people messing around in the system from one perspective, looks like 
local coordination and experimentation from another perspective. Zooming out from 
local dynamics, the chapter also shows how both shifting political and organisational 
dimensions, as well as technological progress affect the form and dissemination of 
collective amenities. This happens as individualised solutions arise and change the 
degree to which various groups within the city are interdependent in terms of this 
network and amenity.
Chapter 8 concludes the book. It starts with a brief recap of the developed methodology, 
the historical relational ethnography. It then turns to the findings of the four empirical 
research chapters, before setting them out with regard to the central research question. 
Finally, it sets out some potentially fruitful avenues for further research, building on 
the work of this thesis. 
Policy recommendations are outlined in Appendix 1, rather than in the main body of 
the thesis, as they go beyond the academic findings of the thesis.
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 45




Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below50 2
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 51
Theoretical framework: 
a figurational perspective
“The essential problem for developmental sociology is (…) to discover 
and explain how later social formations arise out of earlier ones.” 
 - (Elias, 1978b, p. 152)
In this chapter, I describe the framework which forms this thesis’ theoretical backbone, figurational sociology, first in general terms, including the most important criticisms (2.1), and then 
through defining a number of core terms such as figuration, web 
and interdependence (2.2). I then sketch the way I use this theory in 
each chapter and set out the complementary strands of theory which 
I use to augment the figurational perspective (2.3). I also provide 
notes on a few neighbouring schools of thought, discussing either 
how I incorporate them or where this study really takes a different 
perspective (2.4).2
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2.1 Figurational sociology
The newly forming urban areas which are the subject of this study are constantly in a 
state of transformation. Admittedly, this could be said about any place in the world. 
But still, most places are a lot more socially, culturally and institutionally stable 
than Ghanaian suburbs, which are literally being built right now. Most of these new 
neighbourhoods transform from nearly fallow land to densely inhabited area within 
the space of a single generation. In the process, they develop and adopt a number 
of different organisational forms and institutional linkages in rapid succession and 
overlap, and are in a constant process of becoming. 
Since the focus of this research is this process of becoming, rather than any assumed 
end state or present form, its ontological approach should focus as much as possible 
on processes rather than on fixed states. As David Harvey put it, we should focus on 
urbanisation as a process instead of the city as a thing (Harvey, 1996). That idea is hip, 
these days. Everybody wants to be processual rather than static; calls are emerging 
in disciplines throughout the social sciences (e.g. Bartels, 2012; C. Harris, 1987; 
Nayak, 2008; Vandenbussche, Edelenbos, & Eshuis, 2018). A processual approach 
entails that we no longer claim to have captured the essence of static systems in our 
theoretical constructs, instead taking mobility, movement and change as the core of 
our understanding of the world. 
But it is not easy to really take processes as the unit of analysis, and sometimes this 
appears more like a utopian intention than a fully reachable goal, especially due to the 
problem of excess: there is simply too much going on, and text, our medium of analysis, 
is linear (Abbott, 2016, p. 105). To make this intention of doing process sociology 
more concrete and attainable, I take ontological inspiration from a particular strand 
of process sociology: the figurational approach. This approach also has other aspects 
which recommend it for the particular situation under study, which I discuss as well. 
In the following paragraphs, I briefly set out the origins of figurational sociology, the 
reasons why I find it particularly useful for my field of study, and the most frequent 
criticisms it receives. 
The figurational approach, pioneered by Norbert Elias (1969, 1978a, 1978b), 
studies emerging order. It combines in a single framework both cultural change at 
the grassroots and processes of state formation. It is a relational approach, which 
focuses on social bonds and interdependencies between groups and persons, seeing 
for instance (asymmetric) power as an element of, and shaped by the other elements 
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of, a relationship, rather than understanding power as a kind of discrete weapon or 
tool, independently owned or held by one party, to be used on the other party at any 
time (Elias, 1978b, p. 131; Emirbayer, 1997, p. 291). Finally, figurational sociology is 
a process sociology, with an ontology of change rather than an assumption of a static 
world, and a strongly historical perspective. 
In his magnum opus, The Civilising Process (1978), Elias describes how large figurations 
of mutual dependence grew in Europe, over a prolonged process of structural changes, 
spanning centuries, connecting geographically distant areas and societies. He connects 
these macro-process of (among other things) state formation to the micro-processes 
in a very direct way, superseding the usual dichotomy between external and internal 
(personal/behavioural) processes. In later figurational work, Abram de Swaan (1988) 
deals with the collectivising process in health care, education and welfare, showing 
how the welfare state state emerged in Western Europe and the U.S. by tracing the 
confluence between local coping arrangements and larger processes of state formation. 
Such perspectives provide the kind of ontology we need to understand these emerging 
neighbourhoods, in a number of ways. I will mention five of these.
First, figurational sociology recognises the ‘primacy of the process’ (Johan  Goudsblom, 
1977, p. 105). It is a perspective that studies the emergence of new figurations, rather 
than assuming a fixed structure. In Accra, this is what we face: a situation where 
something emerges. A growing city, new urban fabric. More specific, Elias’ focus on 
state formation in State Formation and Civilisation has left his vocabulary exceptionally 
suitable for the study of how new strands of state fabric emerge over time. Time and 
again, this is what I found in Accra: although locals often do not perceive it as such, 
the fabric of their newly growing neighbourhoods is shot through with strands of state 
institutions, which are woven through it ever more tightly, taking shape at the same 
time the urban fabric develops and takes its shape (see also chapter 7). 
Second, in this process of emergence, local organisation and centralising institutions 
levels are highly interconnected, influencing and shaping each other. So we need a 
framework which also allows us to move between levels, which bridges the divide 
between neighbours, neighbourhood and urban system levels. For instance, in order 
to understand the dynamics of water and electricity supply systems in rapidly growing 
cities, and the political consequences of under-performance of the network as a whole, 
it is necessary to understand the process of extension at the granular level, house to 
house through residents’ self-help practices. The figurational perspective allows such 
an interweaving of levels. 
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Third, figurational sociology offers a historical perspective, allowing the researcher 
and the reader to search for the precursors of institutions and arrangements before 
explaining their contemporary appearances. This is useful and perhaps even necessary 
for any research undertaking. But it becomes all the more vital since we are dealing 
here with non-Western sociology, written by a Western author (Goody, 2012). 
Many of the institutions found in Ghana today have clear Western counterparts. Indeed, 
they were often modeled on these. This goes for the churches, the utility companies, 
the state structure, and other institutions which were (partially) imported, rather than 
homegrown. But it also applies to the chiefs, who were forced by colonial rulers to at 
least partially adopt a Western mode of operating, and to less formalised groups like 
Residents Associations and political pressure groups. This creates a misleading sense 
of familiarity: ‘I know how this works, I’ve seen this at home’. However, although these 
institutions look very much familiar to me, they are rooted in a background which is 
unfamiliar, with other pre-existing logics and institutions, where other conditions of 
development apply. 
By looking at these through a historical lens, it is possible to understand more about 
them, to observe the world they function in and to understand a little more of how this 
changes the nature of these transplanted institutions. In the same way, institutions like 
chieftaincy create a misleading sense of strangeness, because they look very unfamiliar 
at first sight, involving highly localised and exotic-looking rituals and seemingly 
drawing on a register of social relations which is typically ‘African’. Again, the historical 
approach helps to better understand the nature of such institutions, to place them in 
the contemporary socio-political field of the city. 
Fourth, in a complex urbanising setting such as contemporary Accra, there are many 
instances where power and influence run two ways, where groups, institutions and 
individuals are interdependent, interwoven in a complex figuration. For instance, the 
chiefs and the formal state at first sight seem to compete. But a closer look reveals 
that they actually support and prop up each other in multiple ways; the weakening of 
one would greatly damage the position of the other. Even in seemingly crystal-clear 
hierarchical situations, a closer inspection often reveals that power never runs one way. 
The local District offices of the Ghana Water Company seem to be clearly subject to 
the control of its headquarters. But the headquarters need the District officers to keep 
the network from sprawling out too much, depend on them for this, and thus again, 
influence runs two ways. The ontology of figurational sociology is exceptionally suitable 
to study such ‘asymmetrical power balances’ (Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1971). 
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Fifth, figurational sociology has much attention for the way technological development 
(re)shapes social relations. The paradigmatic study in this respect is Johan Goudsblom’s 
(1992) analysis of the way the highly valuable domestication of fire also forced humans 
into new dependency relations. Specifically, the unforgiving discipline of a ‘fire regime’ 
of fuel collection and fire maintenance, which would ensure that the precious fire never 
went out. Elias (1978a, p. 206; 1995) discusses the social systemic impact of advances 
in another technology: road systems. In the chapters 5 and 7, I set out how respectively 
central electronic storage of land ownership and improvements in private water sachet 
sealing and borehole systems caused shifts in both local and city-wide dependency 
relations with important political repercussions. 
On a more general note, the figurational ontology is flexible in terms of the ways people 
relate to each other, the ways they form networks and the stories, and the behaviours that 
accompany those networks. The focus of this research is not on individuals, but on the 
ways they bond. When discussing how people bond socially, we need to have some idea of 
their psychology, a set of assumptions about their worldview. It seems that in much of the 
social sciences, the rational choice framework (Becker, 1976) has crept in as the default 
psychological model (Nik-Khah & Van Horn, 2012). This framework sees humans as 
essentially selfish, somewhat atomistic, mechanistic entities, who act only on their own 
behalf and for their own benefit. Its rather bleak theoretical point of departure has been 
softened over the years to include reciprocity and even forms of charitable behaviour, 
‘broad rationality’, but the point of departure remains the same: calculated selfishness in 
a knowable, primarily material and non-connected world (Iannaccone, 1995).
In situations where the scale and scope of our research is such that we have no time for 
individual psychology and need a standard model of the mind, it is very well possible 
and effective to integrate figurational sociology with rational choice (see e.g. Swaan, 
1988). Still, however convenient and broadened it may be, such a perspective does 
tend to remove real human agency from the analysis, reducing morality to norm-
following (Iannaccone, 1995) and casting altruism as either a calculated act of covert 
selfishness (again, usually through improving institutions by strengthening norms) 
or an individually preferred form of ‘consumption’ (Neilson, 2010). This picture of 
humanity is incomplete at best. People have wildly varying motivations for the way 
they position themselves and the ways they act, at times including degrees of altruism 
and sustained action for certain ideals which are simply inimical to the basic axioms 
of fields like rational choice. Therefore, it remains essential to include psychology 
and human agency in the analysis, as well as the often long-lasting belief systems 
(ideologies, doctrines, etc.) which humans tend to hold. 
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As noted, when there is no space for attention to individuals or no time for qualitative 
primary research, such a research choice is understandable and can still be highly 
productive, despite its simplistic assumptions of psychological structure. Fortunately, 
this thesis is an empirical case study of a limited scale and scope. Thus, it is possible 
to let in a little bit more real human agency. To do so, I let research subjects speak 
for themselves whenever possible (while carefully triangulating their self-descriptions 
with concrete observations), and pay attention to why people do what they do, how 
they think, how they justify their actions or lack thereof. I do so specifically for two 
factors influencing people’s behaviour: long-lasting belief systems, and the motive of 
altruism. 
Examples may provide some background on both counts here. First, the notion of 
long-lasting belief systems. In chapter 6 I describe how the Methodist, Presbyterian 
and other ‘orthodox’ churches are increasingly being out-competed by the Charismatic 
movement. This would not fit into that perspective, as these churches are not acting 
‘rationally’ in the current ecology of religious organisations. To fit in, they should 
simply change their doctrine and adapt their internal organisation to also be able to 
rapidly expand to the newly growing urban areas, and to attract new followers. But 
they do so only to a limited degree, stubbornly building schools and clinics and making 
other non-rational investments. Apparently, their doctrine is so strongly embedded in 
their organisational fabric that it simply does not change much. Thus, doctrine and 
more in general, ways of thinking, are an essential part of the analytical framework if 
we are to understand these areas. 
Second, the motive of altruism, or spiritual satisfaction derived from helping 
others. Mr Jacob, described at the start of chapter 7, provides perhaps the best 
example of this type of behaviour. His construction of the water pipe network in 
his own area could easily be understood as a self-serving activity, although he must 
have invested far more energy in it than he got out. But to extend the network to 
neighbouring areas requires a different mind-set. Mr Jacob has not benefited much 
from this himself in material terms, and has rather experienced discomfort from 
it, as he is often called up at ungodly hours to do emergency maintenance work on 
the network. The explanation can rather be found in another direction: spiritual 
satisfaction. In several conversations with Mr Jacob, this became very clear, as he 
explained his beliefs, noting as an aside that he had chosen to convert to Buddhism 
(a highly unusual move in Ghana) because he felt that it better fit his worldview. 
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Mr Jacob and the orthodox church leaders are good examples of the way the 
psychological factor tends to transcend mechanistic models of behaviour, but certainly 
not the only ones. During my research I have met a number of other people who do 
work for the community for which the motivation really cannot be retraced to personal 
benefits or the avoidance of discomfort. Most of them have not made it into the final 
draft of this thesis. But all in all, they provide a powerful impetus for continuing to 
respect both real human agency, the motive of altruism and the power of long-lasting 
belief systems and personality structures.4 Figurational sociology explicitly includes 
these factors in its analysis.
Criticism
For all these reasons, figurational sociology provides a very useful ontology to 
form the theoretical backbone of this thesis. However, the approach does not stand 
uncriticised. Especially its main proponent, Norbert Elias, has received his share of 
censure over the years. Perhaps the most urgent of these criticisms is an attack on his 
use of the term ‘civilisation’. Critics (Duerr, 1988; Goody, 2003) claim that his concept 
of ‘civilisation’ is quite hierarchical and is only one step removed from declarations of 
cultural superiority. He refers to passages such as this one, about what Elias calls the 
civilising process: 
“What must be pointed out here is the simple fact that even in civilised 
society no human beings come into the world civilised, and that the 
individual civilising process that they compulsorily undergo is a function 
of the social civilising process. Therefore, the structure of a child’s 
affects and consciousness no doubt bears a certain resemblance to 
that of ‘uncivilised’ peoples, and the same applies to the psychological 
stratum in grown-ups which, with the advance of civilisation, is subjected 
to more or less heavy censorship and consequently finds an outlet in 
dreams, for example.” (Elias, 1978a, p. xi)
4 A frequently made argument is that people acting from such purely altruistic or ideological motivations 
are rather rare and therefore should not inform our standard view of humanity. This may or may not 
be true, it is very hard to test. But even if it were true, their extraordinariness would not be sufficient 
reason to exclude such motivations from the analysis. Mr Jacob has coordinated the production of 
a water network that serves several thousands of residents. And the churches have provided, and 
continue to provide, the education of important swaths of the Ghanaian elite, thus imparting their ideas 
(for good or for ill) on that society in a fundamentally important way. In such ways, a small amount of 
people can have a disproportionally large impact.
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Here, Elias places societies on a scale of development, saying that children raised in 
certain societies (by which he meant European ones) pass through a stage in their 
development which is more akin to less developed societies (in which he undoubtedly 
included much of Ghana), before arriving at the ‘stage of civilisation’ of their own 
society. 
Such quasi-Freudian (Goody, 2003) theoretical stances have been softened and 
apologised for by Elias himself and his supporters, (Elias, 2008; Liston & Mennell, 
2009), and they may or may not hold water empirically. But they have been effectively 
censured in the social sciences (Mennell, 1998, pp. 2-4), because they lend themselves 
too easily, especially in popularised or vulgarised form, to legitimate racism or to 
political projects which categorise some cultures as inferior, thus justifying conquest, 
exclusion or other forms of violence. 
I believe such criticism to be well justified. Elias’ project of understanding ‘the civilising 
process’ was a hugely ambitious one, both in timescale and in theoretical scope, and 
he did not hesitate in setting it out as broadly as he saw it, notwithstanding possible 
social consequences. This may seem strange for someone who had been forced to flee 
‘scientific racism’ (Brustein, 2003, pp. 95-96) in his own lifetime, as a Jew escaping 
from 1930s Germany, but it was the case. 
Fortunately, later scholars have refined his ideas of a ‘civilising process’ so as to take 
out this edge of cultural hierarchy and progress and make the theory less Euro-centric, 
even while in some cases taking an even broader empirical frame (Johan Goudsblom, 
1992). I take it on board in this thesis, re-framed as the statement that with increasing 
social complexity and longer chains of interdependence, ‘more people are forced 
more often to pay more attention to more and more other people’ (Johan Goudsblom, 
1989, p. 722). Stated that way, I believe Elias’ ideas of the (blind) civilising process 
have academic value in them and are largely freed from the risk of abuse by unsavory 
vulgarisation towards political goals. 
A second criticism is more general: that of Eurocentricity, exporting Western 
theoretical notions uncritically to cities of the Global South (McFarlane, 2011; Parnell 
& Robinson, 2012b; Simone, 2004a). As explained below, my theoretical framework 
consists primarily of Elias and De Swaan, coupled with some Weber and some post-
colonial notions from Mamdani and Roy. However, I do not believe that I export their 
ideas uncritically. I also try to avoid applying Western taxonomies of systems, such 
as identifying overarching ‘modes of governance’ (e.g. Ekers, Hamel, & Keil, 2012). I 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below60
do use Weber’s types of authority, but I use them to describe components of specific 
relationships rather than entire political systems. 
Nor do I seek to develop or apply fixed schemes or taxonomies of suburbs (R. Harris, 
2010), certainly not taxonomies imported from the West. Rather, I use the ontological 
basis of Elias’ and others’ work to be able to theoretically model bonds and figurations, 
to structure my approach of spatial levels and (inter-/intra-)group relations. I have 
found no better frame than this one to understand my research matter. Because after 
all, we may deconstruct as much as we like, but in the end empirical research in the 
professional sociology tradition (Burawoy, 2005) requires an ontology to work with 
(Nijman, 2015). 
Third and finally, when writing about Ghana from an Eliasian framework, it is 
unavoidable to discuss his own work on the country. Norbert Elias spent two years in 
Ghana, working in the sociology department of the University of Ghana from 1962 to 
1964. During this time he wrote very little. He finally published no academic work at 
all on Ghana, only two essays for an exhibition catalog of (partly his own collection 
of) African art (Elias, 2009a, 2009c). The general impression one gets of Elias in 
Ghana is that of a scholar seeking confirmation of his already established theory about 
civilisation, not that of an open mind looking for new insights.
2.2 Core terms
Having explained the core principles of the theory and its main criticisms, it is time to 
define some of the core terms used in this thesis. Elias was passionate about developing 
new “structures of speaking and thinking” (Elias, 1978b). Indeed, he was perhaps less 
interested in leaving behind a new school of thought than in creating a new vocabulary 
(Krieken, 2001, p. 354). I define (my use of) some of these terms: urban fabric, 
figuration, web, valency, and evolving chains of interdependence. 
The first notion to be defined is the one which refers to the research subject as a whole: 
urban fabric. I have already used the term extensively in the introduction chapter, 
but do want to take a moment here to formally define it. What I investigate in this 
thesis is the emergence, development and integration of new parts of urban fabric. 
This term is often used to refer to the urban morphology, the physical composition of 
buildings and the infrastructure between them (Levy, 1999; Scheer & Stanilov, 2003). 
This brings up an image of the city as a tapestry of concrete, steel, wood and glass, 
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laid out over the land (i.e. Carr & Whitehand, 2014; Compagnon, 2004). I use the 
term in a somewhat broader sense, including in the term urban fabric also the social 
infrastructure (Simone, 2004b), more akin to Friedman and Miller’s (Friedman & 
Miller, 1965) or Lefebvre’s (Lefebvre, 1991) use of the term. 
To me, the urban fabric consists not only of buildings, physical infrastructure such 
as roads, electricity cables, water pipes and drains, but also of institutional webs such 
as the system of districts and electoral areas, the hybrid public transportation system 
of minibuses, paramount chieftaincies and their divisional substructures, police and 
army barracks and the areas they control, and the networks of churches which may 
be rooted in one area but expand with new franchises in nearby parts of the city. All 
these factors are part of the urban fabric, just as much as the buildings, roads, cables, 
pipelines and open spaces of the physical city. 
Both the physical and the social-institutional urban fabric are by their nature 
continuous, although they contains many fault lines and breaks, forced by physical 
barriers, land holders with sufficient clout, or other institutions such as governmental 
district boundaries. Despite such breaks, the urban fabric forms a single tapestry and 
as such it spreads itself out over the surrounding countryside. Within this urban fabric, 
I define a suburb as an inhabited area away from the urban center, connected to this 
center by (near) continuous built-up land. 
In terms of theoretical constructs, the basic unit of analysis in figurational theory 
is the figuration. This term describes what we might term a ‘flexible latticework of 
tensions’ between a number of people or groups (Elias, 1978b, p. 126). That can be four 
people around a table, or it can span an entire city. Through this term, Elias tried to 
put an end to the unproductive sharp posited boundaries between entities ‘individual’, 
‘organisation’ and ‘society’, which he saw as ‘desensitising terms’. Elias responded to 
Weber’s ideal types of organisations, composed of individual agents, and Durkheim’s 
society, which was still external to the individual. Figurations shape the thoughts and 
actions of the people or groups that form their ‘building blocks’, and are in turn shaped 
by those people or groups (Elias, 2009b, p. 2). This term is used throughout the study, 
as its flexibility allows very differentiated applications. 
One example of its use is in describing the early grassroots forms of organising in 
Sebrepor, chapter 4. Residents there got together without much formal organisation 
at first, to establish basic infrastructure in the area. Later, this local figuration became 
more formalised, and turned into what one might simply call a (volunteer-based) 
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organisation: the Residents Association (RA). However, this RA and its organisers 
quickly became entangled in a much bigger, more complex figuration, involving 
various officials and arms of the local government, political party leaders organising in 
the area and an increasingly densely populated environment. To understand the fluid 
boundaries and links in such a context, the notion of a ‘figuration’ is very practical, 
more so than ‘organisation’ or ‘network’, as it does not presuppose the uniformity of its 
units or hard (or even any) boundaries. 
In figurational sociology, the mode of relationship between the various entities in a 
figuration (such as individuals, groups or organisations) is generally described with 
the Eliasian term interdependence. This term describes the relationship between two or 
more persons, groups or organisations in terms of power, signifying that these depend 
on each other to a certain degree. I use the term frequently in describing Ghana’s 
process of state formation and the shifting position of the chiefs within that process 
(chapter 5), as well as relations in the urban water field (chapter 7). This term functions 
well to describe the power relations found in the field. To take the example of chapter 
5, it is not the case that the chiefs were simply subject to the state at any point in time, 
nor is it the case that the chiefs hold the vulnerable state in their firm grasp of power. 
Rather, both depend on each other and both have power over each other. Individual 
chiefs were and are easily crushed by a targeted attack of powerful actors within the 
state, both in colonial times and in the post-independence era. But at the same time, 
local politicians of all parties generally depend on a good relationship with the local 
chiefs in order to effectively govern. Chiefs are seen as connected to the spirits of the 
land, thus enjoying a natural sense of (Weberian traditional) authority among the 
local residents. Another, more materialist reason for their power over politicians is 
that chiefs are enstooled (appointed) for life, whereas politicians have to campaign for 
re-election every four years. The locals know this, and strategically divide their loyalty 
accordingly. 
Finally, the relationship between the state and individual chiefs is something 
completely different from the relationship between the state and the chieftaincy 
institution as a whole. Even powerful and determined actors within the state (such as 
Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president) were unable to uproot the institution, as it is 
tightly interwoven with the state. Finally, both chiefs and politicians often come from 
the same small sets of families, the so-called royals, and are further interwoven at that 
level. Hence the term interdependence, a mutual dependence. 
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From interdependence between a relatively limited number of entities we arrive at 
the concept of evolving (often lengthening) chains or networks of interdependence. 
In his central methodological work What is Sociology?, Elias describes the societal 
development process as follows: “Chains of interdependence become more 
differentiated and grow longer; consequently they become more opaque and, for any 
single group or individual, more uncontrollable” (Elias, 1978b, p. 64). 
This elegant but rather abstract piece of theory becomes directly applicable when we 
look at Greater Accra’s piped water network. Through a convoluted and often resident-
driven construction process throughout decades of poor utility company management 
and rapid urban growth, the physical water distribution system has actually become so 
large that the Ghana Water Company has been forced to start a major project simply 
to re-capture their own pipe network. They are forced to go out into the newly built 
neighbourhoods to unearth exactly where their pipes run and what state they are in, 
they are unaware of how exactly the water flows through the system of pipes, they 
have lost track of many of their customers as the city expanded over the decades. To 
understand how this came about, the concept of lengthening chains of interdependence 
and growing opaqueness is very useful.
2.3 Theory by chapter
The methodology described in chapter 3 flows directly from this theoretical 
framework, as described in section 3.1 In this section (2.3) I briefly describe how I use 
this theory in the four empirical chapters. Where chapters build on additional theory 
to augment the figurational perspective, this is also explained and linked to the basic 
figurational framework. This section should not be seen as a summary of the empirical 
chapters, but rather as a more extensive operationalisation and complete sketch of the 
theoretical framework of the thesis. 
Chapter 4: The rise and fall of resident organisations
The first research chapter of this thesis is an empirical, highly localised study of a 
particular kind of organising: successful volunteer grassroots-led organising for 
collective amenities. At first sight, the study looks so simple that very little theory is 
required. And indeed, in that chapter I hardly use the theoretical terms described above 
or refer to literature. However, in understanding Sebrepor, the figurational perspective 
is highly productive. For one, I look at the grassroots organising not as organisation 
but as figuration, evolving networks and coalitions of interdependence and temporary 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below64
structure, whether formalised or not. For such a research subject, ‘figuration’ is a useful 
concept. 
But the application of figurational ways of thinking in this chapter goes further: it 
describes the processes connected to lengthening chains of interdependence. A brief 
quote may be useful here, in which Elias discusses the changes in and between people, 
as the society they live in becomes increasingly tightly integrated, their world bigger 
and its social groups more complex, more varied and (geographically) larger. 
“What changed was the way in which people bonded to each other. 
This is why their behaviour changed, and why their consciousness and 
their drive-economy, and in fact their personality structure as a whole, 
changed. The ‘circumstances’ that change are not something that comes 
upon people from ‘outside’, they are the relationships between people 
themselves.” (Elias, 1978a, p. 402)
Here, Elias notes that as the outside world changes, this change is mirrored by a shift in 
very local, personal relations. We see the same process happening in Sebrepor, as that 
neighbourhood becomes more densely populated and more tightly interwoven with 
the outside world, the rest of the city. A few examples. As political parties establish a 
foothold in the neighbourhood, the local grassroots organising becomes coloured by 
party politics. As the municipality provides bulldozers to clear access roads within 
the settlement, some of the residents are chosen to guide them on where roads 
should be made. This means their personal vision of the neighbourhood is suddenly 
backed with formal power, making the hierarchy of local organising suddenly far 
more pronounced. As a local municipality was established, the tight web of relations 
between locals fell apart, breaking up not only the infrastructure-related functions of 
the Residents Association, but also the informal social security function which the 
Association provided. 
In all of these instances, the ways people relate to each other change, as their social and 
practical world becomes bigger and more complex. One difference is that in Sebrepor, 
this did not happen on the timescale described by Elias in the above quote. This seems 
most relevant for people’s personalities: of all of the described shifts (bonds, behaviour, 
consciousness, personality structure) the shift in personality structure takes longest, as 
personality is formed early on in life, and is likely to change mostly over generations, 
rather than over lifetimes.
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Chapter 5: Traditional authorities in the city
The chapter on chieftaincy embeds Weberian ideal types of bureaucratic and traditional 
authority in the figurational perspective. The goal of this chapter is to understand how 
these different forms of authority combine to form particular state structures (see also 
Baldwin, 2015; Vaughan, 2006). It describes the historical origins of the chieftaincy 
institution, and goes on to show how state formation and urbanisation processes 
have lead to a more complex figuration where traditional authority (chieftaincy) is 
embedded in a larger legal-rational authority (the modern state) and where traditional 
authorities in various parts of the country support each other through this shared 
embedding in the state. 
This chapter does not only use the figurational perspective as its ontological framework, 
it also draws on Elias’ more empirical work directly. Elias’ examination of state 
formation in The Civilising Process (1978a) and The Court Society (1969) shows how 
the formation of modern states both demanded and spawned expansive bureaucracies 
to coordinate complex divisions of labour. As part of these processes of state formation, 
elites’ roles and sources of power changed. Whereas notables under feudalism achieved 
their position through combat and conquest, they were increasingly incorporated into 
an expansive state structure in which they performed specialised tasks associated with 
specific privileges and responsibilities. 
Notables had to accept that they were subordinate to the monarch, but in exchange 
their position consolidated. Not only did they command vast amounts of wealth, they 
also performed critical roles in expanding local administration as well as the justice 
system (Mann, 1986). They were ‘drawn increasingly into central state offices, both 
military and civil’, while ‘the court was the focus of activity, and offices the focus of 
hopes’ (ibid., original emphasis).
While in some countries (notably France) traditional authorities were disposed of to 
facilitate direct rule, in most countries, both in Europe and in the colonies, traditional 
authorities have continued to play key roles as intermediaries between central 
governments and their remote subjects (Tilly, 1990). Where traditional authorities 
have survived, their position has stabilised in conjunction with the consolidation of 
the modern state. In the United Kingdom, for example, traditional authorities still 
perform pivotal functions within government (for instance, as monarch or member of 
the House of Lords), by and large preserve their charisma (as evidenced by intense and 
often flattering media coverage), and control vast amounts of land and wealth.
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The major advantage of Elias’ work is that it shows how traditional authority transforms 
through broader processes of state transformation. In Elias’ understanding, traditional 
authorities and the state are not simply adversaries striving for power in a zero-sum 
game. Rather, they are interwoven in multiple ways, such that the stability of either is 
predicated on the continued existence of the other. They become interdependent as 
they come to fulfil increasingly limited and specialised functions within increasingly 
extensive and encompassing networks. 
The chapter augments Elias’ perspective on state formation with a framework developed 
especially for the colonial state: Mahmood Mamdani’s theorisation of the bifurcated 
state (Mamdani, 1996). In the Ghanaian context, processes of state formation grew out 
of a colonial legacy: the establishment of a bifurcated state by the British government 
in the late 19th and 20th century. While constitutional law was dominant in those 
parts of the cities where colonial settlers resided, ‘customary law’ prevailed elsewhere 
(Mamdani, 1996). Colonial governments made chiefs responsible for carrying out 
the administrative edicts of the colonial state while allowing them a large degree of 
discretion. Weber’s definition of traditional authority (Weber, 1968, p. 227) shows why 
this type of authority is so effective in exercising power: with a large degree of local 
discretion and flexibility (backed by a colonial force), this ruler is able to adapt to local 
values as necessary and at the same time produce whatever results the colonial power 
needs. 
This fits into a larger pattern where historically, when countries recognise group-
specific communal rights and privileges, they tend also to accord power and 
recognition to traditional authorities representing those groups. The conditions under 
which traditional authorities receive such state recognition varies radically. Sometimes 
rights are afforded because traditional authorities represent powerful interests that 
must be reckoned with for any modern state project to be successful (as in the case of 
monarchs of Western Europe), and sometimes those rights are a meager compensation 
for mass killings and land grabs (as in the case of indigenous communities in many 
settler societies). But in all cases, a similar trade-off appears: the consolidation of a 
state deprives traditional authorities of much of their former power, yet at the same 
provides a framework that durably recognises some of their specific claims and roles. 
In order to understand the chief ’s position, the chapter also incorporates the Weberian 
framework of traditional, legal-rational and charismatic authority. 
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“Authority will be called traditional if legitimacy is claimed for it and 
believed in by virtue of the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. The 
masters are designated according to traditional rules and are obeyed 
because of their traditional status (Eigenwurde). (…) Obedience is owed 
not to enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of 
authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by the traditional 
master. (Weber, 1968, p. 227)
As Weber explains, traditional authority is primarily attached to a person, who is not 
bound by strict rules in wielding this power. This condition was very useful for the 
practitioners of indirect rule as described by Mamdani (1996). It enables colonial 
regimes, which internally function as more or less rule-based bureaucracies, to use 
local traditional authorities as a buffer governance layer. As this local governance 
layer was based on traditional authority, it was less bound by rules and prescribed 
hierarchies of authority and thus relatively free to take any action necessary to hold on 
to power, steered by the central (colonial) authority only on the points that matter to 
them. And as twenty-first century regional and national governments try to manage 
their sprawling cities, they again rely on traditional authorities. The government 
recognises the chief as a legitimate authority and stipulates his domain and territory, 
but it does so without specifying procedures or rules, allowing chiefs the discretion to 
deal with dynamic and complex local conditions as they see fit. 
This is the only chapter of the thesis where I discuss the production of informality and 
the deployment of the terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, using Roy’s (2009b) definition of 
informal. These terms originate with the state, and are not natural categories which can 
be clearly distinguished in practice apart from where the state actively creates them. 
Roy describes how in India, urban governance structures include ‘zones of informality’, 
which state bureaucrats intentionally keep vague, ‘un-map’, re-interpreting rights and 
responsibilities as the occasion demands. In urban Ghana, the bureaucrats do not need 
to do this themselves, as the chiefs are strategically positioned to take on this role. 
When the Ghanaian state extends itself to a newly developing (urban) area, it does 
so to an important degree through the chiefs, who form a nexus between the legal-
rational authority of the state and the messy practice of a developing area, where strict 
rule-following would lead to untenable situations. 
In sum, this chapter uses a macro-historical perspective on state formation processes 
that illuminates the long-term trajectory and contemporary conditions that shape 
Ghana’s chieftaincy institution. Instead of viewing the traditional chief as auxiliary, 
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competitor, or residue, it examines the transformation of chieftaincy as part and parcel 
of broader processes of state formation.
Where the chieftaincy chapter focuses on the development of structures of power 
and authority in the process of state formation, showing indirectly how these affect 
the potential production of public amenities in newly growing neighbourhoods, the 
subsequent two chapters go more directly into this production process. Both chapters 
6 and 7 build on Abram de Swaan’s (1988) work on the development of state-organised 
collective amenities in Europe and the U.S.. In a wide-ranging historical analysis, De 
Swaan used figurational sociology to show how rapid urbanisation in the 19th century led 
to the emergence of the complex of collective amenities that is today known as the welfare 
state. In this analysis, De Swaan continuously lays the connections both between the 
personal and the urban or state level, and between the cultural and the material spheres. 
De Swaan’s work strongly builds on Elias, both in conceptual terms and in its object of 
analysis: growing forms of interconnectedness and interdependency in European nation-
states. This forms a useful basis for an understanding of state formation processes, and 
more specifically the understanding of how collective amenities developed.
Chapter 6: Collective effervescence, collective amenities?
De Swaan (1988) describes the figuration of churches and states which arose from 
the late Middle Ages in countries like the Netherlands, Germany and the U.K. In this 
figuration, the churches created educational, medical and social security amenities, 
all of which today are in Western Europe seen as responsibilities of the state. These 
efforts were partially motivated by considerations of competition. Churches used 
medical and educational facilities as ways to bind people to them in the long run, 
with a special role for the education facilities to ensure the long-term institutional 
survival. They also organised social insurance systems and in doing so, helped created 
the communities that were the foundation for later integration into larger structures 
such as the state. An important way that the community actually came into being was 
through the development of these shared amenities. As De Swaan describes, churches 
were especially well placed to organise collective amenities and the required moral 
and social communities in situations where there were none, because they had the 
moral position to coax hesitant participants into their systems, which helped to solve 
collective action problems.
Chapter 6 maps the role churches play in the production of collective amenities in 
contemporary Accra, asking why certain churches are highly active in this production 
process but others are less so. It seeks the explanation for this differential in the internal 
organisation and doctrine of the churches. These, in turn, are shaped by the form of 
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the religious field and its relations to the larger state figuration in the era when the 
church developed. As such, it provides an analysis of the feedback process between the 
state figuration and the church’s contribution to the state formation process, locating 
the connection between these two processes in the doctrine and internal organisation 
of the church. 
This chapter sets out how in Ghana, the European churches described by De Swaan 
were invited by the various colonial powers. As missionaries, they came to provide 
education for the locals, thus training a cadre of Ghanaians in a shared language, 
morality and structure of hierarchy, a precondition to the colonial project. This is a role 
similar to the one the churches played in Western Europe, where educational systems 
were an important step in the formation of both a state apparatus and the required 
ways of relating and thinking. 
In other words, churches were imported in the hope that they would transfer European 
logics and sensibilities to the locals, and it was especially churches which were imported 
because they had played this role so successfully in European countries. And indeed, 
the mission churches created a large amount of high-quality educational and medical 
amenities. Among other feats: ten of the eleven former Presidents of Ghana received 
their primary and secondary education in (Ghanaian) Roman Catholic, Methodist or 
Presbyterian mission schools. 
But where in Europe these church-built collective amenities were actively and 
purposely taken over by the state, thus crowding out the churches, the Ghanaian state 
has until today not had the capacity to take them over to the same degree. Still, this 
has not lead to the level of continued or even increased collective amenity creation by 
the churches one might have expected. A sharp increase of the degree of voluntarism 
in the religious field has radically shifted the conditions of survival, continuation and 
expansion for churches. A growing group of churches whose doctrines and internal 
organisation differ radically from the previous generation of churches, the Charismatic 
Pentecostal movement, is taking over the field. These churches work on a much shorter 
time horizon, with a strong focus on competition for potential believers. This new 
wave of religious organisations does not share the same tendencies towards long-term 
construction and maintenance of educational and medical facilities.
To understand these emerging dynamics in the religious field, an analytical framework 
of market competition is embedded in the larger story of state formation and the 
accompanying church-state figuration. This framework is used to describe the 
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atmosphere of religious competition currently present in Ghana. Indeed, religious 
competition is seen by many as a form of business competition, and shows many of the 
same tenets. This includes large branding and event campaigns in the public space and 
a wide range of franchising structures. But it also becomes apparent in the discourse of 
the church leaders, both in personal conversations and in preaching. 
The chapter therefore uses the framework of a religious marketplace, including its 
terminology of commercial competition, attracting potential believers, shopping 
around, entrepreneurship, franchises and (local) monopolies. This aligns roughly with 
the rational choice framework of the religious field as a marketplace, as popularised by 
sociologists Rodney Stark, Roger Finke, William Bainbridge and economist Laurence 
Iannaccone. In my analysis, as in theirs, the framework of a religious marketplace does 
not stand on its own, but is used to explain the decreasing construction of collective 
amenities by churches, thus remaining embedded in the larger analytical terrain of 
state formation processes. 
Chapter 7: Expansion patterns of connective goods
Elias described how in Europe, advances in technology allowed for greater and more 
effective networks of communication and transportation, leading to the long historical 
process of state formation, where larger areas became effectively integrated in several 
ways, through lengthening chains of interdependence and densifying as well as deeper 
integrating fabrics of social organisation (Elias, 1978a, p. 206). The development of an 
effective road network made it possible for rulers to economically integrate and rule a 
far larger territory than before, and enabled the transformation of the power structure 
from a web of feudal lords to a centrally organised hierarchy centered on the court. 
Road technology, and the network it enables, is a crucial variable here. 
De Swaan (1988) specifies how this process culminated in the 19th and 20th century 
formation of the welfare state, the most tightly interconnected national society 
structure we know of, where people in a large area (a country) are connected to the 
same road system, pass through the same educational system, are cared for by the 
same health system and secured by a shared social security safety net, hooked up to the 
same water and electricity provision systems, all of which are centrally organised and 
collectively funded. In other words, the story of state formation in the longue duree is 
a story of how strides in technology made possible the formation of overwhelmingly 
large and complete physical and social structures of collectivity. 
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Chapter 7 provides a case study drawn from those larger processes of state formation, 
as they are currently happening in urban Ghana. It investigates at the network for 
the provision of clean water, an archetypal collective amenity, through the same 
analytical lens, using as central variables the shifting interdependencies between 
the neighbourhood level and various state institutions. More concretely, the chapter 
develops an analysis of the larger socio-political figuration surrounding the piped 
water system, mapping how local residents, state, utility company and the political 
class interact in the production of both a collective network and a parallel industry 
of individualised provision of the same amenity. For water, a collective piped water 
network and an industry for drilling private boreholes and delivering prepackaged 
water; for power, a city-wide electricity network and a private power generator supply 
chain. 
Here De Swaan’s figurational work again provides a very helpful background. He 
shows the concrete processes through which physical networks for the provision of 
clean drinking water as well as drainage and sewer systems emerged in 19th century 
European cities. The initial investments in backbone infrastructure like water 
purification plants and a distribution pipe network were generally made by wealthier 
strata. As a side effect of their investment, the amenity became more easily attainable 
for less privileged groups by lowering the marginal costs of connecting to the network 
for the poorer residents living in nearby areas (see also Granovetter, 1978).
We see the same process in Ghana. The scale is even more fine-grained than what 
De Swaan describes, who was writing about cities with a high degree of spatial 
segregation into poor and wealthy areas. In the Ghanaian urban context, the degree of 
spatial segregation between wealthy and poor strata of the urban population is quite 
limited. Thus, the process of network extension often involves a single wealthy resident 
in a street who is able to extend water or electricity to his house, whose connection 
subsequently lowers the financial threshold for his neighbours. We see the same 
process at a larger scale, where a small settlement or gated community extends the lies 
for a kilometre or so, and those living close to this extension are able to also connect.
In this chapter, technology plays a particularly large role. On the one hand, modern 
technology such as PVC pipes, better water treatment systems and improved GIS 
technology significantly aid the effectiveness of the piped water distribution network 
in a rapidly sprawling urban area. On the other hand, technological progress in the 
borehole industry and in individually packaged water solutions invite elites to abandon 
the overstretched communal provisions in favor of individual solutions. I analyse the 
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difference between the water and the electricity sector through this lens, investigating 
how the process of elite individualisation leads to divergent investments in water and 
electricity backbone infrastructure, because of the different possibilities offered by 
technology.
2.4 Related theoretical perspectives
The study of newly growing neighbourhoods around existing urban areas, often called 
suburban studies, is a proliferating field that carries with it a host of methodological 
approaches, disciplinary histories and definitions (R. Harris, 2010). In this section I 
discuss several frequently used perspectives on Southern cities, which are related in 
one way or another to my own approach. 
Some of these perspectives have come to form almost a standard part of the way we 
view these cities, but are not quite applicable to the newly growing neighbourhoods 
of Greater Accra. Others are very much applicable to Greater Accra, but do not fit my 
research topic or what I view as the most fruitful way to approach it. In either case, it is 
worthwhile spending some time to set out how this thesis relates to them. 
I start by discussing approaches focused on capitalism as an overarching system and 
other systemically economic perspectives, continue with some other political economy 
or class-based perspectives, then touch on ecological approaches, and finish with a 
brief note on the development literature. 
Perspectives focusing on the larger economic system
There is a strong literature strand in (sub-)urbanisation studies which take the political 
economy of land production as the primary theoretical point of departure, often 
directly tying this in with the current dominance of (late) capitalism as an economic 
mode of governance and a transformative force more generally (Roy, 2011b, p. 8). This 
idea is perhaps most extremely expressed by Walker (1981) who saw suburbanisation 
as a ‘spatial fix’ for capitalism, an outlet for underused capital (see also Beauregard, 
2006; R. Harris, 2013). I do not believe it would be justified to understand the political 
economy of land production in Greater Accra in those terms. The production of Accra’s 
new neighbourhoods is certainly influenced, and in some ways driven, by investors 
and speculators (Bansah, 2017; Darkwa & Attuquayefio, 2012). But there is very little 
systemic investment that could be understood as capitalist in the commonest sense of 
the word (e.g. Ingham, 2013; Shaikh, 2016). 
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However, it is a fact that the space in these new neighbourhoods is produced in a 
neoliberal context, constructing land as something newly existing, by being sold for 
profit into freehold ownership and thus entering the economic field in a new guise 
(Lefebvre, 1991), akin to the ‘great transformation’ in the U.K. (Polanyi, 1944). 
Understanding this aspect of the growth of these new neighbourhoods is in fact vital 
for understanding how the relational webs of these areas are spun and how power runs 
throughout them. In this sense, the ‘suburban land question’ is key to understanding 
the suburbs themselves. This knowledge forms the backdrop to my analysis, and is 
a condition I treat extensively in chapter 5, but it does not form the main analytical 
thrust of the thesis. I take up Parnell and Robinson’s (2012b) suggestion in focusing on 
local organisation and its interactions with the (local) state, and seeing the capitalist 
mode of production of space as only one of the conditions, not necessarily the most 
defining one. 
The economic aspects of these new neighbourhoods, more broadly, are vitally important 
to understanding them. As Streeck (2012, p. 1) notes, “contemporary society cannot 
really be understood by a sociology that makes no reference to its capitalist economy”. 
And I do study economic phenomena. Chapter 4 discusses grassroots solutions to the 
collective action problem of constructing initial infrastructure. Chapter 5 describes 
how chiefs shore up their traditional authority through their grip on the land. Chapter 
6 shows how more profit-oriented churches crowd out churches which create the 
kind of cohesion necessary for the production of collective amenities. And chapter 7 
describes how competing industries and collective arrangements for the water sector 
interact in a series of negative and positive feedback loops. 
However, I would like to discuss these suburbs in some more general economic frames. 
The process of urbanisation has long been seen as coupled with industrialisation 
(Habitat, 2016), as this link existed in Europe, the U.S., large parts of Asia and to a lesser 
degree Latin America. But Africa’s urbanisation does not appear to be strongly tied to 
industrialisation; these are largely ‘consumption cities’ (Rémi Jedwab, 2013). That does 
not mean there is no economic activity, but it does mean that this economic activity 
is largely focused on local consumption (Habitat, 2010, pp. 166-168). In a related 
frame, also borrowed primarily from the 20th century US and European urbanisation, 
unwanted functions, people and activities are pushed out to the periphery (Teaford, 
2008). I have not found this frame to be applicable in Accra either. 
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Class-based perspectives
Then there is the lens of class struggle, mass mobilisation, land invasions and 
insurgency (Holston, 2009). A strand of literature with its center of gravity in Latin 
American describes new suburbs being formed through (both gradual and mass-
action) land invasions by disadvantaged groups of aspiring city dwellers. This ties into 
a particular socio-spatial model often deployed in research on post-colonial cities, of 
persistent core-periphery spatial inequality. In this image, a former colonial city, the 
‘cement city’, lies in the center, surrounded by poor underserved peripheral slum areas 
(Freund, 2007; Oppenheimer, Raposo, & Amado, 2013). In this model, the peri-urban 
areas generally form the ‘arrival city’ (Saunders, 2011), consisting mainly of auto-
constructed (mass occupied) squatter settlements (Caldeira, 2017).5 The newly arrived 
subsequently (attempt to) mount an ‘insurgency’, struggling literally from the outside 
in, to gain a foothold in the urban fabric (Heinrich & Nuissl, 2015)
This socio-spatial model of a wealthy center and a poor periphery does not apply to 
the newly growing neighbourhoods of Accra. As in many other growing cities (e.g. 
Karpat, 1976), in Accra it’s not primarily the poor or the disadvantaged who shape 
the newly growing neighbourhoods. The first step for newly arriving urban migrants 
generally involves bunking down in precarious conditions in one of the inner-city 
slum areas such as Old Fadama, parts of Ashiaman or the older zongo’s (Pellow, 2008) 
- or sometimes squatting or living as a ‘caretaker’ in an unfinished building in a newly 
growing area. A second step is renting a ‘hall and chamber’, a tiny rental apartment, 
which could be anywhere in the city. A final step, and the paradigmatic sign of having 
‘made it’ in the city, is to buy a plot in an outlying area from the local chief, and to 
build one’s own home there. Thus, the suburbs are mostly built by the middle class and 
upper classes, and with the exception of caretakers, the poorer strata of the population 
come in later to the peri-urban areas (Grant, 2007; Obeng-Odoom, 2010; Owusu-
Ansah & O’Connor, 2010). This makes these newly growing neighbourhoods socio-
economically more like U.S. suburbs than like Brazilian favelas. 
This also means that the poor are not spatially concentrated as much as in many 
other countries. This point is related to another frequently found perspective, notably 
borne out by Roy but used more broadly: urbanism as ‘a set of social struggles over 
urban space’ (Roy, 2011b, p. 8) and ‘marked by unimaginable fragmentation and 
5 Notably, there are also accounts of a similar socio-spatial distribution in which the poor were actually 
there first, thus reversing the ‘established and the outsiders’ (Elias & Scotson, 1965) aspect implicit in 
the former model. This we find in the ‘gentrification as a global strategy’ literature, which discusses the 
phenomenon of new wealthy arrivals pushing the proletariat outward (N. Smith, 2002).
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extraordinary violence’ (Roy, 2011b, p. 9). Struggle certainly plays an important part 
in shaping these areas, but it is much less organised, all-encompassing and violent than 
the type of collective struggles Roy and others have observed elsewhere. I have not 
found signs of (collective) class struggle in these newly developing neighbourhoods, 
only ambition for social climbing. The days of Nkrumah’s socialism are long gone, and 
such ideas mostly survive in certain pockets of the universities (Interview Senah, 2018). 
As for squatting and land invasions, these are exceedingly rare in Ghana. As far as I 
have been able to ascertain, illicit land grabbing is really only done by the very wealthy 
and powerful.6 While squatting is widespread in Accra, it is generally semi-hidden, or 
out on very small fringes like the cleared zones next to large drains or along highways, 
where people come to settle in a trickle, not in a sudden invasion. In short, the lenses 
of class struggle, land invasions and insurgency, so familiar from the Latin American 
context, do not seem to broadly apply to Accra. 
Informality, chaos and crisis perspectives
The core-periphery inequality model ties into broader spatial notions of informality 
in the literature. While there is much literature critiquing and nuancing the concept of 
informality theoretically speaking (e.g. Roy, 2011a), spatially speaking the term is still 
frequently applied wholesale to particular areas, ‘informal settlements’ (Myers, 2011; 
Roy, 2011a; Simone, 2004a). It is important to note that this term does not apply to the 
vast majority of Greater Accra’s suburbs, which are not much less formalised in terms 
of level and governance structure than the inner city areas. 
A related topic is a focus, frequently found in research on peri-urban areas in Ghana, 
on the haphazardness of the suburbs. For instance, Owusu-Ansah and Oçonnor (2010) 
sketch these newly growing physical landscapes as a “mosaic of housing structures 
scattered haphazardly on the fringes of Kumasi”. Such analysis is often coupled with 
descriptions of power abuse, corruption and illegality. This disorder is indeed real and 
present, as are the power abuse and corruption. But they are not my focus. I do not 
depart from any notion of order or proper bureaucratic procedures, but rather look for 
whatever patterns of collective organisation are present in the development of these 
areas, messy or not.
6 The only significant exception to this is the neighborhood of Old Fadama, which lies right in the center 
of Accra, on a piece of marshland which according to custom belongs to nearby Jamestown. This is the 
squatter area of Ghana, the most fiercely contested half of a square kilometer in the country, and the 
subject of so much research (e.g. Afenah, 2012; Farouk & Owusu, 2012; Grant, 2006; Monney, Buamah, 
Odai, Awuah, & Nyenje, 2013; Stoler, Tutu, Ahmed, Frimpong, & Bello, 2014) that it may distort our image 
of how frequent large-scale squatting actually occurs in Ghanaian cities.
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Finally, there is the frequently applied perspective of crisis (Davis, 2005). This 
perspective is also applied in some of the literature closest to this work, such as the 
bundle of Tostensen, Tvedten and Vaa (2001, see specifically Gough and Yankson, p. 
127). As Mbembe & Nutall (2004) set out, the lens of crisis is at best a very incomplete 
way to understand these newly growing cities (see also Mabin, Butcher, & Bloch, 2013) 
and at worst rather demeaning. To view entire cities as zones of crisis is extremely 
unhelpful. These are new urban spaces, developing along their own historically unique 
pathways, which have a number of things in common with previously grown urban 
areas in other parts of the world and also have a number of more or less unique or 
different elements. 
Certainly, the fact that these cities are developing at an extremely rapid pace creates 
all sorts of problems. There are many problems: with the water supply, with infectious 
diseases, poor spatial planning, pollution, and abject poverty. Some of these will most 
likely have a more or less permanent impact. For instance, if no space is made today 
for parks, then there will be no parks in the future either (Arku, Yeboah, & Nyantakyi-
Frimpong, 2016). But my impression is that most of the problems Accra faces are in 
fact being resolved gradually, and that most of its residents live there by choice. In 
short, to view Greater Accra primarily through a lens of urban crisis would offer a 
misleading picture of the situation. 
Ecological perspectives
There is another literature on the urbanising areas, which often refers to them as the 
‘peri-urban interface’, focused on the physical transformation of rural to urban land 
(Simon, McGregor, & Thompson, 2006), often framing urban expansion as ‘sprawl’ 
(Mundia & Murayama, 2010). This literature is generally focused on what is lost in 
this process: agricultural land, nature, ecological functions (Simon, 2008). I fully agree 
that this is a loss, and find it an important literature. But I do not see these areas in the 
frame of what is destroyed or lost; I focus on what ‘grows’ there, the new urban forms. 
A broader city-wide approach focused on ecological sustainability is the literature 
strand of Urban Political Ecology (UPE), which is concerned with issues of urban 
metabolism (Kaika, Heynen, & Swyngedouw, 2006). UPE conceptualises the city as 
a sub-system located within a larger socio-spatial system (an urban region) and the 
notion of metabolism highlights the interaction between and among multi-scalar 
systems (Heynen, 2014), the interface between the urban and nature, in some cases 
extending to the planetary scale (Brenner, 2014). 
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Excellent work from this literature strand has also done in Greater Accra, on the water 
supply systems (Alba, 2016; Schulz & Bruns, 2016) and the electricity network (Silver, 
2015). Such work stems from the notion that there is “a need to revisit the overtly 
‘sociological’ nature of much of twentieth-century urban theory” and proposals 
towards “interrogating the failure of twentieth-century urban social theory to take 
account of physical or ecological processes” (Kaika et al., 2006, p. 2).
I wholeheartedly agree with the notion that ecological system dynamics need to form 
a paramount part of our research agenda today. We are living in the Anthropocene 
and must act like it (Crutzen, 2006). Moreover, such analysis could have been included 
in chapters 4 and 7 of this thesis. However, I did not include it, because I feel that 
the inclusion of the human-ecological interface in the analysis makes the writing and 
reading so complicated that the analysis of human institutions itself becomes vastly 
harder and easily muddled. For examples of how quickly this complexity can become 
overwhelming, see the (well executed) recent work of the Trier University WaterPower 
group. 
Hence, although I applaud attempts at integration, I believe that both fields also still 
benefit from separate study, with integration done on the practical and policy level. 
My work in this thesis, therefore, is not concerned with the physical or ecological 
world, but solely with the (historical development of) human-institutional figurations 
emerging in the new neighbourhoods. 
Policy-oriented perspectives
A completely different literature than those mentioned above is the development 
literature, set out in journals like the Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 
Journal of Urban Management, and in the publications of UN Habitat (e.g. Habitat, 
2018). This broad strand of work is in many ways related with what I do here and the 
types of literature described above. There is one difference, but it is a vital difference: 
the development literature is applied research, aimed towards designing better 
‘development’ policies. Here, development is interpreted in a range of ways: from 
macro-economic development towards a clearly defined end state of an industrialised 
society (Rostow, 1990 [1959]) to work focused on increasing locals’ positive freedoms, 
defined in a very broad sense (Sen, 1989). But nearly all development work centers on 
policy: as it is, as it could be or should be, as it should not be. 
Such policy-related work is a vital strand of research, to which this thesis contributes 
little in a direct sense. Although I do study how Ghana’s constitutional and broader 
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legislative framework plays a role, only chapter 7 touches briefly on specific government 
action or policy. In the concluding chapter, I return to the question of the usefulness of 
this kind of basic research for practitioners.
Chapter summary
This chapter has described figurational sociology, the framework which forms this 
thesis’ theoretical backbone. This approach combines in a single framework both 
cultural change at the grassroots and processes of state formation (Elias, 1978a). It is 
a relational approach, which focuses on social bonds and interdependencies between 
groups and persons (Elias, 1978b). This perspective provides the kind of ontology we 
need to understand these emerging neighbourhoods, in a number of ways. I mention 
five of these.
First, figurational sociology recognises the ‘primacy of the process’ (Johan  Goudsblom, 
1977, p. 105). It is a perspective that studies the emergence of new figurations, rather 
than assuming a fixed structure. Second, it allows the seamless interweaving of scale 
levels, bridging the divide between neighbours, neighbourhood and urban system 
levels. Third, figurational sociology offers a historical perspective, allowing the 
researcher and the reader to search for the precursors of institutions and arrangements 
before explaining their contemporary appearances. Fourth, the ontology of figurational 
sociology is exceptionally suitable to study the kinds of ‘asymmetrical power balances’ 
(Van Benthem van den Bergh, 1971) we find in a rapidly developing city like Accra. 
Fifth, figurational sociology has much attention for the way technological development 
(re)shapes social relations. I have also taken on board criticisms of Eliasian work, such 
as its quasi-Freudian notion of an implicitly linear civilising process (Goody, 2003), its 
Eurocentricity (McFarlane, 2011; Parnell & Robinson, 2012a), and the dominance of 
preconceived notions appearing in Elias’ own work on Ghana (Elias, 2009a, 2009c). 
Finally, I have described core terms such as urban fabric, figuration and interdependence.
Subsequently, I have set out the ways in which I apply this theory to the empirical 
world of Accra’s burgeoning suburbs, coupled with additional theory where necessary. 
In chapter 4, the interdependence of newly growing neighbourhoods’ grassroots 
organisational structures and formal state agencies. In chapter 5, the application 
of a long-term historical state formation process, coupled with Weberian notions 
of authority (Weber, 1968, p. 215) and Roy’s (2009b) concept of informality, to the 
contemporary institution of chieftaincy. In chapter 6, the religious marketplace (Stark 
& Bainbridge, 1987) embedded in De Swaan’s figurational research on the emergence 
of church-state figurations and the welfare state in Western Europe (Swaan, 1988). In 
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chapter 7, the relationship between grassroots extensions of the water pipe network 
and city-wide processes of collectivisation and fragmentation, analysed through a lens 
of city-level interdependence relations. 
Finally, I have provided notes on a few neighbouring schools of thought, discussing 
either how I incorporate them or where this study really takes a different perspective. 
This section started with approaches focused on capitalism as an overarching system 
and other systemically economic perspectives, continued with some other political 
economy or class-based perspectives, then touched on ecological approaches, and 
finished with a brief note on the development literature.
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Methodology: 
mapping the city from below
The chapter describes the methodology and research methods of the thesis. Section 3.1 starts with a discussion of the methodology or research design: a historical form of the 
relational ethnography (Desmond, 2014). Here I set out why the 
analytical level of the neighbourhood forms the most logical starting 
point for this analysis, and how ‘the neighbourhood’ is conceptualised 
in past work and in this study. In section 3.2, I provide a discussion of 
the case study selection and its use in each of the analytical chapters. In 
section 3.3, the chapter turns to the research methods, the techniques 
used for data gathering. I set out the grounded theory process through 
which I operationalised the research question and methodology into 
concrete analytical objects and data gathering methods. From there, I 
provide the rationale, description and discussion of the different data 
gathering methods I used.3
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Research, especially the more formal kind, is often presented as disembodied. A question 
was asked. A method was determined. Data were gathered and analysed, and conclusions 
were reached, with certain caveats. But research and researchers do not exist in abstract 
space. We physically enter areas (or fail to do so), we talk to specific people. We trudge 
sweating through unfamiliar neighbourhoods in strange and distant lands, trying to find 
people who will help us build an understanding of what is going on around us. Some will 
talk to us, others will be harder or impossible to make contact with. We sit in the sparsely 
decorated rooms of government agencies, reading their dusty files or sifting through their 
digital databases, all of which were composed by specific agencies with a specific purpose, 
internal struggles and their own orientation on the outside world. The selection of these 
vantage points matters: one does not see the same thing from everywhere. In this chapter 
I discuss the vantage points which I have taken throughout this research project, and 
demonstrate how they matter.
3.1 Research methodology and case study
This section connects the central research question and the theoretical framework 
set out in the previous chapter to my research methodology, the historical relational 
ethnography (in other words, mapping the city from below). In short, I study several 
forms of collective organisation which occur at the grassroots level, using an in-
depth, relational ethnographic lens  (Desmond, 2014). I extend this lens to a large-
scale figurational and historical view (Elias, 1978b) to uncover non-local causes and 
connections. Thus, I use a relatively small and geographically specific sliver of space 
as an entry point into the relations that matter most for the (lack of) emergence of 
collective amenities. In other words, I map from below. 
While tying this methodology to the central research question, “how do residents of 
Accra’s newly developing neighbourhoods organise to create collective amenities for their 
area?”, I unpack the methodology word by word. That is, I start with ethnography: why 
begin the analysis of aspects of a growing urban fabric through an ethnography at 
the neighbourhood level? Then, I go to the relational aspect: why is it not sufficient to 
investigate dynamics at the neighbourhood level, why should we include the relations 
of this neighbourhood with institutions throughout the city? Finally, I briefly discuss 
the historical aspect: an Eliasian approach including state formation processes and 
related longer-term historical developments. Here, I also connect the methodology to 
the theoretical framework in a broader sense.
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However, before I go deeper into the details of the historical relational ethnography 
design, I want to interject a brief note on a few metrics of quality: transparency, 
measurement validity, external validity or transferability and ecological validity. In 
order to provide transparency I have supplied an overview of the type of people I 
talked to and the type of questions I asked (see headings Door-to-door interviews 
and Semi-structured interviews with a variety of actors below, as well as Appendices 
2-4). To improve measurement validity, I have used the grounded theory approach 
(see section Data Gathering and Fieldwork below). To improve the external validity 
and transferability of my results, I have added a comparative dimension of other 
neighbourhoods to the research design. As for the ecological validity (Cicourel, 1982, 
p. 15) of the research, the method of ethnography helps here, as this is one of the most 
naturalistic (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) methods within the social sciences. The method 
of adaptive semi-structured interviewing coupled with informal conversations also 
helps, as this allows interview subjects to structure their own narratives. 
“…ethnography”: local relations
What kind of empirical perspective does it entail, taking the (newly growing) 
neighbourhood (R. Harris, 2010) as a starting point? In the 1960s and 1970s, there was 
a brief but very intensive period in sociology of studying local urban areas, generally 
known as community studies (e.g. Berger, 1960; Elias & Scotson, 1965; Gans, 1982). This 
brought together several branches: population studies (social surveyors, statisticians 
and social reformists), cultural and even anthropological work in the functionalist 
tradition, and the Comtesque literature on the decline of social relations. Perhaps it 
was mainly this final part which earned the field so much criticism, on romanticising 
and essentialising the concept of community and ignoring the often antagonistic nature 
of community life in its contemporary manifestations. 
A more general criticism was the all too frequent conflation of neighbourhood and 
community (Blokland, 2003). Blokland (2017) shows the sheer volume of intellectual 
baggage that has come to be attached to the concept of ‘community’, a convolution of 
ideas about cohesion, naturalness, belonging and homogeneity, but also manipulation 
and imagination (see Day, 2006). Such confusion should certainly not dissuade us 
from studying urban communities. But in contrast to Blokland I do conclude that 
using terms other than ‘community’ facilitates the discussion. Hence, in this thesis 
I simply dodge its intellectual back-load by leaving the term aside almost entirely. I 
take the more neutral and physically geographical term ‘neighbourhood’ as my point 
of departure, but do not assume or discredit any notions of the existence of a social 
‘community’ there. 
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Much of urban African anthropology, which is one of the strands of contemporary 
literature most closely associated with the neighbourhood level, focuses on the way 
the city is experienced and understood by the city dwellers, seeing economic forces 
and constructive activities as more of a backdrop for cultural phenomena, networks 
and understanding. Such analyses, cast in terms of ‘crisis and creativity’, are generally 
underpinned by a Marxian economic framework, a (for anthropologists) strangely 
one-sided materialistic understanding of culture and social networks as mere 
superstructure, being inescapably shaped by economic forces beyond people’s control 
(T. O. Ranger, 1979; Van Binsbergen & Van, 1981). 
In many ways, such an approach seems justified in macro-economically weak or 
peripheral (Wallerstein, 1974) areas such as most African cities. Still, whether people 
manage to actively create collective resources which fulfil substantial elements of their 
material needs does not solely depend on their self-perceived and actual position in 
a worldwide or even local power structure: agency and the capacity to act depend on 
more than (lack of) power in greater structures. 
This thesis therefore focuses on the agency that people do have to shape their 
environment, and more specifically, on the instances where they act collectively and 
succeed in doing so. Of course, I do not solely focus on success. On the contrary, I try 
to understand how such successes are later undermined by all kinds of forces, how 
they in many cases never come to fruition and so on. But the core of my analysis is: 
when do people succeed in acting collectively to produce collective amenities?
“…relational…”: embeddedness in a wider urban fabric
Recently, the field of neighbourhood-level studies has been thinner, but certainly not 
non-existent. Perhaps the most relevant bundle in this context is (Konings & Foeken, 
2006), which takes in the turn towards focus on embeddedness in larger networks 
(Massey, 1991) and works towards no longer constituting the neighbourhood as an 
isolated unit, providing a geographically open understanding of community which was 
set out by early African urban anthropologists, focusing on the relationship between 
various bonding structures such as ethnicity, religion or politics (Peil, 1981) rather 
than assuming that spatial proximity would lead to community. Instead, contributions 
like Moyen, Piot, De Bruijn and Van Til in the Konings and Foeken bundle (2006) 
provide an image of the city as a highly spatialised and almost tangible geography 
of differential opportunities. Such perspectives of the neighbourhood and of the 
city as a tapestry of networks are certainly fruitful, and my work closely relates with 
their understanding of the ‘social construction of locality and its meaning in social 
interaction’ (Konings & Foeken, 2006, p. 13). 
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But our focus differs somewhat, on two points. First, although we do share an interest 
for urbanites’ agency, we look at different groups. Where these authors focus on 
showing that the marginalised in society have agency, I look more specifically at the role 
neighbourhood-level networks play in physically constructing these neighbourhoods 
themselves. This generally involves zooming in on the more affluent and empowered 
residents of an area rather than the most marginalised. Second, my unit of analysis is 
somewhat less individual. That may sound odd, as the aforementioned studies consider 
individuals hardly in isolation; they see them explicitly as located within their social 
networks, their families, their ethnicities, religious affiliations and so on. Still, their 
unit of analysis (within the neighbourhood case study) is the (networked, embedded) 
individual, whereas my primary unit of analysis is the (localised) collective, as it 
constructively acts to produces collective amenities.
This means that mine is a unit of analysis which rather rarely, and even then always 
only temporarily, actually comes into existence. Most of the time, people do not act 
as part of a collective. And even when they do, this collective action is effectively 
directed towards the construction of durable collective amenities only under rather 
specific circumstances, as chapters 4 and 6 show only too clearly. Still, however rarely 
they come into being, such collectives often have a decisive role in shaping the new 
neighbourhoods mushrooming around Accra and building up the infrastructure 
there. In my view, this makes them a fascinating and very worthy unit of analysis.
Despite these differences in focus, my analysis also has much in common with these 
studies. This work could be seen as a community study or ethnography, too. More 
specifically, and following the methodological turns described above, it should be 
seen as a relational ethnography, studying the neighbourhood of Sebrepor not as an 
isolated and bounded community but as a space of flows (Massey, 1991), a lens on the 
multi-layered, dynamic networks that form the world around it. Desmond describes 
relational ethnography as giving “…ontological primacy, not to groups or places, but 
to configurations of relations” (Desmond, 2014, p. 554). This is what the fieldwork 
approach of this study is designed to do; to show a broader spectrum of institutional 
forms than would have been possible when focusing only on a single neighbourhood, 
while trying to approach the depth and continuity associated with a single extended 
case study. It is in that sense also inspired by the ‘extended case method’ (Burawoy, 
1998, 2017).
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An illustrative line of work in this sense is Pellow’s (2003, 2008) longstanding analysis 
of an inner-city Hausa community in Accra. It is illustrative because it is an excellent 
ethnography, showing a rich and detailed profile of the miniature world of a community. 
If my work can in any way approach the local rootedness of Pellow’s analysis, I will be 
proud. But it is also an example of what I try not to do: it remains very much within 
the walls of this particular community, discussing its architectural roots but not its 
economic embeddings, describing its historical line of chieftains but not their current 
political ties and wider interdependence. In studying each of the three topics of my 
empirical chapters, I work to situate them in the larger context of, among other things, 
the state structure and the ever-shifting composition of the newly growing suburbs, 
mapping the social relations across this political field (Desmond, 2014, p. 555).
Does the combination of the neighbourhood level and figurational sociology work? 
After all, neighbourhoods do not generally figure prominently in figurational sociology. 
Elias and Scotson’s (1965) work in Winston Parva is an exception, but even there, 
the neighbourhood was approached as a microcosm, a small mirroring of the larger 
world, rather than as a piece of social fabric, historically embedded in state and societal 
figurations. However, as this chapter and the conclusion set out, the combination is 
actually rather fruitful. That is, as long as the neighbourhood case study does not 
stand alone. The case of Sebrepor works well because it is a suitable case (see below), 
and because it is a relational ethnography, contextualised with research on historical 
developments and the (state) institutions and larger urban fabric which are woven 
through the neighbourhood. In other words, Sebrepor is not treated as a standalone 
microcosm, but as a lens on larger figurations and long-term developments.
“historical…”: Eliasian embedding of the relational ethnography
This brings us to the third part of the methodology: the empirical approach of this 
study is not only relational, but also historical. It is historical in two ways. First, in the 
relatively common sense of viewing the larger institutions (chieftaincy, the religious 
field, the water utility company) in a historical perspective. I trace their various 
precursors, keeping a specific focus on their relationship with the unfolding state 
formation process, from colonial times until today. Tracing the relations between chiefs 
and state or church and state over time allows us to understand their interdependency 
at a much deeper level. Equally, tracing how water provision was organised throughout 
the past century allows us to see historical shifts from a small, tightly managed state 
operation to the sprawling, partially citizen-built network that provisions Accra with 
water now. Thus, we can better understand the various forces pushing and pulling on 
this system today.
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Second, somewhat less usual, I also study the neighbourhood itself through a historical, 
long-term lens. Chapter 4 describes how the neighbourhood of Sebrepor developed 
from being a nearly uninhabited area consisting mostly of bush, to the densely 
inhabited urban neighbourhood it is today. Chapter 5 looks at how the chieftaincy in 
Sebrepor came to be, how it was transferred to this formerly uninhabited area from a 
nearby village in the 1970s and then settled in as an ‘ancient, local’ tradition. Chapter 
6 traces the local development dynamics of two churches, and chapter 7 sets out how 
the network of water pipes in Sebrepor grew. This allows us a detailed view of how 
residents organise for collective amenities, and to comprehend better what factors are 
important in stimulating, enabling or discouraging this.
By using a historical lens on a newly urbanising area, this study contributes something 
which is surprisingly rare in the urban studies literature: a descriptive understanding of 
how new urban fabric forms. Through ‘staying in a single area’ and describing various 
aspects of its urbanisation process over several decades, it provides a multifaceted 
lens on the process of the city’s expansion onto the surrounding land, the formation 
process of new urban fabric. It allows us to trace how interdependencies within the 
neighbourhood and between the neighbourhood and the surrounding urban area 
shift over time, as the neighbourhood develops. Thus, it provides a much richer 
understanding of how the urban fabric grows and interrelates than a single-moment 
snapshot could do.
Building on the theoretical framework set out in the previous chapter, how does the 
combination work between the historical relational ethnography methodology and 
the figurational sociology theory? The emphasis which figurational work places on 
relatively complex interdependences is well served by the detailed qualitative study 
of behaviours and relationships made possible by ethnographic fieldwork. Equally, 
the study of individual orientations and worldviews as interconnected with state 
formation processes and other long term, large scale shifts pioneered by Elias (1978a) 
in contemporary form requires detailed, personal fieldwork. The methodological 
approach of taking the neighbourhood as an analytical starting point is unusual in 
figurational work, which normally focuses on larger constellations such as urban or 
(supra-)national levels. But as this is a relational ethnography, those larger figuration 
do come into view eventually, and all the more sharply because they are understood 
from the grassroots up. Finally, the historical character of my methodology fits well 
with the notion of a process sociology, which is core to the figurational approach.
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Starting point: the neighbourhood
Having set out these various components of the methodology, I want to mention the 
crucial aspect of sequentiality: the analysis starts from the neighbourhood. The pioneers 
forming new urban fabric are faced with a host of challenges: how to get connected 
to the piped water network, the electricity lines, to stay safe from robbers, to prevent 
their houses from flooding and to get their kids in a school. Especially in such a 
situation of weak collective institutions, both organisational institutions and cultural 
institutions, it is the local relations that make all the difference.7 ‘Neighbourhood’ is 
the most effective term to refer to the local level of analysis, the level where social 
bonds between generally non-professionals for the purpose of improving physical and 
social infrastructure and structuring local power relations play an important role. And 
indeed, the networks of local relations are often dense and highly active. 
Starting from below has the advantage that the focus is not limited to the larger, more 
formal institutions, but starts with the practically existing relations and organisation 
on the ground. For instance: if I had studied the water pipe network from the center 
outward, as is the more usual (top-down) method, I might have observed that it has 
somewhat loose ends. I would have observed and heard that at times, people take 
matters into their own hands (illegally) and construct a connection without the 
knowledge or permission of the utility company. However, I would have never found 
out that entire networks (two square kilometres of dense water pipe network, in and 
around Sebrepor) were built by the residents themselves, through local organisation, 
and that these only later were institutionally integrated with the central system 
- a process which is very much on-going. I would also never have observed all the 
alternative water supply systems, or perceived them only as annexes of the piped water 
system, missing the rise of a private borehole industry and the fact that many people 
simply do without a connection to the central network. 
Equally, when studying the chiefs, I might have started with a systematic overview of 
the chieftaincy structure of Greater Accra, starting from the Paramount Chiefs and 
working my way down from there. That might have been complemented by a profile of 
the position chiefs generally take in a community, assuming that they do indeed take a 
central position (which chiefs and all those around them would tell you, for better or 
for worse). However, starting from the neighbourhood level, I found out that there are 
large expectations attached to the position, but that these are often far from fulfilled. 
7 Residents’ organizing is all the more important in cities which are growing without accompanying 
industrialization, such as Accra (Rémi Jedwab, 2013), and where the new urban fabric is thus almost 
entirely residential.
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Having starting out by interviewing residents at the grassroots level, I ended up with 
a central case study of a neighbourhood whose chief is absent most of the time. In a 
top-down research project on chieftaincy, such a situation would almost certainly have 
been written off as an aberration. I also ended up with a clear picture of the way the 
chief ’s persona, in absence, still shapes the relationships between opinion leaders in 
the neighbourhood, the way he affects local organisation. Such insights come naturally 
with a perspective from the neighbourhood level, mapping from below, as opposed to 
an institution-centered perspective. This is closely related to Berry’s approach, with 
her focus on ‘everyday politics’ (S. Berry, 2002).
3.2 The primary case study area: Sebrepor
Having set out all these theoretical notions, one rather practical methodological question 
does remain unanswered: the concrete spatial one. What exactly then constitutes the 
neighbourhood, which forms the point of departure of this study? Where is it located, 
and what are its boundaries? Sebrepor lies on the northern suburbs of Tema, which is 
the eastern half of the Greater Accra urban agglomeration. Its geographical boundaries 
could be delineated in many different ways: as an electoral area, as a partition of the 
local municipality, as the traditional area of a chief, or in the streets and landmarks 
that locals use to indicate its boundaries. Each of these delineations would give us a 
different cut-out of the stretch urban fabric called Sebrepor, in which I did my primary 
fieldwork. 
But taking the average of all these approaches, we might end up with an area containing 
some 7.000 residents, covering about two square kilometres. This is close to the average 
for Accra in general, depending on how close to the center you are, where population is 
more dense and electoral areas are smaller. Sebrepor is quite mixed in terms of ethnic 
and religious composition, although a relatively large proportion of the population is 
of Ewe ethnic origins and Christians are perhaps slightly over-represented vis-a-vis 
Muslims. It is also quite mixed in socio-economic terms, with a reasonable amount of 
single family houses and even some villas sprinkled through a criss-crossing network 
of streets, which contain everything from tiny wooden shacks to rows and rows of hall-
and-chamber rental housing, made of wooden boards or sometimes bricks. I describe 
the area in more detail in chapter 4. 
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Use of the case study for each chapter
In the empirical strategy of the historical relational ethnography, much hinges 
on the choice of the primary research site. While this selection process is always 
partially serendipitous, Sebrepor does have a number of strategic characteristics, 
which recommend it as a case study area for each of the four topics of the analytical 
chapters. I discuss these in the order in which they appear in this book, following 
Yin’s (2017) typology of critical, extreme, exemplifying and revelatory cases. At the 
same time, I provide a somewhat more general description of the way I use the case 
study neighbourhood in each chapter, in terms of the historical relational ethnography 
methodology. 
Chapter 4 is based entirely in Sebrepor, a historical analysis of the neighbourhood’s 
development trajectory focusing on the role of grassroots organisation in the 
neighbourhood. This analysis could not have been written without extensive 
local ethnographic fieldwork. For the analysis of this chapter, Sebrepor functions 
an exemplifying case, one representative of a majority of cases. Sebrepor has the 
advantage that it allows for a somewhat deeper historical analysis than most other 
neighbourhoods would have allowed. As this neighbourhood started its development 
somewhat earlier than most of the surrounding areas, it is possible to find traces of 
more different stages of urban development, which enfolded under different political 
and economic conditions. This made it possible to observe change over the years of 
this project. For instance, in Sebrepor we find the traces of grassroots organisation 
during the long reign of Rawlings, a time when the country was economically weaker 
but self-organisation was also actively encouraged by the state.  
Chapter 5 is a historical relational ethnography pur sang, focusing on the chief of 
Sebrepor and his relationship with the local state. This local-level analysis is coupled 
with a historical perspective at the national level on the state-chieftaincy relationship 
as it developed through the colonial and post-colonial period. For this chapter, the 
case of Sebrepor is instructive as an critical case. A critical case is one that allows us to 
see what happens to an institution or system when a crucial element of the situation 
changes. That is: while chiefs are normally seen as the embodiment of groundedness, 
having deep local roots and forming the center of community life, Sebrepor’s chief 
does not reside in the neighbourhood, and almost never makes an appearance there, 
because of family strife over his position. Sebrepor thus allows us to see what happens 
to the position of the chieftaincy in the local social fabric in the case of such an ‘absentee 
chief ’, who despite a lack of physical presence still holds the ‘traditional authority’ over 
the area.
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Chapter 6 also starts from Sebrepor, looking at the contribution of churches to the 
production of collective amenities such as schools and clinics. It does so less through 
a spatial lens, focusing instead on church doctrines and organisational forms and how 
these transform or remain stable over time, as the socio-economic background changes 
around them, shifting from a colonial state with local monopolies for individual 
churches to the contemporary highly competitive arena of religious pluralism. Here, 
Sebrepor forms an exemplifying or representative case again. In fact, the neighbourhood 
as a unit of analysis does not figure very prominently in this chapter: the analysis 
rather revolves around the churches themselves. However, Sebrepor’s age is relevant 
here once again, as this chapter’s analysis relies on the comparison between churches 
which dominated the religious landscape until 10-20 years ago, and churches who do 
so now. It is instructive to find both types of churches in the same neighbourhood. 
Chapter 7 is again firmly grounded in the historical relational ethnography model, 
taking Sebrepor as a strategic case to show how local organisation interacts with more 
settled and formalised institutions in the creation of utility networks. From there 
the analysis slowly fans out, extended through case studies in other neighbourhoods 
to broaden the analysis, and slowly zooming out to the Ghana Water Company’s 
organisational form, then to the water provision sector as a whole. For this chapter, 
we can best see Sebrepor as an extreme case, one where one factor is very extreme: 
in this case an unusually high and effective degree of self-organisation. This chapter 
investigates the historical decentralised network development process of the water 
network and its consequences for city-wide levels of collectivity. Sebrepor is extreme 
in this regard, as the entire piped water network in Sebrepor (and surrounding areas) 
was auto-constructed by area residents, with very little involvement of the state utility 
company. This makes it easier to see the dynamics originating from such highly 
developed self-help organisation.
3.3 Data gathering and fieldwork
Having described the overarching methodology or research design of the study, we 
are left with the nuts and bolt of the fieldwork: the research methods. I was fortunate 
enough, through generous and flexible funding, to have the opportunity to split the 
fieldwork up in several periods of stay. This made it possible to start with a round of 
exploratory interviews and neighbourhood visits, to test the initial assumptions and 
allow the research subject to gradually take shape. In total the fieldwork took place 
over four visits to Ghana between 2014 and 2018: first an exploratory visit of a single 
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month, and in subsequent years roughly three months per year, totalling 10 months 
of fieldwork. Part of this period was spent living in Sebrepor and other newly growing 
neighbourhoods, with another part spent in central Accra to facilitate access to gather 
data from government institutions. 
This section sets out the practical methods used for data gathering during these 
fieldwork episodes. In brief: I first set out my general approach, which can be summed 
up as fixed central question, flexible use of methods. I then set out the process of 
approaching the research subject, gaining a first understanding of Accra’s ecology and 
its core institutions, and grounding the research. From there, I chose a case study area, 
conducted a block of door-to-door interviews there, and subsequently branched out 
into various lines of inquiry with a series of semi-structured interviews with grassroots 
leaders, civil servants, politicians and other key informants. I augmented these with 
ethnographic work and document analysis from various archives. To broaden the 
research base beyond the central case study area, I added a comparative dimension: 
I conducted systematic observations and interviews in eight other neighbourhoods. 
Finally, and not unimportantly, I kept exploring the city in an open-ended sense. 
Below, I describe each of these data gathering methods in detail. 
Fixed central question, flexible use of methods
Throughout the research process for this thesis, I kept quite an open approach to the 
research subject, based in the grounded theory research philosophy (Charmaz, 2014; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Within this, my efforts fall primarily under the heading of 
‘theory construction’ (Glaser, 1992) rather than under ‘concept development’ (A. 
Strauss & Corbin, 1990; A. L. Strauss, 1987). I believe that in such an unfamiliar 
situation, working with a diversity of data gathering techniques, constant grounding 
and re-evaluating, and actively triangulating is the most effective way towards 
promising theory formation.
The anchoring point throughout the project remained the core research question: how 
do residents of Accra’s newly developing neighbourhoods organise to create collective 
amenities for their area? It took me a long time to become more or less familiar with the 
peculiarities of Accra as a city and Ghana as a highly diverse and complex cultural and 
institutional world. Parallel to this journey of discovery and growing understanding, I 
built a network of personal connections in Accra and in the process ‘made the city my 
own’. These two processes of preparation, as one might call them, are rarely mentioned 
in descriptions of research projects.8 But they form a vital part of the work. 
8 As the apocryphal Einstein quote goes: “if we knew what we were doing, it wouldn’t be called research”.
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Hence my approach, both in terms of analytical objects and research methods, changed 
throughout the process. As for the core objects of analysis, two examples may serve: 
chiefs and churches. Over time, I came to understand that chiefs held a very central 
position in Ghana’s institutional fabric, anchored both in the formal state structure and 
looming large in the popular imagination of a Ghanaian community, whether urban 
or rural. This led me to focus a full chapter on these traditional leaders, although there 
was no mention of chiefs in my research proposal, because I found that their position 
in the cities had not been adequately theorised or empirically investigated so far. 
Similarly, it also took me quite a while to discover the immensely central role of 
churches in building up Ghana’s educational and medical infrastructure. Having 
discovered this, however, I decided to focus an entire chapter on the churches. None 
of this was planned or indeed knowable before I started the research project. Through 
a similar process of discovery, I found out about the centrality of the Residents 
Association. I decided to interview all present and former leadership figures I could 
locate, which led to the development of chapter 4. Thus, although my central question 
remained constant, the core objects of analysis within that overarching question 
changed throughout the research project. 
Following the same logic for data gathering methods as I did for analytical objects 
of focus, I made a conscious choice not to fix myself to a particular set of empirical 
methods before the start of the project. During the fieldwork, I used a wide variety of 
data gathering methods, flexibly determined by the needs of the research subject at 
hand, as described in the remainder of this section. Working on unfamiliar territory, I 
tried to form hypotheses as early on in the research as possible, which I then actively 
tried to falsify during subsequent interviews and other data gathering activities. 
Take again, for instance, the persona of the chief. I first discovered his importance during 
exploratory door-to-door interviews of ordinary residents, in which I had included 
questions asking what people felt was the biggest problem in the neighbourhood, 
also asking whose responsibility it might be to fix those problems. This in turn led 
me to conduct semi-structured interviews with Sebrepor’s chief and several others. 
From here, I started looking for additional forms of data. Finally, an interview with 
a neighbourhood elder serendipitously led me to a rich source of information: the 
chief ’s Divisional Council archives.
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Approaching the research subject
Having set out the methodological philosophy and its motivations, I now briefly discuss 
how I structured this grounded theory process in practice. In short, I started with an 
exploratory phase, followed by a systematic pursuit of various research subjects that 
emerged from the exploratory interviews and observations. The general technique for 
finding research topics used in this project could be summarised as follows: ask people 
what they considered infrastructural deficits in their environment, then ask them 
“who should fix that” or “who does fix that” and then find those people or institutions. 
If they indeed appeared to play an important role, the analysis then consisted of 
tracing the network of social connections, historical precursors and other lines flowing 
outward from these people or institutions, slowly working towards larger geographical 
scales and into history. I traced these lines until I felt I properly understood how they 
ticked, what the figuration around them looked like, what their power or ability to act 
rested on and what moral or social obligations or desires drove them. In the following 
paragraphs, this methodological trajectory and its internal logic are set out in more 
detail. 
As I first arrived in Accra, aiming to understand how people organise for collective 
amenities, I had very few local contacts, but I knew of one NGO that worked to 
‘empower communities’: People’s Dialogue. So my research started through them, 
with interviews with NGO workers and their contacts in the community, ‘community 
representatives’, working from the offices and the resources of PD, the best-known 
community development NGO in Accra. However, as I delved deeper into their network, 
I came to realise that PD did not actually seek out pre-existing community leaders but 
rather worked with a small amount of fixed contacts, whom they introduced to all 
visitors who came to inspect field projects. In addition, it became clear that Accra does 
not have many neighbourhoods that could be characterised as ‘informal settlements’. 
Although land ownership in many areas is more or less contested, wholesale squatting 
of areas is extremely rare. So I decided to cast my net wider, at the newly emerging 
neighbourhoods on the urban fringe. 
Through contacts at the university and chance conversations, I acquired entry points 
in various neighbourhoods: Old Fadama in Accra center, Okatabanman, between 
Madina and Adenta, Sebrepor, on the northern side of Tema, and Darkuman, on 
the north-western side of Accra. In each of these neighbourhoods, I did exploratory 
interviews and observations. From there I selected the neighbourhood that seemed 
most promising on the basis of my criteria at the time. That is: the neighbourhood 
should be relatively new, not quite finished in terms of infrastructure, contain at least 
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some resident organising networks, and not be too unique or extraordinary in any 
particular dimension. That neighbourhood was Sebrepor.
Door-to-door interviews
After doing some exploratory interviews in Sebrepor, I started with the first round 
of structured data gathering, at the absolute grassroots level. That is, a series of door-
to-door semi-structured interviews covering a complete street block. The block was 
selected according to the following criteria: socio-economically mixed, ethnically 
mixed, politically mixed, and roughly average for the rest of the neighbourhood in 
all of these areas (see table 3.1 below). The choice to interview every household on a 
single block was made to ensure that there was no self-selection or accessibility bias 
in the respondents. The choice for such a mixed block was made in order to capture 
as broad a range of lived experiences as possible. Some basic characteristics of the 
respondents are pasted below. 
Gender Age bracket Housing situation (socio-economic indicator)
male  10x 18-30:  8x shack: 10x
female  29x 30-39:  6x hall&chamber:  26x
  40-49:  10x 3+ rooms or complete house:  13x
  50-59:  6x 
  60+:  6x 
   unknown  3x  
Table 3.1: basic descriptives of the respondents to the door-to-door interviews 
Within this block I conducted a standardised interview with at least one, but 
preferably more, respondent from every household on that block. The questionnaire 
was designed to shed light on the basic social fabric of the neighbourhood, focusing 
on residents’ background, their relations to each other, and their view of the area. 
It included questions about personal characteristics, housing situation, personal 
history, neighbourhood history, personal social networks, social cohesion in the 
neighbourhood, infrastructure development and the presence or lack of organisation 
and leadership in neighbourhood development. 
For instance, I asked how well people knew their neighbours, whether they felt they 
had friends in the area, whether they belonged to any groups or clubs, where they 
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would borrow a chair, some pots or some money in case of need, how they got their 
water on a daily basis, what was wrong with the neighbourhood and who should 
work to fix it, and much more. I first tested the questionnaire with five respondents, 
then updated it and used the same questionnaire for the rest of the block. For the full 
questionnaire, see Appendix 3.
These were not easy conversations. People found it hard to understand why anyone 
would ask such basic questions, and even harder to see how I could have such a terribly 
poor understanding of their answers, often repeating the same question twice or thrice 
even after they had provided a crystal clear answer. Because the answers, indeed the 
entire conversations, were often shockingly surprising and revealing, at least to me. 
There was another reason why these conversations were hard and frustrating for both 
sides: I did not understand people well. For my benefit, they did speak English. But 
Ghanaian English is quite an idiosyncratic language (Simo Bobda, 2000). And quite 
apart from spoken language, Ghanaian body language also has its own conventions. 
I had to get used to subtle nods or tilts of the head, the meaning of longer or shorter 
silences, the ways people say no (or yes) when they do not want to say it outright, 
the ways people signal that they are uncomfortable talking to you or want to end the 
conversation, and so much more. And then of course there are the social conventions. 
For instance about giving back: when you fly in from a country with much larger 
material wealth, and ask for somebody’s time and energy in a strange and seemingly 
useless interview, are you expected to provide any material gift in return? And how do 
you do this without being rude or making people feel like beggars? 
In all of these matters, I was a novice, and this made my research quite difficult. For 
instance, these misunderstandings made interviewees irritated, tired and suspicious. 
At one point, people started physically fighting provoked by our presence, and I and 
my research quickly had to retreat to safer quarters. At other moments, my research 
assistant was asked “why she had brought a political spy” into the neighbourhood. She 
was subsequently threatened, and cautioned not to walk outside alone after nightfall. 
Despite the fact that we had introduced ourselves and gotten research permission from 
the Assemblyman and the chief ’s elders, such issues could not be wholly prevented. 
In the foreword I have dutifully thanked my interlocutors for their great patience, and 
my research assistants for their invaluable help and translation in linguistic, cultural, 
social and many more dimensions. But here I want to note that these issues are not just 
good stories afterward, or reasons to hand out thanks. They are real methodological 
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concerns as well. For instance, the language barrier means that many researchers do 
interviews only with the help of a translator, or end up interviewing only those who 
are accustomed to western (linguistic) habits. This is completely understandable: it 
took me several months of intense fieldwork before I was able to ask questions and 
interpret answers in a way that actually made the conversation flow, and many people 
do not have that time. But it is a real methodological problem as well, as it often limits 
the perspective of researchers to the more formal and westernised aspects of a society. 
Hence, I included this brief discussion of these issues in this methodological section.
In short, many of these door-to-door interviews were among the hardest I have done 
during my entire fieldwork, and I had to push myself hard every day just to go out 
there again and do more of them. But in terms of research, it was more than worth 
it. These interviews gave me a foundational understanding of the neighbourhood’s 
internal social dynamics, and provided a host of leads for productive further research. 
Semi-structured interviews with a variety of actors
From this initial block of door-to-door interviews, I branched out in different 
directions, following different lines of inquiry. Throughout the project, the main 
source of information consisted of interviews, generally semi-structured. I conducted 
these with traditional leaders, neighbourhood leaders and activists (‘opinion leaders’), 
civil servants at the local and central levels, political big men and ordinary residents, 
each of which I discuss below in more detail. Apart from conducting interviews, I used 
ethnographic methods, including key informants, participant observation, field notes 
and extensive informal conversations. I used various types of documents, from local 
meeting notes and letters to formal reports of utility companies. And finally, I did not 
stay solely in Sebrepor; I kept comparing the neighbourhood to others, using both 
systematic and less systematic techniques. 
I conducted in-depth semi-structured interviews with Sebrepor’s chief and all elders 
on his Divisional Council. These interviews were mostly about how these leaders saw 
their position, what tasks, roles and activities they took up on a regular basis, and how 
they saw the social fabric of Sebrepor. To augment this to a relational ethnography, I 
also interviewed his (superior) paramount chief, several chiefs in the neighbouring 
areas, officials at the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs including 
the Chief Director, dr. Afful. Branching out in another direction from the chief of 
Sebrepor, I also interviewed his land registrar. Finally, I spent a week of interviews, 
data gathering and observations at the Lands Commission (cadastral registry), the 
government institution which provides chiefs with their formal ties to the land. Here, I 
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worked to find out how the web of traditional leaders is embedded in the formal state 
and how their ‘stewardship of the land’ is interpreted in practice and translated to by 
the front line bureaucrats dealing with land ownership issues. 
To further probe the social fabric of Sebrepor, I conducted in-depth semi-structured 
interviews (several times) with Sebrepor’s Assemblyman and both of his predecessors, 
as well as Assemblymen in surrounding and other neighbourhoods. The questions were 
comparable to those asked of the chief and the people around him, although tailored 
to the specific positions of the person I was interviewing and using any additional 
information found through other interviews and observations, in order to stimulate 
deeper discussion. I also interviewed all other Sebrepor residents who were referred to 
as ‘opinion leaders’ by the residents. This included prominent businesspeople, school 
directors, political activists and church leaders, as well as leaders affiliated with the 
Sebrepor Water Committee. 
Working my way outward from the neighbourhood, I visited the Kpone-Katamanso 
District Assembly (currently a Municipal Assembly) to conduct interviews with the 
Presiding Member of the Assembly, the Chief Planning Officer, the Head of Planning, 
the Head of Social Services and several more junior civil servants. A major purpose of 
these visits to the Assembly was to obtain documentation on the work of the Assembly 
and on the activities and organisation of resident groups. Other interviews were with 
civil servants in ministries and other municipalities who had spent a year at the IHS 
in Rotterdam. These officials generally found it easier than most to be frank with me, 
and to explain the ‘less official’ version of how things worked in their institute. I also 
interviewed officials in the Ghana Water Company, Electricity Company of Ghana, and 
Department of Urban Roads, at various levels throughout these organisations. In all of 
these civil servant interviews, the goal was the same: to find out how their organisation 
worked in practical terms, and how it related to neighbourhood organisers and activists. 
I also conducted interviews with the District Chief Executive, former PM, and repeated 
interviews with the Member of Parliament for my research area. These interviews were 
generally conducted on Sunday afternoon in their respective gardens, a setting which 
allowed for undisturbed discussions, thanks to the generosity and the good network of 
my local research connections. These interviews were informative largely with regard 
to the ways these men (they were all men) portrayed themselves. The interviews with 
the MP, for instance, taught me that his emphasis was on freely giving out his phone 
numbers, being reachable. Indeed, he had three cell phones, all of which rang at least 
ten times during the interview. His assistants answered them, sometimes briefly 
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handing the phone to him. Such insights help to understand the ways people relate, 
and to see what is important in those contacts. 
In each of these networks, organisations and fields, my main technique for selecting 
interviewees was theoretical sampling, as described by Glaser and Strauss (1967). In 
this technique, “[t]he process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, 
whether substantive or formal” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45). That is, the sampling 
is an “ongoing process rather than a distinct and single stage” (Bryman, 2008, p. 415). 
This is a non-probability sampling approach, meant to progressively develop theory 
rather than to generalise a population. 
Some technical details. As table 3.2 shows, I conducted some 153 formal interviews over 
these years, roughly two thirds of which were in Sebrepor, all of which I transcribed, 
and 55 of which I coded using Nvivo. About a quarter of these interviews were repeat 
interviews with previously interviewed respondents. The number of interviews per 
category was not fixed beforehand, but determined in a continuous process of data 
evaluation. Generally, respondents allowed me to record the interviews; in a few 
cases, I had to rely on note-taking. Where possible, I have included direct quotes in 
the thesis in order to preserve local voices and details which may be of interest to 
other researchers. Interviews generally lasted 1-2 hours. All of these interviews were 
semi-structured, with a prepared questionnaire of 10-15 questions which I adapted for 
every respondent and often wrote from scratch as the situation demanded. Examples 
of these questionnaires are available in Appendix 4.
Category Amount
Politicians, including Assembly members 17
Traditional authorities: chiefs and paramount chiefs 11
Preachers and other religious leaders 14
Neighborhood elders (Sebrepor) 25
Sebrepor residents who were otherwise relevant  12
Neighborhood elders (non-Sebrepor) 20
Central government functionaries 15
Local government functionaries 10
NGO workers  12
Academics 10
Technical experts 7
Total 153
Table 3.2: an overview of the different categories of interviewees.
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Ethnography
To gain an understanding of the networks and organisations in Sebrepor, I also used 
ethnographic methods (Agar, 1996). I follow Bryman (2008) in conflating these 
with participant observation methods. In practical terms, the research setting was 
open, and my role always overt (Bell, 1969). In Gold’s (1957) scheme of participant 
observation, my work in Sebrepor, Old Fadama and Okatabanman would be placed 
in the bracket ‘observer-as-participant’. That is, I was present mainly as an interviewer 
and an observer, but also joined meals, attended birthdays, church services and other 
celebrations with my local interlocutors, got intoxicated with them on occasion and 
was invited to partake in and bear witness to some locally significant rituals such 
as libation and faith healing actions. During most of the time, I stayed in a nearby 
residence but not inside the neighbourhood, traveling back and forth during the day; 
during one month of the fieldwork, I lived in Sebrepor with the neighbour of Mr. 
Aryeetey (see below).
In Sebrepor, I had two key informants: Emmanual Aryeetey and Levina Dubin, with 
whom I developed an apprenticeship relation (Downey, Dalidowicz, & Mason, 2015). 
Mr. Aryeetey had been one of the first people to move into the area, and had lived 
there for several decades. As a former executive member of the local NDC leadership, 
he provided an entry point to political party networks, which enabled me to attend 
several closed-door political meetings and gain an inside understanding of the logic of 
political parties. As a former secretary of the chief ’s Divisional Council, he provided 
access to Sebrepor’s chief, his paramount (superior) chief in Kpone, and to several 
other chiefs and related figures around the area. Finally, as a former executive in the 
Residents Association, he was able to put me in touch with many current and former 
resident activists in the area. Exploring his personal network and history also helped 
me to understand the degree to which leadership roles of various institutions are 
frequently combined in single ‘big men’ in urban Ghana.
My second key informant, Mrs. Dubin, has lived nearly all of her life in Sebrepor. 
She is the daughter of one of the most prominent NPP political actors in and around 
Sebrepor, Charles Dubin. Thus, I was a frequent guest in the Dubin family home 
during each of my fieldwork bouts. This facilitated my access to an experienced 
politician, Charles Dubin. Spending time with Mrs. Dubin also allowed me to learn 
more about the political process from someone who had been a frequent observer of 
political gatherings without having a clear personal stake in them. Having Mrs. Dubin 
as a key informant also allowed me to get closer access to gendered perspectives on 
neighbourhood relations, to learn about the kinds of gossip that did the rounds in 
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the area and to simply see the area from the perspective of someone who grew up 
there and spent time as a child in the area’s developing stages. Mrs. Dubin frequently 
also acted as my research assistant, translating interviews and helping me to navigate 
social settings, especially in the early stages of the research. On rare occasions she also 
individually conducted interviews and made covert observations, in situations where 
I could not have gained access. 
To gather the data for chapter 6, I participated in Sunday services and other activities in 
some ten different churches. Here, my role was that of a researcher-participant (Gans, 
1968). That is, I entered these services as a participant, joined the prayer and other 
parts of the service, signed up as a church member and generally participated as an 
ordinary congregant to the best of my understanding.9 But I was not a total participant: 
having a smart phone allowed me to take brief notes during the service and to take 
pictures and even record brief videos.10 I finally chose two of these churches as my case 
studies, which I visited more frequently.
In these two churches, the Christ the King Presbyterian Church and the Freedom 
Chapel, I participated in a number of church services and conducted semi-structured 
interviews with believers, ushers and assistant pastors, as well as the head pastors. 
Again inspired by authors who might be seen as operating on the border between 
anthropology and sociology, I try to follow Benson and Jackson’s (Benson & Jackson, 
2013) recommendation to incorporate performativity into this analysis, looking 
at how people come together, through what rituals and regularities they constitute 
their community and give it a practical form of cohesion (chapters 4 and 6). After all, 
community is a ‘public doing’ (Jenkins, 2014, pp. 138, ).
9 That is not to say that I did not stand out in these church services. Although I tried my best to blend 
in, I sometimes misunderstood rituals, and on one occasion found myself dancing around the open 
space in front of the pew, as did many other church-goers, only to look around and realize that the 
other dancers were all ladies - from the church’s official dancing team. Fortunately, the Ghanaians I 
met nearly universally valued active and indeed fervent participation in the service over accurate rule-
following, and were rather forgiving of such beginners’ mistakes. 
 A more important reason why I stand out is the fact that I am white-skinned. I came to realize just 
how visible and indeed observed that makes a researcher after participating in the Sunday service of a 
2000-person church. I had joined the service in a seat towards the back of the church and kept a modest 
profile during the more effervescent parts of the service, trying to be as unobtrusive as possible. 
However, over the subsequent weeks I found myself having several conversations where people (whom 
I had never met before) mentioned having seen me in that church and (approvingly) mentioned details of 
the way I had participated there, indicating that a large amount of congregants had paid close attention 
to my behavior during the service.
10 Unfortunately, I had to use the latter technique sparsely: church services seem to be among the very 
few occasions where Ghanaians do not enjoy snapping pictures to share on social media.
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In exploring Sebrepor, I used field notes as much as possible. Generally, these were 
jotted notes first, worked out as full field notes later that evening when I returned to 
the privacy of my home (Lofland & Lofland, 1984; Sanjek, 1990). In addition to these 
formal field notes, I also kept a blog during each episode of my fieldwork, on which I 
recorded the most striking impressions in my research area and in Accra in general. 
Working out field notes in this way also enabled me to think them through as if in 
conversation, which led me to explore situations and impressions in more depth. 
In addition to these formal interviews, ethnographic immersion techniques and 
key informant connections, I also gained many insights from other, less formalised 
informants. Sometimes these were experts of various kinds, such as political operators, 
academics or resident organisers. Others were simply observant citizens. Most 
Ghanaians I have met are very friendly and open people, willing to discuss almost any 
aspect of the world they live in, which they often viewed in a radically different way 
than I did. In addition, Accra is an exceptionally safe city (except for its traffic) and 
access to every kind of area was therefore uninhibited by considerations of safety. This 
allowed me to gather a wealth of additional information, research leads and insights 
from discussions with friends, neighbours, taxi drivers, academics, research assistants, 
expatriates, fellow fieldworkers and other people I met throughout the city.
To better understand the position of the chief in the contemporary Ghanaian urban 
fabric, one organisation I studied in-depth was the Divisional Council. This is a council 
of some 5-7 elders from various ethnicities in Sebrepor, brought together by the chief 
to consolidate his position in the neighbourhood and facilitate the resolution of local 
conflicts among residents. Since it was not possible for me to attend their meetings, 
which had become infrequent by the time my fieldwork started, I complemented my 
interviews of the council’s members with an analysis of the council’s archive, which 
consists of meeting notes, letters sent and received and several other types of documents 
related to the council’s work. I used these documents to gain a historical understanding 
of the council’s activities, to understand their perspective on developments in the 
neighbourhood, to theorise the position of the chief in contemporary urban Ghana, 
and to draw leads from which I used as probes in subsequent interviews. 
Document analysis
More broadly in the research process, I used documents to understand organisational 
logics and to gather quantitative information where possible. For chapter 7 I spent 
the better part of some weeks in the Public Records and Archives Administration 
Department (PRAAD), where I systematically combed through all folders from the 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below112
colonial and post-colonial era that seemed to have anything to do with the (piped) 
water supply system, the electricity network or the roads network. I also acquired 
a number of internal historical reports of the GWC and the Department of Urban 
Roads from my interlocutors there, which helped to understand their internal logic 
and which also provided a broader spectrum of information on their respective 
physical networks throughout the city. Finally, I received a number of documents from 
the Kpone-Katamanso District Assembly, which helped to get an overview of what 
a municipality does and what sort of practical problems it runs into. Besides this, I 
sometimes used newspaper report to triangulate insight about these organisations and 
to help gauge public sentiments about issues. 
Comparative dimension: other neighbourhoods
However informative the lens of a relational neighbourhood ethnography is, it also has 
its limitations. One limitation is that a single case of a small-scale area study carries 
the risk of drawing unwarranted generalised conclusions (Sarsby, 1984). So even after 
selecting Sebrepor as my primary case study, I kept spending time and conducting 
interviews in other neighbourhoods. This served partly to include more extreme 
cases, such as the resident organisation CD-Rec in Okatabanman, an extremely 
energetic and effective resident organisation platform that goes far beyond what most 
Residents Associations tend to accomplish. Following this organisation’s work through 
interviews, participant observations in their meetings and three years of presence 
in their neighbourhood organising WhatsApp group greatly helped to augment my 
understanding of how neighbourhood organising works in contemporary Accra. 
Apart from gaining what I could from my network of personal connections, I also 
built in a more systematic comparative dimension, selecting other neighbourhoods of 
various types and locations to augment the case study of Sebrepor. With the invaluable 
assistance of the tireless fieldworker Levina Dubin, who has accompanied this project 
almost from the very beginning, I put together profiles of eight other newly growing 
neighbourhoods (see Appendix 2 for an overview). To improve inter-observer 
consistency, we mapped four of these eight neighbourhoods together, each taking our 
own observations and subsequently comparing notes and discussing differences in 
interpretation. 
These neighbourhood profiles included systematic observations on collective amenities 
in two different blocks of each neighbourhood, as well as interviews with at least one, 
but generally two or three long-time residents, selected for their knowledge of the 
area. The below table provides an overview of these comparative cases. Throughout the 
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thesis, these neighbourhoods sometimes figure as minor comparative case studies. But 
more often they served chiefly to inform and sharpen the descriptions of the processes 
as found in Sebrepor, and to help flag developments or conditions that were specific to 
Sebrepor and not broadly generalisable. 
Neighborhood
Afienya
Bulasu
Christian Village
Community 25
Dawhenya
Gbetsile
Golf City
Kpone
Sbrepor
Socio-economic 
profile
Lower middle class
Upper middle class
Middle class
Middle class
Lower middle class
Poor
Middle class
Lower middle class
Middle class
Resident 
Association 
active
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Est.
1998
2013
1995
2010
1960
1985
2000
1950
1975
Description
Village core on the northern 
edge of the urban fringe area.
Relatively new neighborhood, 
clearly delineated plots.
Part of the older Ashiaan 
agglomeration, no pre-existing village.
Relatively new neighborhood, 
clearly delineated plots.
Older village on the urban fringe, 
established in 1970s for farming,
Dense neighborhood within the 
urban fabric. 
Older, but organized, quite 
centrally positioned neighborhood. 
Old village core, dense, messy, a lot of 
communal housing.
Mixed buildings, somewhat older than 
surrounding neighborhoods, no village.
Table 3.3: an overview of the neighbourhoods in which I did comparative research
Exploration as a fieldwork method
Finally, in order to further broaden my understanding of the urban fabric, I also 
undertook frequent trips throughout other parts of Accra’s built-up area, in taxis or on 
the back of a friend’s motorbike, taking pictures and making notes throughout the day 
and chatting to as many people as possible. If I may end this methodological chapter 
with a recommendation to future researchers (and my future self), I would echo the 
advice given by Doug Saunders, author of Arrival City (2011). That is (paraphrased 
from p. 2 of that work): 
Ride the train, bus or whatever you can find, from the city center to 
the furthest station. Get out there, walk around, talk to random people. 
Then slowly make your way back to the center over the course of a day. 
That is the best way to really get to know a city, and to find out things 
that you would have never looked for.
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Neighbours: 
the rise and fall of 
residents organisations
This chapter analyses the most local level of organising for amenities: between neighbors. In section 4.1, I provide a brief chapter introduction and position this material within the thesis 
as a whole. The next section of the chapter, 4.2, sketches a portrait 
of Sebrepor today and provides an impression of its social fabric. 
Section 4.3 describes the founding years and the kinds of claims and 
relationships to the land that existed before peri-urban settlers started 
moving here. Section 4.4 describes the rise of Sebrepor’s Residents 
Associations, a cluster of effective grassroots organisers for collective 
amenities. Section 4.5 describes their demise, as the neighbourhood 
became more densely inhabited, its population more heterogeneous 
and as competing organisations entered the fray. Section 4.6 
describes the proper arrival of formal government on the scene, the 
process that led to the establishment of a local municipality and the 
effect it had on the grassroots organisations. Section 4.7 discusses 
commercial and grassroots organisations that do not work to provide 
collective amenities, in order to provide a more complete picture of the 
organisational fabric of the area. Finally, section 4.8 concludes with 
an analysis of the evolving interrelation between the neighbourhood’s 
grassroots organisation and the formal institutions that extend into the 
growing neighbourhood from the existing city and state.4
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4.1 Introduction
Within the thesis, this chapter discusses the most local relations, those between 
neighbours. It analyses how purely local grassroots organising leads to concrete 
collective amenities such as roads, water pipe networks and public security. It centers 
on Residents Associations: secular, goal-specific organisations at the neighbourhood 
level, working to organise local infrastructure development. These bodies form the 
platform through which a surprising amount of neighbourhood-level amenities are 
developed. More generally, the chapter investigates how residents organise themselves 
in the early stages of neighbourhood development and how this changes as thicker and 
more diverse strands of organisational connection develop between the neighbourhood 
and the wider urban fabric. 
The chapter’s contribution to the larger project is threefold. First, it introduces the 
central case study neighbourhood Sebrepor (see Figure 4.1, below). Second, it provides 
a rare empirical case study of evolving resident organisation in a newly growing 
neighbourhood from the start, helping us to understand under what conditions 
grassroots organisations like Residents Associations flourish and break down. Third, it 
provides a first vista on the development process of newly growing urban fabric, seen 
from the ground. Chapter 5-7 do that too, but this chapter is less specialised in a single 
institution or amenity, thus providing a broader perspective on the process as a whole.
Figure 4.1: Sebrepor, 2018
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It is based on the historical relational ethnography as a methodological approach, while 
following a chronological story line over the past 50 years of Sebrepor’s development. 
It describes the evolution of social organisation in Sebrepor, as it grew from an 
unnamed patch of bush, a few hours walking distance from the Atlantic coast, to a 
fully developed neighbourhood, part of the growing tapestry of urban fabric known as 
Greater Accra, the capital city of Ghana. It shows through what processes was Sebrepor 
tied into the urban fabric more closely, and how this process of integration into the 
city changed the neighbourhood’s internal social fabric. By studying the area through 
a historical, relational and geographic lens, it simultaneously uses Sebrepor as a lens on 
the broader development processes of Greater Accra.
4.2 An impression of Sebrepor
Sebrepor is not a clearly demarcated neighbourhood with a strong identity. Nobody 
will call themselves a ‘Sebreporian’. Some people call the place Kakatomanso 2, some 
say Old Sebrepor, others do not give this area any particular name. The locals will 
roughly know the boundaries of area they are referring to. But there is no spatial unity 
in any form; the neighbourhood could be best viewed as an archipelago of many little 
islands. Nor is Sebrepor a uniform area. Its population is a mix, in terms of wealth, 
religion, ethnicity, education, and this diversity shows. Some areas consist mainly of 
walled mansions, nested in a raster of dirt roads, empty and faced with walls on all 
sides. In other parts there are no walls at all. One can walk freely between the houses, 
and this is not seen as trespassing. But come too close to the front door or porch, and 
there is a zone which is private. We say “co-co-co” before entering that zone, indicating 
that we are knocking on the door. This does not necessarily require an answer before 
advancing further. 
Limited street life
The streets and public spaces are rather abandoned, considering the amount of people 
that live in the area. Some, almost all women, are sitting around the houses, although 
not very many during the daytime. Clearly, this is a bit of a sleeping neighbourhood; 
most of the residents spend their day elsewhere, the men as well as the women. But 
some are at home during the daytime. They do washing outside, or sometimes just sit 
on their porch or in front of their house. Little kiosks dot the landscape, selling phone 
credit, little sachets of washing powder, water or milk, candy and lottery tickets. These 
are basically standing plywood boxes with a woman, nearly always a woman, inside 
them. It’s the women who do the petty trading in Ghana, for as long as anyone can 
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remember. 
Figure 4.2: a shop is being moved, to make way for an expansion of the road. Most of the 
shops in Greater Accra are mobile, either wooden kiosks or halved shipping containers, and are 
frequently moved around as the neighbourhoods develop. 
Along the wider unpaved streets, where cars can drive, there are little shops, mostly 
built into the frontage of homes, or in halved shipping containers, retrofitted for this 
purpose and rented out throughout Accra (see Figure 4.2, above). Most of these shops 
have roughly the same assortment as the kiosks, expanded with different kinds of 
drinks and packaged foodstuffs, others specialise in frozen meat, fashion, there are 
also restaurants and barber shops. Some sell only packaged drinking water. 
Taking a closer look, one notices how many of these shops have iron grills welded in 
front of their door. Some of them do the business through these iron bars, passing the 
goods through them and taking the money in that way too. Most do open their door 
completely, and only close those iron grills at night. People explain that they are there 
because of armed robbers. Armed robbers and other types of bandits play a large role 
in people’s imagination of the neighbourhood. It is difficult to ascertain how many are 
really there, but every area I have been had recent stories of thieves or armed robbers 
coming around and stealing from people. Many of these stories included a vigilante 
group catching the robbers and beating them to death. 
Little bars are sprinkled around the neighbourhood. Old billboard tarpaulins, cut into 
long narrow strips, serve as something in between a wall and a curtain to the outside 
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world, for the privacy of the drinkers. They don’t work very well; it is generally very 
possible to look inside and see who are there: almost exclusively men, between 20 and 
70 years old. Usually just a few, or even one, drinking alone. They don’t limit their 
drinking to specific times of the day, but are not in it to get screaming drunk either. 
They are just spending time there. 
People gather in other places too. From colourfully painted buildings, several stories 
high (a rarity in this neighbourhood), the chatter of schoolchildren is heard. In other 
streets, crackling loudspeakers carry the urgent voice of a preacher and the answers of 
his congregation out into the street from large, barn-like church structures with names 
like Doctor Jesus Prayer Ministry, Christ the King Presbyterian, International Central 
Gospel Church and Beautiful Gate. At night, light spills out through the ventilation 
openings in the walls, as their choir, their youth wing or their Women’s League gather 
inside for their weekly meeting.
But most people are not outside. Surprisingly many people spend their days sitting 
inside their homes, even throughout the midday heat. Although there are trees outside 
to sit under, with a bit of wind to cool down and a view on the streets to pass the time, 
many people choose instead to isolate themselves inside their home, mostly watching 
television. These homes are sparsely decorated, both on the outside and on the inside. 
The only thing covering most walls are some family pictures, some images of Jesus. 
Oh, and calendars, calendars everywhere, from last year or from ten years ago. These 
are handed out by companies or churches as advertising tools, and people put them up 
on the wall for a bit of colour. 
Spending some more time in the neighbourhood, chatting with people here and there, 
an odd sensation arises: most people don’t seem to feel at ease in this new urban world 
they live in. They don’t like to associate beyond the boundaries of their home, and seem 
to feel quite alone in the area. People often move along the street alone, and somewhat 
hurried, like moving around the neighbourhood is a liability. This sensation is also 
expressed in the sermons of those very jubilant churches, sermons which are alive with 
stories of (mis)fortune, curses and spells. The armed robbers figuring so prominently 
in the accounts of residents and shop-owners, too, seem to stand for something else 
than just robbers. In these stories, they take on a grander and more sinister character, 
of nightly danger, of the darkness itself. 
And there is no safety in personal contacts, either. “People are always talking,” one of 
the oldest residents cautioned. “I go around, sure, to do my shopping and everything. 
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I go to church. But I don’t stop to talk to people. No, no, no, no, no. That will only get 
you into trouble.” In fact, most people don’t seem to fraternise with their neighbours 
much either. When asked where they would borrow something in need, most people 
reply that they would never borrow anything. Not even a pan, or a couple of chairs 
in the case of visitors. Sure, the neighbours would lend it to them, but they would 
“always harass me afterward, looking down on me”. Many also explain that they “don’t 
do friends”, since friends, too, will only get you in trouble. In fact, that is what many of 
these churches promise deliverance from: evil spells cast by one’s jealous friends and 
family members, chains which bind one to the ground, the ‘pull-him-down syndrome’, 
demons, witchcraft.
Collective action
In this kind of environment, it is not easy to get people together for a shared enterprise, 
even in daylight. The fact that neighbours have so many shared problems, if only of 
physical infrastructure, does not automatically lead to shared action or neighbourly 
organisation. One resident complained: 
“I’ve tried to get my neighbours together to fill up the big hole in our 
dead-end alley here. We all have cars and they all have to go through 
that giant pit, which is damaging them. We are five, so it should not 
be too difficult. But I could not even get them interested.” (Interview 
Robbins, 2015) 
When something does get off the ground, people often find it hard to keep track of the 
process. 
“A man came by the door. He said he was our neighbour and he was 
gathering money to build a gutter along this street. We didn’t believe 
him at first, but then he convinced us and we gave him some money. The 
gutter never came. After a year, we started wondering about this. My 
father eventually went to the Assemblyman, who told our neighbour to 
give the money back. He did.” (Interview Owusu, 2015)
It seems that in such situations at some point inevitably some money disappears or 
seems to disappear, and the brief spurt of neighbourly activism is ended. Doors close, 
and people don’t talk to their neighbour again.
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But such mishaps do not stop people from trying to come together. After all, everyone 
needs some kind of community. What is more, these specific people, living in newly 
settled areas, have a great shared need of infrastructure. And attempts are made. In fact, 
Greater Accra is absolutely buzzing with grassroots initiatives to improve collective 
amenities. When I went house to house in Sebrepor for interviews, it turned out that at 
least every second homeowner had in the past years gathered their neighbours to tackle 
one or more projects. They often included a local church or business, and worked to 
build a stretch of drainage, fix holes in the road, create speed bumps and so on. 
People really do try. In a sea of perceived dangers, mistrust and anonymity, people work 
hard to build islands of trust and cooperation. This chapter is about those islands.11
4.3 Early days
The neighbourhood lies on the outskirts of Tema along the northward Tema-
Akosombo road, just opposite the army base Michel Camp. The first settlers in the area 
were poultry farmers, a few scattered farms in the bush. Their main connection to the 
outside world was an overgrown footpath to the Tema-Ada road, which today forms 
part of the Trans–West African Coastal Highway, linking together the entire West 
African coastline. Each week, the farmers would pool together to send one person to 
the market in Tema to buy chicken feed. Sometimes, traders passed by the farms to buy 
their poultry, transporting it on a flatbed pickup truck to the Tema or Accra markets. 
Under Acheampong’s Operation Feed Yourself (1972-1978), some more pioneers 
moved into the area (Interview Vinoko, 2018). For a bottle of schnapps and a symbolic 
payment, they acquired permission to farm there from Nii Dortey I, a noble from the 
local Ga tribe. The tribal elders of Kpone, a village ten kilometres south of Sebrepor on 
the Atlantic shore, had sent Nii there to act as headman of the nascent hamlet. However, 
he warned the arriving farmers: they were not allowed to build anything permanent on 
the land (Interview Vinoko, 2018). The area had been acquisitioned under Nkrumah’s 
presidency from the traditional owners by the government-owned Tema Development 
Corporation (TDC). The TDC had subsequently leased the land to the army, who 
had built the Michel Camp barracks on it, but left most of the land empty. Seeing the 
land remain fallow, the chiefs had recently decided to reoccupy the land. Not with 
any grand moves, but simply by sending a few of their family members to farm there, 
11 The chapter focuses on Accra’s Residents Associations, a topic on which I only know of one other piece 
of substantial research, by Katherine Gough (1999).
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living in temporary structures of mud and plywood. During Acheampong’s reign in 
the 1970s, farming was encouraged as part of Operation Feed Yourself, so the Michel 
Camp army command turned a blind eye as farmers built their provisional mud and 
wood structures in the bush outside their gates (Interview Abotey, 2015).
As the 1970s went on, however, the settlement slowly acquired the first signs of 
permanence. One of the pioneers, Jacob Milehu, was a retired army plumber. He 
convinced the state water company to draw up a standpipe at the edge of newly growing 
Sebrepor. From there, he gathered contributions from the other farmers to finance 
connections from the standpipe to the homesteads in the immediate surroundings. 
Another settler, Vinoko, had a father in law who was a high-ranking military officer. 
Through this connection, he got some army engineers to draw an electricity wire from 
the base to Vinoko’s homestead, just across the road (Interview Vinoko, 2018). From 
there, several wires stretched out to his neighbours’ houses. 
However, a few years later the base commander was replaced. Fearing that the land 
would slip out of his grip, the new commander decided to act. Soldiers were sent 
out to rip down the electricity wires, and the farmers were told they would have to 
vacate the land (Interview Kueli, 2015). Curiously, this crisis provided an impetus that 
would carry the settlement forward over the subsequent decades. In response to this 
existential threat, the settlers set aside their differences, quickly organised themselves 
in the Sebrepor Settler Society and formed a negotiation team which would hold 
monthly discussions with the base command and the Tema Development Corporation 
until the threat abated. As many of the settlers were retired soldiers from that very base, 
the army did not evict them in the end, on the condition that they would continue to 
not build any permanent structures in the area. 
In the 1980s, the small cluster of farms began to attract more and more ex-servicemen 
from the nearby base, as well as retired civil servants, slowly expanding into a village 
(Interview Aryeetey, 2015). Homesteads sprang up everywhere in the bush. Electricity 
was still not present, but Mr. Jacob’s Water Committee had made some headway in 
spreading the piped water network, doubling the amount of connections in the area. 
By the end of the 1980s, the first churches were also constructed in the area. Before 
then, people had grouped according to their denomination (when the concentration 
of worshippers was sufficiently large) gathering in unfinished houses, on porches 
and under trees. But now, as the danger of eviction seemed to have subsided, they 
pooled their money and built the first churches: a Pentecostal and a Methodist church 
(Interview Aryeetey, 2018). A few years after, the Presbyterians also got their own 
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church established (Interview Abotey, 2015). This made it somewhat easier to organise 
locally, as residents could now be reached through the churches, rather than through 
labor-intensive house to house visits. Roads, however, were still lacking, and the water 
had not reached most of the new settlers (Interview Achina, 2018).
The 1990s saw the influx grow further. As Tema and nearby Ashiaman grew denser 
and spawned their own suburbs around them, more and more people started coming 
in. Increasingly, the newcomers were not there to farm, but simply to live. Still, a 
large percentage of the incoming population were retired civil servants and soldiers 
(Interview Aryeetey, 2015). Others were low-income workers from the Tema harbor, 
who found a home in the rental housing that some of the older farmers had started 
to build on their land. In the early 1990s, the area got its first shop: a wooden kiosk, 
just big enough to stand in, which sold tinned fish, sugar, matches and cheap pomade 
(Interview Kueli, 2018).
In sum, during the initial neighbourhood development phase of collective action, 
residents produced a number of basic amenities almost entirely through self-help. They 
built up small, localised networks for the distribution of electricity and water, which 
they acquired through a legally gray-zone process from the nearby army barracks. They 
constructed churches, which formed an important organising platform for these self-
help efforts and facilitated coordination, trust and communication. Accessibility of the 
area, however, remained poor throughout this phase, partially on purpose. Contact 
with the state was minimal: some expulsion threats and an on-and-off permission 
to tap the local utility networks, dependent on the personal connections of specific 
settlers with army and other state personnel.
4.4 The rise of the Residents Associations
With Sebrepor expanding, it became harder for the leadership of the Settlers Association 
to gather the entire community for collective action. So in 1992, the Settlers Society 
subdivided itself into three Residents Associations (Interview Aryeetey, 2018). They 
now restarted their efforts for electricity in earnest. Vinoko, who lived in the oldest part 
of Sebrepor right next to the military base, had a cousin who was Regional Director 
of the ECG, who got that part of Sebrepor short-tracked for the state-funded Rural 
Electrification Project (Interview Vinoko, 2018). The other two Residents Associations 
banded together and collected money from the landowners in their respective areas, 
to fund the start of their own electricity networks with some help from the new chief 
(Interview Aryeetey, 2016). 
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By the second half of the 1990s, with the three Residents Associations firmly established, 
the opinion leaders12 of the area were emboldened enough to “open the place up”. Until 
then, the growth of the settlement had been covered up by the abundantly growing 
trees and bushes in the area. As Mike G, one of the oldest residents, explained: 
“We first people, we don’t want to be at the roadside. Because if 
development comes, or if soldiers come, these people will be seeing you, 
they will come and demolish, because you have to be hiding yourself. 
They can see you, they can gossip about you, so we like to be hidden.” 
(Interview G., 2018)
Though the soldiers could see that there were people living in the area, residents did 
not want to make it obvious how many people were really there, as this might provoke 
the army into action. But this also meant that the area still had no roads fit for cars and 
no structured drainage, which made life harder in many ways. Now, the Associations 
decided to open up.
The construction of open roads was done in cooperation with the Tema municipality, 
which Sebrepor fell under at the time. In appreciation of the residents’ efforts, the 
municipality provided a bulldozer on loan and a professional street planner, but it 
was up to the residents to do the rest. The committee collected contributions from the 
residents to pay for the bulldozer’s fuel, decided where the roads should be constructed, 
cleared vegetation that was in the way, and guided the operator of the bulldozer 
(Interview Aryeetey, 2018). Until then, tractor tracks and footpaths had been the only 
transportation network of the area. Now, they had dirt roads cleared of debris, tree 
stumps and larger rocks (Interview Aryeetey, 2018), so that normal passenger cars 
could enter the place. 
This also meant that wooden structures would no longer suffice. As the area was now 
opened up to outside prying eyes, any outside observer might note that here was a 
potential residential area, being actively settled. Aryeetey:
12 Opinion leaders is a local term which was hard to grasp at first, but is in fact surprisingly effective. It 
refers to anyone who has the power or the status to sway local opinion. Thus, it is a more effective term 
than ‘notables’ or ‘leaders’, grouping together wealthy businessmen, respected for their money, those 
with exceptionally high education, respected elders, pastors and so on. Generally the first people to have 
moved to an area are also among the opinion leaders, because they know the history of the area well. 
This section will make clear in more detail how important that is in an area where much is kept under 
the surface, and essential questions like land ownership are rarely definitively determined, depending 
instead on a combination of political power, legal documentation and importantly: historical claims.
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“The opening up of the area caused people to feel exposed, to feel 
that, oh, now we can be accessed, we are vulnerable. So we cannot 
continue sleeping in wooden structures. Especially along a highway like 
the one from Tema to Akosombo. If we don’t do this, some authorities, 
or developers, may come and overtake us with their own chief and 
some legal paperwork, and they will ask us to vacate the area. Because 
their wooden houses can easily be demolished. But when you put up 
something concrete, the one who will be asking you to move first will 
think, the cost involved in asking you to go leaving that block structure 
there. They’ll have to pay!” (Interview Aryeetey, 2018)
The ballooning population of the area raised another concern: security. As the area 
became more anonymous, theft increased and it became harder to spot intruders. 
Through an initiative of the Residents Association, some of the unemployed young 
men in the area were drafted into the newly formed Community Watchdog Group 
(Interview Samuels, 2015). This project, however, was beset with troubles from the 
beginning. The group was poorly funded, and the security they provided appears 
to have been accordingly poor. What’s more, many of the residents felt that the 
unemployed young men that formed the organisation were precisely the type of people 
they should be worried about (Interview Aryeetey, 2016). As the chairman of one of 
the Residents Associations put it: 
“As for security, well, it’s a problem. And we’ve come to discuss vigilante 
groups and those things. But that too will not work. Because the people 
signing up for those vigilante groups, most of the time, they themselves 
are the thieves. (…) They are dropouts, they can’t get any apprenticeship, 
that’s because they are trouble. Before you realise, there’s a break-in 
here, and they are patrolling half a mile away.” (Interview Agbey, 2018)
And since constant pay for a reliable security force could not be realised, the Watchdog 
groups were indeed disbanded in one of Sebrepor’s Residents Associations. In the other 
zones, they lasted longer, as the ex-military officers living there had more confidence 
in their abilities to control the Watchdogs. The feeling of insecurity, however, has 
remained until today. During our fieldwork in 2015-2018, our interlocutors were 
highly worried about safety, both ours and theirs. Some insisted that we do not go out 
unaccompanied. When we conducted interviews throughout the area, several people 
would only speak to us from behind the iron grills on their shop frontages.
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Despite such setbacks, the decade around the year 2000 was the high water mark for 
local organisation in Sebrepor. The carving out of roads through the settlement also 
set the general spatial plan for the area. This allowed easier expansion of the water 
and electricity networks, funded through fixed monthly contributions to the Residents 
Associations. Members with greater wealth, evident because they owned a car, tractor 
or a bigger farm, were pressured socially to contribute more (Interview Achina, 
2018). These Associations used both carrots and sticks to gather their contributions: 
backed with the legal power to force contributions and obligatory membership for 
all landowners, they also ran basic social security (’welfare’) schemes and promised 
members potential regularisation of their land (Interview Johnson, 2016). But being 
rather far removed from an effective judicial system, the mere threat of legal troubles 
was not always enough to prevent free riding. Different Residents Associations handled 
this in different styles. As Aryeetey, the former secretary of Zone 3, explained:
“Let me compare the administration of Zone 1 with that of Zone 3. 
Here, the leadership appears to have been a bit gentle. They tried to 
convince the landlords [homeowners]. But our end, where the landlords 
were livestock farmers, we came down on you heavily. If your money 
will not do the job, you must contribute your labor. If you are [too] old 
[to work], then your children. They must bring pickaxes, shovels, and 
what have you. Then no matter if it is drainage, or electricity pole, or 
laying of water pipes; you come, you do the job. So either your money 
or your labor. And we keep a register. If we have noticed that you are 
not prepared to contribute in any way, we also find a way to punish you. 
You’ll not enjoy the usage of any utility. If you try to drive your car on the 
road we all built together, oh, don’t worry. We’ll take it off the road for 
you. In our zone, everybody paid.” (Interview Aryeetey, 2016)
In 2004 the neighbourhood also got its first secondary school, a public one. Confronted 
with the choice between low-quality expensive private schools or traveling costs for 
their children every school day, a group of parents came together. They sent out letters 
to the parents of all children enrolled in the three primary schools of the area to pitch 
the idea, and a general meeting was organised. Encouraged and facilitated by several of 
the community elders, the parents contributed enough to build the first two classroom 
blocks, helped by an advance of roofing materials from a local construction shop. The 
Tema Department of Education seconded two teachers for a year. After the school had 
successfully run its first year, the local Member of Parliament secured government 
funding to build two more classroom blocks and formally adopt the school into the 
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public system, thus guaranteeing its continuity (Interview Aryeetey, 2016). A few years 
later, the Presbyterian Christ the King church, the largest religious community of the 
area, constructed the second Junior Secondary School in the area (see also chapter 6).
It might be good to put the success of the Residents Associations somewhat into 
perspective here. Since most of the residents were far from wealthy, the networks for 
electricity and water spread through the area haltingly. It took until the year 2000 
for electricity to transverse the first kilometre from the Michel Camp gate, and only 
around 2010 would the network reach all corners of the settlement. At that point, 
many people were still not connected, as this requires a financial outlay of around 
€150. As for water, its expansion was slowed down somewhat by the fact that those 
who already had water were trying to recoup their investment by selling the water by 
the bucket. Hence, they were hesitant to let their neighbours connect onward from 
their pipeline, as this would destroy that business model. 
The Residents Association model also had its limits in terms of financial carrying 
capacity: residents could only contribute so much. That meant the furthest they could 
get for roads was the clearance of dirt roads wide enough for cars, with the loaned 
bulldozer from the municipality; tarmac or bitumen are far too expensive to finance 
through such local collection schemes in all but the wealthiest neighbourhoods. 
Drains, too, were beyond the reach of the Residents Associations and were only 
constructed in individual streets, when 3-4 neighbours were able to come together 
(Interview Johnson, 2016). 
It was around the turn of the century that troubles started brewing around Sebrepor’s 
chieftaincy (see also chapter 5). The Ga headman, who welcomed the first poultry 
farmers to the area in exchange for a few bottles of schnapps, had passed away in the 
1980s. He was succeeded by his oldest nephew, who got promoted to a full divisional 
chief by the Kpone elders on account of the growing population in the area. But as 
the area opened up, a conflict was sparked. The children of the old headman were still 
making their living by selling land in the name of their (deceased) father, but land was 
no longer an unlimited resource. 
At the end of the 1990s, the new chief finally put his foot down. He publicly scolded 
his relatives, and even had some of them arrested by the police. Before long, a backlash 
followed, and the chief ’s wider family was soon divided into two camps. He tried to 
stabilise his position by drawing leaders from both political parties into a newly formed 
Sebrepor Council of Elders, which worked for some time to steady the governance of 
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the area. But eventually, the chieftaincy conflict got out of hand. In 2009, the chief was 
chased out of Sebrepor by his disgruntled relatives (Interview Dubin, 2016). Despite 
attempts by the Council of Elders to conciliate the various sides of the conflict, he still 
lived outside the area in 2018, with no peace in sight.
Summarising, in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, Sebrepor underwent 
a major transformation. The residents had become organised enough, numerous 
enough and bold enough to “open the place up”, to make it visible that here was a 
permanent settlement. The grassroots organisation had now split up from the old 
Settler Society to form three separate Residents Associations for various zones in 
the community. Through these organisations, they created a substantial amount of 
basic infrastructure including electricity, water, roads and a secondary school. In this 
period, a conflict arose in the extended family of the local traditional authority, which 
displaced that authority and disabled it as a grassroots force for development.
With respect to the area’s relations with the state, much of this infrastructure was 
produced through a process of co-production with the local municipality, which was 
distant enough not to initiate projects in the neighbourhood or even suggest that it 
would, but also near enough to provide material assistance in more capital-intensive 
areas like heavy machinery and year-long salaries for school teachers. In other areas, 
residents attempted to get government projects, such as the Rural Electrification Project, 
but if they did not receive this help, did it themselves. In the water provision sector, 
the residents managed to greatly extend the network throughout the neighbourhood 
through concerted and now informally institutionalised resident action: the Sebrepor 
Water Committee. As for the position of the state vis-a-vis neighbourhood organisation, 
we might say that the state is present in many forms, but still not interwoven into the 
neighbourhood’s organisational fabric.
4.5 The demise of the Residents Associations
Around the middle of the 2000s, the Residents Associations started hitting on hard 
times. The influx of new residents had been so great that most people in the area did 
not know each other anymore. Some of the new homeowners did not even realise 
there was such a thing as a Residents Association. As one old-time organiser put it: 
“it’s easier to lead a few people than to govern the whole world”. Besides this, a great 
amount of renters had moved into the neighbourhood, who did not participate in 
the Residents Association, as renters in Ghana are seen as transient, impermanent 
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residents.13 Moreover, when the old leadership tried getting people to meetings, they 
were ridiculed by some of the wealthier new immigrants. The former secretary of zone 
2 explains: 
“There are people who feel that they are big. You know, my house, it’s 
a two-story building but uncompleted. And if somebody is putting up 
a luxurious mansion…how can I go to this person and say, come to 
my house, for a meeting? He will just look at me like I’m not a serious 
person. Of course, if there’s a common problem, like they are coming to 
demolish the houses, then everyone will come rushing. But otherwise, I 
cannot get these people to move.” (Interview Achina, 2018)
Meetings were getting harder and harder to organise. And these were crucial; as one 
Residents Association leader put it: “If you don’t meet, how will you contribute?” 
(Interview Agbey, 2016). With meetings unattended, contributions also dwindled. 
These dynamics put the Residents Associations in a vicious circle of decreasing 
efficacy and decreasing commitment. Newcomers were no longer arriving into an area 
where they felt the presence of a neighbourhood organisation. In our door-to-door 
interviews, most of the newer residents reported that when they arrived in the area, 
no-one had welcomed them or introduced them to others in the community. 
While the Residents Associations were going downhill, another form of local 
organisation came up: party politics (Interview Vinoko, 2018). Initially, Sebrepor’s 
population had consisted mainly of Ewe, who could be counted on to put out a block 
vote for the National Democractic Congress (NDC), ran by their fellow Ewe Jerry 
Rawlings. There was little political discussion in the area, and little party-line activism. 
But in the 2000s, a group of Ashanti came together to establish the first NPP branches 
13 If we should summarize the ‘Ghanaian Dream’ in a single concept, it would be ‘to own a piece of land’. 
The whole sequence would be something like: moving out of one’s village to the city, then climbing up 
from renting a mattress in a city-center slum, sharing a room with friends, renting a ‘hall & chamber’, 
renting a bigger apartment and finally buying a plot of land to build one’s own house. This is part of 
the reason why Greater Accra is sprawling so incredibly fast: most people want their own plot of 
land. Renting is seen as an impermanent and inferior condition. Home ownership on the other hand is 
generally thought of as permanent, even to the point that homes are mostly self-built and rarely sold 
on the market. Residents Associations, by law, include only those who own property in the area. The 
same issue plays in electoral politics. Candidates who do not own property in an area have a hard time 
campaigning, as people suspect that they are not committed to the development of the area. What is 
more, since renters are seen as having no ties to the area, such politicians “could easily abscond with 
any funds allocated to them” (Interview Aryeetey, 2018).
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in the area (Interview Dubin, 2015).14  Today, Sebrepor alone has seven different NDC 
branches and five NPP branches (Interview Adams, 2016). Again, such branches do 
not appear out of nowhere. An experienced political operator working all over the 
Kpone-Katamanso District Assembly explained how he routinely works to set up new 
branches in recently inhabited areas:
“Once people have come to settle in a certain place (…), you quickly 
get closer to them, to find out their affiliations. You know, there is no-
one that doesn’t belong to a party. Some pretend, at the initial stage. 
‘No, I don’t belong to any political party, or I don’t want to be part of 
it.’ But they, brother, take decisions for the community, because they 
are in the Residents Association positions. So we find out their leaning. 
Then gradually, we work to start the branches. People will do it at night, 
meeting in secret. 
(…) One day, it rises above the table. You will find someone who says: we 
need electricity. I think if we pass through this politician or that person, 
we will get it faster. They bring in that politician, just for a meeting. And 
the politician may say: oh, I’m going to make sure to bring this, to lobby 
to bring those things to your place. Organise yourselves, in a branch. We 
will need the votes to put pressure up top. (…)
So you see how it works. People start to organise to get something, 
and then they need the politicians. Either it will be monetary, or it’s 
just infrastructure. Some who go into the party branches do it just for 
themselves. Some do it because they want to see development, so 
they affiliate to politicians who can help them get those things. (…) But 
whatever the reason, they join the branches. And then, it shifts things.” 
(Interview Bogtiabor, 2016)
The increasing prominence politics in the neighbourhood shifted things. Not because 
political debate was new to the area; people were often passionately political even in 
new neighbourhoods were branches had not yet been formed. But the formation of new 
branches concretised and institutionalised such fault lines among the residents (Interview 
Allenge, 2018). This undermined the Residents Associations and other forms of 
independent citizen activism, as partisan considerations often made cooperation harder. 
14 In Sebrepor the development of local political branches coincided historically with the moment that 
democracy came back in, but I heard of the same process in many other areas.
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At one instant, residents were setting up a project to flatten a certain road and clear 
it of overgrowth to make it suitable for motor traffic. But the sitting Assemblyman 
refused his support; in fact, he actively blocked the move (Interview Achina, 2018). 
Most of the residents involved with the project were aligned with the opposition, and 
it would not have favored his party in the upcoming elections.15 In small ways like this, 
political framing started to affect everything people did, and the meetings of Residents 
Associations were suddenly fraught with suspicion. When another residents wanted 
to form a pressure group to protest an illegal landfill in the area, they were accused of 
taking sponsorship from the opposition party, and their original message was buried 
in a political shouting match (Interview Johnson, 2016).
Nor were all these suspicions just paranoia. There were indeed party political groups 
being organised in the area, often cloaked in other guises. For instance, politicians 
from either party would gather a bunch of young guys, give them football jerseys and 
some drinks, and keep up a regular trickle of gifts to that group (Interview Allenge, 
2018). All this in preparation for “the day when you will need their strength”, as one 
contestant put it: to spread posters and leaflets, to attend a rally or demonstration, or to 
show up in physical strength around election day (see also Klaus & Paller, 2017). These 
teams, as he explained, were not openly politicised. 
“When you go there, you won’t see that it’s politics. They will not make it 
visible. Their activities don’t say. Only once you enter, you’ll find out that 
this leader organised the club to support a political party. Some of the 
youth clubs are mostly political, some others are not at all political, just 
keep-fit clubs, or welfare, or doing something to make some money.” 
(Interview Dubin, 2016) 
Why did this happen in secret? Unlike organising in a Residents Association, organising 
through political parties is not without risk. The so-called foot soldiers, the political 
grassroots workers, are unpopular in many areas (Interview Hayibor, 2015). Politics 
can get rather personal. Sometimes, revenge is even taken on the losing side after the 
election. As Bogtiabor explains: 
15 Such stories may sound like accusatory tales, exaggerations from party loyals. But I believe they are 
not. In many of the interviews I have done about these topics, members of both parties were present. It 
often happened that they joined forces in trying to explain to me how politically charged the atmosphere 
often was. In the interview where this instance was discussed, all those present seemed rather shocked 
that I did not seem to comprehend why, naturally, the Assemblyman should try to block such this road-
clearing project.
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“If we win, well, things could be good. But in case the other party wins, 
then all your hard work has been wasteful. They can even target you! 
There’s gonna be a spy on you. Living in Africa after losing an election is 
very difficult. You know, victimisation, vilification, it’s in African politics. 
We have this winner-take-all-syndrome. In Africa, you’re gonna be 
tacked. They’re gonna come after you. ‘He’s one of the other guys, keep 
a close eye on him, make sure he stays at home.’ That is it. So it is very 
difficult. So it has taken a lot of people aback, politically. They’ll go out 
and vote, they have their favorite. But they don’t want to come away 
[come to a public rally]. The few people that come away, they are facing 
difficulties.” (Interview Bogtiabor, 2016)
Apart from undermining mutual trust among neighbourhood leaders, the advent of 
politics had another effect on local organising. As party leaders started making bigger 
campaign promises, local initiative was dampened. Residents became more and more 
inclined to wait and see whether politicians might indeed deliver, before spending their 
own money on collective amenities. This effect would become even more pronounced 
with the establishment of a local municipality. As government gained an increasingly 
visible presence in the neighbourhood, self-help decreased. 
But Sebrepor’s closer connection with state institutions, which brought in all these 
political complications, did also have its advantages. The aspiring politicians organised 
women’s groups, who met weekly to learn skills and form micro-credit circles. They 
organised pressure groups which explicitly existed to pressure politicians (of the other 
party) into action. And the advent of government and political representation for the 
neighbourhood brought development into the area, improving roads, fixing streetlights, 
extending the electricity network. However, many of our interlocutors reported that 
this development came in a very particular rhythm, which some described Bible-
abiding locals as ‘one fat year, three lean years’. As they noted, ‘since politics grew here’, 
in the year leading up to an election, street lights, water and electricity extensions and 
other long-desired developments would arrive in the area ‘like manna from heaven’ 
(Interview Allenge, 2016). 
However, people noted that such projects would often be stalled in the following three 
years, as there was no immediate electoral pressure, leaving many projects unfinished 
(Interviews Nukpenu, Oglie, Dubin, Allenge, 2018). This idea was widespread, coming 
up in interviews with various present and former Assembly members of both parties, 
several chiefs, other opinion leaders and a high-ranking local government official who 
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spoke off the record. However, this broadly living notion and the anecdotal evidence 
from Sebrepor should not be uncritically extrapolated, as they are not supported 
by recent quantitative work on project completion rates, which does not find lower 
finishing rates around the date of the election (Williams, 2017).
Not all development projects suffer equally from the election cycle. Larger projects, 
often also connected with outside sponsorship or which transcend the scale of 
constituencies and EAs, suffer less from such election cycle-dependency (Interview 
Vanderpuije, 2018). But smaller projects stall very frequently (Interview Nukpenu, 
2018, see also Williams, 2017). This is where non-partisan local organisation is essential: 
to make sure local government16 delivers on its promises and its started projects. As 
several respondents made clear, the local elites who may contest each other in the 
political arena also realise that they all own houses in the same neighbourhood, where 
they and their children expect to live for a long time to come. So they often try to work 
across the aisle to develop it.
Whether or not government spending changes throughout the electoral cycle, it is often 
heavily politicised. Around the elections, including local government elections, this 
politicisation becomes more explicit.17 Sebrepor’s Assemblyman Charles Dubin was 
aligned with the opposition party NPP, and quite vocal about the perceived failures of 
the NDC government. This did not go very well with the local MP, known as Lion, who 
belonged to the ruling party. With his party controlling the budget strings, the MP let 
the roads in Dubin’s area deteriorate, to the point where the main thoroughfare road 
of Sebrepor and surroundings was untarred only in Dubin’s area. In fact, the paving 
stopped and started precisely at his boundaries, as various residents pointed out. Then, 
he spread the rumour that Dubin had taken the budget for road tarring for himself. 
16 Ghana’s local government is seriously underfunded, most of the state budget runs through the central 
state apparatus. It is also not taken very seriously locally: the 2015 local government elections were 
postponed for a year, but the term of the incumbents did run out, leaving committees unstaffed and 
Assemblymen formally not in function for over a year. Only international donors such as DANIDA and the 
World Bank are pushing to get it taken more seriously, for instance by running a fund which adds €100M 
per year to the local government budgets of which the donors supply €80M (Interview Hayibor, 2015).
17 In Ghana, the local government system is designed explicitly to be non-partisan, unconnected to the 
highly competitive two-party system at the national level. Assembly members (AM) are forbidden 
from using party colors or logos, and may not publicly discuss their party membership. In practice, 
national politics do often filter in and shape local dynamics. Almost all AM in the areas I investigated 
appear to be partisan-aligned, often seeing this position as a stepping stone in a political career. The AM I 
interviewed provided the numbers off the top of their head: ten of the municipality’s AM were members 
of the governing party, eight were with the opposition. Voting in the Assembly happens largely on party 
lines; committee chairs are divided between the parties first and foremost.
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This is unlikely, since AM don’t have access to these kinds of budgets, but most people 
don’t bother to get into the details of Assembly budgeting rules, and many believed it. 
On election day, an industrial road grading machine rolled through the neighbourhood. 
On top of the machine, next to the operator, sat the NDC candidate for Assembly 
Member. Just to be sure that the message would get across, the grader was followed 
by an announcement vehicle with large speakers on the roof, proclaiming that this 
candidate was going to grade all roads in the area, and then put asphalt on them. 
Although the election was a close call, this kind of pressure is not easily countered 
by door-to-door campaigning. Although Dubin was known as an honest and 
hardworking Assemblyman, it was clear to many residents that he was simply not able 
to get government funds to the area, so he lost the elections. As one voter explained 
on election day: 
“I hate to say this, but we all here know that the current Assemblyman 
is not making any headway at the Assembly, because he is not an NDC 
man. Frankly I don’t dispute the competency of Honorable Dubin, but he 
is struggling. Ghana today is about links, who you know, and what party 
is on.” (Interview Akpokavie, 2015)
After the elections the road grader disappeared from the area again, leaving most of the 
roads bumpy as ever (see figure 4.3 above). No tarmac or bitumen was forthcoming. 
And when frustrated residents sent an inquiry to the government agencies involved, 
they were sent away. Residents felt that this was part of a larger pattern. As one resident 
explained:
“When we came to call on government to deliver on their promises, they 
would tell you that there are no people here. Their map will say: it’s just 
bush. Yes, that’s it. They come for votes though. So some of us will tell 
them, during election you realise that we are here. After election, oh…this 
place appears on their maps as a wilderness.” (Interview Agbey, 2016)
Notably, the fact that development may be politicised does not automatically mean 
that areas with opposition-aligned Assemblymen or opposition-aligned populations 
are left standing in the cold. In this case, Sebrepor got extra attention (although after 
being passed over first) exactly because its Assemblyman was in the opposition. And 
during national election campaigns, the political alignments of Assemblymen are 
largely ignored, as the incumbent party needs their knowledge of the situation on 
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Figure 4.3: mountains of laterite, ostensible destined to improve the road, remained on the 
central Sebrepor thoroughfare for months after the elections.
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the ground to effectively channel development into their areas and convince voters to 
support them for another term (Interview Dubin, 2016).
In sum, from the middle of the 2000s grassroots organisation in Sebrepor started to 
break down. One factor in this was the increased size and heterogeneity of the area’s 
population, which made it harder to organise residents. But an even bigger factor 
was politicisation. As political parties entered the area, they took over much of the 
grassroots organising energy. In addition, they made people more suspicious toward 
one another; where previously there was self-interest and the communal interest, now 
a whole layer of potential scheming and power games had been added in the form of 
political parties.
In sum, residents’ self-organisation fell off during this phase. Through processes of 
anonymization, politicisation and establishment of formal institutions in the area, 
the autonomous forms of local organisation were being crowded out. Several local 
institutions which had previously gathered momentum did manage to keep going and 
produce impressive results, often co-producing with the state. The local Presbyterian 
church built the second secondary school in the neighbourhood, a large investment, 
made possible by a large and active congregation. The school was subsequently run 
in co-operation with the municipality, which provides teachers and some materials. 
And the Sebrepor Water Committee kept functioning, managing and expanding the 
network. These are the strongest elements of the self-organisation fabric that grew in 
the previous periods. In addition, these were areas where collective action problems 
were limited, as these are so-called ‘club goods’, goods which require collectivity 
but do allow for exclusion on the basis of contribution or membership (Sandler & 
Tschirhart, 1997). But there were few succesful new initiatives. Trust fell throughout 
the neighborhood. And the residents’ gaze in general became directed toward the state 
and toward commercialised solutions.
4.6 Formal government
In short, the fraternal spirit of the pioneer days had disappeared. Local organising 
either died down (none of the Residents Associations held regular meetings after 
2005) or it got reshaped as party-aligned organising (Interview Achina, 2015). With 
the Residents Associations mostly out of business, the development of collective 
amenities in the area now depended very much on the more formal institutions: the 
state utility companies, the Assembly member (AM), the District Assembly and the 
Member of Parliament for the area. 
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Much here hinges on the AM. The civil servants of local government frequently hardly 
know the area they are working in, as they are rotated to a different Assembly every 
five years (Interviews Baeka, Hayibor, 2015). This is done to prevent corruption from 
taking root, but it also means knowledge build-up in the civil service is difficult and 
frequently undone (Interview Ofori, 2015). In addition, they often take on additional 
side jobs to augment their pay, leaving even less time for working in the area (Interview 
Brouwer, 2014). This puts a heavy burden on the shoulders of the (nearly unpaid) 
AM, who form the crucial node between residents and Assembly. They are not only 
a channel for complaints and requests from citizens, but also an important link from 
the local government to the assumed ‘community’ in the area. As former AM Dubin 
explained:
“I know all the people here, the land areas, the associations, the 
companies around. The Assembly does have a list of the companies here, 
but they don’t know them well. But physically, I know that company A is 
here, B is here, C is there. So if the Assembly sends some people to come 
and see something, they will pass through me.” (Interview Dubin, 2016)
In the more institutionalised neighbourhood, the AM is an essential middle man 
between residents and formal government (a role he partly shares with the chief, see 
chapter 5). But underfunded and overstretched, many are challenged to effectively work 
and mobilise local organising to translate governmental possibilities to developments 
on the ground. This is made even more difficult by the fact that this position comes 
with extensive social obligations: several funerals and weddings every week, and 
demands on the personal purse. 
Although political fault lines increasingly dominated the organisational landscape of 
the neighbourhood, local opinion leaders were not automatically co-opted into this 
logic. They still cooperated strategically across party lines whenever the occasion 
required it. After all, those who owned houses in the area wanted the infrastructure 
to improve, regardless of party colours. On several occasions, Sebrepor’s NPP-aligned 
and NDC-aligned members of the Council of Elders cooperated in applying political 
pressure for the production of a better road, the development of a market area and 
other such developments, closely coordinating their actions to achieve the best results 
for the neighbourhood. 
One such campaign occurred in the late 2000s and early 2010s. With the area’s 
population multiplied, the role of the Assemblyman had become increasingly taxing. 
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As one elder explained: “One Assemblyman was doing the whole area, from Bethlehem 
to Golf City. If they bring ten bags of cement, each Assemblyman will get one, so it’s 
not good if one man runs a large area.” (Interview Aryeetey, 2018). Several leaders 
from the area decided to mount a campaign for the subdivision of the electoral area. 
This campaign involved discussions behind closed doors with the chiefs of Sebrepor 
and neighbouring areas, pulpit activism and a round table discussion with all sorts of 
opinion leaders, the local MP and officials from the Ministry of the Interior. In the 
process, media attention was used strategically, as the activists wanted to make it very 
clear that something was stirring in the area, but did not want to provoke things with 
a demonstration or other visible protest (Interview Allenge, 2018). 
In 2012, the campaign came to fruition. The electoral area was split into five new ones, 
and Sebrepor got its own Assembly member. A similar drive had taken place for the 
establishment of a new district, as Sebrepor and the surrounding areas continued to 
be a distant and largely neglected part of the now metropolitan district of Tema. This 
campaign also succeeded in 2012, with the establishment of the Kpone-Katamanso 
District Assembly. The newly appointed District Chief Executive (DCE, the mayor) 
started his work with a tour of four months throughout the district. For the occasion, 
the chief came out of his exile and spoke, in name of all the residents, about the 
amenities they had created and what more they needed from the Assembly. 
However festive the occasion, the establishing of the nearby Kpone-Katamanso District 
Assembly in 2012 was a further nail in the coffin for the Residents Associations. 
The Assembly and the Residents Association have largely overlapping activities: 
improving infrastructure, providing social services such as schools, and providing 
some basic form of social security. Hence, most residents saw them as mutually 
redundant. However, in the first years of its existence the Assembly produced little 
of use to its residents; it was, as the DCE put it, “a baby Assembly, with little strength” 
(Interview Alhaji, 2016). Offended that the Assembly was not delivering anything of 
tangible benefit, many of the residents refused to pay its taxes (Interview Johnson, 
2016). However, many others decided instead to stop contributing to the Residents 
Association, since they felt they were being taxed twice for the same purposes, and 
the Assembly could more easily enforce their taxation (Interview Johnson, 2016). As 
Mr. Aryeetey explains, viewing the same phenomenon from a more optimistic angle: 
“The Residents Association ceased to be active when the District 
Assembly was born. Because these associations were formed to 
promote our health and our needs, socially, economically, religiously, 
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educationally. (…) That’s why we started contributing the little money 
we could, to boost our efforts. Then fortunately, the Assembly came 
into existence. So now all of us lean against the Assembly for our 
support.” (Interview Aryeetey, 2015)
The same happened to the security efforts: as soon as the police announced that they 
would patrol in the area, most people stopped contributing to the remaining Watchdog 
groups (Interview Johnson, 2016). Equally, the Sebrepor Water Committee has been 
trying to transfer its responsibilities to the state utility, the Ghana Water Company, for 
several years now, although so far they seem not to have succeeded. Still, many of the 
newer residents only find out that their area has its own (grassroots) Water Committee 
once they are directed to get its permission to connect their house to the water pipe 
network which the area’s pioneers have painstakingly built. In short, through processes 
of anonymisation, politicisation and establishment of formal institutions in the area, 
the autonomous forms of local organisation were being crowded out. 
And there was a final factor contributing to the demise of the Residents Associations. 
The old Settler Association’s vision for the area had mostly been realised, so people 
have gone back to their private issues. This is largely a matter of standards: the 
expectations people have also play a big role. As the former chairman of Sebrepor’s 
Zone 2 colourfully put it:
“Land, electricity and water, that’s about it. First [people want] land 
[security], then water is number one, then electricity. The next thing 
they might be fighting for are streetlights. After that, they will be more 
or less satisfied. They will start talking of roads and drainage, sure. But, 
Mr Joris Tieleman, if you put the black man in a new area, you add water, 
electricity, then streetlights. Oh, you have done sixty to eighty percent 
of the job for him. And if you give him drainage, untarred roads, then 
you’ve done more than eighty percent of the job for him. You are his 
lord!” (Interview Agbey, 2016)
As the quote shows, people’s standards play a big role in the activity of a Residents 
Association. In neighbourhoods with high concentrations of wealthy homeowners, 
the Residents Association may well continue beyond providing water and electricity. 
For instance, in Bulasu the Residents Association has not only put up water, power 
and streetlights, but also provided effective security, and is now tarring roads and 
constructing drainage. But from the data I have gathered (see also chapter 3, last page), 
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the above estimate from Mr. Agbey appears to be roughly accurate for the average 
neighbourhood built today in Greater Accra.
Today in Sebrepor, it appears that only one thing will still bring the residents together: 
when there is an update on the formal status of their land ownership. That situation 
has not progressed since the 1970s. Formally, the Tema Development Corporation still 
owns the land, which they have still formally allocated to the military, despite the fact 
that a full-grown neighbourhood stands there. This stalemate prevents the residents 
from registering their property at the Lands Commission, which prevents them from 
selling the house, getting a mortgage, a home insurance or any of the other home-
related financial instruments which are becoming increasingly common in Ghana 
(Interview Theophilus, 2016, see also De Soto, 1989). 
For most residents, these are still theoretical problems only. But among the opinion 
leaders of the neighbourhood, the ones who organise in Residents Associations, this is 
the cause of much strife. For instance, when the previous Assembly member tried to 
start a formal process of regularisation, he got into a severe conflict with the chief, who 
preferred to lie low until the legal period of the government lease would have run out. 
The tactic of lying low and ‘not stirring the mud’ is considered crucial by many of the 
early settlers, who had been visually hiding their neighbourhood’s presence in the bush 
for decades, before ‘opening up’. As one of them put it: “If elephants are fighting, it is 
the grass which gets trampled” (Interview Aryeetey, 2018). Hence, several members of 
the chief ’s Council of Elders and other old-timers campaigned vigorously to upset this 
activist Assemblyman during the following election. Using the considerable weight 
of their position as community elders and early settlers, they speeched during church 
services that he, a relative newcomer, was endangering the safety of the neighbourhood 
by disobeying the chief. He was not re-elected.
Summarising, the increasingly tight interweaving of local government into the area’s 
organising fabric had a severely dampening effect on local grassroots organising. 
Residents’ energy was increasingly channeled largely toward the Assembly Member, 
who forms an essential but generally overworked and underfunded linchpin in Ghana’s 
local government system. Hence, residents did still actively organise to increase the 
amount of representatives of their area in local and national government, campaigning 
for a split in electoral areas, constituencies and municipal districts. A final factor in the 
demise of grassroots organising for infrastructure in the area was the fact that much 
of what people considered the most essential infrastructure had already been realised. 
Today, the only thing that will bring together residents for collective, neighbourhood-
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broad organising is a development concerning the legal status of the land they live on: 
this is still unresolved, and most residents do not have legal ownership of the land they 
live on.
4.7 Commercial and non-public organisation
Before moving on to the conclusions of the above analysis of grassroots organising 
throughout the history of Sebrepor, we will briefly look at two other forms of 
organisation: commercial activity, and non-public associations. This forms somewhat 
of a break in the chapter’s line of analysis. Nevertheless, there are two reasons why I have 
added this description here. First, because this chapter also serves as an introduction 
to the case study neighbourhood, and the topic of the research project is grassroots 
organising in Accra’s new neighbourhoods. I have not found anywhere in the literature 
a rich description of the small-scale social and commercial infrastructure in such 
newly growing neighbourhoods. In other words, this section completes the picture 
of grassroots organising in the neighbourhood. Second, it is important because the 
organisations described below also border on the RAs, just like local government. The 
RAs do much in terms of building social fabric, and providing basic social security. In 
this they are complemented by, and partially compete with, the types of organisations 
described below. 
First, commercial activity. Most commercial activity in areas like Sebrepor is petty 
trading, and thus far from collective organisation, whereas this story is focused on 
collective organisation and the shifting interdependence between neighbourhood-
level and centralised institutions of collective organisation. However, it is important 
enough to be briefly included in this account. The general rule appears to be: anything 
that can be organised commercially, will be organised commercially rather than 
collectively (Interview Agbey, 2016). 
The boundary between the two modes is mobile: increasingly, schools are being 
organised on a commercial basis, whereas in the past they were usually set up 
by churches. In fact, the churches springing up in currently growing settlements 
are looking more and more like commercial establishments themselves. They are 
increasingly run like businesses, have an unapologetically profit-oriented ethos and 
are often kick-started with outside investments (see also chapter 6). Water too is 
increasingly produced on an individual, commercial basis rather than through the 
collective process of extending the pipe network ever further into the neighbourhood 
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(see also chapter 7). For all these categories, the quality of the private solution is 
generally lower than the quality of a collective solution. But the growing commercial 
sector does have the effect of making it harder to organise collectively, as wealthy 
residents are able to cop out and the need is less felt. 
Second, although this chapter focuses on the development of collective amenities 
which are generally physical and mostly cover the entire neighbourhood or at least 
a major part of it, there is also a lot of local organisation in smaller groups, for less 
infrastructural purposes. In our door-to-door interview sample among 50 households, 
82% of the interviewed residents reported being member of one or more groups. 
Dominant among these are the welfare groups in church, which provide a basic 
form of social security, and the Men’s/Women’s/Youth Fellowships in the churches, 
which are generally not compulsory but which most people do join if they have the 
money to afford the weekly contributions. Especially church groups extend far outside 
the neighbourhoods. For instance, wearing a Sebrepor Methodist Men’s Fellowship 
shirt (all these groups identify by dress) will very quickly help to build trust in other 
Methodist churches across the city, and in universities a very active network is held up 
by groups like the Pentecost Student Association. 
Other social groups abound as well. There are professional associations of every kind 
imaginable. Hairdressers, dressmakers, taxi drivers, beauticians, Indomie noodle 
sellers, fish mongers, fruit sellers, teachers, private school owners, bar owners, nurses 
and shopkeepers all have formed local associations which regularly meet, contribute 
money, help each other out in troubled times and celebrate together.18 Other 
associations include Old School (alumni) groups, veterans groups, and all sorts of 
rather open-ended groups like Keep-Fit collectives, Rotary clubs, Artisans Associations 
and women’s clubs, which women often join without the knowledge of their husband 
and which can play an important emancipatory role. 
Apart from their shared characteristics such as church membership, gender, 
professional activity and so on, these groups are constituted and held together by 
several regularly shared practices. The first thing a group must do if it is to remain 
in existence is to regularly meet. Then, at meetings, people will contribute a small, 
fixed sum, usually in the order of 5 cedi (€1) or more, depending on the wealth of the 
group members, for the shared expenses of simply running the group (renting chairs 
for meetings, getting drinks, etc.). The next step up the group cohesion ladder is a 
18 There is even an association set up by the people who make a living by collecting and recycling the 
plastic drinking water bags that have been discarded on the streetside.
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shared welfare fund, out of which people are paid when they get married, give birth, 
lose a close relative and other major life events. Many groups also start up a savings 
scheme, through which people either save up and give the sum to one group member 
each time, or simply encourage each other to save individually, sometimes in a shared 
bank account. 
To put the above in perspective: not everyone is part of such groups. Nearly 20% of the 
residents we interviewed in the door-to-door interviews reported not being member 
of any groups, and often these actually seemed rather sad stories of social isolation. 
Especially since the advent of electricity in the area, many people spend their days inside 
their own houses. As one resident described their social life: “During Christmas, and 
Easter, I go to visit my parents. Apart from that, when I am not working, I just sit inside 
my house and watch TV.” These houses are generally very cramped places, but people 
still prefer to spend their time inside there rather than outside, although there is enough 
public space to sit in. These were generally the poorest respondents. Membership of a 
club costs money and time, and not everybody has those. Virtually all clubs have a welfare 
component, and contributions are compulsory, with the penalty for missing presence or 
contributions often being expulsion. Especially for those with irregular incomes, this 
discourages membership. 
But there is also another factor in such social isolation: many of the residents described 
the neighbourhood as a hostile space. They emphasised that there is a lot of malicious 
gossip in the area, that people do not trust each other and indeed are not to be trusted, 
and that the atmosphere on the street is unfriendly. Such sentiments were also expressed 
by many people who are members of one or more social groups and several who are very 
actively organising in the area. A seemingly related notion which I still cannot claim 
to understand properly is the widespread idea that “friends are bad for you”, generally 
expressed in exactly these terms. As one resident put it: “I was told not to mingle, because 
people will put you in trouble.”
In sum, the commercial activity in Sebrepor covers an increasing extend of people’s need 
for infrastructure. For instance, schools used to be a public affair, but these days are 
privately organised. Churches, too, were formerly a communal effort but are increasingly 
often constructed as private enterprises (see chapter 6 for details and figure 4.4 for 
an example). Then, there are many kinds of welfare and savings groups in the area, 
including professional associations of every kind imaginable. These are held together by 
shared practices and generally run a small social welfare fund for their members. But not 
everyone is part of such circles: nearly 20% of the residents interviewed in door-to-door 
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interviews was not part of such groups. To many people, the neighbourhood feels like a 
(potentially) hostile space, in which they prefer not to mingle.
4.8 Conclusion
This concluding section draws out the more general patterns found in the empirical 
material presented above. It first generalises and abstracts the empirical material 
directly, then provides a brief discussion on the degree to which these findings may be 
extrapolated, and finally returns to the central question of the thesis as a whole, placing 
the chapter’s findings in that context. 
Figure 4.4: Today, Sebrepor is filled in, its population swollen. This is the first church in the 
neighbourhood, the Zion Church. Its congregation has grown, so they are building a new church, 
which is so much bigger that the old building fits inside it entirely. Once it is done, the old church 
will be broken apart. Its wooden planks, which sheltered the congregation during their first two 
decades in this new neighbourhood, will be ceremoniously carried away through the door of the 
new church.
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Resident organising conclusions
Let us come back to the central subject of this thesis, the urban fabric spreading 
outward. As this chapter shows, much of the initial momentum of this spread outward 
is provided by the pioneering residents of all these new neighbourhoods: settling, 
organising, building. In Sebrepor and throughout the city, the organisational form this 
takes is volunteer work, prefiguring local government, often in Residents Associations. 
The pioneers found ways to overcome their divisions19, got together, pooled resources 
and connections, and got their basic amenities.
The organisational form Residents Association is institutionalised quite strongly: 
membership is obligatory if you own property in the area, and it has the legal right 
to levy contributions from its members. In addition, government agencies generally 
recognise this form and are used to co-producing amenities with them. Especially in 
situations where settlements are somewhat isolated, the social cohesion is often further 
strengthened by including elements like a mutual assistance fund. It should be noted 
that this tendency was particularly strong in Sebrepor, likely because of the long relative 
isolation of the area. Sebrepor’s associations were also helped by the fact that a lot of 
the settlers there were civil service and army retirees, which made organising along 
shared templates easier. Thus, mutuality is both nurtured and enforced, especially in 
isolation. 
However, well-organised grassroots initiatives will often break out of that isolation 
themselves, and initiate projects of co-production with the state. It is very common 
that infrastructure is built in cooperative projects between residents and government 
agencies. Often, residents will supply the simple physical labor, will supply part of 
the funding through contributions, or even completely kick-start the project, with the 
state coming in to complete the project. Residents built the first two classroom blocks 
of the Ebenezer Hill Secondary School and ran it during the first year, while the state 
supplied a teacher and picked the project up afterward. The Ghana Water Company 
put out the initial standpipe, for residents to build out its network into the area. The 
19 To be sure, as the introduction chapter of this thesis also makes clear, this does not imply that people 
usually succeed, only that in nearly every neighborhood, some people eventually succeed. For every 
project that is successful, several others run aground because of language and culture barriers. Ghana 
has more than 250 recognized languages and dialects (Ethnologue, 2014), and a startling variety 
of local cultures, all of which come together in the great cosmopolitan melting pot of Accra. Most 
Ghanaians are trilingual or more, speaking at least their native language, Akan and some amount of 
English. But skill levels vary, and cultural barriers and ethnic distrust and discomfort persist. The ethnic 
and socio-economic mixing of Accra, favorable though it may be for peace and democracy, is often a 
detriment to local self-organization.
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Tema Assembly provided bulldozers for road clearances, but residents had to buy the 
fuel. This pattern also appears in the other eight comparative neighbourhoods (see 
section 3.3). Streetlights in Accra’s neighbourhoods are mostly bought and (home-)
mounted by residents, while the electricity to light them is provided by government. 
And so on and so forth. In fact, the co-production approach is firmly built into the 
local government bureaucracy. Assembly planning officers also expect residents to 
help out with monitoring the contractors working on Assembly projects, and will often 
provide them with the technical specifics required to do so. 
But while the formal institutions can be temporarily harnessed by grassroots 
organisations to leverage their development projects, it appears to also signal the 
start of their demise. The process described above in Sebrepor is a particular case of 
this, but the pattern appears to be quite broad. We have found very few instances of 
Residents Associations surviving once the land rights were secured and basic amenities 
developed. This is partly a matter of having created the bare necessities like roads, 
power and water, and the arrival of formal government institutions. 
In addition, the unraveling of the Residents Associations is accelerated by the 
anonymisation of the area and the politicisation of its local organisation. As formal 
organisations came in or even just said they were coming in, this had a big impact on 
the local figuration: organisation started to decline. And it is important to note that 
this is not simply a matter of passing the baton of local government from a volunteer 
corps to the professionals (see Swaan, 1988). The collapse of grassroots networks often 
actually slows down local developments, because some local organisation and active 
pressure is often still required to get serviced by formal organisations. 
Discussion
What elements from this history can be generalised? Certainly much of this 
development was geographically and historically specific. Despite its remote location, 
the area was settled relatively early as it was close to the army base, where its soldiers 
felt safer. Coupled with the fact that shared army pasts enabled residents to organise 
more easily, this also facilitated early connections to water and electricity. Therefore, 
this area’s settlement started relatively early and was also more drawn out - it is only 
in the last ten years that Sebrepor was really filled in, roughly at the same time as 
surrounding neighbourhoods, some of which got started decades after Sebrepor. The 
politicisation of local organisation coincided with the rebirth of active democracy in 
the country at the end of the 1990s, so that is at least partially historically specific. 
But many important elements of this history can be generalised to a smaller or larger 
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degree. The above analysis is based not only on the material from Sebrepor, but also 
on the other neighbourhoods investigated during fieldwork, described in more detail 
in chapter 3, last section. 
It is noteworthy that this rise and fall of area-based organising in Residents Associations 
does not appear to strongly affect the kind of smaller clubs and groups described in 
the above section, for good or for ill. Throughout the existence of a neighbourhood, 
people get together to create small welfare groups, professional associations and all 
kinds of clubs. This happens primarily within the churches, which provide an excellent 
rhythm for weekly meetings, a moral community and, not unimportant, a physical 
building to meet in. But also outside the churches, the urban fabric is rife with such 
small-scale groups. 
This process of social group formation does not appear to be much touched by the 
anonymisation of the neighbourhood, the rise and fall of the Residents Association, the 
politicisation of the area or the demise of local organising for collective infrastructure. 
Most members of such clubs and associations told us that politics plays no role in their 
group. As for the growth of the neighbourhood population, if anything this increases 
the formation of such groups as further specialisation is made possible. Denser areas 
like Ashiaman and Madina were often reported by respondents to have an even greater 
proliferation of groups and an even more active population in this regard.
Urban growth process: division and upgrading
In short, we see collective action arising under conditions of isolation, reaching its 
peak production when stepping out of that isolation and embarking on co-production 
with the state. Subsequently, it also collapses after that breakup of isolation, because of 
three factors: anonymisation and loss of solidarity, politicisation of the local organising 
atmosphere, establishment of formal institutions in the neighbourhood. 
Besides introducing the case study, the above description of Sebrepor provides us with 
a small, localised lens on the growth processes of the city’s organisational institutions. 
What does this growth look like? As the urban fabric spreads outward, its spatial 
collectivities are continuously being enlarged, subdivided and upgraded. Sebrepor 
started with a few farmers in the bush under a headman; his successor was a full 
Divisional Chief, with several headmen working under him. As his area grows more 
populous, it might be split up again. With the growth of Sebrepor and the surrounding 
hamlets, an Assembly Member was assigned to represent those farmers in the Tema 
Metropolitan Assembly. Later, in 2008 and 2012, the Tema Assembly itself was 
subdivided into Ashaiman, Adenta and Kpone-Katamanso District Assembly. Also in 
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2012, a national record was set by splitting Sebrepor’s electoral area into five, creating 
four new Assembly member positions at once. In 2017, Kpone-Katamanso was 
promoted to a Municipal Assembly on account of the growing population (Interview 
Adams, 2016). 
The same thing happens with political party branches, administrative regions, church 
congregations, parliamentary constituencies, Residents Associations and all sorts of 
other entities: a continuous process of division and upgrading, division and upgrading. 
Such processes are generally the result of a struggle of some kind: an internal fight 
causing a rift, a campaign for independence, or simply for the increase in allocated 
resources that comes with an upgrade or subdivision. But the trend is universal: 
expansion, subdivision, upgrading.20 
The division and upgrading process does not only happen within categories of 
organisations, churches splitting to form more churches, administrative units being 
subdivided; it also happens between categories of organisations. While Residents 
Associations are often the first among these institutions to take root in a newly growing 
neighbourhood, they should be understood as part of that institutional tapestry. Thus, 
as this social fabric grows more complex, the bonds between people that form these 
general, area-based Residents Associations are slowly split apart, woven instead into 
more specific organisations such as various churches, political parties and other 
organisations. This, in turn, results in the demise of the Residents Associations, and 
their organisational capacity and drive along with it.
20  To be clear, this process is slow. In some areas, it takes years or even decades to get the first hundred 
settlers, in other neighborhoods the pace is somewhat higher. The same goes for infrastructure like 
water pipes, electricity lines, roads and drains: this is generally built in a highly incremental fashion, 
connecting house by house, often taking years to travel a single kilometer into the neighborhood 
(depending on the level of wealth and organization in the area). These neighborhoods are not created by 
land invasions, but rather by a slow trickle of settlers.
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Chiefs: 
traditional authorities in the city21
In this chapter, I explore the foundations and form of the contemporary urban chieftaincy position, Section 5.1 provides some theoretical and methodological background. In section 5.2, I trace the historical 
development of the chieftaincy institution in Ghana. In sections 3.3-3.5, I 
unpack three different roles the chief plays in relation to both residents 
and a variety of departments of the formal state, showing a shift during 
the urbanisation process between these three roles. 
Section 5.3 looks at the chief in his role as a traditional informal leader, 
where the chief judges, leads, and generally governs much like a soevereign. 
Section 5.4 studies the chief’s role as a lower-level bureaucrat, where he 
acts in direct cooperation with several state and semi-state bureaucracies. 
Section 5.5 focuses on the chief as landlord, as chiefs have an important 
position as managers and owners of the land in their area. I show a trend 
over time from the first role to the second and the third, developing as 
the complexity of organisational structures deepens during the period of 
densification and urbanisation of his area. 
Following this, I historically locate this neighbourhood chieftaincy 
figuration in Ghana’s national state-tribal figuration (5.6). I show that 
the traditional institution of chieftaincy endures and rejuvenates in the 
cities, not in spite of the omnipresence of the modern state, but because 
of it. Finally, I draw conclusions regarding the central question of this 
thesis: how does the institution of chieftaincy affect the development of 
grassroots organisation for collective amenities? 
21 This chapter has been published as: Tieleman, J., & Uitermark, J. (2019). Chiefs in the City: Traditional 
Authority in the Modern State. Sociology, 53(4), 707–723.
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It was about a month since I had started fieldwork in Sebrepor, and I had been able to 
get appointments with the local Assembly Member, the Divisional Council of local elders, 
various local ethnic leaders and church leaders. Only the chief himself had proven hard 
to get in touch with. I was in good contact with Emmanuel Aryeetey, the secretary of 
the Sebrepor Divisional Council, and finally, he had promised to take me to the chief. 
He told me to wear something decent, and gently asked after “the weight of my pocket, 
as a student”. Then, he advised me to buy some foreign schnapps as a courtesy gift. This 
request became a little more precise later on. As it turned out, the traditional gift to a chief 
(strictly: to the chief ’s stool) is a 70 cl. bottle of Henkes’ Aromatic Schiedam Schnapps, 
certified ‘Produce of Holland’.
Sebrepor’s chief, Nii Dortey Abotsi III, is a pleasant old gentleman. He speaks slow, 
measured English and receives visitors in his private house. Visits are somewhat 
ritualised, starting with the exchange of gifts, normally the colonial liquor and a small 
amount of money. He answered all my questions extensively and politely, explaining his 
role as traditional ruler of the community, head of the royal family and guardian of the 
land. He spoke of his relations with the municipality, how he worked with various offices 
to get development into the neighbourhood. And he explained how he had set up the 
Divisional Council, composed of elders of all major tribes in the area, to “let peace and 
sanity reign in the community”.
In fact, it was hard to match this caring old man with the stories I had heard from 
ordinary residents of Sebrepor. Several people in the area, including his own relatives, 
had described him to me as an illegitimate chief, who does not take any responsibility 
for the neighbourhood, who steals the money that is meant for the development of the 
community, and who even uses black magic to desperately hold on to his power. 
But if he was such a caring chief, why was he not among his people? Why was he living 
so far away from ‘his subjects’, in a private house in Nungua, more than an hour’s travel 
away from Sebrepor? And if he was indeed not much of a leader, an absentee chief, then 
how was it possible that he still held on to his position as the main spokesperson of the 
community, the foremost grassroots leader? Why did others not rise up to replace him, 
in an area like Sebrepor, which was clearly in such urgent need of development? Or, if 
the traditional authority was not functioning to the benefit of the residents, or indeed, to 
anyone’s apparent benefit, why did it even still exist?
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the position of the chief, an institution carrying great 
traditional authority in contemporary Ghanaian society. It assesses primarily the 
position of the chief in the neighbourhood’s power structure, and from there asks what 
effect the institution has on the development of grassroots organisation for collective 
amenities.
In media and public debate, chiefs are portrayed as all-round community leaders 
who guard traditional customs in the face of rampant modernisation. The chiefs are 
celebrated as the embodiment of values, communities, and traditions which come 
under threat as urbanisation, modernisation, and commodification proceed. However, 
chieftaincy in its current form is neither an ancient nor a decaying institution. Local 
stools are often not ancient, because the current system of chieftaincy is largely a 
creation of the colonial state. And the institution is anything but decaying: it remains 
integral to the functioning of the formal state. In fact, there has been a veritable 
resurgence of chieftaincies in many African countries (Holzinger, Kern, & Kromrey, 
2016). Significantly, and contrary to common perception, it is not only in the rural 
communities that chiefs reign. They also obtain strong new positions in the governance 
figurations of the neighbourhoods of rapidly growing cities. In Ghana, a new chief 
emerges in every new urban neighbourhood that grows onto the outskirts of existing 
cities. 
Theoretical approach
To define the shifting roles of the chief in his immediate surroundings, I use Weberian 
categories of traditional and legal-rational authority, especially focusing on the 
interrelation of bureaucratic and traditional organisational forms and the development 
of traditional authority regimes under urbanisation (Weber, 1968). I embed these in 
the Eliasian perspective that forms the overarching theoretical framework for the 
thesis as a whole. That is, I see chieftaincies and state agencies such as municipalities, 
ministries and state utility companies forming a ‘flexible latticework of tensions’ of 
interdependent institutions, which themselves can be unpacked to reveal their own 
internal figurations (Elias, 1978b, p. 126). More in particular, I see the chieftaincy 
structure as folded into the formal state. This is an important relation within the 
larger figuration, one so stable that even in newly settled areas, chieftaincies emerge 
in a process indirectly but strongly supported by the legal-rational institutions of the 
formal state. That is, the standard figuration of local bureaucracies of the formal state 
contains valencies, figurative openings, which chieftaincy structures snugly fit into.
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In order to understand the kind of position that emerges for the chief at this intersection 
of traditional authority and bureaucratic power structures, I build on Roy’s concept of 
informality as an idiom of urbanisation. I follow her in seeing informality as a ‘state 
of exception’ and therefore a mode of urbanisation, an ‘organising logic’ rather than a 
sector (Roy, 2005). In Roy (2009b), she describes ‘planning by informality’, a practice 
or an ‘idiom of urbanisation’ characterised primarily by its inherent informality. This 
informality is “inscribed in the ever-shifting relationship between what is legal and 
illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorised and unauthorised” (ibid). Thus it allows 
for the arbitrary division between squatters and slum dwellers, who can be framed as 
‘nuisance’, as opposed to ‘normal, private property-owning citizens’.
This technique of ‘governing by informality’ is a mode quite opposed to everything 
that Weberian legal-rational bureaucratic regimes stand for, such as “technologies of 
visibility, counting, mapping, and enumerating” (Roy, 2009b). It is, in fact, an ‘un-
mapping’ of cities (ibid.). Yet it is used by the state itself, which Roy describes as a 
“deeply informalised entity, one that actively utilise informality as an instrument of 
both accumulation and authority”.
I use much of this idea, denoted by the term governing by informality. However, two 
differences with Roy’s term must be noted. First, I use the notion in a slightly broader 
sense than Roy does: not only as applied to spatial planning, but to governing in 
general. Second, I do not apply the term directly to the state, but to the institution 
of chieftaincy, functioning in a sense as the most local extension of the formal state. 
As I show, the institution of chieftaincy may not be technically a part of the formal 
state, but it is still folded very tightly inside of it. Thus, I portray the chiefs’ regimes as 
‘governing by informality’, both independently and as an extension of the formal state.
Empirical strategy
The relation between chieftaincy and the modern state is an ambiguous one, a 
complex balance of power further complicated by the asymmetry in geographical 
scale between the two structures. Chiefs are folded into the state in multiple ways, 
and this relationship is transformed and further complicated during the urbanisation 
process. To understand how and why this relationship is transformed, I combine the 
social dynamics within the neighbourhood, the structure and logic of formal local 
government, and the national-level processes shaping the legal position of the chiefs.
It is not easy to situate Sebrepor, the central fieldwork site of this thesis, as a case 
study area for this topic. On the one hand, it is an exemplifying case study (Yin, 2017) 
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because like in most of Accra’s new neighbourhoods, there is no long-standing village 
in the area. The land is as close to terra nova as one can find around Ghana’s major 
cities, and hence there is also no long-standing chieftaincy in the area.22 This creates a 
suitable setting for the question I want to answer: what type of chief ’s position develops 
in an area where everyone, including the chief, is to some extent an newcomer? In 
other words, what does the chief ’s position today look like if his palace is not rooted 
in an urbanised village, but has been created in the same time-frame as the urban 
neighbourhood around it?
On the other hand, Sebrepor forms a critical case study (Yin, 2017), that is, a case 
study where one critical condition is different from the ideal type situation. Several 
years ago, the chief moved out of his neighbourhood because of a conflict with parts 
of his extended family. This recently developed situation of absenteeism allows for a 
comparison between a present chief and an absent chief within the same area. It allows 
us to observe what aspects of his position depend on his presence, activity and local 
bonds, and what aspects of his position remain after he became a contested figure and 
therefore stopped living in the neighbourhood, being only dependent on his position 
as a formally enstooled chief within the Ghanaian state figuration.
Summary
I conclude that the institution of chieftaincy, although its organisation and discourse 
largely remain that of a locally rooted, popular and socially central traditional authority, 
increasingly starts to lean on rational-legal sources of power such as its interdependence 
with several bureaucratic state agencies as a local ‘governor by informality’ and its 
formal land ownership. With regard to the chief ’s effect on grassroots organisation 
for the development of collective amenities in the neighbourhood, I conclude that the 
chief has formidable power there. This is primarily blocking power; that is, if the chief 
wants to stop a particular group or activity, he can easily do so. But depending on the 
disposition of the chief and his degree of security in power, a chief can also contribute 
powerfully to local action for development, by taking the lead and using his influence 
to stimulate residents to participate in collective action.
22  It should be noted, however, that even though there was no local chief, the land still fell under a chief in 
theory. In the case of the Ga-Dangbe, most of those chiefs historically lived in coastal villages, and the 
inland land, which was largely unoccupied, was categorised in complex local and frequently unwritten 
patterns as belonging to one of the coastal chiefdoms. Every square meter of land in Ghana belongs, 
in the end, to one chief or another. But when the city expands to cover previously uninhabited land, the 
chieftaincy in those newly growing neighborhoods is generally as young as the neighborhood itself – 
appointed by an older, distant chief. 
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5.2 Background
In this section, I briefly set out a history of the institution of chieftaincy. I show how 
diversely chieftaincy has historically been constituted, how the institution developed 
in interdependency with various extractive and colonial regimes, how it was then 
interwoven with the state during the British colonial regime and how that arrangement 
was taken over by Ghana’s post-colonial government at independence after 1957.
Ghanaian chieftaincy is a highly diverse institution, ranging from the fully centralised 
and hierarchical to the quasi-acephalous. There have been a number of kingdoms in 
what is now Ghana, formerly Gold Coast and part of the Lower Volta Seini (Brempong, 
2006). These were notably the Ashanti in the center and the Mamprusi and the Dagbon 
in the north of the country. These tribes had, and have, highly centralised leadership 
systems with a king at the apex, and a clear military organisational structure. The 
Ashanti also had highly elaborate taxation legislation and collection systems (Reindorf, 
1895). 
Such concentration of power and militarisation were stimulated by the arrival of Arabic 
traders from the North and the European colonial powers on the coast, whose demand 
for slaves was most easily satisfied by fighting wars with the neighbouring tribes and 
selling the captives. The Ashanti, which started through a military unification of 
various Twi-speaking tribes in central Ghana, are the best example of this; their name 
literally means ‘because of war’ (Graeber, 2011). 
However, most tribes were, and are, organised much more loosely. The Ewe were, and 
often still are, regarded as highly spiritual by the general public in Ghana, and their 
chiefs were accordingly more spiritual leaders than military ones (Meyer, 1999). The 
same goes for the Ga-Dangbe, who hold traditional authority over the central part 
of the coast, including all of the Greater Accra Region. The Ga villages, in fact, did 
not use to have military leaders at all. Their highest decision-making authority used 
to be a council of priests. The concept of secular chiefs and stools, now seen as the 
traditional form of local government, was quite foreign to them and seems to have 
been imported from the Ashanti, “greatly to the detriment of Ga peace”, because it did 
not fit into the Ga non-dogmatic theocracies and their democratic, deliberative mode 
of self-governance (Field, 1937, p. 3). 
There are many other differences between the different tribal organisation systems 
within Ghana (Boateng, 1994). For present purposes however, the spectrum sketched 
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above should serve. It shows that the modern concept “chief ” in Ghana is a mixture of 
very different types of origins. Within the different systems, chieftaincy has combined 
military, religious, judicial, administrative, legislative, economic and cultural functions, 
and to various degrees it still does so. It should also be noted that the institution is, and 
always has been, subject to constant change. That means the institution adapts to new 
circumstances, such as urbanisation, and it also means that the definition of its roles, 
responsibilities and powers is always up for debate. 
But how did the modern, somewhat standardised and legally enshrined national 
network of chiefs originate, with its National and Regional Houses of Chiefs? It 
was created in the colonial era by the British. When shaping the area into the Gold 
Coast colony, these had no desire to fight all the local strongmen they encountered. 
Instead, they included them into the fabric of their colonial state. The British colonial 
administration model was largely one of indirect rule, which required local leaders 
who could act as a layer of home-grown administrators, cushioning the colonial rulers 
from the complexity of local politics. 
To this end, colonial administrators crudely divided up the land and the people 
into a number of discrete ethnic groups, in the process ignoring any ambiguity, any 
political arrangements or identities that did not fit this new order (Mamdani, 1996). 
They required each of these ethnic groupings to identify ‘chiefs’, who were to act as 
local authorities. When local communities had no individual chiefs, the colonial 
administration recognised as ‘chief ’ whatever local elites they found pliable (Van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Van Dijk, 1999).
For instance the Ga, living in the Greater Accra region, had no worldly leaders to speak 
of, but only a small number of purely spiritual ‘earth priests’ (Field, 1940). This lack 
of a clear negotiating partner frustrated the British, who finally simply appointed one 
of these priests, the Mantse, to be chief, roughly modelling the Ga chieftaincy system 
on that of the nearby Akan. In exchange for their loyalty as local proxies, these chiefs 
were endowed by the colonial government with a large amount of local discretion and 
military backing (Mamdani, 1996). 
However, the colonial administration deliberately did not institute any clear 
succession rules for the chiefs. This had the (publicly espoused) advantage that any 
local traditions for succession would not be violated, but it also had the (less publicly 
espoused) advantage that the colonial rulers could more easily influence who would be 
chief. This started a long tradition of state structures governing Ghana by informality. 
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It also led to a situation where endless legal fights are waged between candidates for 
succession, often ranging over more than a decade after the previous chief has died, as 
well as a practical to install chiefs based on political party preference, made possible by 
the vagueness of succession rules. 
Thus, tradition was often invented, as the needs of the colonial government dictated 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). However, this lack of local institutional continuity 
does not make chiefs any less of a traditional authority in the Weberian sense. This 
became clearly visible in our interviews and longer interactions with Ga chiefs, elders 
and others involved with the institution, who scrupulously study old books, obscure 
archival material and oral history to find out the ‘correct’ rules of succession and power 
lines – correctness of the rules being defined by their age.
Surrounding independence in 1957, there was deep distrust between the Ashanti, whose 
region formed Ghana’s economic and political powerhouse, and the first president 
Kwame Nkrumah, who had gathered a coalition from all regions of the new Ghana. 
The final compromise, partly brokered by the British, was that the chiefs would get a 
powerful position in the newly formed independent state, symbolised by their presence 
in the national coat of arms. This went against the will of the nationalist Nkrumah, who 
saw many chiefs as henchmen of the former colonial regime (Rathbone, 2000).
This entrenchment of the chiefs’ power was a concession to regionalism, since the 
Ashanti chiefs were the de facto leaders of that region and could be expected to form 
a stronghold against any overly centralist policies emanating from Accra. However, it 
applied and still applies to all chiefs in Ghana, which includes many in regions where 
they are far less rooted leaders than the Ashanti chiefs are. They thus held on to the 
strong position they had held under the British, which was enshrined in Ghana’s first 
independent constitution (art. 267, Const. 1992), protecting their local right to govern 
and their stewardship over the land, with its most recent incarnation in the Chieftaincy 
Act 759 of 2008.
Today, most Ghanaians still cannot imagine a community without a chief. Research 
among residents of villages around Kumasi, Ghana’s second city, shows that even those 
who feel their chief is grossly malfunctioning do not feel that chieftaincy itself should 
be abolished (Ubink, 2007). In Accra, only 5% of the residents would want to abolish 
chieftaincy (Knierzinger, 2007). Whether they perform well, poorly, or not at all, their 
position is accepted as a fact of life by almost everyone, including the institutions of the 
formal state.
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How can we understand chiefs today, and unpack the various roles they play, especially 
in urban areas? It is notoriously hard to categorise and pinpoint chief ’s activities (Van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal & Van Dijk, 1999), if only because they differ so much between 
chiefs. They differ not only between various ethnic traditions and local customs, but 
also between chiefs of the same tribe whose areas are right next to each other, because 
the position is a highly flexible one, allowing for a large degree of personalisation. In 
the end, there is no job description, and chiefs interpret their duties very differently 
(Odotei & Awedoba, 2006). Some work hard to develop their area, others see their role 
as limited to preserving tradition, some actively engage with formal state authorities 
and maintain their social presence in the neighbourhood through active mingling, 
whilst others wait to be approached or are even very hard to approach for the residents 
of their area.
To deal with this, I have narrowed down the description of chief ’s roles and positions 
for this chapter in a very simple way: I have looked only at the chief ’s sources of power, 
and within those, I have only looked at the observable, direct lines of power, excluding 
for instance the power chiefs have through their influence on local politicians around 
election time. By tracing the chief ’s sources of power, it becomes possible to establish 
a bare-bones image of his position within Ghana’s modern state figuration, one which 
is roughly similar for all chiefs in southern and central urban Ghana.23 What chiefs 
subsequently do with such power is another matter altogether, and one which differs 
radically between chiefs. 
Finally, a note on terminology. The word ‘chief ’ is applied to a variety of positions 
in contemporary Ghanaian society (Odotei & Awedoba, 2006). The one which is the 
topic of this paper is the enstooled (or enskinned) chief of the ‘indigenous’ ethnicity, 
appointed by the kingmakers and generally gazetted as chief by the Regional House of 
Chiefs (although positions are frequently contested). 
Then there are the so-called migrant chiefs, leading and representing clusters of 
Ghanaians of the same ethnicity living outside their area of origin. These chiefs are 
generally appointed or elected by popular acclaim, and as such more easily held 
accountable by their community than enstooled chiefs. These have a social leadership 
role, and can have substantial influence. But they do not control the land on which 
23 There is a cultural divide in this sense around the lower Black Volta. The regions to the north (Upper 
East, Upper West and Northern) often did not have any chiefs of the kind found in modern-day Ghana, 
until this institution were forced on them by colonizing powers who required similar structures of 
indirect rule throughout the country (Abotchie, Awedoba, & Odotei, 2006).
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they and their people live, and they are not protected by the constitution, since they 
are not considered proper chiefs. Unlike enstooled chiefs, their position fully depends 
on their performance. 
Finally, there are development chiefs or Nkͻsuohene (Bob-Milliar, 2009). This is an 
honorary title given to people who have done much to develop a certain village or 
area, like European knighthoods bestowed for services rendered to society.
This section has provided a historical introduction of the chief ’s institutional position 
throughout Ghana’s state formation process, showing the trajectory through which 
this position was developed and specified during the state formation process, and 
progressively embedded in the nation state’s narrative and legal fabric. In the following 
four empirical sections, I study the contemporary roles of the chief, using Sebrepor as 
the central case study, relying mainly on interviews, observations and the archives of 
the chief ’s Divisional Council.
The empirical part of this chapter is divided into four sections (5.3-5.6). Section 5.3 
looks at the chief as a local traditional leader, unpacking the relationship between the 
chief and the residents of the area. Section 5.4 goes into the interdependencies between 
the chief and a variety of government bureaucracies, also sketching the change over 
time in this figuration. In section 5.5, I discuss a particular source of power, which 
is not so much relational as it is technical: the chief ’s position as land manager, and 
his attached legal hold on the land. In section 5.6, I pose the question “who is ‘the 
chief ’?”, and unpack the dynamics around this private person, centering on that larger 
definition of the chieftaincy institution, ‘the palace’. In this section, I also zoom out 
and extrapolate from this case study to the historical and expected development of the 
figuration of state and urban chieftaincy in Ghana as a whole.
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below176
5.3 Traditional leader
“The chief is the heart and mind of his people. When he gives directives it 
is seen as a law. This town has a chief, but no one has an idea who he is. 
He doesn’t live among his people, or even close to them. This has caused 
the people to lose their moral support. So if the chief who is seen as the 
conscience of the people is absent, the order governing the people is 
also absent.” – Sarah, Sebrepor resident, 2015
“The chief is the heart and mind of his people.” The root identity of Ghanaian chiefs is 
that of sovereign community leader. In the literature, chiefs’ main characteristics are 
their traditional authority over a relatively homogeneous local population and their 
management of the accompanying land (S. Berry, 2013; Ray & Reddy, 2003). Chiefs 
are also described as the embodiments and mediators of local tradition, functioning 
as syncretic linchpins between the traditional and the modern (Van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal & Van Dijk, 1999).
As described above, they have indeed historically taken up this role in many forms. In 
this section, I unpack that role as it is reshaped under the process of urbanisation, by 
looking at the three main elements of that role: first the chief as ‘soft’ leader, a cultural 
guide and a peacekeeper, second the chief as local strongman, and third the chief as a 
clientelist patron, delivering material benefits to his people. There has been over the 
past few centuries a more general pattern of structural differentiation, where various 
functions of the chief are taken over by modern institutions. I find that most parts of 
the chief ’s role as a traditional leader dwindle under processes of urbanisation.
The chief as ‘soft’ leader: cultural guide and peacekeeper
As “the conscience of his people”, the chief has a cultural leadership function. Among 
the Ga (the native tribe of Greater Accra), this is the chief ’s original primary function: 
they emerged from a priest-order known as the wulomo (Reindorf, 1895). Up to the 
present day, the chiefs work hard to keep that role as a cultural leader. This becomes 
very clear in a letter in which the chief reminds everyone of the stipulated traditions 
around engagement, marriage and death. The letter is addressed to all stools and 
churches in the neighbourhood. 
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“RE: Review of customary practices on funerals/marriages in the Kpone 
Traditional Area
Sir,
I submit herewith a comprehensive review of the customary practices 
on funerals / marriages in the Traditional Area, for onward transmission 
to your family members / congregations. 
This review took place at a general meeting of the Kpone Traditional 
Council held on 13th December, 2005. Defaulters will face the penalties 
accordingly.
Counting on your cooperation, 
H. A. K. Attipoe,
Assistant Regional Registrar”
The letter then sets out the traditional customs surrounding the death of a man, listing 
all the items that should be provided by the family, the daughter-in-law and the widow 
(soap, a coffin, deathbed clothes, and so on). The letter also goes into the customary 
items surrounding marriage and general gender relations, the punishment for adultery 
(a monetary fine, two bottles of schnapps and a sheep), and sometimes oddly specific 
throwbacks to times of different material circumstances: “A man who impregnates a 
woman without seeking the consent of her family will provide the woman two half 
pieces of cloth and will provide medical care for the impregnated woman with any 
other responsibilities.”
Efforts like this letter are part of a centuries-long power struggle between the tribal 
leaders and the churches for cultural hegemony. This process can be said to have 
started with the first attempts at Christianisation of the Gold Coast, when in March 
1767, the Directors of the Danish Guinea Company…
“…begged the Elders of the United Brethren to send missionaries to the 
Gold Coast to preach the Gospel to the natives for the purpose of making 
them orderly, faithful and diligent people like those on the three Danish 
islands in the West Indies” (Reindorf, 1895, p. 216).
From the start, Christianity has undermined the religious authority of the local priests 
and indirectly that of chiefs. After all, even more than the kings in Europe, Ghanaian 
chiefs were leading ‘by the grace of God’, as in most ethnic groups, the chiefs were part 
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of a caste of priests. So as the local gods were being supplanted by Jesus, so was the 
religious authority and power basis of the chiefs undermined (Reindorf, 1895, p. 109). 
This struggle for cultural leadership continues up to the present day, although most of 
it is of course not captured in such letters but rather a matter of daily discourse. “Tribal 
organisations are wicked, our church doesn’t allow us to go there”, as Mary, another 
resident, put it. 
Another aspect of the chief as “the order governing the people” concerns the chief 
functioning as an informal court of law (Englebert, 2002; Ubink, 2008; Van Kessel 
& Oomen, 1997). This is a major occupation for the chief and his self-appointed 
Divisional Council. They handle several cases each month, on land ownership 
conflicts, domestic disputes, conflicts between neighbours, offenses against the chief ’s 
honor, public fighting and other local disputes. Traditionally, this is a large function of 
the chieftaincy, but in Sebrepor, it is now declining. As Mr. Aryeetey, the secretary of 
the Divisional Council, notes: “Before 10 years, we had a whole lot of cases. These days, 
it is decreasing. Of late, we have not been receiving many complaints at all.”
In short, the chief ’s ‘soft’ leadership as the ‘heart and mind of his people’ is dwindling 
rapidly. This holds in the sense of cultural leadership, ‘the conscience of the people’, 
where the chief ’s moral authority is being supplanted by a plurality of churches. It also 
holds in the sense of judging local disputes, as ‘the order governing the people’, where 
the chief is increasingly bypassed in favor of institutions of the formal state. 
The chief as local strongman
The chief ’s cultural leadership and judging role support another one of his roles: as the 
guardian of the community, a local strongman. “When he gives directives it is seen as 
a law,” Sarah said in the above quote. As another resident, Mary, put it: “The chief is 
the only one with real authority. You know, we also have these other leaders here, the 
Assemblyman, the Traditional Council, but they don’t really hold that same power.”
We can see this role set out by the chief himself in the course of a seemingly innocent 
project: the naming of the streets in Sebrepor. Because of the inherently political 
potential in naming locations, often after prominent people, this often turns into a 
number of micro-level power struggles (Godin, Le Roux, & Farvacque-Vitkovic, 2005, 
p. 16). The chief writes a letter to the Duratec Alu & Sons Company, ordering them to 
stop a street naming project they are running in Sebrepor. Why? 
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“It had come to my notice that you were violating the advice we all arrived 
at, when we were meeting at the Fire of Flames Ministries in Sebrepor.” 
The letter ends: “NOTE: The failure to comply with this directive would 
be met with most stringent opposition needed, as many are dissatisfied 
with the exercises (work).” 
In other words, the company is not naming the streets in a manner agreeable to the 
chief, and he threatens to set some people against them. In his role as a traditional 
leader, the chief largely draws his power from a state of informality, and he uses his 
local strongman position to determine how and when formality will come into his 
neighbourhood. When the formal state comes into play, the dynamics become very 
different, as the following section of this chapter shows. But as long as he moves in the 
informal realm that falls under his traditional authority, his use of such physical power 
is relatively unconstrained. 
There is a piece of land in Sebrepor, between a railroad and a high-tension power line, 
where a group of migrants had settled without obtaining formal land documentation. 
They had bought the land from a long-time local, who had obtained the land from 
the previous chief to farm on. Throughout a year, negotiations take place between the 
‘squatters’ and the chief on how to solve the issue: formalise their residence or leave. 
The chief continuously puts pressure on the ‘squatters’ to leave their plots. 
When they don’t appear before his court quickly enough, he first decides to fine 
them. From the Council’s notes: “It was agreed behind closed door discussion that the 
squatters should pay 1 white ram, 2 bottles of foreign schnapps, plus c3.000.000 for 
forcing Nii Dortey III go to the Regional Crime Officer to make them appear at his 
stool.” It is relevant to note here that the chief actively works to discourage residents 
from getting the formal authorities involved - this fine is explicitly for the ‘crime’ 
of “forcing [the chief] to go to the Regional Crime Officer”. And formal though the 
fine may sound, though, it is negotiable. When the squatters do appear, they pay 
several bottles of schnapps and a whiskey, and it is accepted as enough. However, the 
negotiations do not lead to a resolution. 
So “the Council decided that Nii Mankralo, Nii Shippi, Nii Narteh and Asafoatse should 
move to Nii Dortey, and discuss a more pragmatic way of approach, since they are the 
owners of the land. The rest of the councillors are ready to give the necessary support.” 
What ‘a more pragmatic approach’ means soon becomes clear: a crew of strongmen 
with guns and knives, so-called ‘land guards’, is sent to threaten the ‘squatters’ in order 
to force them out of the area. 
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This convinces them to appear again at the chief ’s palace, where the chief denies 
sending land guards at them, but suggestively notes that it is better for everyone to stick 
to his rules. After giving the ‘squatters’ a stern talking-to, the chief makes them “purify 
the Stool”, i.e. pay another fine in foreign liquor and money, because the ‘squatters’ 
reported him to the local police for sending land guards at them. Finally, the land is 
cleared for the larger part, and the ‘squatters’ are re-settled in a corner of the area. 
What can we conclude about this traditional strongman role of the chief? It seems to 
be still quite present, although in a subdued form. It could be said that this part of his 
traditional role remains, to the extent that the chief can operate in the informal realm. 
That means he can implicitly threaten people with force, like he did to the (formal) 
street naming company, and he can anonymously send gangs to threaten and attack 
people who have no formal rights to the land they occupy. But as the following section 
sets out, he can no longer use his strongman position in the open, being increasingly 
restrained by a variety of well-organised state bureaucracies around him.
The chief delivering material benefits to his people
There is a third part of his role as a traditional leader: solving people’s material 
problems. His role in this could be best seen as a patron one, where he provides limited 
material benefits in exchange for respect and loyalty. As he says: 
“The people, they owe allegiance to me. The citizens, they owe allegiance 
to me. So I also see to it that they are in perfect stay. It is my duty to 
meet them frequently. To consider the development of the area. If we 
need some amenities, we sit down, and we take a decision.” 
This clientelist leadership is a role that other local leaders, such as church leaders, 
businessmen, politicians, also take up. But the chief has a head start on them, through 
his traditional leadership his bureaucratic middle man position and his land manager’s 
role (see later this chapter). However, this role is one that depends particularly on 
whether one takes the initiative. Sarah, from the quote above, later elaborated on the 
consequences of the chief ’s absence: since the chief is not present to lead the locals 
in development efforts, nobody is doing anything. “The indigens are not ready for 
serious development. The chief lives outside his community, and does not even visit 
his people.” This quote also sheds light on the broader ethnic relations in the area: 
the chief is seen as the head of the local Ga people, and it is their responsibility to 
act to develop the area. All other ethnicities, Ghanaian or otherwise, are guests. This 
sentiment was echoed by most of the Ga I spoke with. 
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In the Divisional Council notes, such development plans do crop up from time to 
time, but they make little headway. In 2002, during the first meeting of the Council, 
several projects were suggested, most importantly a marketplace for the area. However, 
when I came to the area for research in 2015, the marketplace was still on the agenda. 
Meanwhile, open land in the area had filled up almost completely. 
Would things be different if the chief were living in the area? It may be helpful to 
compare this chief with his superior, the Kpone Paramount Chief Nii Tetteh Otoo 
II. Nii Tetteh is still living in his area, the nearby town Kpone, and regularly sets up 
development projects. 
“In the development, you see, the members of the community have been 
helping me to create structures, digging for foundations, everything! 
Every week or maybe fortnightly, we go around the neighbourhood 
and beat the gongong, announcing there is a project here, we are doing 
communal labour, and so on.”
However, he complains that the residents don’t want to help with communal labor any 
longer.
“We invite the boys to come and work, but some were protesting. After 
inviting them, some of them said, oh!, they will not do the communal 
labor, they will not dig, because our sponsor has given us 1.2 billion 
[about $100.000] to build the maternity block. So why should we then 
call them to come and do communal labor for free? Meanwhile, our 
sponsor did not give us one peso! But these days, you know, people 
just don’t want to come out for communal labor anymore. They say 
‘government, government’. They say, ‘the [municipal] Assembly will do 
it’. Meanwhile, the Assembly doesn’t have money to do all this!”
As noted, the extent of the chief ’s role as a clientelist leader, delivering the goods, 
depends to a large degree on whether he actively takes this role. It is certainly possible 
to do this more actively, as his colleague in Kpone does. But even in that case, the 
chief ’s ability to deliver services is increasingly outpaced by the government agencies. 
And to get services from government bureaucracies, political patronage is a more 
effective channel than tribal patronage. There appears to be a gradual erosion of tribal 
identification. As the local Assemblyman explains: 
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“You see, in Ghana, politics has taken over all that we do, more than 
80%. If you belong to his or her party, the person will attend to you. 
Whether I’m an Ashante, if I don’t belong to their party it won’t help me. 
Though even the head of that party is an Ashante, but because I don’t 
belong to their party, they won’t attend to me.”
As the Assemblyman explains, tribal loyalty has largely given way to party line 
patronage, and for individual tribe members, this shared identity is no longer enough 
to ask for favours. The chief, however, does get strong channels into the various state 
bureaucracies, as we see in the next section. Perhaps counter-intuitively, these channels 
are not so much connected to his position as a tribal leader, but rather as a traditional 
middle man for the formal government. 
As we have seen in this section, the chief ’s role as a traditional leadership is in principle 
quite wide-ranging. However, as we have also seen, Sebrepor’s chief is certainly not 
making the most of this role. In fact, as Sarah notes, he is not around. “No one has 
an idea who he is,” is not to be taken literally, but it does illustrate the strangeness of 
the absence of this presumed traditional leader from his own home area. Moreover, 
Sebrepor’s population is ethnically highly diverse, whereas Nii Dortey is explicitly an 
ethnic leader. This problem is faced by most urban chiefs, regardless of their efforts: 
they rule over a population largely made up of ‘strangers’. His cultural leadership role, 
too, has become very limited. His strongman role has moved underground and is now 
limited by formal state power. Finally, his clientelist leadership has almost disappeared. 
In short, his role as a traditional leader has dwindled rapidly as urbanisation progressed 
in the area.
5.4 Middle man
“You know, if there is a chief, then definitely, if someone is trying to 
misbehave the first point of contact is the chief. Because if you should 
go to the police, then they will find out where you are residing. And then 
they will ask you, from whom did you acquire your land? You say the 
chief. Then they will ask you: why didn’t you report the matter to the 
chief? Then what do you say? So the chief’s house is the first point 
of call to report any matter.” – Emmanuel Aryeetey, Secretary of the 
Divisional Council
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“If we [the municipality] want to do a project in the area, we first 
call together the community. Who? Well, the chief is the head of the 
community, and then there is the Traditional Council, composed of the 
heads of the various clans in the area.” – Paul Ofori, Chief Municipal 
Planning Officer
Since colonial times, the chief has been a middle man between formal government 
and the residents of his area. Under conditions of urbanisation and the accompanying 
densification of bureaucracies, this creates a variety of new positions for the chief as a 
kind of ‘lower-level bureaucrat’, as I show below. Taken together, this creates a structure 
of ‘governing by informality’ with the chief mediating bureaucratic relations. For the 
residents, the chief thus often appears as a gatekeeper towards formal institutions. 
However, the chief ’s intimate relationship with state bureaucracies bring him something 
more. From the multiplicity of lower-level bureaucrat roles which he takes on emerges 
a larger role: to speak in the name of ‘the community’ to bureaucracies in general, 
even when there is no individual case to be handled. The chief can thus leverage his 
relations with the state in the local arena, where there is an ever-expanding day-to-
day influence of bureaucracies. In this respect, processes of modernisation provide 
him with another instrument of local neighbourhood power, even as his traditional 
leadership role dwindles. 
The chief as lowest bureaucrat and gatekeeper
The chief ’s role as a lower-level bureaucrat is most apparent when we see him at work 
as judge, or somewhat broader, as ‘keeper of the peace’. His Divisional Council has 
frequent correspondence with the surrounding police stations, asking the police to 
arrest subjects for cases being adjudicated in their courts, requesting to take over cases 
from them or informing them of the outcome of such cases. 
“The above (…) Council has solved the problem between Mr. Otoo and 
Mr. Coleman and family. The arbitration team has reached a fitting 
compromise between the two (2) parties. The Council would therefore 
be grateful if you could close the docket on the case.” 
This is not a one-way channel. Sometimes the Divisional Council does not manage to 
solve the case, and decides to refer it back to the police. At one instance, the Council 
writes a longer letter to the police station explaining how they arbitrated a certain 
dispute, but one of the parties is refusing to pay the fine. 
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“Reference a case between [name], complainant, and [names], 
defendants, lodged at your outfit, Community 22 Police Station, 
withdrawn upon the request of the two defendants to the Kpone-
Sebrepor Divisional Council. 
The Kpone-Sebrepor Divisional Council arbitrated in the dispute. Rulings 
were made known to all the parties who consented to the rulings. The 
complainant [name] and one of the defendants [name] honoured their 
parts of the rulings and paid their fines. [name], the other defendant in 
the case, asked for time up to ending of May 2008 to pay her fines. She 
failed on this date and came to request again for 15th June 2008. The 
husband [name], who was present when verdict was passed, also came 
to confirm that he will pay on the 15th June since they are paid on the 15th 
of the month. 
Both failed to honour this promise up to date. The Kpone-Sebrepor 
Divisional Council is therefore referring the case back to your outfit.”
This letter, routine as it looks, is worth some closer reading. It does not only 
communicate an outcome, or simply carry a request for certain action. It also includes 
a detailed justification for that request, and it contains all the information the Council’s 
leaders know the police will need to be able to continue building their file on this 
case. That is, here the chief ’s Council operates as a full-fledged part of the police 
bureaucracy. So in fact, the letter’s routineness is exactly the point: the chief ’s Council 
is quite used to operating as the local extension of various government bureaucracies. 
It also becomes clear once again that the chief ’s open use of force is no longer acceptable. 
When the defendant refuses to pay, the chief does not send out some of his boys to 
forcefully claim the payment, but instead refers the case back to the police. The case 
has been solved, so the police are not required to do any detective or judiciary work. 
Their job here is only as holders of the monopoly on violence. 
In the previous examples we have seen the chief working as an extension of formal 
bureaucracies into the neighbourhood. But often, he also plays a role as a gatekeeper 
when it comes to the provision of amenities. In the 1990s, several Sebrepor residents 
got together to set up a water supply system for the area, autonomously organising 
the connection to the Ghana Water Company mainlines nearby and building the 
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neighbourhood distribution network. But when they write to the Ghana Water 
Company to register new customers, the position of the chief again comes through. 
The request is titled “Authority Note”, written by the Sebrepor Water Committee, but 
by coming through the chief ’s Divisional Council, the letter carries much more weight 
and is more likely to move smoothly through the Ghana Water Company bureaucracy. 
In fact, Sebrepor is the only neighbourhood in the area to have a specific Water 
Committee made up of plumbers. The surrounding neighbourhoods also have such 
committees, but there, they are chaired by the divisional chiefs themselves, so that 
these are direct gatekeepers for access to this vital amenity.
In a later letter, the chief in fact orchestrates the transfer of this informally built 
infrastructure from the Sebrepor Water Committee to the state utility company Ghana 
Water Company. “Potable water supply in the township was initiated and the cost borne 
by the inhabitants, including its maintenance.” The infrastructure has so far served the 
people, but now the professional state bureaucracy needs to come in, bringing new 
infrastructure “serving these three big communities (…) with large populations (…) 
to prevent frequent pipeline bursts and wastage of precious treated water in the area.” 
This request is made directly by the chief, not the grassroots-organised Sebrepor Water 
Committee.
This is a pattern that appears time and again in the meeting notes: the Divisional 
Council and the municipal and other government authorities seem to work hand in 
hand. As the Chief Planning Officer of the municipality put it: “If we, the municipality, 
want to do a project in the area, we first call together the community. Who? Well, 
the chief is the head of the community, and then there is the Traditional Council, 
composed of the heads of the various clans in the area.” Two things become very clear 
from this quote: the municipal officers see a layer of organisation existing between 
them and the residents, and that layer consists primarily of the local chief and his 
elders. In many respects, the Traditional and Divisional Councils could then be said 
to function much like subsidiary layers of government in the formal system, only with 
somewhat different rules. 
The relationship is clearly shown in an exchange of letters at the occasion when a new 
municipality is established under which Sebrepor falls. In a letter addressed to the chief, 
the District Chief Executive (DCE, basically the mayor) embarks on a “familiarisation 
tour” of the newly formed Kpone-Katamanso District area. 
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“The purpose of the tour is to offer the Hon. DCE the opportunity 
to acquaint himself with the development challenges facing the 
Communities and institutions/establishments in order to plans solutions 
to address them.” 
In this tour, he visits two locations in the Sebrepor area: the local army barracks, 
and the chief ’s palace. As the new DCE puts it, “he and his team of technocrats…are 
visiting the community…to interact with you and your elders”. In short, the chief is 
addressed as the unequivocal leader of the community, thus signposting his right to 
rule by informality.
The chief responds to the letter with warm words of welcome. He writes: “The Sebrepor 
Mantse, Nii Dortey Abotsi III (…) and the entire residents of Sebrepor township seise 
this opportunity to welcome you (…) and the Kpone-Katamanso District Assembly 
to Sebrepor.” He then describes what the residents have done for themselves, and 
requests, in their name, the tarring of a motorway, better water pipelines, effective 
road drainage, local sub-offices for better daily coordination of developmental work, 
and street lighting. In essence, the chief here speaks from the role in which he was 
addressed: as the only legitimate spokesperson for the community, the linchpin 
between residents and state. 
In short, the entire figuration around the modern state is hardwired to recognise the 
chief as the natural neighbourhood leader and spokesperson, the man of the people. 
This goes for state bureaucrats at the local level, state bureaucrats at the national level, 
semi-state bureaucrats at state utility companies. Sebrepor’s chief works with the 
Electricity Company of Ghana to bring new connections to the neighbourhood; he 
signs his residents’ forms to apply for a new water connection with the Ghana Water 
Company; he shifts cases back and forth with formal judges and the local police 
commander; and he works with various municipal agencies such as the local Planning 
Office. 
All of these organisations could in principle also communicate with other local leaders, 
but they are predisposed to look for the chief first.24 They mostly work through the 
24 The direct competitor of the chief in this sense of being the ‘natural gatekeeper’ is the Assemblyman. 
And in many ways, these two positions function as communicating vessels. This detracts a little bit 
from the importance of the chief, but not seriously so, since most Assemblymen have full-time jobs, 
and chiefs are generally more respected by the public than Assemblymen (Ubink, 2007). Moreover, 
Assemblymen have full-time jobs, so they generally do not have time for such functions.
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concept of ‘opinion leaders’, a complex category involving anyone with local influence, 
of which the first point of address is, certainly for those who are not intimately familiar 
with the local area, the chief. This gives him quite some discretionary power. Thus, 
urbanisation and state formation spawn a variety of new positions for the chief as a 
local gatekeeper between residents and formal institutions. 
This is a pattern I found in all neighbourhoods I visited in Accra. The exact mix of 
such responsibilities and powers differs between chiefs, but what is constant is that 
local chiefs essentially participate in weaving a web of bureaucratic institutions and 
infrastructures in which they have a central position, refining and deepening of the 
pre-existing interdependency between chieftaincy and the state. 
It is important to note here that this role goes two ways. Not only do bureaucracies 
approach the chief as their local extension, the chief himself also actively seeks out 
political connections and power. He made sure that his Divisional Council cross-
cuts political party lines. The chief himself worked as an NPP Assemblyman during 
the same period that the Council’s secretary was part of the NDC municipal cadre, 
and several of the representatives of various tribes in the Council are also prominent 
political movers and shakers, in both parties. Thus, the chief has assembled many of 
the local ‘opinion leaders’ in a temporarily stable figuration around himself. In a larger 
pattern, such interdependencies between chiefs and politicians are widely recognised 
(Boakye, 2016; Rathbone, 2000). 
The chief as community spokesman
In his interactions with local bureaucracies, the chief seamlessly merges two parts 
of the middle man role. First, the government works with the chief as the local 
extension of many different government bureaucracies. We call this the chief as lowest-
level bureaucrat¸ where the chief positions himself as one of the bureaucrats. But he 
interweaves this with another role: speaking to bureaucracies, from ‘the community’. 
Both concern the chief as seen from the point of view of government bureaucrats, and 
both build on from the chieftains’ colonial past as middle men. But they are subtly 
different in terms of the responsibilities and legitimacy they bring. 
From the combination of these two roles emerges another position of independent 
power. The chief can use his role as community spokesman and his privileged relations 
with state bureaucracies to achieve personal goals and exert power independently. We 
see here the chief as an independent informal ruler, with close ties to the bureaucracies 
but not bound by the restrictions of a bureaucrat. 
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This becomes apparent in two letters sent to the Ghana Police Station in Ashaiman 
(the nearest police station) in September 2005. The chief writes: 
“To the Officer in Charge. 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
One Mr. Paul, a resident in the area where I am ruling as the Mantse25 
[traditional Ga title for the chief], is trying to misconduct himself. I have 
a stool land [a piece of land owned by the stool, the ‘throne’], which has 
been earmarked as a mini-market to serve the township. Mr. Paul has 
issued a warning to artisans on any attempt to develop that piece of 
land. We are about to start a Communal Labour to start the mini-market 
project. Should he make the second attempt to stop the project, I will 
not hesitate to communicate to your outfit for immediate police action. 
Thank you, Hon. Nii Dortey Abotsi III” 
Mr. Paul in response defends himself with his own letter to the police station, in which 
he explains that he has been living on that land for two decades now, and that the chief 
has plenty of land on which to build a mini market. 
“But if it pleases him to use the only piece of land on which I’m resident 
for a mini market, he should come so that we negotiate for appropriate 
compensation. If he is not convinced of negotiating for appropriate 
compensation, he is free to go to court, where my lawyer is anxiously 
waiting for him”. (emphasis in original)
25 On the position of the Mantse: the Ga’s were originally a pure theocracy, with four types of priests. The 
highest of these was the wulomo, whose leadership was purely spiritual. Two others were the mankralo 
and the mantse. The latter was actually not a leader at all, but rather a beautifully-dressed man who 
functioned as a war mascot (’War Medicine’). As the Ga said, this man in his role of the mantse ‘has 
no mouth’, his function was not to speak or pass judgement, let alone lead. His function was to bring 
luck in war. When the British started to insist that every town would have a chief to negotiate with, 
the mantse was often appointed to this function. This was the source of a large number of internal 
conflicts, because in the case of the mantse as a chief, it was not a matter of him overstepping his 
traditional right to rule – he had no right to rule at all. The Ga originally simply did not have any worldly 
leaders (Reindorf, 1895).
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As he puts it: 
“The chief’s letter, copied to me, seeks to intimidate me. It aims at 
twisting my arms behind me so that at the time of the chief’s intended 
provocation, he can have his way out easily. I therefore humbly wish 
to inform the Ashaiman Police that should the chief send people to 
my house (land) to do anything funny, all in the name of building a mini 
market, I shall not hesitate to inform the Dodowa Police Unit since my 
area is under the Dodowa District Police Jurisdiction.” (emphasis in 
original)
This letter provides a vivid illustration of how the chief can deploy his right to govern 
by informality: a mix of intimidation and the opportunistic use of state bureaucracies. 
However, it is also relevant to note the ending of Mr. Paul’s letter, which shows his 
tactic of resistance: he refers explicitly to another police unit than the one addressed by 
the chief. Why? The chief is more than just the chief. As an Assemblyman (signified by 
the ‘Honorable’ before his name) he has privileged connections at the local municipal 
agencies, including the police. But as Mr. Paul notes, the chief ’s ability to govern 
informally, whether by right as a traditional leader or as derived from his position 
as middle man for the local government bureaucracies, is increasingly restricted by 
the various state bureaucracies surrounding him. Indeed, Mr. Paul ended up winning 
the case, the chief and his Council had to back down. I come back to this point in the 
conclusion of the chapter.
However, not everyone is able to stand up to the chief. The case of the ‘squatters’ under 
the high-tension line, introduced in the previous empirical section, is a good example. 
As the fines and the land guards do not have the desired effect, the chief and Council 
decide to involve their connections in the formal sector. They send out a letter to the 
Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) to disconnect the ‘squatters’ from electricity, 
in order to push them out, and simultaneously send a letter to the regional police 
commander.  
“RE: Request for Power Disconnection
Dear Madam,
The above Council operating under the Manteship of Nii Dortey Abotsi 
III wishes to draw your attention to an exercise about to take place in 
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his area of traditional jurisdiction (…). People have defiantly planted 
wooden structures and containers under the high tension power lines in 
some areas in the Sebrepor township, to the detriment of unsuspecting 
residents. They have worsened their defiance by drawing power through 
some of your workers without consideration to life and properties 
belonging to responsible citizens. (…) 
We are therefore appealing to your high office to remove all electrical 
connections (…) in the affected area before 23rd January 2008.”
The letter sent to the police commander is almost the same, except that the request 
this time is not to disconnect people from a public amenity, but somewhat more 
martial: “for help to weed out those squatters to forestall peace and sanity in the area 
mentioned above before the 23rd January, 2008.” Indeed, the chief won this fight and 
managed to remove the squatters. His position appears to be very clear: he uses his 
authority as a local leader of the community, representing the ‘unsuspecting residents’ 
and ‘responsible citizens’. But in the Council notes, we find that the piece of land in 
question was in fact under litigation. Rather than being squatted, it was sold to the 
people living there by ‘unauthorised parties’, that is, the chief ’s relatives. 
Thus, in a tangle of competing claims and ambiguous property and usufructuary 
rights, the chief is able to push through his own. He does so with the support of the 
formal authorities, who follow his interpretation of the situation. What is more, he 
is able to punish citizens for getting the formal authorities involved in the first place, 
twice in fact. First, he fined the squatters first for forcing him to call in the Regional 
Crime Officer to bring them to his Council, and then he fined them again for reporting 
him to the police when he sent goons at them. This is what governing by informality 
looks like in practice. 
Effect of the chief ’s position on grassroots organisation
The chief functions in a sense as a street-level bureaucrat, shaping how these 
institutions are concretised within his neighbourhood (Lipsky, 1980). However, he is 
not employed by any single bureaucracy, nor are his powers confined to those of a 
bureaucrat, as he plays a double role: speaking for ‘his people’ towards bureaucracies, 
and speaking for the bureaucracies towards his people. In addition, he has the power 
to act independently, and works hard to keep it so: in the previous section we saw him 
handing out fines to the ‘squatters’ for forcing him to get the formal authorities involved 
to oust them (whilst in this section we saw him fine those same people for reporting 
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him to the police!). Throughout all this, the government bureaucracies continue to 
stand by and support the chief ’s local authority. Therefore I interpret this position 
not, in the end, as a bureaucratic one as described by Lipsky, but as a more complex 
position of combined authority: a governor through informality (Roy, 2009b). 
The dialectic between the chief ’s role as traditional leader and his role as a lower-
level bureaucrat follows a certain, rather fixed course, as it plays out over time. First 
the chief is seen mainly as spokesman for the amorphous group of settlers which is 
call his ‘community’, then as the organisational density of the area grows, increasingly 
as bureaucrat. This is characteristic of the arrival by foreign organisations (such as 
Western colonisers, or municipal bureaucracies) in ‘terra nova’. We can observe this 
progressive interaction at the national scale in all of Ghana over the course of centuries, 
as described above, first between the colonisers and the chiefs and later between the 
post-colonial governments and the chiefs. 
But the same process shows up at a smaller scale in every new neighbourhood like 
Sebrepor, over the course of decades or even less. At first instance, the formal state’s 
attitude towards chiefs is quite simple. When the (municipal) bureaucratic apparatus 
arrives in new terrain, the chiefs are seen as a form of local government, to be negotiated 
with. This role includes a very broad spectrum of powers and responsibilities, as 
described in the previous empirical section. But over time, in the process of state 
formation and formalisation, the full-fledged traditional authority position shapeshifts 
into ‘lowest bureaucrat’. The chief is now no longer seen to independently govern the 
community, but is trusted to speak for the entire community, to ‘know what’s right’ and 
to judge and manage conflicts, as well as used as a gatekeeper by formal authorities like 
the municipality, the police apparatus and amenity providers.
This role of ‘lowest-level bureaucrat’ is only one of the chief ’s roles, but it is an important 
one. It allows him to direct the power of well-equipped bureaucracies to shape the 
development of the neighbourhood to his advantage. Since the chief is a gatekeeper 
towards bureaucracies for many residents at many times, this role also provides the 
chief with a plethora of soft power opportunities towards any residents wanting to 
organise themselves locally. In nearby neighbourhoods I have witnessed chiefs working 
to hinder or completely preclude alternative forms of resident organisation, in order 
not to lose their privileges position towards government bureaucracies. 
This role too shifts in the process of urbanisation of the area. Two factors increasingly 
limit this source of power as urbanisation progresses, both of which were visible in Mr. 
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Paul’s letter above. First, this role is limited strictly to mediating the interface between 
the formal and the informal sphere. So when the chief wants to involve the police to 
send Mr. Paul off his land, he responds based on the formal sphere, inviting the chief 
to a state court of law. 
Second, as Mr. Paul notes, there are several police stations in the area. With this he 
implicitly warns the police force that if they try a hands-off approach, conveniently 
leaving the chief his right to govern informally, there are other formal agencies he can 
call upon. That is, the bases of power in the area get diversified as more bureaucratic 
organisations enter the space. This does not mean the automatic demise of the chief ’s 
middle man position. In fact, the Council quickly responds to the implications of Mr. 
Paul’s move. From the Council notes: “It was generally agreed that the traditional 
heads must introduce themselves to all the police stations dotted around the township 
to ease the work of the Council.” 
But as a more general pattern, when bureaucracies move in closer and get more 
knowledge of the neighbourhood, the chief ’s discretionary exercise of traditional 
power is circumscribed. It is when bureaucratic institutions become more effective at 
reaching the residents directly, and vice versa, that this lower-bureaucrat role of the 
chief diminishes and is increasingly fragmented. As the various institutions in the area 
develop an ever more fine-grained web of functional differentiation, the chief becomes 
less of a sovereign ruler and more of a link in lengthening chains of interdependence.
It should be noted that this does not immediately preclude him from wielding traditional 
authority, including the possibility of using physical force. Remember the street naming 
company: apart from certain strongly organised institutions like the courts of law and 
the police, which the chief cannot mess with, he still has a lot of latitude to determine 
how formality comes into his neighbourhood. But over time, as his informal sphere 
gets wrapped more tightly into various bureaucratic organisations, the power play 
of a traditional leader has to go increasingly underground and partially disappears. 
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5.5 Custodian of the land
Apart from being an informal leader with traditional authority and a middle man for 
government agencies, a third source of power for the chief is his legal power base as 
landlord. This is in the first instance a specific case of the relations mentioned in the 
two sections above, a mixture of the chief as spokesperson and as lowest bureaucrat, 
because he got these powers as community leader and he works with the legal courts 
to determine what land is rightfully who’s, and with the municipal planning agency to 
keep the land organised. So it is, in a very real sense, derived from the various aspects 
of his middle-man position along the same lines as the various roles described above. 
But it deserves a separate section here, because it is also much more than that: this is 
the main source of the chief ’s power in modern times.
In this section, I sketch the contours of this role and its development up to the present. 
First I show how it emerged from a position as land manager for the local community, 
which was historically granted to the chiefs by the colonial authorities. This role includes 
judging land ownership disputes, a prerogative which the chief guards vigilantly, even 
from the formal state agencies. I then discuss the reason for the chief to spend so much 
attention on this particular role: it gives him land ownership or at least influence over 
almost all of the neighbourhood, including many of the plots that have already been 
bought and settled on. That again provides him with an enormous amount of soft 
power within the neighbourhood. While the chief ’s hard coercive power is declining, 
he is gaining influence through his bureaucratic connections and control over land, 
which ensures that every resident of the area wants to be in his good book.
The chief as land manager
As sketched in the historical section above, the chieftaincy institution evolved in very 
different ways throughout Ghana, with tribes like the Ashanti and the northern Dagomba 
having hierarchical leadership early on, and most other tribes, like the coastal Ga, being 
more anarchic, loosely organised through various types of priests. When the British 
constructed their indirect rule apparatus, they named certain of these priests ‘chiefs’. 
And whatever tasks these specific priests had originally, one major role that emerged 
afterward for all chiefs was to ‘manage the land’, in the name of the local community. 
Today, this is the role that the chiefs display most publicly towards any outsiders. When 
I went to interview him and asked him to explain his duties as a chief, he first explained 
that he is a member of the Abotsi family, and then directly connected that to his duties 
of land stewardship. 
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“So Abotsi family settled at Sebrepor, where you are coming from. So 
I was made a chief to look after that area. So I’m the head of Nii Abotsi 
family, in charge of the area. Me and my cousins, we are supposed to 
look after the land. Although I am the chief, I cannot look after the land 
alone, I have to have people to help me, to aid me. So three of us were 
chosen to look after the land.” 
The settling and densification of previously empty land is a messy process, involving 
lots of conflicts and tensions. The chief sees it as his responsibility to manage such 
conflicts. As can be seen throughout the eight years of Divisional Council notes, this 
is a constant preoccupation. In terms of regular work, it mainly involves various forms 
of keeping spatial order in the area and judging land ownership disputes. Examples 
run from very small matters, such as unclear boundary fencing, people exceeding their 
plot and building into the road, to large matters like organising a local football field for 
the area youth. Here, again, his Divisional Council often operates in close contact with 
the municipal bureaucracy. For example, in a note to the District Building Engineer, 
the Council writes:
“Re: Haphazard construction
Dear Sir,
The above Divisional Council is reporting the conduct of a resident 
in Sebrepor – Mr. Afrifa on the Better Best Academy Road, who is 
constructing a manhole in the entrance lane of a neighbour. In addition, 
he intends to fence totally his residence which happens to be by the 
road. If not checked, future outbreak of fire and sucking of filled man-
hole would be difficult to attend to. Attempts to dissuade the culprit 
from carrying out this wicked undertaking are falling on deaf ears. 
We are therefore appealing to your outfit for assistance.”
Again, we find that when necessary, the chief and his Council perfectly blend into 
the bureaucratic discourse and logic, setting themselves up as lower-level bureaucrats 
reporting to their superiors, who are to get involved in a case that is threatening to get 
out of hand. And of course, here too the chief has a certain amount of discretionary 
power, as evidenced by the case of the ‘squatters’ described above. 
The chief as land dispute judge
Most of the Council’s attention spent on this role is in judging land ownership and 
boundary disputes. This happens in a fairly formal manner, with the chief acting 
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alternatively as independent local leader and as ‘lower-level bureaucrat’. Most disputes 
are settled by the Council and never reach the formal courts. But sometimes, the chief 
does appeals to his role in a hierarchy of judicial powers, reporting to a judge:
“Dear Sir,
I wish to write to your Lordship to confirm the true owner of the piece 
of land being litigated upon by Mr. Charles Tosu and one Etse Tugbenyo. 
Somewhere in 1982, Mr. Charles Tosu approached my late father, Nii 
Tetteh Abotsi II, who was the regent of the Kpone-Sebrepor Stool Land 
(…). 
Mr. Charles Tosu has since been occupying that piece of land for his 
businesses. I therefore can’t stick my neck out for Mr. Etse Togbenyo as 
to how he came by the said piece of land. I hope this piece of information 
would help you in your judgement.”
The above quote shows how the chief positions himself as a blend of manager, judge 
and original owner of the land. It also shows how his power as land manager is 
ultimately embedded in the legal structure of the formal state – he positions himself 
as subservient to the judge. But, as we can read between the lines, he does claim the 
authority to determine which land is whose. 
As part of this positioning act, he also claims jurisdiction over any cases related to this, 
as long as they are not explicitly in the hands of a higher judge. Instructive is a letter 
to a nearby police commander, in which he requests that the police help him trace the 
defendant of a land case which is being treated in their courts.
“RE: Invitation of a Suspect 
(…) Unfortunately, the defendant at your end, [name], refused to 
honor the Council’s numerous invitations. Since the problem is about 
the ownership of a piece of land and access road, the Council would 
appeal to your high office to refer the problem to us for solution. The 
outcome of our efforts will be communicated to you. Thank you for 
your cooperation.” (emphasis added) 
Where there is normally a free exchange of cases between the Divisional Council and 
various government bureaucracies, in this case the chief explicitly claims jurisdiction. 
He could in principle do this in any kind of situation related to the many different roles 
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that chiefs have traditionally taken on, such as general conflict resolution, cultural 
leadership, development work, safe-keeping and other roles. But he takes an attitude of 
ownership most prominently and consistently surrounding land arbitration cases. By 
now, it will be clear why these are so central for the chief: because they affirm his role 
as rightful manager of the land. 
The chief as land owner
This leads us directly to the ownership the chief claims over the land in ‘his’ area. Clearly, 
this claim is a large step up from a stewardship-like function of managing the land. It 
often does not reflect the variety in historical land ownership and user patterns but 
rather represents a kind of land grab by the chief (Ubink, 2006). As Amanor (2008, p. 
61) puts it: “The construct of customary land that developed in the 1920s sits uneasily 
with history. It did not reflect the social relations and transactions in lands that had 
existed in the nineteenth century.”
Such claims of land ownership originate from the turn of the 19th/20th century. At the 
time, the British colonial government attempted to enact various laws, which would 
have appropriated all unregistered land in Ghana as Crown Lands. In response, Gold 
Coast elites (from various tribes) waged a legal campaign for ‘local and customary 
land ownership’, arguing that all land on the Gold Coast had an owner, and their rights 
would be violated by such a declaration (Mensah Sarbah, 1897, in K. S. Amanor, 2008). 
Eventually, the Privy Council in London decided in a 1921 landmark case brought 
by a Nigerian chief that all land in coastal West Africa had always been communally 
managed, never privately owned. This decision led Ghana’s colonial government to 
grant all tribal leaders the vital position of ‘custodians of the land’, a position which was 
subsequently codified in the constitution. As a consequence, the chiefs are customarily 
and constitutionally obliged to administer land in the interest of the community 
(Ubink, 2008). These rules were developed and negotiated when commodification was 
weakly developed, and ethnic communities largely coincided with specific territories. 
In such a context, the chief could take on a role of custodian who manages land within 
a specific territory for his community. 
Today, with urbanisation and state formation proceeding apace, the land is increasingly 
commodified, property relations are increasingly formalised, and ethnic communities 
no longer reside in specific territories. However, cobbled together from dubious 
historical origins though they may be, and outdated though this institution may be, 
today such rights are generally recognised by formal state institutions like the Ghana 
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Lands Commission to be vested in the paramount chiefs and their sub-chiefs, or more 
precisely, in their stools (K. S. Amanor, 2008). 
Since the legal personhood of the stools is not very clearly established, there is quite 
some room for interpretation here. In Sebrepor, the chief has used that room to the 
fullest extent possible. He has hired a professional land surveyor, who has made a 
subdivision map of his entire area, and to whom he refers anyone who has bought a 
piece of land in his area, to formally register it. It is significant that the only professional 
on whom the chief relies on a regular basis is a technician purely related to land 
ownership and registration. With the assistance of this commercial land surveyor, the 
chief has gotten a very strong grip over the land in Sebrepor. As the surveyor puts it:
“Chief Nii Dortey Abotchi III registered the entire Sebrepor area, at the 
National Land’s Commission [Ghana’s cadastral registration authority], 
as his own land. So yes, if anyone has a plot there, honestly bought from 
the chief, but didn’t register that land transaction with the Commission, 
then the plot will still be registered in the name of the chief. However, if 
you and the chief are in good faith, there won’t be a problem to register 
that same land in your own name now, or to register it to another person 
buying it from you.” 
This is governing by informality taken to the extreme. Because government is not 
able to disentangle all the different customary claims to land ownership and usage, 
they vest it in the amorphous stools. While the land is vested in the chiefs’ stools as 
an administrative estate, in the process of commodification this is subverted into a 
personal right, with chiefs often refusing to share the revenues of land transactions 
with the local community or local government (S. Berry, 2013; Rathbone, 2000; Ubink, 
2008). Thus, in practice, this leads to the land becoming the private ownership of a 
single individual. Clearly, that is a source of enormous power and wealth.
This power also extends to all land that has been bought from the chief or his 
predecessor, unless that transaction has been officially registered with the Lands 
Commission. It is impossible to get exact figures on this from the Lands Commission 
on this, but interviewees suggest that the majority of landowners in Sebrepor have not 
registered their property with the Lands Commission, as this is an extremely onerous 
process. This is confirmed by the amount of land cases handled by the Divisional 
Council. It applies at least to all land distributed by the previous chief, as he was, in 
the words of his successor, ‘an illiterate’, who did not keep a written record of land 
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transactions in his area. In the case of any issue related to such informally bought land, 
the chief has a chance to put his mark on the situation. A sample case: 
“M. D. Koranteng was asked: why he is demarcating his land and 
erecting pillars without the stool’s concern? Mr. Koranteng agreed 
that he had erred. On the size of his land, he revealed that it covers 
an area of four acres. He was asked: what are the purposes of pillars 
and the demarcations for? At this point Mr. Aryeetey suggested that 
Mr. Koranteng go back to do his homework well with the stool elders. 
This was agreed by his wife who accompanied him.” (Kpone-Sebrepor 
Divisional Council, 4-4-2007)
The Council also makes it very clear that unless formally registered with the Lands 
Commission (a process which can take years), a sale of land does not imply an end 
to responsibility or power over that land. The chief repeatedly retracts transactions, 
takes land from conflicting parties back into the ownership of the Stool, and forces 
everyone who has not had his/her land registered at the cadaster to do subsequent 
transactions only in his presence. In short, he claims a large bundle of rights over 
such lands. This becomes visible again and again in the cases appearing before the 
Divisional Council. One example, during a case between two residents, Aklolos and 
Aminu, who have a boundary dispute, “Bampoe [a secondant of the chief] came in to 
point out that Aklolos has no land, nor Aminu. All transactions pertaining to that plot 
must be carried out before the chief.” (Kpone-Sebrepor Divisional Council, 24-1-2009)
In a practical sense, Aklolos and Aminu do have that land. They live and farm on 
it, and as the records show, they have acquired permission of the previous chief for 
that. But as this quote shows, they are not considered the true owners of that land 
by customary law, the law that in Ghana governs traditional land ownership (K. S. 
Amanor, 2008). Customary law only recognises usufructuary (user) land rights for the 
chief ’s ‘subjects’, and allodial (sovereign ownership) land rights for the chiefs, being 
the state-recognised founders of the local pre-state polity, the paramouncy (Chanock, 
1991, in K. S. Amanor, 2008). Thus, land can only be taken out of the hands of the 
chief by formally registering it at the Lands Commission, for which the chief ’s seal of 
approval is required. 
Obviously, this is a powerful channel for the chief to exert influence over residents’ 
organisations in the area. We regularly see the chief ’s control over the land registration 
process appearing in the Council’s notes, in rather casual form: “The executives of the 
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Zone 3 Residents Association appealed for the reduction of the new land registration fees. 
This was overruled.” (Kpone-Sebrepor Divisional Council, 3-3-’07). As these examples 
show, a world of local influence is hidden within that innocent side remark of the chief ’s 
surveyor above, “…if you and the chief are in good faith, there won’t be a problem…”.
This chiefly power is not only present at the neighbourhood level. The 80% of Ghana’s 
land that is formally in the hands of the local chiefs also includes the sites of most 
government agencies. For instance, the Flagstaff House, Ghana’s presidential office, 
as well as most ministries, stands on land of the Osu chiefs. Government offices 
throughout the country are generally in the same situation; they are formally hosted by 
the local chiefs. In most cases a yearly token amount is paid to the chiefs in question, 
to affirm their ultimate ownership of the land. 
Nor is this power relationship purely a theoretical one. As one example, in 2013 the 
University of Ghana ran into trouble. The La chiefs, on whose lands its campus stands, 
attempted to take back some fallow parts of the university’s land, saying that the UoG 
clearly did not need this much space after all, and the La people needed somewhere 
to live. A flurry of action ensued. The University of Ghana immediately started laying 
roads to the furthest corners of its land, hastily organised a conference with the La 
chiefs to describe their usage plans for the fallow land, and conferred an honorary 
doctorate on the La paramount chief (personal interview, anonymous source, 2018). 
Similar negotiations with ministries and other government bodies are reported nearly 
every month in Ghana’s newspapers, and doubtlessly many more happen outside the 
limelight. Such instances show how much power the chiefs have in their interdependent 
figurations with government agencies.
A new view of the chief ’s position emerges
Let’s go back to the larger picture of the chief ’s roles. It is now clear that this role 
of managing the land in the name of ‘the community’, which has spun off from the 
combination of his role as a traditional leader and his role as lower-level bureaucrat, 
has increasingly taken on a life of its own. This happened under the process of 
urbanisation, increasing legal formalisation, and the accompanying commodification 
of the land.
As noted before, Sebrepor’s chief does not live on his land these days. His house is a 
good hour’s drive removed from Sebrepor and as he says, “I do not frequent the place”. 
As I have shown above, this among other factors has lead his traditional authority 
to decline. He does still have a powerful position as bureaucratic middle man, but 
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as I have shown, that position too is increasingly restrained as the lines between 
bureaucracies and residents get shorter. This role too is of course severely limited by 
the fact that he is not present in the town.
Unlike these two roles, which depend to a large extent on his active self-positioning 
in the neighbourhood, his role as landowner is hardly limited by his absence, nor 
is it hindered by any lack of proximity to formal state agencies. While his distance 
to Sebrepor undermines the chiefs’ capacity and legitimacy to resolve disputes and 
allocate land according to custom, it actually emancipates the chief in other ways. With 
urbanisation proceeding apace, the chiefs’ discretion increases, as he is decreasingly 
embedded in communal ties or bound by customary deliberations, while at the same 
time the land itself increases in value and can be more readily marketed. 
Because although this role spun off from a confluence of his traditional leadership and 
his middle-man position, it is by now only dependent on the chief ’s legitimacy in the 
eyes of a single government institution: the Lands Commission. And there, the chief 
makes sure to be well-connected. As the chief ’s technical land surveyor puts it: “The 
chief will clearly mark transactions he approves of, with his signature and his seal. 
These are very familiar at the Lands Commission, he is a well-known and popular 
chief.”
5.6 The Palace
As we have seen above, urbanisation transforms the role of the chief from a relatively 
independent traditional authority into a local extension of bureaucracies, a ‘ruler by 
informality’ and an owner of commodified land. His new bases of power are legal-
rational rather than traditional. But in this section I show that it is not all Weberian 
rationalisation. I begin by investigating the dynamics between urban expansion and 
chiefs’ palace formation. I then proceed to show what the internal dynamics of the 
Sebrepor palace look like. Following this, I zoom out, and look at the increasing 
complexity of stool succession struggles in general, concluding that through the process 
of urbanisation the internal structure of the chieftaincy institute becomes a more 
complex and deeper traditional leadership structure. I also show how this traditional 
authority does get ever more tightly embedded in the legal-rational structure of the 
modern state.
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Urban growth and palace expansion
When looking at the process of urban expansion, where every newly growing 
neighbourhood turns out to have a chief, the first question we have to answer is: how are 
these chiefs made? I take the answer of the Paramount Chief, who in the Greater Accra 
Region is the highest authority in terms of tribal organisation. A paramountcy is about 
the size of a municipality (although the two rarely overlap exactly, very impractical in 
terms of governance, and much complained about by municipal officers). All chiefs 
within the Kpone Traditional Area, including Sebrepor’s chief, are drawn from a small 
group of ‘royal families’ centered around the local paramountcy.
“Those days, Sebrepor was just a small…in your area you call it a 
hamlet. But with time, it started growing. People went to those areas, 
because of farming, animal rearing, crop farming. The land was vast 
and vacant, so you just go there and start farming. At that time, a 
sort of caretaker chief, caretaker authority was established by us, the 
traditional authorities at Kpone, to report what is going on in the area. 
From a hamlet this place grew into a village; now, it’s even more than a 
village.
Then around 1984, when people really started trooping in, we decided 
to install a chief. With time, those areas really develop, so we have to 
raise their status to chief. If you go to the Akan areas, you will see the 
same thing. First, there are caretakers, then one by one, we elevate 
them to divisional chiefs.” – Nii Tetteh Otoo II, Paramount Chief of Kpone 
Traditional Area
This quote is a striking illustration of the way the city grows, and the way the chieftaincy 
system grows with it. At first, there is almost empty land, “vast and vacant”, which only 
in theory falls under of a certain paramountcy. As Ghana’s population grows, more 
and more empty tracts of land are settled by people from all around the country. The 
‘royal families’ send a caretaker to the area to claim ownership and keep an eye out for 
intruders, but does not do much else. 
Then as the city expands and draws closer to the area, “people start trooping in” and a 
divisional chieftaincy, a new stool, is established by the paramount chief ’s Traditional 
Council in Kpone. At this point, the royal families of the Kpone paramountcy really 
cement their traditional ownership of the area. As the current Sebrepor chief explains: 
“I was named a divisional chief of Sebrepor in 1984. Before I was made the chief, we 
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met people there. They are settlers, they were there when we arrived. But now, they are 
more or less citizens of Kpone.”
From the above section on the chief ’s relation with formal state bureaucracies, it 
should be clear why this man can simply come into the area and claim chieftaincy, 
including a kind of lordship over settlers who arrived to the area earlier than he did: 
government agencies expect to find a chief. They are hardwired to look for the chief, 
that familiar middle man connecting them to ‘the community’, their governor by 
informality. The chiefs are thus folded into the state, and when the state rolls itself 
out, agency by agency, over an area following recent urban expansion, it contains what 
Elias calls valencies for stools (Elias, 1978b).
This terms originates in the idea that people and organisations cannot be seen as 
discrete units. Their ties to others form part of themselves. In the word valencies, this 
is operationalised by assuming that people and organisations have in their system 
openings for certain types of others: if a man’s wife disappears, there appears in him 
and in his life something that could be crudely described as a wife-shaped valency. In 
this case, it means that the formal government institutions all assume that there is a 
chief, and their resident interaction practices and legal habits are attuned to this fact. 
This means that it is very easy for a chief, even one with very little local legitimacy, to 
establish himself towards the formal authorities. They expect him to be there. 
Intra-palace power struggles
But much like the growth of a city or the accompanying growth of a formal state 
apparatus, the growth of a chieftaincy structure is neither a simple nor a peaceful 
process. Field (1940, p. 46), an anthropologist who studied the Ga customs under 
colonialism, describes the process for the appointment of chiefs as follows: 
“All succession is a question of election by relatives, not of inherent right. 
There are certain very usual customs among the Ga, but there are no 
rigid rules. Native procedure has only one rigid rule, namely that the 
election of the successor shall be constitutionally carried out at a proper 
meeting of kinsmen.”
Field describes how wide open the succession process is, how little formalised. It should 
be realised that he writes here about the succession of an existing stool, and as can be 
imagined, the claim to a newly formed stool is even more open. This means that some 
of the families and family members are bound to come out of the process dissatisfied. 
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In Sebrepor, this is indeed the case. Asked why her uncle is living so far away from the 
area he is governing, a close relative of the chief told us: 
“Oh, he was living here before. But when he was asked to vacate the 
stool, since he was only meant to be a caretaker, he refused. He is afraid 
we would find out the number of lands he has leased out. So he won’t 
even stay here. Can he dare come live here again? After he sold all the 
lands, which made the stool unattractive? If he tries we will knock him 
dead with a club.” 
“Is it his? Is it his money? It’s the stool’s money. So he cannot lay claim 
to it. Since he wants to be chief, he can take the title, but he shouldn’t 
think we would acknowledge him as one. As for his leg problem, which 
he uses as a reason not to come here, that is not a real sickness. Which 
sickness? It’s only him who knows what is wrong with him. It’s an open 
secret that he dabbles in occultism. He isn’t sick, it’s his demons that 
are eating his flesh alive. Call it what you want, but I say it as it is. He 
is a lodge member. His leg cannot heal because that is his weapon for 
money.”
Putting the accusations of black magic aside for the moment, what stands out from this 
quote is the open hostility between the chief and his family members. And indeed, this 
family conflict is a large part of the reason why the chief is not living inside Sebrepor. 
As he says: 
“We have put up a palace there, have you seen the palace? Yes! We have 
gotten a palace, but because of these misunderstandings, between me 
and my siblings, it is simply there. A white elephant. We cannot use it. 
They have locked it! They have prevented me from using it. So now they 
have prevented me from using it. We were meeting there, when these 
problems came. So, they are more than me. They say they will not allow 
me to be using the place.”
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Figure 5.1: The chief’s seat of government, the Sebrepor Palace, remains closed. The door is 
bolted down with several padlocks, one from each fraction of the family, so that no-one can 
enter the building until the conflict is resolved.
The palace door is locked. As figure 5.1 above shows, all afflicted parties have put 
their own lock on the door, so that nobody can open it unless all parties come to an 
agreement. The palace has become the physical representation of a conflict between 
the royal families over who should be able to profit from the ownership of the recently 
commodified land. It is locked not only in a literal sense, but also in a figurative sense. 
As Sarah said at the beginning of this chapter, in the absence of the chief, the area is 
lacking leadership. I have argued that the chief ’s traditional leadership role is declining 
as urbanisation progresses, this is a clear general trend. But this type of intra-palace 
strife, when it occurs, forms a large extra factor in the decline of his practical leadership 
function. 
The chief continues: 
“So I, in my own wisdom, have chosen people. I have chosen people 
I’m ruling with. In the village, we have so many tribes. When I was first 
enstooled, when I first came, I made some headmen, one for each tribe. 
So they are the people who are forming our Council now. In absence of 
my own blood, who have abandoned me.”
It now becomes clear that he established his Divisional Council partly with a view 
to strengthening his position in the neighbourhood, in the face of an antagonistic 
group of relatives. In fact, it is visible throughout the Council notes that the chief is 
less motivated than the other Council members to get any real development off the 
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ground. The Council members are pulling hard to get the chief present at meetings, 
because without him, it’s hard to take decisions that will be pushed through, both for 
their private benefit and for developmental goals. 
They also push him to make peace with the rest of his family, 
“A council member pleaded that there should be self-respect to ourselves 
and to the stool. (…) It was suggested that the impasse lingering among 
the stool owners is long overdue for a peaceful settlement. Nii Supi 
and Nii Asafoatse were asked to take the initiative.” (Kpone-Sebrepor 
Divisional Council, 16-4-’05) 
On the other hand, there is always the threat of the Council becoming demotivated 
or even falling apart if the chief does not show up often enough, which would gravely 
undermine the power of the chief. This has created a complicated figuration between 
the Kpone stool elders, the chief and his Divisional Council members, with asymmetric 
power relations. Such relations are hard to pin down exactly in research, but are often 
expressed in smaller day-to-day instances within the council’s dealing. 
An example: in 2007 the Sebrepor Divisional Council took on an explicitly bureaucratic 
role and carried out a registration and taxation exercise. The proceeds were split 
equally between the Stool Elders at the Kpone Paramountcy (25%), the Stool Elders at 
Sebrepor, that is the chief and his second-in-command (25%), the Divisional Council 
coffers, from which sitting allowances and small expenses are paid (25%) and the 
Divisional Council members as individuals, who did (or outsourced) the registration 
and collection work (25%). This is often the case in such government-by-proxy 
arrangements, and it shows the way the figuration is tied together.
The relations surrounding the chieftaincy position in Sebrepor could best be 
characterised as a triangular figuration. The Divisional Council can be seen as the 
chief ’s entourage, which then forms the Palace together with the relatives fighting the 
chief for his position. This figuration both reflects and affects the external relations of 
the Palace. It reflects them, in the sense that the chief needs his Council to help him 
stabilise and legitimise his position in the neighbourhood in the face of his family’s 
opposition. The Council speaks for him, for example in insisting that the name of the 
neighbourhood is Sebrepor and not Kakasonaka Number Two, an alternative name 
which is often used, and which undermines the traditional claim of the chief ’s family 
to the land. Every time that name came up, Mr. Aryeetey strongly insisted that this is 
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not the correct name for the area. The Council also forms his ears and eyes, calming 
unrest in the area, acting as a stabilising governing body. In return, the members 
get the benefits of being close to a powerful figure in the area, which they can use 
for their personal gain and for their attempts at (partly clientelistic, partly idealistic) 
development projects.
In recent years, however, the work of the Council has come to an almost complete 
standstill. As one Council member puts it: “…normally, we used to meet once a month. 
Now, we don’t do anything anymore. Unless we all have a meeting, whereby we all sit 
with the chief, then we talk over the planning of the town.” (Interview Kueli, 2015) But 
since the chief does not come to Sebrepor anymore, that hardly happens. 
What stands out in this complicated tangle is the fact that despite his lack of 
neighbourhood ties, the almost complete collapse of his Council’s activities, and the 
serious threats posed by his relatives to his legitimacy as stool owner, the chief is still 
able to hold on to his ownership of the land. As described in the previous section, this 
he thanks largely to his well-established relations with the Ghana Lands Commission. 
We may conclude, then, that his role as manager and owner of the land has become 
almost completely detached from its origins: his role as a traditional leader. 
The succession process: increasingly arcane figurations
How exceptional is such a situation? As for the position of the Council, the establishment 
of such a self-built Divisional Council, composed of representatives from each major 
immigrant tribe present, is not quite standard, although not unusual either. But as for 
the ‘lingering impasse’ with his family, to get a better picture of what the dynamics are 
like within the larger chieftaincy family ecosystem, and to understand more about the 
contemporary succession practices, I now briefly zoom out again to the level of the 
Paramount Chief in Kpone. When asked for his daily occupations, he summarises 
them as follows: “Primarily, my work is two things: we have family problems, and we 
have land issues.”
He goes on to explain how these family problems originate:
“We have Kingmakers, those are elders from a particular house. They 
see to it that when the chief dies, everything is done. They say that, 
okay, now it is your turn, this particular house’s turn, to provide a chief. 
So they have to send to that particular house, you have to provide a 
chief. To make the selection, that house will then look at the background 
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of the persons. My father, he has five brothers, so before my selection, 
they had to look at eligible persons, out of those 5 brothers’ children. 
They will look at personality, and other things, all those things come into 
play. Now if they have selected you, they will not tell you. But they have 
to make investigation, around you, you unknowingly. To look at your 
behaviour, your character, how you comport yourself, they have to go 
into all those things before they agree. Where and when, some of them 
disagree. Then that is where we have the conflict of chieftaincy issue.”
The chieftaincy institution is sometimes described as an “invented tradition”, as it 
was partly designed to fit the practical governance demands of the British colonisers 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983). This is in many respects a fair description, especially 
with regard to the more hierarchical elements in modern Ga chieftaincy, which were 
imported under pressure from the British colonisers from the neighbouring Akan 
tribe. However, with respect to history it should be noted that the procedure described 
above, of selecting a heir to the stool, actually comes from a locally rooted tradition that 
used to served its purpose quite effectively. Field (1940) describes the governments of 
the Ga towns in the 1930s as highly deliberative ‘democratic gerontocracies’, generally 
peaceful. Field may well have taken this term directly from Weber, who defines the 
‘decisive characteristic’ of a gerontocracy as follows. 
“…the belief of the members that domination, even though it is an 
inherent traditional right of the master, must definitely be exercised 
as a joint right in the interest of all members and is thus not freely 
appropriated by the incumbent.” 
In that kind of situation, such a lengthy, open and deliberative selection process makes 
sense. However, in the modern urban context, where only a small percentage of the 
chief ’s ‘subjects’ even belong to his tribe, let alone to its ‘royal families’, it becomes 
something of a sham. As the paramount chief continues: 
“The conflict comes when you get to the house of where they have 
to install the chief. So it’s inside the house they create problems. The 
kingmakers. Everyone knows that it should be house B this time, but 
then who from house B? You see, because when it gets to our house, and 
we get to know that it is our turn, some of us induce these kingmakers. 
You know, they are old men, we induce them with a little currency, or 
something else… So let’s say, once it has come to our turn, I say, “oh, 
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why don’t you support me to be…” So they have to influence each other, 
so that is where the split comes between the kingmakers. Then, it will 
start with the litigation. Then some of them will also influence other 
houses, to support them, so sometimes it becomes two houses against 
one person, from another house.”
How then are these conflicts settled, in practice? 
“It can take very long to resolve something like that. Very long. Very 
very. Because you will start…if it’s a divisional chief, divisional chiefs, 
they have to start from the Traditional Council, where and when they’ll 
adjudicate on the issue. And one, is found guilty. And is not happy with 
it, can make an appeal against it. Then from the Traditional Council, then 
to the Regional House of Chiefs. Then from the Regional House of the 
Chiefs, you are still not happy with the verdict, you have the right to 
appeal to the National House of Chiefs. There, too, when you are not 
satisfied, the last option is to go to the Supreme Court. Oh yes. And I have 
gone through the same process before (laughs loudly). Yes, I’ve been to 
Supreme Court, before they could install me. So you see, sometimes it 
takes some time. Sometimes, more than ten years. Depending on the 
situation.”
As becomes clear from the above description, the chiefs jostle for their positions in 
complicated struggles involving a mixture of traditional legitimation, family politics 
and clientelist networks. This leads to a large number of empty stools (sometimes over 
a decade, as the paramount chief explains), or chiefs weakened by intra-palace conflict, 
which can hardly be regarded effective traditional leaders, such as the one in Sebrepor. 
Clearly, the traditional gerontocracy has long been left behind. In the chieftaincy 
figurations that currently grow in the process of urbanisation, the appointment is 
done by a select group of nobles of his own tribe, the kingmakers, and the majority of 
the locals have little to do with it. Once appointed, the influence of established chiefs 
mainly rests on outside sources of power (relationships with state bureaucracies), not 
on a good relation with his ‘subjects’.
It may seem strange that the chieftaincy internally develops into such an arcane 
traditional authority figuration, despite the fact that the urban world around him is 
moving in the legal-rational direction. All the chief ’s new powers are derived from 
the legal-rational sphere, and his traditional leadership position is crumbling. But the 
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chief ’s own story has to remain a traditional one. His current personalised hold on 
the commodified urban land may be a far cry from the original story of land rights in 
the hands of the long-time leaders of locally rooted communities, but he continues to 
uphold that story. After all, if he is not seen as a traditional local leader, who is simply 
managing the land for his community, and interacting with authorities on behalf of his 
people, then the foundation of all his other roles and claims to power is undermined. 
Traditional authority is bound by “certain limits that cannot be overstepped without 
endangering the master’s traditional status” (Weber, 1968). Or as Kleist (2011, p. 636) 
puts it: “Chiefs have to remain within a circumscribed space of action in order for 
them to be recognised as legitimate rulers, and they have to position and negotiate 
their innovations as being located within this space”.
Traditional authority, but deeply embedded in the formal state
The Ghanaian chiefs are generally described as rather independent local traditional 
grassroots leaders, who often defy the encroaching formal state. But many of these 
urban chieftaincies are the reverse: their power, as we have seen in the previous 
empirical sections, is largely predicated on the power of the state and the state’s 
recognition of their position, rather than on any large grassroots support base. Their 
sphere of governing by informality, is indeed permanently being threatened by the 
expansion of those same state bureaucracies, but in the case of such ‘tabula rasa-
chieftaincies’ it was also created by the formal state in the first place, through their de 
facto appointment as governors by informality. Finally, their battles for succession are 
fought in the formal state courts. 
So how deep exactly are the chiefs then folded into the formal state? I have described 
how the chief acts as an extension of several bureaucracies, and how he takes the power 
that that privileged access to government agencies brings further at his own discretion. 
But there is another dimension to his embeddedness, which comes from the side of the 
formal state. This is visible in the way succession disputes are fought out, in the way the 
chiefs handle their daily work, and in the way government is continuing to wrap the 
chiefs’ unpredictable local power figurations ever further into an insulating blanket of 
legal-rational organisation. 
As explained above by the paramount chief, the succession disputes are in principle 
decided in-house, by the kingmakers of the family. But in practice, they often go 
through three different levels of formal law courts, ending at the nation’s Supreme 
Court. The court levels before that are populated by the chiefs, but originate from the 
government-sponsored Chieftaincy Act 759, which stipulates the responsibilities of 
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the (government-sponsored) National House of Chiefs. To wit: to improve relations 
between chiefs and the government, to formally codify succession and customary 
law, to update ‘old-fashioned’ customary law, and any other functions delegated to 
it by the Parliament. In other words, to get a grip on those unpredictable traditional 
authorities. Such insulating institutions, however, have also had the effect of further 
entrenching the traditionality of the chiefs, which ultimately protects their position 
from government interventions which are based on a legal-rational logic (Interview 
Senah, 2018). 
How does this regulatory framework affect the chieftaincy figurations? When royal 
families are disputing the legality of a chieftaincy position, the closing argument is 
that one of the two contestants is the “gazetted Mankralo” – the state’s law courts have 
the final say (GNA, 2017). And as for the tribal hierarchies, these too are ultimately 
not only instituted, but also continuously managed by the formal state. Sebrepor’s 
present chief is a divisional chief, who has himself succeeded a caretaker chief. At 
this level, the paramoutcies are responsible not only for the appointment of individual 
chiefs, but also for the creation and promotions of stools, from caretakers to divisional 
chieftaincies. 
But the career ladder of chieftaincy goes even higher, all the way up to paramountcy. At 
this level, the formal state plays an important role in its management. As a government 
announcement read: “President John Dramani Mahama yesterday announced that 
government through the Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs is working around the clock 
to promote more chieftaincy divisions to paramountcy levels.” (GNA, 2016) Whilst 
generally, such promotions are widely seen as rewards for politically loyal chiefs, they 
are also interpreted as divide-and-rule tactics, where formal government cuts up the 
chieftaincy power structures into ever smaller paramountcies in order to fragment 
their power (Boakye, 2016). 
Government and the state bureaucracy work to increasingly encapsulate traditional 
authorities, who in turn are often highly active in the electoral and broader political 
process, throwing their weight behind politicians and demanding rewards for 
themselves and their area in return. Despite the efforts of the Ministry of Chieftaincy 
to encapsulate the chiefs, they retain much of their discretionary power. In fact, 
during the writing of the current constitution in 1992, a heavy presence of chiefs 
in the Constitutional drafting committee ensured that chiefs would have greater 
independence from the state in determining their successors (Ray, 1996). 
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However, the Ministry’s regulatory and supporting frameworks do have the effect of 
making the various chieftaincies throughout the country more alike, further severing 
the connection between the local-historical origins of the chiefs and their current 
position. This is visible in the daily traditional leadership work of the chiefs, such as 
their meetings, their land court sessions, and their campaign to keep their cultural 
leadership position. As the paramount chief explains: 
“We have also government staffs who are working with the Traditional 
Council. Government equips all Traditional Councils with their required 
staffs. It falls under the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs. 
They will train government workers, and send them to the traditional 
areas, to work on their behalf. They do a lot of the correspondence, 
sending out things, when it comes to meetings, they take our minutes 
and all of these things. Every day, from Monday to Friday, they are 
always there.”
They are always there. And if we look closely, we can see them in action in the first 
letter quoted in this chapter, the one on the marriage and death customs in the Kpone-
Sebrepor Traditional Area. In fact, this letter ironically summarises the modern 
condition of Ghanaian chieftaincy. The surface message is one of traditional rulers, 
asserting their cultural authority over the ancient rituals surrounding the sexual 
relations, marriages, births and deaths of anyone living in their traditional lands. But 
the tone is emphatically that of a bureaucrat.
“I submit herewith a comprehensive review… 
…for onward transmission to…. 
The review took place at a general meeting of…, held on …. 
Defaulters will face the penalties accordingly.” 
In fact, the letter is written by a state bureaucrat, the Assistant Regional Registrar. And 
it carries all the regalia of a bureaucratic product: a formal header, a postal address, the 
seal of the Ghana Republic, and of course that core attribute of bureaucratic agencies: 
a 10-digit reference number. “In case of reply, the date and number of this letter should 
be quoted.”
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This ever-tightening state embrace of the chieftaincy structures is an ongoing effort, 
and it’s not over yet. In 2014 the Ministry of Chieftaincy still had to publicly call for 
chiefs to enter themselves into the National Register of Chiefs (Dennis, 2014). That 
is, the formal state does not currently have a complete register of all chiefs in Ghana, 
let alone having a number of government bureaucrats at each of their desks, keeping 
watch over their traditional rule. It still has quite a way to go, but it’s working hard. As 
Ghana’s Minister of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs put it in his yearly progress 
report: 
“We always say that there are no bad chiefs, but bad advisors. It is therefore 
important for us to continuously train and develop the skillfulness and 
expertise of our staff, and then equip them with the necessary working 
tools to help them deliver effectively on the job.” (Daannaa, 2014)
Slowly and carefully, the Ministry works to embrace the chiefs, taking great care not to 
offend them or publicly threaten their authority. Out of a patchwork of locally grown 
chieftaincies, this creates an increasingly uniform traditional-cum-bureaucratic web, 
stretching across the country.
5.7 Conclusion
The general position of chieftaincy in developing neighbourhoods
In this chapter, I have described the various roles of the chief: as traditional leader, as 
lower-level bureaucrat plugged into the formal state, and as landlord. His traditional 
leadership role declined, most notably its cultural and ‘soft leadership’ components, 
but also his position as a local strongman and his position as a clientelist patron. At 
the same time, new bureaucratic roles emerged through the expansion of the formal 
state and its (initial) arrangement of government by informality, where bureaucratic 
relations are mediated by the chief.
Urbanisation and state formation do not replace the traditional authorities, but place 
them in a new position within a more complex web of interdependencies. Throughout 
the process of urbanisation, the scope of this government by informality continuously 
expands and shrinks at the same time. It expands, because ever more bureaucratic 
agencies become involved in the area, requiring mediation. And it shrinks, because 
over time, these agencies develop more direct and formal connections with the area’s 
residents, decreasing the mediating role of the chief.
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In the process, while the chief ’s claim to the land is decreasingly sustained through 
his reputation and relations within the neighbourhood, the expanding bureaucratic 
and legal apparatus casts him into a key position as land manager and furnishes 
him with entitlements to individual and tradeable plots. As a consequence, the chief 
is increasingly able to extract resources from the neighbourhood, as his traditional 
authority is buttressed with legal-rational authority. The commodification and 
registration of land are thus transforming the role of the chief from that of a conflict 
manager into that of a gentry.
This is governing by informality, which is a modified form of what Roy (2009b) 
describes. In her work, the formal state directly governs the city through informality. 
In Ghana, there is a layer of local players, the chiefs, forming a flexible layer of 
informality. Just like the state bureaucrats in India, they keep things vague, they un-
map, and they re-interpret rights and responsibilities as the occasion demands. But 
the difference is that the chiefs are not civil servants. They are partly dependent on 
their position within the formal state apparatus, but not exclusively so. The chiefs also 
have their own agency, based on their traditional leadership and their land ownership, 
which makes them less pliable towards the various incarnations of the formal state. 
Taken to its logical extreme, the chiefs’ powers of traditional leadership and their lower-
level bureaucrat role would be further and further diluted, replaced by a plurality of 
other organisational forms. And at some point, having de facto lost their foundational 
‘right to rule’ as a traditional leader their land management role would lose its support. 
In theory at that point some kind of land reform, which is indeed sometimes called for 
in public debate, might happen.
However, this is the point where we have to zoom out of Greater Accra, to the national 
level. The dilution of local leadership and bureaucratic roles is not a universal trend 
in Ghana: many chiefs do manage to keep these roles very much alive, particularly in 
the Akan areas and in northern Ghana, where the national government is less present. 
And since the entire chieftaincy system is co-dependent, existing in an asymmetrical 
figuration with the state, the continuing prominence of those well-organised chiefs 
would ensure that the weaker ones remain in place as well, and that in the continuing 
urbanisation of the country, empty stools will continue to be created in all new 
neighbourhoods. After all, the various local-level forms of chieftaincy are all folded 
into the same national-level state.
This makes it relevant to ask again: what exactly does this contemporary chieftaincy 
look like, in areas which have undergone a process of urbanisation? It consists of 
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expanding palaces, which are throughout the densification of the area being promoted 
from caretakers to divisional chieftaincies and eventually, paramountcies. Internally, 
these palaces form increasingly arcane figurations. Externally, they are increasingly 
tightly embraced by a state-sponsored fabric of bureaucratic organisation. While 
their discretion is circumscribed, the chiefs also derive power and security from 
their immersion into the expanding state. They are no longer all-powerful in any one 
domain, but this is compensated by the fact that their position is now undergirded 
by laws, vested in institutions, and recognised by the array of organisations that have 
expanded their operations in areas that were virtually unpopulated until recently. The 
chiefs are circumscribed and domesticated, confined but strengthened. 
While in colonial times there was a crude division of labour, with the chief acting as a 
local sovereign at the behest of the colonial government, today ethnic, legal, political, 
and administrative relations form a complex, interwoven web. This web not only 
covers areas where chiefs have long ruled, like existing villages which are swallowed 
up by the city, but also develops in previously unpopulated areas like Sebrepor.
Effects of the chieftaincy institution on grassroots organising
The chief ’s position as a traditional leader helped to keep the peace in the 
neighbourhood, by judging disputes and exerting a forceful dampening effect on any 
conflicts that might erupt. In addition, his power to call up young men living in the 
neighbourhood for communal action can be a powerful aid to local development 
projects, whether grassroots-initiated or government-led. In many neighbourhoods, 
this makes the chief a strong actor in local development. 
But his position as a local strongman also means that others tend to tread very carefully 
around him. A group of migrants whose shacks displeased the chief were first beset 
by thugs and then, having asked the police for protection from physical violence, 
suddenly found themselves apologising to the chief for calling in the cops. This power 
is slowly replaced, as the neighbourhood develops, by a legal stranglehold over any 
land that is not securely registered at the government Lands Commission. His position 
as ‘custodian’ of the ‘traditional lands’ gives the chief an extensive degree of leverage 
over most residents in the community, providing a modern, bureaucracy-supported 
version of the chief as strongman.
The chief ’s position as a middle man between residents and various government 
agencies compounds the effects described above. As a prominent spokesperson for 
the community, the chief is able to speak powerfully to government agencies and 
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demand improvements to inadequate water infrastructure, work with spatial planning 
officers to improve the layout and facilities of the neighbourhood, or stimulate the 
development of electricity in the area. At the same time, he can effectively block any 
developments he does not like. The street naming company which displeased the chief 
was kicked out. And he can use this middle man position, once again, as leverage over 
ordinary residents, as in the case where he set the police on Mr Paul. 
This was borne out throughout the fieldwork: those active in grassroots organising 
always appeared to spend an inordinate amount of time on ‘managing’ the chief. The 
conflict in Sebrepor’s palace brought the chief ’s contribution to local development to a 
complete standstill, as well as absorbing a large amount of energy from other prominent 
grassroots leaders in the area. This patterns was borne out throughout the fieldwork in 
other neighbourhoods: those active in grassroots organising always appeared to spend 
an inordinate amount of time on ‘managing’ the chief and the figuration around him.
In sum, the continuity of power throughout the urbanisation of the area (from 
sovereignty to bureaucracy-supported ‘informal rule’) makes the chief an extraordinary 
important figure in grassroots organising networks. In Sebrepor, no meaningful 
grassroots activity could take place without the blessing of the chief, even as he had 
moved away to live in another part of the city. The other neighbourhoods we investigated 
showed the same image: the persona of the chief nearly always figures prominently in 
residents’ imaginations of the neighbourhood’s social structure. This gives him a large 
power to obstruct local organising, especially if this seems to empower alternative 
big men in the area and create alternative ‘informal rulers’. But it also allows him to 
effectively promote grassroots organisation for development. The balance between his 
productive and his obstructive activities rests mainly on the personality of the chief 
and the power structures in his family and wider palace figuration.








6
Churches: 
collective effervescence, 
collective amenities?
This chapter investigates the contribution made by Accra’s ubiquitous churches to the formation of its collective amenities. It starts with a brief theoretical exposition regarding the position 
of churches as collective amenities (section 6.1). It continues with a 
historical analysis, showcasing how different socio-political figurations 
led to the emergence of different types of churches (section 6.2 and 6.3). 
From there, it goes into a more detailed description of the differences 
between those churches in terms of doctrine, internal organisation and 
production of collective amenities (section 6.4 and 6.5). 
Section 6.6 describes how this plays out in today’s religious 
marketplace, unraveling the factors behind the transition from orthodox 
to charismatic churches in newly developing neighbourhoods. Finally, 
section 6.7 brings together the relevance of these developments for 
neighborhoods like Sebrepor.6
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“These business churches, they are now even more than the traditional 
ones! You see, those people, they use psychology to woo you, to get 
you. When you go to one, they will tell you that oh, your grandmother 
is a witch, and other things. Oh, when you start one, within one or two 
years you will be OK. So when you go to their churches, they have a lot 
of very big cars. They travel, they have a lot of money. And the little that 
you have, they will rather collect it from you. And they don’t do so many 
things too, to help the society. Unlike other churches. Look at Methodist 
church. Look at Baptist. Look at the Catholics. They put a lot of schools 
across the country. They have a lot of clinics and hospitals. They have a 
university, they have colleges. They do give a lot of scholarships. They 
help society.”   
  – Charles Dubin, Assemblyman of Sebrepor
6.1 Introduction
When walking around Accra, it is impossible to miss the many manifestations of 
Christianity. Billboards, posters and stickers of Jesus and his earthly representatives 
are ubiquitous. The minibuses which form the throbbing transportation veins of 
this growing city are almost without exception decorated with Christian slogans, 
often quoting a specific verse from the bible. Churches, big and small, dominate the 
cityscape, both through their massive buildings and through their impressive sound 
systems and the crowds they attract. Most commercial enterprises have religious 
names. For instance, I usually got my lunch at the God is Great Restaurant. I did my 
shopping at the In His Name Grocery Store. On the way, I would pass the Jesus is my 
Friend Bakery, the Blood of Christ Bicycle Repair and Maintenance Shop, as well as a 
meat shop with the unfortunate name God Loves Butchers.
As the quotation at the chapter’s start from Sebrepor’s Assemblyman shows, there 
are large differences between the various religious strands, in terms of their internal 
organisation, their doctrine and in terms of their role in providing social services 
and building up the newly growing suburbs. This chapter describes two ideal types of 
churches, investigates the differences between them in terms of producing collective 
amenities, and ties that into a historical analysis of the connection between Ghana’s 
religious landscape and its state formation process. 
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Figure 6.1: Churches offer an anchor in a sometimes bewildering world.
Churches as collective amenities
Churches are clearly a focal point of people’s attention and energies (see figure 6.1, 
above). They could even be described as the most successfully established type of 
collective amenity in Ghana’s cities. In a PhD thesis on collective amenities, they could 
not go undiscussed, for two reasons. First, because they are such a successful and 
ubiquitous collective amenity in their own right, providing not only weekly religious 
services, but also creating a community within which many amenities can effectively 
be organised, providing an effective platform to quickly reach many residents, and 
creating material structures such as a building which can be used for other collective 
purposes as well. I briefly discuss the role they play in that sense for the newly growing 
urban areas in that sense, as it is an important role, but then I move on, because those 
functions of churches as collective amenities is generally well studied in the literature 
(i.e. Putnam, 1993). 
The second reason why a chapter on churches could not be omitted here is that 
churches are not only amenities in their own right: they also spawn other collective 
amenities, like schools and medical facilities. This mechanism has been explored 
somewhat in the literature, but key aspects of it have remained outside the limelight, 
especially surrounding the question of how doctrine and internal organisation lead 
churches to radically differing levels of collective amenity production. These are the 
focus of analysis in this chapter. 
First though, it should be noted that churches are an important type of collective 
amenity in their own right, and are extremely successful in Ghana, no less in the 
new suburbs than in the inner cities. According to the latest census, 70% of Ghana’s 
population self-identifies as Christian (see table 6.1 below). In major cities, the 
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Christian population even stands at 81% (ibid).26 Why is a high degree of Christianity 
relevant for a study of collective amenities? Not because Christianity is necessarily a 
better or even a more collective belief system than any other. Rather, the point is that 
the form of Christian organised religion is different from traditional spiritual practices 
in Ghana, which are more individual in nature, and do not bring people together on a 
weekly or even more frequent basis like churches do.
The most salient feature of churches is their weekly core activity, a Sunday service 
where people are addressed together, sing, dance and celebrate. This is also their 
most frequently explored aspect in the literature, in terms of collective effervescence, 
theology and material culture. But as a collective amenity, churches are much more 
than that. Besides religious preaching, these services also provide a variety of other 
organisations with a suitable platform for quickly disseminating political, practical, 
medical and other information. During elections, candidates hold brief stump speeches 
in churches. Municipal workers often spread their announcements of durbars27, 
collective cleaning exercises, new taxes, infrastructure projects and other news, at 
the end of church services. In the same time slot, doctors and nurses often spread 
information on medical best practices. Furthermore, the weekly services provide 
residents with ample informal opportunity for socialising and organising before and 
after the service, keeping in touch with friends and neighbours and generally forming 
a community. 
Churches also provide infrastructure for all sorts of activities in the rest of the week, 
such as a building, musical instruments to play together, etc., enabling smaller sub-
groups within the congregation to use this infrastructure throughout the week. 
Organisations unrelated to the use churches use the building at other times, such as 
in vaccination drives or for longer municipal events such as durbars. This is no mean 
feat, in a newly growing city where good infrastructure is scarce, and churches are 
often the biggest and best buildings in an area. In this sense, churches are platforms for 
collective action, socialising and so on, and are important collective amenities. 
26 In fact, the massive growth of Christianity in cities may be masking a decline in the rural areas. In a 
recent joint communique of the Christian Council of Ghana and the Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic 
Council, these two bodies dramatically called for renewed missionary activity in the rural areas, stating 
that “whereas individual denominations may be growing in the cities, most denominations in the rural 
areas are dying” (CCG and GPCC, 2017).
27 Durbars are large meetings, where the entire neighborhood or town is invited to discuss topics of 
collective importance. They are often organized by state organizations such as municipalities, but also 
by other groups and in rare cases, by individuals.
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below230
Having noted how churches are collective amenities in their own right, it should be 
observed that churches are a special type of collective amenity: they also spawn further 
collective amenities. In Ghana, these have mainly been educational and medical 
facilities, making an important contribution to the development of the country and 
the well-being and affluence of its population. The process by which churches produce 
these collective amenities is the focus of the rest of this chapter. In the form of a 
question: what determines whether churches channel the collective energy gathered in 
their services and their congregations into durable collective amenities? 
In the newly developing urban areas on which this thesis focuses, it quickly becomes 
visible that there are not nearly as many church-built schools and clinics as there 
are in older parts of the urban fabric. Instead such facilities are generally provided 
there by entrepreneurial individuals, on a commercial basis. In fact, the newer the 
neighbourhood, the more pronounced this difference becomes. An additional 
observation of my fieldwork is that those church-built amenities that do exist in these 
neighbourhoods are almost exclusively built by a particular category of churches: 
the so-called orthodox churches. This is all the more noteworthy because most of 
the churches found in the new neighbourhoods are not orthodox, but fall on the 
charismatic side of the spectrum.28 
Theoretical and empirical strategy
This leads us to ask the following question: why are church-built collective amenities 
mainly built by the orthodox churches, even though these form a minority within 
the peri-urban Christian population? Following De Swaan (1988), I use a figurational 
perspective to answer this question. This includes understanding the churches as 
part of larger figurations, at times tied into strong interdependency with the central 
state, at times engaged in intense competition in the religious marketplace. It involves 
embedding the analysis in a historical perspective, and shifting its focus between the 
macro-, meso- and micro-levels of state-church figuration, religious marketplace and 
individual churches. 
In terms of data, I make use of a variety of fieldwork interviews and observations, 
augmented with online data gathering, secondary sources and other material. This is 
a broad cross-section of data. That is necessary because the area covered is wide, from 
macro-historical developments to the nitty-gritty micro environment of a church’s 
internal organisation and doctrine, and personal decisions on which church to join. 
28 I will specify the meaning of these labels and the general classification of churches in sections 5.4 and 
5.5 of this chapter.
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It also helps to developed a broad view on the studied phenomena, as there is not 
much research on how the internal organisation of churches affects their production 
of collective amenities. 
Two factors are central to answer this question: the doctrine and the internal 
organisation of the churches. I locate the origins of both doctrine and internal 
organisation of a church in the circumstances prevalent during the period in which it 
was established. Thus, I assume that doctrine and internal organisation are relatively 
fixed, although I allow for some change over time. To get a proper understanding 
of the circumstances during a church’s genesis, a historical perspective and a macro 
view of church-state relations are required. Most of these terms are self-evident, but 
allow me to briefly operationalise these three: doctrine, internal organisation, religious 
marketplace. 
I use the word doctrine to denote the beliefs and values of a church. In this, I focus on 
earthly matters. Of course any church’s doctrine also has a large spiritual component, 
but in my discussion I leave that by the side, remaining largely within the earthly 
domain of material activity, dress and decorum, service components and rituals, 
and social organisation (although these too are generally legitimated and described 
by references to the divine). Around these themes I ask: what behaviour does this 
church encourage? What are held to be its highest goals? What is this church’s attitude 
towards other religions and non-believers? What personal conduct does it encourage 
or permit? In short, what are its societal values?
As for internal organisation, that is a less abstract term, but since churches are rarely 
discussed from this angle (Iannaccone, 1995) I still briefly define it. I use it to refer to 
organisational structure and economics, hierarchy and division of labor, noting the 
types of positions that exist and the types of activities that are formally organised by 
and through the church. I also include in this term the organisational culture: what 
attitudes do church workers project, how much hierarchy is tolerated or encouraged, 
what type of words are used to describe the work done and the church organisation?
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Finally, throughout this chapter, I use the metaphor of the religious marketplace to 
describe Ghana’s contemporary religious field. This metaphor is generally associated 
with the rational choice29 literature on religion, popularised by sociologists Rodney 
Stark, Roger Finke, William Bainbridge and economist Laurence Iannaccone. In this 
literature, an core term is religious mobilisation, denoting the increased activity that 
results from religious pluralism (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987). Religious organisations 
will be stimulated to work harder, as they compete with each other to attract believers. 
Believers will be more inclined to shop, drawn to the marketplace through the activities 
undertaken to attract them. In short, as a result of greater competition, there is greater 
supply, which in turn raises demand. As Chaves and Gorki (2001) find, whether this 
theory applies is highly context-dependent. In Ghana, the mechanism does appear to 
work, as I set out in empirical sections four and five. From the marketplace metaphor, 
I furthermore adopt the idea of (essentially commercial) entrepreneurs, as well as 
competition, including its relative: (local) monopoly. 
In my view, the religious marketplace metaphor adequately describes the religious 
field in Ghana for the analytical purposes of this chapter, with a few caveats. First, the 
churches are embedded in a larger context, a figuration involving local and national 
elements of the state as well as religious organisations and cultures outside Ghana. To 
properly capture these in the analysis, I embed the religious marketplace metaphor 
in an Eliasian framework, where changes in the cultural and the political structures 
influence each other and where organisations like churches are analysed as part of 
a greater figuration. Second, the churches do not only offer a bundle of services to 
believers, as conventional firms do. They also use the funds, time and energy taken 
in return to produce a variety of collective amenities, many of which are not limited 
to their congregation. First, a church building and all its associated possibilities (see 
above), and second, amenities like educational and medical facilities. This is known as 
a positive externality in the rational choice literature, and it is the main focus of this 
chapter.
29 From this perspective, the keyword for me is choice. Rational is a highly loaded term, requiring a host 
of unrealistic assumptions. It assumes a clear pattern of personal preferences, as well as thorough 
knowledge of any relevant systems and the consequences in these systems of one’s personal 
choices for the achievement of one’s preferences. What is more, it is not a necessary term. As long 
as individuals have concrete and actionable choice in terms of their providers, we have a marketplace, 
and we are free from tacitly assuming or laboriously defining the mechanisms those choices are 
made. Therefore, I will follow more recent scholarship in the study of markets in not pre-defining the 
mechanism of choice, as rational or otherwise (Shaikh, 2016). I will however define the mechanisms 
of believers’ choices empirically, drawing both on self-description and observation by neighborhood 
leaders and other observers.
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Detailed chapter overview
The following paragraphs set out how the chapter moves between the various levels of 
analysis, and provides an overview of the structure of the chapter. 
Section 6.2 describes two different historical periods, focusing on the state-church 
figuration, dominant doctrines brought in from outside Ghana, and the level and 
nature of competition in the religious arena. It first describes the colonial era, when the 
first Christian churches arrived in Ghana and a patchwork of missions was established 
throughout the southern and central regions of the country. This era was characterised 
by a strong interdependency between churches and the colonial state, low levels of 
competition between the churches, and a strong strand of missionary spirit in the 
churches’ doctrines. The second historical period described in the section are the most 
recent decades of Ghana’s history. This era saw a veritable explosion in the number of 
denominations and independent churches, especially in Ghana’s urban areas. It was 
characterised by loose church-state relations, a high degree of competition among the 
churches, and the arrival of the prosperity gospel from the U.S.. 
To understand what churches emerged from those two eras, the section 6.3 leaves 
the historical perspective. It provides an overview of Ghana’s contemporary field of 
organised religion, mapping the differences between so-called orthodox churches, 
pentecostal churches, charismatic churches and sects. This section focuses on the key 
variables for the production of additional collective amenities: doctrine and internal 
organisation, as well as period of church genesis, the main driver of these two variables. 
It is of necessity largely built on secondary literature.
On the basis of this mapping of the contemporary religious field in Ghana, I proceed 
with the central analytical thrust of the chapter. That is, a comparison at the micro-level, 
between the internal organisation and doctrine of a contemporary orthodox church 
(section 6.4) and charismatic church (section 6.5). In these sections, I show how the 
different orientations of these churches lead to radically different outcomes in terms 
of the production of additional collective amenities such as educational and medical 
facilities. These case studies build on observations within church services, interviews 
and informal conversations with the pastors, other church workers and congregation 
members, as well as printed and digital material produced by the churches, such as 
a church constitution, billboards in Accra and text from online platforms. The two 
case studies are augmented by examples from other churches, to further flesh out the 
spectrum of orthodox and charismatic churches, and the territory in between these 
two extremes. The material for this augmentation is drawn from interviews with 
congregants, online sources and interviews with neighbourhood leaders.
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In section 6.6 I zoom out again to describe the meso-level of Ghana’s contemporary 
religious marketplace, particularly in the newly developing neighbourhoods. This 
section shows how the societal shake-up inherent in the development of a new 
geographic area provides numerous impetuses for a reorientation in the religious field, 
favoring the transition from orthodox towards charismatic churches. It is based on 
interviews with congregation members, other neighbourhood leaders, and a series of 
door-to-door interviews I conducted on the choices people made in terms of church 
and other social group memberships, augmented with census data.  
On the basis of this empirical analysis I conclude that the charismatic churches, which 
increasingly dominate Ghana’s religious landscape, play a much smaller role in the 
provision of material collective amenities than the orthodox churches did and still 
do. I attribute this to deep-seated differences in doctrine and internal organisation 
structure between these two types of religious organisations. I find that the charismatic 
churches are far more structured like business enterprises, organised for survival and 
profit in a competitive religious marketplace. This leaves little room for the construction 
of collective amenities except for those directly benefiting the church services and 
organisation, such as the church structure itself, and its means of transportation.30 
They are also more focused on the short term and the visible, which hinders the type 
of sustained energy, resource and organisational investments required to construct 
and maintain schools, clinics, and the type of dense local institutional network which 
is conducive to neighbourhood development.
6.2 Churches and the state formation process
This section provide the historical background for the rest of the chapter, showcasing 
how different socio-political figurations led to the emergence of different types of 
churches. Distinguishing two different historical periods, it focuses on the state-church 
figuration, dominant doctrines brought in from outside Ghana, and the level and 
nature of competition in the religious arena. I first describe the colonial era, when the 
first Christian churches arrived in Ghana and a patchwork of missions was established 
throughout the southern and central regions of the country. This era was characterised 
by a strong interdependency between churches and the colonial state, low levels of 
30 Many churches also have extravagant cars, which may see like a waste of resources in such a 
competitive market. However, most observers explained this to me as the equivalent of private profit 
in regular enterprises. That is, these cars are seen as a reward the pastors give themselves for having 
performed well.
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competition between the churches, and a strong strand of missionary spirit in the 
churches’ doctrines. I then turn to the most recent decades of Ghana’s history. This era 
saw a veritable explosion in the number of denominations and independent churches, 
especially in Ghana’s urban areas. It was characterised by loose church-state relations, 
a high degree of competition among the churches, and the arrival of the prosperity 
gospel from the U.S.. 
The Christianisation of Ghana started in May 1752, with the landing of Reverend 
Thomas Thompson, of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, in response to a 
request of the British Royal African Company (Assimeng, 2010, p. 86). In March 1767 
this British invitation was echoed by the Danish, when the Directors of the Danish 
Guinea Company wrote a letter to the Elders of the United Brethren, a missionary 
denomination in Copenhagen “begging them to send missionaries to the Gold 
Coast, to preach the Gospel to the natives, for the purpose of making them orderly, 
faithful and diligent people, like those on the three Danish islands in the West Indies.” 
(Reindorf, 1895, p. 216) The missionaries were called in by the colonial government, in 
order to make the natives more obedient and more fit to work in the colonial project. 
Five missionaries were sent in 1767, all of whom died of various diseases within a 
few years. So did the second group, consisting of four more Danishmen. This was 
too much for the United Brethren, who stopped their attempts to Christianise the 
Gold Coast. But the first seeds had been sown, and a small mission was established, 
now manned by natives and those of mixed Euro-African origin. The first substantial 
churches, however, were founded between 1827 and 1848 by the humanist oriented 
Basel Mission. At the invitation of the Danish Governor, Basel sent in a mixture of 
Europeans from several countries and people of Ghanaian ancestry, born and raised as 
Christians on Jamaica (Assimeng, 2010, p. 86; Reindorf, 1895, p. 227). 
Such missionaries were invited in by the colonial powers, and they quickly established 
an working relationship with those powers, along the same lines as in so many other 
colonies. The missionaries were to educate the natives, which meant, following Western 
European standards of public education of the time, “to render them virtuous, patient 
and industrious” (Swaan, 1988, p. 57).31 In the colonial state figuration, it was the 
churches’ task to pacify the natives, to develop the land in terms of schools, hospitals 
and agriculture, to create a layer of administratively competent natives who would 
31 Although De Swaan’s work is European in focus, and this research investigates the historical development of 
Ghana, I believe his work has relevance here, because these missionaries were requested by the (European) 
colonizers explicitly in their role as carriers of specific aspects of European cultures and worldviews.
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be assigned roles in the project of colonial extraction, and to form a fine-grained 
network of European settlements throughout the country. Although usually presented 
as a ‘civilising mission’, an enriching project, the invitation of missionaries was largely 
intended to create a more obedient population and a layer of capable administrators, 
which could be counted on to facilitate the extraction of natural resources and of 
human beings.32
However cynical the reasons for inviting them had been, it should be made clear that 
the churches were by no means simply a tool in the hands of the colonial powers. Their 
agenda was to spread the Gospel, but it also contained an earnest push to improve the 
well-being of the natives; not just through education, but also by medical and economic 
means. Additionally, the mission churches were inevitably shaped by local culture and 
circumstances (Meyer, 1999, p. xix; T. Ranger, 1986). And as the missionaries realised 
that the colonial state depended on them for the education of a local administrative 
workforce, a network of stable settlements throughout the colony, and vital health care 
services, the relationship between the two was an interdependency, both needing the 
other to survive and thrive (Plange, 1984). 
Throughout the 19th century, the British, Dutch, Asante and Fante kingdoms 
competed for supremacy in the southern part of current-day Ghana. As the century 
progressed, the British and their Fante allies slowly gained the upper hand. In 1850, 
the Danish sold out their colonial possessions to the British, followed in 1872 by the 
Dutch. In 1900, the British definitively asserted their dominance over southern and 
central Ghana, as they crushed the Asante Uprising and captured the Asante capital 
city Kumasi. This enabled Christian missionaries to start working in all of modern-day 
Ghana. At this point, something resembling the territory of Ghana in its current form 
was first unified under a single state, as the Gold Coast, a crown colony of Britain. 
This enabled missionaries to work more widely throughout Ghana, and soon, the 
country was more or less divided in terms of missionary activity: the Evangelical 
Presbyterians in the Volta region, the Presbyterians around Akwapim in the Eastern 
Region, the Roman Catholics generally further north among the Ashanti, in the 
Brong-Ahafo Region and in the Northern Territories, the Anglicans in the northwest, 
32 It was not always possible to tailor-make and -break the traditional aspects of culture. The British wanted 
the locals to be educated in Christian culture and to adopt its work ethic, but as chapter 5 explains, they 
also wanted them to accept a ‘traditional’ regime of chieftaincy (for the Native Administration system 
of indirect colonial rule), which in many places had to be cobbled together in questionable ways from 
various local traditions. At some point, groups of zealous Christian converts started walking around the 
villages carrying red flags and ‘giving out that the authority of the chiefs was at an end’ (Der, 1974, p. 54).
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the Wesleyans or Methodists in the Central Region, and so on (L. Berry, 1994, p. 104; 
Der, 1974). These mission churches normally worked in close concert with the newly 
unified colonial state. Archive work shows that the missions would always ask the 
colonial authorities for permission to establish themselves in a new area, reported 
frequently on events in their area and the progress they made in ‘civilising the natives’, 
and formed a channel of information ‘from the ground’ for the more distant colonial 
government (Montana, 2009). 
The missions attracted followers at a high pace and grew quickly, because they effectively 
offered their converts a powerful socio-economic lure. Conversion to Christianity 
enabled natives to work as clerks, farming headmen and similar lower- and middle-
rank positions in the colonial state apparatus (Meyer, 1999, p. 11). Although Ghanaians 
could not achieve the same status as Europeans, Christianity opened doors to status, 
knowledge and relative economic wealth. This was not only because Christianity was 
a prerequisite for positions in the formal colonial apparatus, but also because the only 
educational institutions at the time were church schools. 
Around the time when the first missionaries were being sent out to Ghana, education 
had become a core concern of many European churches. Churches worked hard to 
develop the minds of young people, in order to spread their own ethos and ensure their 
own continuity as well as for more idealistic reasons. But while churches in Europe 
were engaged in fierce competition with each other, in Ghana they held regional 
religious semi-monopolies, competing only with pre-existing local spiritual traditions. 
This was mainly so because the capacity of most churches to expand was severely 
limited, because of poor transportation and communication technology, keeping the 
missionary churches largely from competing with each other (Remi Jedwab, Meier Zu 
Selhausen, & Moradi, 2018). Colonial government, which needed the missions for the 
provision of education but did have the final say in land grants and mission permits, 
also stopped them from competing on several occasions. The Wesleyan mission 
(the later Methodist church) was barred from opening a mission in the north (Wa 
and Tamale) since competition with the Catholics already settled there was seen to 
be undesirable. As the Chief Commissioner noted in a 1913 letter, he did not want 
to disturb the monopoly of the Catholics: “I do not think that the establishment of 
missions of various denominations in this Dependency would be conducive to the 
good of the country or its inhabitants.” (Armitage, 1913)
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Although there was a strong relationship between the missions and the colonial 
government at this time, they did have rather divergent aims.33 Often, the missionaries 
(especially the Protestant denominations) were more inclined towards creating local 
independent prosperity. Meanwhile, the colonial administration was rather more 
focused on getting well-educated personnel to build a more streamlined operation for 
the production and extraction of raw materials (Grier, 1981). 
In some cases, the missionaries and the colonial government even engaged in long-
term conflict. The Pères Blancs (White Fathers) were largely French Catholics, who 
started a mission at Navrongo in the far north of Ghana in 1906. They had recurring 
difficulties with the colonial administrator of that area, the Chief Commissioner (Der, 
1974). He felt they did not sufficiently educate the people, they were a cause of possible 
strife with the local Muslim community. He also felt that they were far too active in 
proselytising rather than focusing on quality education. This fear was not unfounded, as 
effective proselytising by the White Fathers in the North-West soon led to iconoclastic 
fury against other religious traditions. Finally, they were French, which was politically 
impractical in the so-called Scramble for Africa. This was part of a pattern where the 
nationality of the various missionary denominations came into play more frequently. 
Depending on the political circumstances at the time in Europe, French and German 
missionaries (such as the Catholic Pères Blancs and the Presbyterian Basel Mission) 
were distrusted and suppressed, or even evicted. 
In the early 20th century, the first cracks appeared in the patchwork of local religious 
monopolies by mission churches that had come about during colonialism. Growing 
internal migration of Ghanaians led to mixing, which gave rise to the first stirrings 
in Ghana of voluntarism, a situation where religious affiliation is by choice (Warner, 
1993). To be sure, Christianity was always optional, never a collectively enforced 
religion in Ghana. During the colonial era Christians were a distinct, if powerful, 
minority among Ghanaians. Most Ghanaians remained fully within the pre-existing 
spiritual traditions. But the territorially discrete nature of the mission churches had 
always provided a strong incentive for Ghanaians to join a specific church: the mission 
church active in their area, which provided a bridge towards the colonial government. 
33 Differences in purpose did not only exist between the missionaries and the colonial state. Prior research 
also shows that missionaries regularly clashed with their pupils on the content and emphasis of the 
curriculum. Berman (1974, p. 528) describes: “The differing perceptions of the schools’ role by the 
missionary and his African clientele inevitably led to conflict. The missionary continued to place religious 
instructuion at the forefront of the school curriculum. (…) The Africans, on the other hand, asked that 
more utilitarian subjects - those which would enable them to move into the European economy, to 
modernize, if you will - be emphasized.”
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As internal migration accelerated, the local monopolies of specific denominations 
were dismantled further, with various churches co-existing in the same, generally 
urban, areas. At the same time, the various missions had also reached a stage where 
they had the capacity to expand their missions into territories already settled by other 
denominations. 
In the middle of the 20th century, the monopoly of the orthodox churches was 
definitively broken by the rise of African Independent Churches (AICs34) and the 
first Pentecostal churches. ‘AIC’ is originally a colonial denominator for the first wave 
of different African-led churches, meaning simply that they were not supervised 
by whites (Maxwell, 1999). I mention them together with the classical Pentecostals 
since many of the AICs cast themselves part of the broader worldwide Pentecostal 
movement, straddling the typological divide (Meyer, 1999). Ghanaian-started and 
-led AICs adopted the names of worldwide Pentecostal churches such as the Apostolic 
Church and the Assemblies of God, and western missionaries from these churches 
had come to Ghana to further their growth. Hence, researchers treated AICs and 
classical Pentecostals as a single category until around 1990 (Meyer, 2004). Classical 
Pentecostalism was a movement of spiritual renewal, rejecting much of the dogma 
and rigidity that had built up within the Christian denominations over centuries, and 
claiming a return to the original Christian values by placing special emphasis on a 
direct personal experience of God, rather than through formal rituals (Cox, 2009). 
As Ghana became independent, the AIC movement took off even further. Was this 
correlated with the independence movement? The AIC religious movement had usually 
not agitated openly for independence, or generally been openly political in the explicit 
sense of the word, organising political action. But it was a movement which emphasised 
cultural, spiritual and political self-determination in general, and as such broke open 
both the political dominance of the colonial regime and the religious hegemony of 
the mission churches (Meyer, 2004; Sackey, 1996). The spread of Pentecostalism was 
also aided by the activities of non-denominational or lay Christian fellowships such as 
Women Aglow and the Full Gospel Business Men’s Fellowship International, which are 
extremely active in terms of evangelism (K. Asamoah-Gyadu, 1997).
Concurrent with the further growth and maturing of the AICs, Ghana became 
increasingly oriented towards the more enterprising religious field of the USA 
(Hastings, 1979). In the 1970s, a new movement came in, which was to eventually 
34 For a further discussion of the term AICs, including potential re-labelings as African Indigenous Churches 
(Appiah-Kubi, 1981) or African Initiated Churches (A. H. Anderson, 2001), see Meyer (2004).
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supersede the AICs as West Africa’s primary growth pole of Christianity: the 
charismatic church movement.35 This movement, generally taken to have originated 
in 1965 with the Calvary Chapel in Costa Mesa, California, has taken not only West 
Africa, but also the rest of the world by storm, rising to over 300 million followers 
worldwide by 2010 (cf. Meyer, 2004; Pew, 2011; Sweeney, 2005, p. 150). The rise of AICs 
and classical Pentecostal churches had broken open the religious field and legitimised 
religious pluralism. This was an important enabling factor in the extreme growth and 
wide diversity of the charismatic movement (Meyer, 2004). 
It was also over this period that Christianity became the dominant religion in Ghana 
and most of the surrounding countries. In 1910, 1.7% of West-Africans was Christian, 
still only a small minority. In 1970, this had grown explosively to 29.3%. In 2010, the 
figure stood at 36.5%. In Ghana, the growth was even more rapid. Although statistics 
differ, the pattern is impressive by any account. For instance, the Gordon Conwell 
Center for the Study of Global Christianity registers a percentage of 51% Christianity 
in Ghana for 1970, growing to 65.4% projected in 2020 (Johnson, 2013, p. 32). The 
reasons for this are difficult to capture, as they most likely span the spiritual, cultural, 
social, political and economic domain. In general, it appears that in this situation, 
the religious mobilisation theory (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987) appears to be applicable. 
What is much more clear, and a necessary preliminary to the rest of this chapter, is the 
transition between dominance of various strands of Christianity: from orthodox, to 
African Initiated Churches and Pentecostal, to charismatic (J. D. Amanor, 2004).
Since the 1980s, the charismatic churches have seen spectacular growth in Ghana. 
It seems most sensible to discuss this growth in relative terms, as Ghana’s entire 
population has been growing enormously, from 10 million in 1975 to 28 million 
in 2015 (World Bank, 2016). The religious composition of Ghana in the first post-
independence population census of 1960 was 41% Christian, 38% Traditionalist, 
12% Muslim, and the remainder (some 9%) reporting no religious affiliation. Of the 
Christians, 25% were Protestant (orthodox), 13% Roman Catholic, 2% Protestant 
(Pentecostal) and 1% Independent African Churches. 
The next dataset is from the 1980s, when the Ghana Evangelism Committee 
conducted two surveys, in 1986 and in 1991 (Gifford, 1998, p. 38). According to the 
1985 estimate, Ghana’s population was 62% Christian, 15% Muslim, 22% indigenous 
or nonbelievers. The Christian group was composed of Protestants (25%, largely 
35 The characteristics of this movement are discussed in detail in the following section, as part of a larger 
overview of the contemporary Ghanaian religious field.
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 241
Methodists and Presbyterians), Roman Catholics (15%), Protestant Pentecostals 
(8%), and Independent African Churches (14%) (Federal Research Division, 1994, p. 
102). That is, within a single generation, one fifth of Ghana’s entire population had 
converted to Christianity, and the Pentecostal and AIC shares had taken in that entire 
growth. Between 1986 and 1991 the traditional AICs, the older Pentecostals, had lost 
members, the orthodox church membership had remained constant in absolute terms, 
and the new Pentecostal churches, most of which would later be recognised as part of 
the charismatic movement, had gained enormously. Later surveys, in particular the 
census data from 2000 and 2010, show the continuation of this trend (Ghana Statistical 
Service, 2013). The membership of the orthodox churches did not really decline, but 
the vast majority of the explosive population growth over the past 25 years has swelled 
the charismatic congregations, making this the dominant religious category in seven 
out of Ghana’s ten regions (ibid). In short: Ghana’s market for organised religion 
is expanding, and the charismatic movement is capturing the large majority of the 
newcomers.
The process of decolonisation also had other impacts on the religious field and the 
relationship between churches and state. At first there had been a clear division of labor 
between the colonial state and the mission churches. The churches did education, health, 
smaller development projects, organised some forms of social security, and provided 
the cultural and religious framework. The colonial state organised larger infrastructure 
projects and held the country together and racially suppressed by military force. After 
decolonisation in 1957, the First Republic under President Nkrumah took over all 
schools from the churches, reforming the curriculum and adding nationalist elements 
(Berman, 1974). 
Although this complete nationalisation of the school system was reversed after 
Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966, the state remained strongly involved in education. In 
1992, the Fourth Republic Constitution declared free and compulsory basic education 
for all children between 4 and 14 years old. In 2017, the newly elected NPP government 
extended this to free Senior High School education (severely straining the educational 
resources of the state). Today the situation is that churches are allowed to run their 
own schools, with a government-approved curriculum, or work with local government 
for this, sharing the building, the teaching materials, the teachers and other costs in a 
variety of constellations. This cooperative approach has contributed to one of the best 
educated youth populations south of the Sahara (World Bank, 2016).
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Churches still today organise another important material collective amenity: social 
security. The most common form of this in Ghana is the welfare fund, which consists of 
a group of people pooling money every week, during a live meeting which participants 
must attend. This money is not stockpiled for long, but rather used that same week or 
month to support one or more of the participants, who gave birth, was bereaved or had 
another major life event. This money is not personal savings, nor is it comparable to a 
pension system. Welfare funds are more like health or other insurance systems: needs 
based, short term. There are many different systems for this: either fixed payments, or 
ad-hoc, give-what-you-can collections; either fixed payouts, or payouts determined by 
the discretion of church leadership; either as a separate financial system, or integrated 
with the rest of the church’s financial flows. Almost every church offers members at 
least one of these options. I use the term “welfare” to denote all such systems. 
Unlike schooling, this function was hardly taken over by the state. The public sector has 
a state insurance company called SSNIT, but this is only for formal-sector employees. 
The idea of mutual funds has also spread from the churches in other directions, and 
today a wide variety of secular groups or ‘clubs’ exist, which are also organised as 
welfare funds. These fill part of that gap, especially for the urban upper middle classes 
(Interview Agyere, 2015). However, for most Ghanaians, the church welfare fund and 
the family are still the main forms of insurance.
6.3 Categories of churches today
This section of the chapter describes the various groups of churches active in Ghana 
today. It builds on the previous section in the sense that it shows the outcomes of 
the historic processes described there. The section stays largely at the meso-level, 
describing categories of churches, their group characteristics and the organisations 
representing them. The section also delineates which groups of churches exactly are 
described in the following section, and briefly denotes why some Christian groups, 
the so-called sects, as well as other religions such as Muslims, are not covered in this 
chapter.
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 Greater Other Rural Rural Rural Total
 Accra urban south center north
Catholic 9% 15% 15% 18% 43% 17%
Protestant 22% 25% 21% 28% 13% 25%
Pentecostal/Charismatic 54% 44% 48% 39% 32% 44%
Other Christian 13% 16% 16% 16% 11% 15%
Christians total 86% 75% 71% 80% 40% 73%
Islam 12% 21% 18% 10% 52% 20%
Traditional 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
No religion 2% 5% 12% 11% 8% 7%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 6.1: An overview of membership of organised religion in various parts of Ghana (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014, p. 10). 
Building taxonomies of churches and religious movements is a tricky enterprise 
(Meyer, 2004). Scholars of Christianity in Ghana estimate that around 7000 different 
churches are active in Ghana, and it is impossible to definitively categorise them, 
whatever theoretical, doctrinal or empirical basis one chooses (Assimeng, 2010, 
p. 245). However, a rough grouping around ideal types is possible, and is actually a 
prerequisite for analysing the declining contribution of churches to the production of 
collective amenities. Therefore, this section briefly sets out a number of categories. To 
provide an indicator of where the boundaries between these categories currently lie 
and how porous or rigid these are, I also provide an overview of the associations and 
councils through which Ghanaian churches have organised themselves. 
Following common parlance in Ghana I divide Christian groups in Ghana into 
five main groups, eventually focusing on two of them. These groups are: Orthodox 
churches, Spiritual churches, Pentecostal churches, Charismatic churches and so-
called sects. Following the previous section, I treat these in order of their appearance 
on the religious scene. There is an additional difficulty, in that even where there is 
broad agreement on the categorisation, most of these categories are referred to by a 
number of different labels. I use for each category the label which I have heard most 
frequently in Ghana, starting the description with that label and continuing to use it 
throughout the chapter, while also noting in these descriptions other labels that have 
been used to refer to these groups in academic literature or elsewhere. 
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First, the Orthodox churches, which generally have European origins, and came into 
the country as mission churches in the colonial era. These missionary churches are 
sometimes also referred to as mainline churches (Gifford, 2004). They have an extensive 
and relatively bureaucratic internal organisation, and are relatively strict in terms of 
doctrine. This category is the only one of the five described here whose boundaries are 
more or less uncontested. It includes the Calvinists (Presbyterian), Baptists, Lutherans, 
Methodists, Anglicans/Episcopals and the Roman Catholics. I describe this category 
in more detail in empirical section three. 
Second, the Spiritual churches. The early Spiritual churches were often conflated in the 
literature with Classical Pentecostal churches, under the header African Independent 
Churches or AICs (Sackey, 2001).36 Originated around the 1880’s (see Fernandez, 
1978), this movement brought in African elements like drumming and dancing into 
the services, and was considered revolutionary in that sense. During my fieldwork 
I have visited several church services of this type. The first thing I noticed was that 
they are very relaxed in terms of protocol. Much of the services consisted of music, 
communal or simultaneous individual prayer, and speaking in tongues. In general, 
these churches emphasise collective effervescence, a direct experience of God, and are 
often rather loose in their use of the Bible and their general theology, as far as I can tell. 
These churches do not appear to be very active in the provision of collective amenities. 
Third, and often conflated with the previous category, we have what are in Ghana called 
the Pentecostal churches, known in the literature as Classical Pentecostal churches 
(see Cox, 2009). Pentecostalism originated in the late 19th century, and emerged as 
an apostolic and evangelical movement, which was also actively taken up in West 
Africa starting around the 1920s. Having originated in California and the U.K., 
these churches emphasise personal connection with God through baptism, rather 
than biblical doctrines. They also provide room for prophetism, dreams and visions, 
speaking in tongues, prayer healing, and deliverance from evil spirits (Meyer, 2004). 
Although they are generally less traditional than most of the orthodox churches, I 
found the major churches of this category in Ghana to be rather strictly organised 
and relatively conservative in their doctrine. This category includes churches like the 
Assemblies of God, the Apostolic Church, the Church of Pentecost and many others. 
Several of the churches in this category are actively involved in the production of 
36 The term “independent” was originally a colonial term, designating Christian movements without white 
supervision (Maxwell, 1999). I will not use the term AIC in this chapter, as it is a somewhat arbitrary 
grouping, at least with respect to the purposes of my analysis. It ranges across the full doctrinal 
spectrum: from African spin-offs of Orthodox churches (such as the African Methodist Episcopal 
Church) to Spiritual churches with radically different doctrines and organizational structures.
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collective amenities, generally focusing on education. But their numbers are on the 
decline (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013; Gifford, 1998). 
Fourth, the Charismatic churches. These are well described by Gifford (2004), core 
elements being their focus on charismatic leadership, the exuberance of their services 
and their focus on ‘healing’. In terms of doctrine, it is similar to the Pentecostal churches, 
with the notable addition of the Prosperity gospel (see Bowler, 2013). A second main 
point of difference between these and prior religious movements in Ghana, which 
“remained community enterprises within, resisting modernisation in the capitalist 
sense” (Fernandez, 1978) is that the Charismatics fully embrace capitalism, also in 
the religious field itself. Other notable factors are their strong global orientations and 
ambitions, which are also reflected in their doctrine as a “complete break with the past” 
(Meyer, 1998). 
The development of Charismatic churches in Ghana was strongly related to, and 
inspired by, similar churches rising in the USA, and happened at the same time in nearby 
Nigeria. However, the Charismatic movement has always been less institutionally 
integrated than both the Orthodox and the Pentecostal churches, and the churches 
founded in Ghana were institutionally independent from their American inspirators. 
Initially, these churches were not very big, and also generally not international, 
although they always aspired to be (Meyer, 2004).37 Although there are several large 
and thoroughly structured Charismatic denominations, this category also stands out 
because of the large volume of independent religious entrepreneurs it includes. In fact, 
even its larger denominations often work with franchise models which leave individual 
churches much more freedom than the Orthodox or Pentecostal churches do.
Finally, the so-called sects, a category which includes Jehova Witnesses, Seventh Day 
Adventists, the Salvation Army and other strongly independent, somewhat idiosyncratic 
denominations.  These groups are relatively small in Ghana, comprising less than 10% 
of the Christian population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013), and are largely ignored 
in the literature. I follow suit here, since they form such a small percentage of the 
population, and did not have a recognisable presence in my case study areas. Most 
of these churches do not appear to be very active in structurally providing collective 
amenities. It should be noted, however, that the Salvation Army and the Seventh Day 
Adventists (SDA) are important exceptions to this rule. In fact, SDA activities in the 
37 One way to note this is in the names, many of which end in “International”, even when that is clearly not 
the case, i.e. when the church in question is a single, local group gathering in a small structure, with no 
other affiliations.
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areas of health, education, water and sanitation, and livelihood and agriculture are well 
established in Ghana, driven in part through the NGO Adventists Development and 
Relief Agency (ADRA).
This complex field of churches is grouped in a number of councils and associations. 
I briefly discuss these, first to denote which of the categories may be considered 
neighbours or allies, and which stand further apart from each other, and second 
to emphasise once again how fluid the boundaries between the categories are. The 
Christian Council of Ghana (CCG) brings together most of the Orthodox churches, 
except for the Catholics (who are not members of any of these councils), as well as 
a number of their AIC spin-offs. The Ghana Pentecostal and Charismatic Council 
(GPCC) represents some 450 different denominations, including classical Pentecostal 
churches such as the Apostolic Church and the Assemblies of God, as well as several 
large Charismatic churches, such as the Royal House Chapel International and the 
Perez Chapel International. This group, founded in the 1960s to facilitate pan-African 
gatherings of the Pentecostal movement, could be said to stand for the majority of 
institutionalised non-orthodox churches. Its leadership recently issued a call to 
“regulate lone rangers”, as these damage the societal standing of Christian churches 
in general (Frimpong-Manso, 2018). Finally, there is the National Association of 
Charismatic and Christian Churches (NACCC), which unites some 50 Charismatic 
denominations, among others the Lighthouse Chapel International of Dag Heward-
Mills and the Action Chapel International of Archbisshop Duncan-Williams. Some 
of the spiritual churches are members of the GPCC, several others have found a 
home in the NACCC, but the majority is simply independent, as are nearly all of the 
sects. A large amount of Charismatic churches, especially the smaller ones, are also 
independent. 
This overview of the religious field, as shown in Table 6.2, leaves out two main groups. 
First, Muslims. I have left these out because mosques have historically been much 
less active than churches in the production of collective amenities and are still not 
nearly as active as churches in this field, apart from maintaining the mosque building 
and enabling social bonding to facilitate peer assistance (Interview Alhassan, 2015). 
Second, apart from formal religion, Ghana has a lively landscape of spiritual providers, 
colloquially known as witch doctors or fetish priests (whose followers are denoted 
in table 6.1 as ‘traditional religion’). They are generally not engaged in institution 
building, nor indeed do they gather groups of followers in any practical sense. 
However, they answer to a widely felt need to intervene in the spiritual plane on behalf 
of individuals, providing protection from spiritual harm and support from powerful 
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spirits and ‘lesser Gods’. They play their role in the background of the story laid out 
in this chapter, often by supporting Christian preachers, especially on the charismatic 
side of the spectrum, with spiritual energy. For a good example, see fetish priest Nana 
Kwaku Bonsam, who often speaks out in the Ghanaian press and through Twitter on 
religious and other issues.
Out of these five groups, the chapter focuses on orthodox and on charismatic churches. 
On orthodox churches, because these have historically dominated the religious field in 
Ghana and are still the most active group in terms of building collective amenities. And 
on charismatic churches, because these appear to be taking over the religious field, so 
their productivity in terms of collective amenities matters most for the newly developing 
urban areas, where collective amenities are yet to be built. The Pentecostals are also 
regularly active in terms of building collective amenities, but less visibly so than the 
orthodox churches, and their share of the religious marketplace is dwindling, so they are 
less relevant to the analysis for newly growing parts of the urban fabric. As for the so-
called sects, I have seen relatively little activity in terms of building collective amenities 
on their part, and they do not constitute a major part of Ghana’s Christian population.
A final note, to provide transparency and to discuss and signal the border between 
personal opinion and scientific work. The charismatic churches of West Africa have 
been receiving much flak lately. Ghana’s press regularly features attacks on the opulent 
lifestyles of their leaders. Some academic authors describe these churches as parasitic 
on the society they work in, as businesses which blatantly disregard the damage 
they do to society to achieve their financial aims (Sackey, 2006). Others have written 
about such churches in nearby Nigeria as providing investment vehicles for corrupt 
politicians (Ukah, 2016, p. 537). This gives an indication of the stakes in the discussion 
surrounding the material and financial culture of this new wave of churches. 
I personally share many of the broader notions surrounding the moral character of 
many charismatic church leaders posited by such pieces, but it is not up to a social 
scientific researcher to pass moral judgment. So I have tried my best to keep the 
empirical material in this chapter strictly focused on its theoretical goal: explaining 
why there appears to be a large difference in the provision of material collective 
amenities between the orthodox and the charismatic churches. That does involve 
citing fieldwork respondents who hold strong opinions on these churches. But there 
too, I have ensured to triangulate observations. Furthermore, I have refrained as far as 
possible from quoting respondents who had clear personal interests in or against the 
churches under discussion.
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From mid-18th century
Mission churches
Calvinist (Presbyterian), 
Baptist, Lutheran, 
Methodist, 
Anglican/Episcopal, 
Roman Catholic, …
Orthodox
Calvinist (Presbyterian), 
Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, 
Anglican/Episcopal, 
Roman Catholic, …
Charismatic
Winner’s Chapel, 
Action Chapel International, 
International Central Gospel Church, 
Lighthouse, 
many smaller organised 
church groups, 
and “one-man churches”
Spiritual & Pentecostal 
churches (AICs)
Christ Apostolic Church, 
Church of Pentecost, 
Deeper Life, …
Charismatic churches)
Assemblies of God, 
Heavenly Gate, 
Royal House, …
From early 20th century From 1980s
Table 6.2: an overview of the typology of churches developed in this chapter.
6.4 Orthodox churches: a case study
This section and the following form the central analytical thrust of the chapter, by 
providing a comparison at the micro-level between the internal organisation and 
doctrine of a contemporary orthodox church (section 4) and charismatic church 
(section 5). In these sections, I show how the different orientations of these churches 
lead to radically different outcomes in terms of the production of additional collective 
amenities such as educational and medical facilities. These case studies build on 
observations within church services, interviews and informal conversations with 
the pastors, other church workers and congregation members, as well as printed and 
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digital material produced by the churches, such as a church constitution, billboards 
in Accra and text from online platforms. The two case studies are augmented by 
examples from other churches, to further flesh out the spectrum of orthodox and 
charismatic churches, and the territory in between these two extremes. The material 
for this augmentation is drawn from interviews with congregants, online sources and 
interviews with neighbourhood leaders.
To flesh out the ideal type of an orthodox church, I provide an example which comes 
fairly close to the ideal type: the Presbyterian Church in Sebrepor, a descendant of the 
Basel mission. Its doctrine was expressed by its reverend as follows:
“We think of the holistic of the people. We need to cater for the spiritual 
aspect of the person, the soul aspect which is renewing their mind, and 
the physical aspect. So if the person is not strong, is not healthy, well… 
So our Social Services Department also caters for the environment, 
they work to improve the health, they try to organise employment for 
the youth. It is our duty to run these social services, because in the end, 
the church is for the society.” 
Francis Akey, Reverend of the Christ the King Presbyterian Church, 
Sebrepor
The Presbyterian church is one of the biggest buildings in Sebrepor, a massive pointed 
roof rising above the surrounding villas, shacks and dirt roads. On Sunday mornings, 
it is surrounded by a sea of ladies in long, flowing dresses of every style imaginable. 
Sprinkled between these ladies is a notably smaller amount of men, wearing eminently 
respectable suits which they crown with brightly coloured ties. The crowd is fairly old, 
the average age between forty and fifty years old. More people arrive and slowly trickle 
into the building through the wide open doors, stopping every few meters to greet 
friends.
Traditional values
The various parts of the service flow smoothly into one another. Since the first 
missionaries from Copenhagen landed on Ghanaian shores to start their missionary 
work, a number of new elements have been introduced: more singing, colourful 
clothing, clapping and dancing. As Reverend Akey explains, “God has spoken to us, so 
we have to respond. Yes! We dance while we do our offerings. Your country, you are so 
stiff in worshipping, when you should be flexible. You are going to your daddy God, 
and God is love. So go to your daddy with joy!”
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Beyond such visible elements, important though they may be, the service has remained 
true to its Basel Mission roots to a surprising degree. There is a strong emphasis on 
Bible study, with half an hour reserved for that in the beginning of the service and 
three public Scripture readings later on. Bible study takes the majority of time in this 
service. The sermon, too, is very much focused on interpreting these readings and 
weaving them together into a theologically sound storyline. Singing and dancing take 
an important place, but the singing is hymns, in classical style, accompanied by the 
organ.
Beyond these Bible readings, the service does contain some elements more commonly 
associated with Pentecostalism which go beyond visual style elements. The most 
notable of these is deliverance, an element brought in strongly by the Charismatic 
churches. Its purpose is to drive out evil spirits and to promote health and well-being. 
During this part of the service, everyone in the congregation is asked to close their 
eyes, raise their right hand, and pray fervently to drive out any evil spirits and to attract 
positive energies. But as I looked around the church through my half-closed eyelids, 
I saw many of the older members around me grudgingly sit still, hands in their lap, 
eyes open, looking around impatiently while they waited for this ‘modern nonsense’, 
as some called it, to be finished.
Clearly, there is a generational conflict here. Many of the older members resist the 
introduction of such recently adopted elements as deliverance, much dance and 
collective rapture, instead putting great weight on ‘proper dress’, and emphasising a 
careful reading and interpretation of the Bible. This comes at a cost (Assimeng, 2010, 
p. 31). It comes at the cost of dynamism, at a cost of attracting new members, and in the 
end could prove to be an existential threat to these churches. Still, its services clearly 
show that in this church, the traditional habits are still dominant. And the advanced 
age of the congregation reflects this fact.
Internal organisation
It is not hard to see why people look up to Reverend Francis Akey as a leader. Chairman 
of the Christ the King Congregation in Sebrepor, he is an imposing preacher. He speaks 
with authority, and clearly has no time for distractions. His office, where he receives 
me to explain the inner workings of his church, is furnished with a broad desk and 
wooden panels on the wall. Alternating between his laptop, various paper files and his 
Samsung tablet to explain the different aspects of his church, Akey is more reminiscent 
of a small-town mayor than of a reverend. 
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Asked for a description of his church, he says: 
“You see, our church, we have 7 key result areas, or Departments. 
We have the Department of Evangelism, those who share the word of 
God. When they bring the souls in, we have a Department which takes 
charge, the Church Life & Nurturing Department. Then since we are in 
a community, we liaise with the community and we have a department 
which is in charge of that. (…) Then we have Finance. We also have a 
department which caters for Secular Education, or General Education, 
and Development and Social Services. And finally, we have those who 
manage our statistics, our human resources, the staff we have. We call 
it Administration and Human Resources Management. (…)”
The first thing that stands out from the Reverend’s descriptions of his church is how 
systematic it all is. Only at the end does he mention traditionally bureaucratic areas 
like statistics and human resources, but in fact that rationalised spirit runs through 
the whole story. The Department of Evangelism goes out and brings in the souls. The 
freshly gathered converts are then taken over by the CL&N department, and counted 
and filed away by the AHRM department. Relations with external organisations are 
maintained by yet another department, and internal conditions are managed by 
Development and Social Services. God’s work must be done, and it must be done 
with care. But in the Presbyterian church, this does not seem to require any rapturous 
devotion. Quite the contrary: in interviews, the cheerful leaders of these departments 
were more reminiscent of civil servants, cracking cynical jokes while getting on with 
today’s business.
Nobody stands outside this gently humming machine: even Reverend Akey himself 
and his colleagues are regularly transferred by the church’s national leadership. An 
administrative rotation process sends them to other stations of duty every five years, 
just like the Local Government Service does with municipal officers. The purpose of 
this is to keep them from getting complacent and to keep the churches from being 
dominated by any locally grown ‘big men’. This calibrated structure and sober attitude 
make the church a highly effective organisation. They have managed to erect and 
maintain the biggest building in the Sebrepor area, they have a well-oiled internal 
machinery which keeps the Sunday services and other programs running smoothly. 
They have some strong internal welfare programs, effective internal communication 
channels, and they have managed to set up a number of community services which are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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The fact that it is organised in a tight and somewhat bureaucratic way does not mean 
there is no enthusiasm or commitment to these practices. Most of these Departments 
are run by volunteers, some receiving small allowances and others receiving no 
compensation at all. As Akey describes the financial arrangements for the people 
keeping the church running: 
“We have employees only in the administration. Then some people, we 
give them some allowances. But to be honest, I can’t call it an allowance, 
it’s just a token to buy phone credit and transport wherever they are 
going. We also have a small minibus which takes people around. People 
willingly volunteer to do it. If the commitment is not there, you can’t do 
it. You need real commitment.” 
Again, this is an example, purely set out here to provide substance to an otherwise 
abstract ideal type, positioned at the orthodox end of the spectrum described above. 
Such bureaucratic structures are not limited to Ghana’s former mission churches, but 
they are nearly only found in churches which entered the field before the 1960s. This 
includes the Pentecostal Churches (the specific denomination with that name, not the 
broader category). As Rev. Abloma, head pastor of the Sebrepor Pentecostal Church, 
describes: 
“At the beginning of the year, the national HQ sends us their calendar, 
the things they want to do, and they bring us a theme that they want us 
to work on throughout the year. The calendar says they will do ABCD 
[specific events] on this date of this month. Then the Area also brings 
their calendar. Then the District, we will also develop a calendar for 
ourselves. Then we work it out here at the district, and let them have the 
program of the district, so the local churches can also have their local 
program.”
Like Reverend Akey, he too is rotated on a five-year basis to other locations throughout 
Ghana. I ask him whether that isn’t a shame, to waste all the built-up contacts and local 
knowledge, but he just laughs, and answers: 
“Yes, perhaps. You didn’t start the congregation though, somebody else 
started it, so you can’t claim it for yourself. In fact, in our system, we 
have multiple churches for one pastor. I’m here as a district minister, 
which means I have several churches under my care. Apart from that, 
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there are elders for the churches, I’m supposed to be the minister, 
coordinating all the affairs of the churches. The minister is not for one 
particular assembly, no, the minister is for several churches.”
In short, Ghana’s orthodox churches were designed as single bodies, with many moving 
parts. Their head pastors, who have gone through a lengthy education to qualify for this 
position, are more administrators than spiritual leaders, fulfiling clear-cut functions in 
a consciously designed larger institution. They are balanced out by long-serving local 
elders, stabilising the churches while head pastors move around on a 5-year rotational 
regime, similar to that of the local government bureaucrats. This notion of a deep 
rooting in a larger whole is also reflected in the financial flows within the church: large 
parts of the collected donations are appropriated by the national headquarters, to be 
used in structural nation-wide programs. 
A doctrine of community building
In Europe, the churches had over the 17th and 18th century risen to be the main 
organisers of social services.
“Priests, in their role of ‘charitable entrepreneurs’, promulgated a 
uniform rule of distribution which could serve as a focal point for 
coordinating almsgiving. They also manipulated reciprocal expectations 
among the established families and created a public setting for 
ostentatious giving and mutual inspection of each one’s contributions. 
Collective charitable action in turn contributed to the emergence of the 
parish as a collectivity. In the context of this emerging parish community, 
‘public order’ as a collective good acquired increasing social relevance.” 
(Swaan, 1988, p. 218)
While churches often carry an association of social conservatism, preserving the socio-
political status quo, and while the missionaries had been invited for just this purpose 
by the colonial powers, the missionaries themselves often had more progressive 
ideas. Many of the Methodists and other missionaries coming to Ghana had been 
strongly influenced by evangelical and philanthropic ideas, which were spreading in 
the churches of Western Europe at the time (Swaan, 1988, p. 218). These movements 
“stressed personal spiritual growth and the humanitarian improvement of institutions, 
advocating education as a means for both.” (ibid). 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below254
The Basel Mission, which founded the Presbyterian Evangelical Church in Ghana, 
worked by taking promising young men from artisanal and peasant backgrounds, 
and give them a chance to move up in the world through training and discipline 
(Graham, 1971). This philosophy of social mobility through hard work was carried 
to the missions, among which Ghana. De Swaan, in his fundamental work on the 
growth of the Western European welfare states, emphasises that such a spirit of reform, 
of humanitarian ideals in education and their other work, was a historical rarity in 
churches. But in 19th century Europe, it was an important current. 
Welfare system
The idea of mutual funds, which was really developing in a big way in 19th century 
Europe by working class associations and guilds (Swaan, 1988, pp. 143-151) was 
brought into Ghana by churches, and spread from there to the broader population. In 
Europe, this was superseded by statewide insurance programs (Swaan, 1988, p. 148) 
but in Ghana, the church welfare fund is still the only insurance for many people. 
Whether church members get married or have children, fall ill, are bereaved or pass 
away themselves, a financial safety net is always in place. Reverend Akey describes how 
welfare is organised in his church. 
“For the welfare, we come out with by-laws to guide them so that they 
will not discriminate. We want to guard against discrimination. So we 
have by-laws which regularise how the welfare should be operating, 
the way we operate the wellfare. And every few years we update the 
Welfare Constitution. A constitution that helps us in that manner.”
The church members and leadership find it important not to discriminate, to treat 
everyone by the same standards. The Constitution mentioned by Akey is a 7-page 
document, which spells out in great detail the rules in case of “(a) Wedding (b) 
Sickness (c) Old age (d) Incapacitation (e) Unemployment (f) Transfer (g) Death 
(h) Birth (i) Disaster/Accident (j) Widowhood (k) Scholarship (l) Sponsorship”. It 
goes on to describe the beneficiaries of this system: official congregation members, 
who have filled out the required Membership Declaration Forms (with two passport 
pictures) and have ensured regular fulfilment of all required Tithes, Dues and Pledges. 
Finally, this constitution sets out the exact amounts receivable, stipulating also that 
all congregation members are required to attend each other’s funerals and that “the 
Welfare Committee shall pay regular visits to every sick member”. 
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In other words, the church comes as close to being a bureaucratic welfare state as 
it can, caring for its members from the cradle to the grave. And this system is not 
limited to the local churches. On each university campus, there is a chapter of the 
National Union of Presbyterian Students of Ghana. Its members go around campus, 
knocking on every door to see whether there is a Presbyterian student in that room 
and to ensure that he or she is well cared for. And when congregation members move 
to another area, they receive a transfer letter from the church, which allows them to 
automatically enroll in the membership base of the Presbyterian church in their new 
area of residence. 
Again, such systematic coverage is not limited to the Presbyterian churches. Rather, 
they are associated with churches which came of age in the era before competition 
among churches was an important aspect of Ghana’s religious field. All old mission 
churches have similar welfare systems in place, and most old-style Pentecostal churches 
have similar systems. Many institutionalised Pentecostal churches have the same, often 
going even further, being even more centralised financially. 
A ‘secular’ school
As one of the first churches that was erected in the area, the Presbyterian church has 
also built a school. As Reverend Akey explains: 
“Then we have a school also, because we have a community we cater 
for. A secular school. It ranges from the nursery level, including primary 
and junior high level. So in our area, this is the only public secondary 
school. The others are a little far off. So, if you go to the class right now, 
you will find them overcrowded. The highest in a class is about 91. So we 
need to expand our facilities.
For that we are liasing with the District Assembly to find another place. 
It’s not a private school, it’s a public school, to serve the community. So 
we have a department which caters for Secular Education, or General 
Education. So for this we liase with the District Assembly, the Regional 
Director and up to the national level. So the minister in charge, he is the 
local manager, he manages the school with his leadership.” 
Three things stand out from this quote. First, this is the only public secondary school in 
the area. There are some (very small) private schools, but those are prohibitively expensive 
for most children.  Second, in many respects this school is a shared project between 
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government and the church. It is run on a daily basis by the church, but its teachers are 
provided by the central government. The church sees it as its responsibility to expand 
the school, but the District Assembly, that is the municipality, is actively searching for 
a location. Such cooperation arrangements between churches and local government 
in areas of public service are very common (Interview Ofori, 2015). Third, this is an 
explicitly secular project. It is still tied to the church community, so church members’ 
children are prioritised, Christian holidays are celebrated, and teachers who attend the 
Presbyterian church are strongly preferred. But children from other denominations and 
religions are also welcomed and do in fact attend in serious numbers, and the teaching 
is not strongly religious in nature. This orientation is born out in the fact that the school 
is run by the church’s Department for Secular Education. Although largely secular 
education organised by a church may at first sight seem like a contradiction in terms, for 
this church it is a natural consequence of their social mission. 
It is important to note that for many orthodox churches, this kind of project is as much 
official church policy as it is part of the spirit of the church. For example, Methodist 
churches often do not organise the building of the school as an explicit church project, 
but their morality does emphasise its importance, and the church provides an effective 
forum for the required logistical organisation. As one church member explains: 
“We are a Methodist church, and the school here was built by the 
members of the church. But it wasn’t built by the Methodist church per 
se. Every fund which was used to build that school was raised in this 
church, and it is known under the name of Methodist school. So that’s 
what you see in most places. You’ll see a Methodist church, which wasn’t 
funded by the central Methodist organisation in Ghana. I mean, it’s quite 
natural: once the church is established, the next project will be a school. 
For who is the school? Well, actually, we built the school for the area. 
So our member’s children come there, but also others. We even have 
Muslims who come to attend that school. It’s open to anybody. If you 
can pay the fees, you can come.”
Apart from this school, the church also runs a Department of Development, which 
focuses on the economic aspect of its adult members’ lives. This Department provides 
training and rental equipment for so-called ‘small scale technology’, like fitting, 
welding and other such crafts. They target industries which are not capital-intensive, 
but which do require some investment and mainly training to be successful, and 
which therefore allow the church members to make a dependable living. Apart from 
providing equipment and training themselves, and perhaps even more importantly, the 
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Department functions as a hub connecting church members to potential employers 
and customers in the area. 
Finally, the church also has a Department of Social Relations and Ecumenism 
Department. As its chairman explains:
“We liaise with the political authorities, we liaise with chiefs, we liaise 
with the other denominations and the other faiths. We are like the Foreign 
Affairs of the church. Sometimes, as a church, we want to do a program 
that will not be on religious basis. For example, we were having an event 
here which we call ‘Assembly Forum’. The purpose is to establish strong 
contact between the Assembly (municipality) and the people of this 
area, to push the development of the community. We invited the District 
Assembly to come here, with all the Assemblymen, to discuss with the 
community. You know, sometimes it is difficult. The Assembly, they are 
hard to reach, they will make excuses. But when you press on them, we 
can usually manage to get them to the community. I have their contact, 
and even if the DCE (mayor) himself can’t come, he will send somebody.”
In short, the church has both an internal welfare system, and a broad spectrum of 
activities directed at the structural development of its surrounding area. These systems 
are supported by its internal form of organisation, a bureaucracy which during 
observations appeared to be largely free of the lethargy which so often accompanies 
this form of organisation. The church runs as a well-oiled bureaucratic organisation, 
yet it is more than a task-based bureaucratic system: the whole enterprise is motivated 
by a sense of inspiration on the part of the ‘bureaucrats’, the church workers, to build 
up society and carry out ‘good works’. 
In Ghana, the orthodox churches often play this role, providing public amenities like 
schools and clinics. 19 out of the 20 highest ranking secondary schools in the country 
are run by orthodox churches (AB Review, 2017). The Roman Catholic church is 
particularly active in the field of medical clinics and hospitals, running 41% of all 
clinics in Ghana (Gifford, 2004, pp. 20-22). Many of the larger universities, too, are 
run by orthodox churches, and several larger foreign (sometimes religious-based) aid 
institutions work through their local counterparts, bringing in large amounts of aid 
money. See for example the Catholic Relief Services, but also organisations like USAid. 
Apart from the Catholic Church, these orthodox churches, including the Methodists, 
Baptists, Anglicans, Salvation Army, Presbyterian and many others, are organised in 
the Christian Council of Ghana.
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Many of the older Pentecostal churches are similar to the orthodox churches, both 
in terms of their social development activities and in terms of their internal culture. 
The Pentecostal Church of Ghana, for instance, has a highly centralised leadership 
structure, and its ministers rotate to a different posting every five years, like municipal 
bureaucrats. 75% of the church’s tithe is sent straight to its national headquarters, which 
spends the money on a large university and several secondary schools throughout the 
country, as well as a number of smaller projects (see Church of Pentecost website, 
2018). 
To be clear, not only the orthodox churches do this kind of structural social work. The 
Latter Day Saints church has a very active program through the Church Relief Society. 
The International Central Gospel Church has the Central Aid program, and has built 
one of the country’s best universities. And charismatic churches of various hues have 
built up countless schools throughout the country. The point here is not to say that 
they are not providing any social services, but rather to describe a structural, general 
difference between charismatic and orthodox churches.
In short, the orthodox churches have historically played a large part in state building. 
Their internal organisation is that of a parastatal institution, with similar bureaucratic 
structures, employee rotation systems, and sense of (bureaucratic) civil service duty. 
They have erected many of the country’s schools, universities and clinics, and played 
a role as its civil society more general, working with the state to develop local areas. 
They continue to do so today, despite diminishing attendance numbers and graying 
congregations.
6.5 Charismatic churches: a case study
“You see, when you are in the market to sell, you package your goods, 
you suit the market. So I think the charismatic churches have done that 
very well.” – Seth Quaynor, Sebrepor resident
In the 1970s, a new religious movement arose: the charismatic churches. Based on 
the template of Pentecostal megachurches in the US, this movement arrived first in 
Anglophone West-African countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, before spreading to 
their Francophone neighbours (Meyer, 2004, p. 453). The movement is also known as 
charismatic Pentecostalism, new or neo-Pentecostalism. These so-called ‘Charismatic 
churches’ took Ghana’s religious landscape by storm. 
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In Ghana’s orthodox churches, the doctrine is a core concern. Without the right beliefs 
and education, the Presbyterian Church will only let you in after six months of Bible 
School. But interestingly, in such churches, the strength of one’s belief is not really 
probed. It is rather the knowledge of the beliefs that matters. This is a broader theme: 
the Bible reading sessions have a rather relaxed atmosphere, and the sermons, although 
well composed and holding a clear message, are delivered with little more energy than 
a routine speech by a politician. Clearly, the Word of God must be heard clearly and 
digested well. But always in a dignified and relatively calm manner. 
Maximal effervescence
In the Charismatic churches, it is exactly the other way around. This is first and foremost 
visible in the atmosphere of their services. As one Baptist (orthodox) church member 
told me: “In the orthodox churches, fasting is not as vigorous as in the charismatic 
churches. Those charismatics, they are praying harder, they are fasting harder.”
This becomes immediately clear, the first time I visit a Sunday service in the Freedom 
Chapel. From several streets away, the bass of its sound system is audible. Once I reach 
the building, the atmosphere is palpably different from that in the Presbyterian church. 
Here, too, women dominate the scene, but the crowd is markedly younger, much less 
family-oriented. Small groups stand everywhere, people greeting their friends as they 
trickle in. Inside, many people are pacing around nervously, or sitting in the pews, eyes 
closed, rocking from side to side and praying fervently. The energy level is high, even 
feverish: fast-paced electronic music booms through the hall, big LCD-screens flash 
with animations of Jesus and scripture quotations written in neon, and colourful lights 
flash on and off. 
During the walk-in period, we are first warmed up by a junior preacher. Dressed 
in a fluorescent yellow suit, he jumps up and down in the pulpit, driving home his 
devotion to Jesus with pumping fists, his voice rising to a highly pitched crescendo 
as he intones the name of the Saviour, again and again and again. Often, the same 
sentence is repeated 3-5 times, with voices from the public chiming in louder every 
time. “Jesus will protect me, Jesus shall help me prosper, Jesus will strike down my 
enemies, Jesus I invoke you, in your name Jesus!” As he is gathering steam, tremors 
spread throughout the audience. We start to move with him, in little movements at 
first, the right hand raised in devotion, to dispel any unwanted spirits and strengthen 
those that would support us. 
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Finally, after many such groundswells, the wall of sound seems to die down for a 
moment. The audience grows quiet and expectantly tense. The previous preacher 
comes onto the stage one more time, whips the audience into a frenzy using slogans, 
asks us: “Do you want to hear him?” “Yes!” “Will you hear him?” “Yes!” “Finally, are you 
ready?” “Yes!!”  And at last, he makes his appearance. The man we’ve all been waiting 
for, Apostle Francis. His name is written everywhere in the church. His picture, larger-
than-life, is on the touring busses which brought in so many worshippers, and on 
banners hanging to either side of the stage, which bear his slogan: “I am a Fountain of 
Blessings”. In a neon-pink three piece glitter suit, microphone in hand, he bounds onto 
the stage with large steps. A superstar. People come from everywhere, traveling hours 
every Sunday to see him. The audience goes wild, and his first few sentences drown in 
thunderous applause and shouting. 
These services have an almighty power, as anyone who has attended one will attest. 
This power is realised not so much in stories, but in images and above all, in sound 
(Sackey, 1996). As one aspiring preacher put it this way (Interview Mawuna, 2014): 
“If you are called to preach, nobody can stop you, because it is the Word 
of God that you speak. It is not your own choice, you have to acknowledge 
that Higher Power. So yes, people are building soundproofed churches 
now. But inside, the sound still has to be loud. Here, sound is not a 
medium to carry a message of words. Here, it is an experience!”
A liberal, materialistic doctrine
In contrast with the orthodox church services, there is little Bible reading. There is 
far less attention for interpreting the Bible, and for deducing behavioural rules from 
it (Gifford, 2004, p. 40). Some church services go completely without any reading. 
Instead, the Bible is used like a source of inspiring quotes. As one orthodox preacher 
indignantly put it: “they are playing loose and fast with theology!”. 
The material culture of these churches, too, is quite open and freestyle. Again, the 
energetic vibe that is created appears to be prioritised over strict adherence to the 
Christian roots. National flags of all countries hang from the ceiling. Video screens 
are playing psychedelic loops of colourful animations. A picture of a beautiful garden 
is used as the stage décor: the Jerusalem gardens of the Baha’í, a holistic religion 
originating in 19th century Iran. The image is completed by a couple of real palm 
trees, flanking the stage. 
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The preaching is not only less Bible-based. It is also far less focused on telling people 
how to behave. One element of this is a rejection of the morality of obedience which 
the Directors of the Danish Guinea Company so shamelessly invited the missionaries 
to spread (Gifford, 2004, p. 46). As Archbishop Duncan-Williams, perhaps Ghana’s 
most influential charismatic preacher, put it: “The orthodox churches (…) preach a 
doctrine which says in essence – poverty promotes humility. But you all know this is 
not true. The missionaries erred tragically, by not teaching the Africans God’s Word 
and laws regarding sowing and reaping.” (ibid)
The relaxed material culture goes along with a loosening of the strict dress codes 
and the conservative European idea of family composition and gender relations. 
Where orthodox churches have a fairly strict adherence to long dresses and suits, 
and Pentecostal churches mostly add African touches to these but otherwise keep 
the pattern intact, the Charismatic church audience looks subtly different. Like in the 
orthodox churches, colourful dresses and suits dominate, but there is a larger variety of 
dress styles here. Some dress up even more, look ready for a Hollywood catwalk, a gala 
or a millionaire’s cocktail party. Others, including some of the church workers, dress 
down, wearing jeans and a T-shirt. There is more visible skin, cleavage, even some 
backless dresses. In the preaching, too, there is less emphasis on ‘wholesome dress’ 
and ‘decency’, and more free discussion of sensitive topics such as specific bedroom 
activities and (short-/long-term) sexual relations. In informal conversations, Freedom 
Chapel members appreciatively described the style of their church as “less tight”, “more 
relaxed”, “less strict and boxing-me-in” and simply “more free”.
As mr. Seth, an elder of the local Methodist church, explains: 
“When you watch the people on Sunday morning, you can see which 
church they went, just by the way they’ve dressed. The orthodox 
churches for instance, they expect the women to be decently dressed. 
So under normal circumstances, to wear above the knee is not well done. 
However, when the charismatic churches came, they didn’t care. And 
honestly, it’s also one of the reasons why you have the youth pulling to 
those ones. Because there you have the freedom to wear anything. You 
see them dressing like African-Americans. Even to the way they speak, 
including the reverend ministers. Because many of them stayed there 
and studied there. And when they came, many of them were funded 
from there. So they are drawing to that side. 
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These churches are not about telling people how to live. Instead, they offer guidance and 
seemingly practical help, now. This help is mainly of two kinds: spiritual, and material. 
In spiritual terms, the charismatics largely leave out heaven and hell, punishment or 
reward in the afterlife. Instead, they focus on the current world. That does not lead, as 
might be expected, to simple materialism; this world is seen as highly spiritual. Indeed, 
the charismatic church movement has allowed the resurfacing of many elements of the 
spiritual world as it had been conceptualised by the pre-Christian spiritual traditions 
in Ghana. Main among these: a dualistic worldview of good and evil, various forms of 
witchcraft, and omnipresent spirits, not in the next world but in this one (D. J. Smith, 
2001). This is expressed in slogans like “No attack can harm me”, “No evil spirit will 
strike me”, “No blocking will affect me” and “I have a very Big God, he is always on my 
Side”. In this world, the Holy Spirit is the most powerful spiritual entity of all. As Mr 
Seth, who has regularly visited a number of different churches in the past years in his 
duties as an inter-church liaison, explains:
“The other thing too is that the Orthodox churches weren’t interested in 
the working of the Holy Spirit. But then these other people came, and they 
were propounding the work of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit can do this, 
can do that, you see? And we are all coming from a very superstitious 
background. We say in Accra that there is a witch in every house. And all 
our problems are caused by the witches. So if you come to tell me that 
you can exorcise the witches in my house, then naturally I’ll follow you. 
So when they came to reveal the Holy Spirit and its powers, we started 
following them.”
In material terms, the charismatic churches exploit the mental insecurity originating 
in the economic inequality of the newly growing urban world in which their audience 
finds itself. Cities like Accra contain the full spectrum of economic possibilities: from 
shining SUVs and air-conditioned malls with expensive fashion accessories, to twenty 
people living packed inside a single shack, paying by the week, and large numbers 
of homeless and destitute migrants. Since Ghana’s economy is highly skewed, rapidly 
changing and highly intransparent, most of this material wealth seems to fall, more or 
less randomly distributed, out of thin air. This situation creates in many (new) urbanites 
both a sense of (relative) deprivation and a sense of hope, the idea that untold material 
riches are within reach. Thus, it is understandable that many Ghanaians appear to 
be looking for the magic switch. Many of the charismatic churches pander to this 
sentiment in a highly effective manner.
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As Mrs Quarpong, a secondary school teacher in Sebrepor, explained the powerful 
draw of the charismatic churches: 
“Why do people flock to these charismatic churches in such numbers? 
Well, I can say that poverty is a main reason. Because you see, the 
charismatics, they appear to be doing much. Now, if you listen to the 
radio, what they will tell you is almost always what the Holy Spirit can 
do for you to get work and prosper. So if the Holy Spirit can do all this, 
why shouldn’t I go there and try it? So that is where the problem is. In the 
orthodox churches, they would aim you at heaven. In the charismatics, 
they are aiming at here. And I am here, and I am not going to heaven. I am 
suffering here, and someone is offering me a relief. The heaven, I don’t 
know whether it’s there. But once I’m gone, I’m gone.”
The charismatic churches promise economic prosperity and material support. In fact, 
their ‘healing’ activities have a quite broad material range. As Sackey (2001) explains: 
“…healing, in African terms generally, is a blanket term that denotes 
a change or improvement in a person’s former situation in life, be it 
health, economic, political or social wellbeing through the intervention 
of religion. For example a cure from a headache, infertility, making 
profits in commercial activities, defeating an opponent in any event 
such as litigation, winning political elections, passing an examination 
or improving human relationships are described as healing. These 
ailments/misfortune are believed to have spiritual causality and hence 
need spiritual treatment but traditional Christianity does not support the 
spiritual causal theory of illness and misfortune.”
Finally, the charismatic churches have a far more individualistic outlook on life. 
Where the rise of the Pentecostal movement supplied newly wealthy urbanites with 
a theological justification to cut their ties with needy relatives back in the village, the 
charismatic movement focuses almost completely on the individual level (Engelke, 
2004; Meyer, 1998). All its slogans are in the singular, “I am a Product of the Covenant, 
I am Smelling Success”, “My year of Double Portion” and so on. This individualism, 
though, does not translate to loneliness. It rather forms an attraction for people fleeing 
the oppressive social conservatism of the orthodox and older Pentecostal churches. 
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Summing up: as opposed to the orthodox churches, the charismatics are hardly 
preoccupied with doctrine. Nor do they put much emphasis on the traditionality of 
dress or decoration; rather, the focus is on exuberance. They invest in an overwhelming, 
emotionally thrilling experience, carefully built around a central charismatic figure, to 
reach a well-orchestrated crescendo of energy. The Bible is relegated to a very small 
supporting part. In social and behavioural terms, the charismatics have thrown off 
the shackles of the missionary morality. Theologically speaking, the spiritual world 
of heaven and hell is replaced by a dualistic, spiritual world here and now. These 
churches have a far more individualistic outlook on life than their orthodox and older 
Pentecostal counterparts. Finally, these churches promise economic deliverance, here 
and now. 
Growth and prosperity
Where the orthodox churches are quite complacent, perhaps owing to their original 
role as tamers of the population, perhaps due to their previously secure position as 
regional monopolists. This stands in stark contrast to the charismatic churches, which 
seem to be permanently geared up for the fight. From a dualist worldview they depict 
the world as a battlefield between good and evil, and act accordingly. Many of their 
slogans have an almost war-like feel to them (see figures 6.2 and 6.3 below). 
And in this war, the charismatic churches are permanently on the offensive, carrying 
out the Great Commission, that Biblical imperative to evangelise and expand. As sister 
Mary of the Living Waters church in Sebrepor explains: “Our church was founded 
based on the purpose of missions. So that means, most of our programs for the 
year are geared towards evangelising.” This drive for expansion is a constant among 
charismatics, all of whom have grown up in a Ghana of intense religious voluntarism 
and the accompanying competition for worshippers. In interview after interview, 
the church leaders or their junior pastors worked to impress upon me how fast their 
congregation was growing, and described in detail the vast network of churches they 
were aiming to create. Many of these church founders pose on their Facebook profile 
pictures at building sites, showing how fast their church is expanding. 
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Figure 6.2: Advertisements for the events of the charismatic churches frequently involve 
language derived from the vocabulary of armed conflict, such as “invasion”, “strategic 
ambushment” or “Operation Kill your enemies”.
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Clearly, the competition is stiff. As one pastor explains: 
“There are some one-man churches which are quite big. But you see, 
and you know, they are big, because of the one man. And the one man is 
connected to the Holy Spirit and can do wonders. Those wonders he can 
do is what attracts people. So if his powers seem to be less, his church 
may collapse. But there are always others. In fact, people move from 
one to the other. So it depends on what you can do at a particular time. 
You don’t have to die, you can just be less inspiring, and they will start 
leaving you.”
As described at the beginning of this chapter, to grow in this fiercely competitive 
environment, the churches advertise relentlessly. Driving and walking around Accra, it 
is striking to see that the most-advertised product is not fashion, cars or personal care 
products, but church services. The biggest churches are able to afford giant billboards, 
towering over the roundabouts, or touring cars with the face of their charismatic 
founder covering the side. But smaller churches as just as active, (illegally) pasting 
posters for their events on any flat surface where they will not be immediately removed. 
Bumper stickers are everywhere. Many preachers act as human advertisements, 
standing on busy crossings with a megaphone and a Bible, or even riding along on the 
long-distance minibus lines to preach there, inviting the passengers to their service the 
following weekend. 
Figure 6.3: Advertisement for the church events often show the religious leaders like rock stars, 
such as this billboard for the “Supernatural Empowerment Summit”.
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These marketing campaigns are by no means limited to the roads; they use all kinds 
of modern technology (Meyer, 2011). As the junior pastor of Living Waters explains: 
“Now when you turn on your TV set, all you will see is churches 
ministering on every station. As of now, we cannot stay behind in this. 
We as a church have a slot on the Focus FM radio station where we 
share the word. That program is called “Living bread”. Also we organise 
crusades [open-air festivals], church outreaches and also door to door 
sessions. With the advent of younger pastors in the congregation, we 
have been able to also use social media in the propagation of the gospel. 
Finally, we have provided Wi-Fi hotspots in our church and as such we 
attract lots of the youth who not only come here on Sundays but on 
weekdays also, this brings them closer to us.”
Those who cannot afford to use radio and TV find other creative methods to spread 
the gospel. The Living Waters Chapel has created two innovative programs. To attract 
the poor, they do Tea Evangelism, serving tea and bread to the people in their area, 
while preaching.38 They found it harder to get their message out to the wealthier parts 
of society. As Kwesi Gyampong, the head of the church’s Prayer Warriors, put it: “those 
people are always driving, and its quiet difficult to stop someone in other to preach to 
the person”. So, they created the Car Wash Evangelism Program. The church website 
describes it as follows:
“The church is always looking for exciting ways of reaching out to the 
lost souls. Car Wash Evangelism is organised twice a year. The aim is 
to share Jesus with the Community. During Car Wash Evangelism, the 
entire congregation go for an outreach in a different form. We set up 
temporal washing bays and wash people’s cars for free. While the cars 
are being washed, a team will seise the opportunity to share the gospel 
of Jesus Christ with the Drivers. Their contacts are taken for follow-
ups. Another team also stand by the road side holding placards with 
scriptural inscriptions on them, still sharing the gospel of Jesus.”
The above quote reads like a page out of a modern sales manager’s manual. Indeed, 
38 This raises an important point, although it is not directly related to the thesis set out in this chapter: the 
charismatic churches may be very focused on money, but that does not mean they only cater to the 
wealthy. The Great Commission appears to be quite acutely felt by most charismatic church leaders, as 
applying to all souls, not just wealthy ones.
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the charismatic churches appear to see themselves as market actors. This represents a 
fundamental shift in the nature of the religious landscape. Only one century before, 
orthodox mission churches had held regional monopolies on religious organisation. 
Now, orthodox, Pentecostal and charismatic churches had all become equal, in the 
eyes of a new, powerful, ‘consumer’. 
A religious landscape organised as a marketplace has advantages for the ‘consumers’. 
It liberates people from potential tyranny, it liberates them from a fixed, often petty 
morality. It forces church leaders to listen more actively, and adapt to the needs of their 
congregation. But a market where switching ‘product’ (church) is easy also means that 
the focus of ‘suppliers’ (church leaders) shifts to the short term. It makes churches 
spend much more time on marketing, and less time on building long-term institutions 
and civil society. This appears to be what happens in Ghana. Additionally, many 
respondents complained to me, this environment can also drive the church leaders 
to manipulate their congregation into psychological dependency relations, in order 
to make them stay in the church, and spending on donations as quickly as possible, 
because they might be gone soon.
It also narrows the focus of church leaders to the immediate needs of their congregation, 
rather than the development of the broader community around it. “…in the end, the 
church is for society”, as Reverend Akey put it, is not something a charismatic church 
leader is likely to say. These churches are simply much less involved in the world 
around them. Generally, the orthodox churches imagine themselves as quasi-statal 
institutions, providing collective amenities such as schools and medical services, as 
well as creating a social level between state and individual. 
The self-image of most charismatic churches is quite different. Having emerged in a 
time when the religious field was already marked by a high degree of competition, 
they see themselves as market players competing for a share of the audience, not as 
builders of collective goods. What is more, the strategies for institutional continuity 
have shifted. As competition in the religious field became more fierce and turnover 
rates faster, churches no longer had sufficient time to establish schools and wait for 
the children to grow up in order to ensure a continuous following. No new church 
adopting this tactic would survive long enough to reap the fruits of their investment. 
This means the state-church connection unravels over time. 
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Worldwide, these churches are united by what is called the prosperity gospel (see 
Bowler, 2013). Related to the broader dictum “give, and ye shall receive”, the prosperity 
gospel is somewhat more specific: the giving must be to the church, personified in the 
charismatic head pastor. 
This giving, too, takes a very different form from donating in the orthodox churches. 
These mostly have a single moment in their service to donate, when the congregation 
forms a long line to move, singing and dancing, past a simple jar placed in front of the 
pulpit. Welfare happens through fixed donations of 5 or 10 cedi per person per week, 
and is distributed according to a fixed set of rules. 
The charismatic churches take a different approach; they make donating flexible and 
urgent, exciting, visible and competitive. 
They make it flexible and urgent, rather than asking for fixed contributions to welfare 
every week. Instead, as one worshiper of the Heavenly Gate charismatic church in 
Sebrepor put it: “Those people, if something happens, they put the bowl down. They 
tell you, this man, he has such and such problem, so let’s help him! And to be honest, 
that way of collection is much more suitable to the way people want to be giving.” They 
make it exciting. At several points in the service, everyone is asked to rush forward, 
dropping to their knees at the stage, leaving it covered in crumpled bank notes upon 
returning to their seats. They make it visible. Donation envelopes for special fasting 
services are auctioned off publicly, with the highest bidders eminently visible to the 
rest of the congregation. During music performances, it is completely normal to just 
walk up to the stage, alone, and stuff a 50 cedi note in the singer’s hand. Finally, they 
make it competitive. To encourage more donations, churches also create makeshift 
competitions, between, let’s say, the left side and the right side of the church, or the 
green donation jar and the red donation jar – anything to make the process more 
exciting and encourage giving. 
Not only the contributions are organised in a far more flexible manner; the payouts 
are too. They are generally determined at the discretion of the church leadership, and 
visibility is an important factor in their decisions. That is, the importance of being seen 
as giving generously often detracts from the purpose of providing an effective safety 
net. This may seem counter-intuitive; wouldn’t a reputation of generosity require 
supporting all those in need? The problem is, especially in larger churches, there are 
always several people who have an urgent financial need. And the most visible action 
is to give a larger sum to one person, and make this a public event. That means the 
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others, whose need was perceived as less urgent, or whose case was not as fit for the 
limelight, remain in the cold. This practice does, however, enable a vigorous drive for 
donations, for the one selected ‘urgent case of the week’. 
This urgency is transferred to other aspects of church life as well. The daughter of a 
Pentecostal church elder, Adjoa has switched to the charismatic Freedom Chapel to 
escape the social conservatism of her father’s Pentecostal church. But after some time, 
she left the Freedom Chapel as well, because as she explained she prefers a more laid-
back churchgoing. “I try to be invisible in church, but the charismatic churches make 
that impossible. Yes they are more liberal in many ways, and I like that. But they are 
always pressuring me to join groups and activities, and to conform to their doctrine of 
giving, giving, giving.”
The prosperity gospel is an extraordinarily positive gospel, with little patience for 
the economic constraints of daily life. Of course, the outcomes of this approach with 
respect to one’s personal finances inevitably vary. But the PR problems this might 
result in have been solved by making testimony a fixed part of the Sunday services 
of most charismatic churches. In this time slot, those church members who have 
indeed recently come into material wealth get to share their story of blessings with the 
congregation. Some churches go very far in this regard; Winners Chapel, a charismatic 
church with Nigerian roots, reserves about a quarter of its entire Sunday service for a 
series of ‘Testimony and Miracles’. This unrelenting positivity has also led to the strange 
result that death is hardly talked about in many of these churches. This is a strange 
aberration in Ghana, where most people spend their Saturdays at lavish funerals, the 
main type of social event apart from church services (Gifford, 2004, p. 52). 
Internal organisation
The institutional form of the charismatic churches, too, is somewhat different from 
the orthodox or older Pentecostal churches. They are less quasi-statal institutions, and 
more private enterprises. This is enabled by the prosperity gospel, and has created an 
unusually enterprising religious sector. The main institutional differences between the 
charismatic churches and the orthodox churches are best summarised in two labels 
frequently applied to the charismatic churches: ‘business churches’ and ‘one-man 
churches’. Both of these are pejorative terms, applied to the churches by non-members. 
As for the invective ‘business churches’, the prosperity gospel is a theology of personal 
gain. Through voluntary gifts, but still, personal gain. This not only makes it possible 
for preachers to gather and flaunt large amounts of personal wealth, it all but forces 
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them to. In the logic of the prosperity gospel: ‘follow my lead, and you shall be rich 
like me.’ The pastors and their followers, then, subscribe to the notion that the spiritual 
power of a preacher is reflected in his earthly wealth, and will in turn benefit his 
followers. Thus, they see little wrong with such self-enrichment by church leaders, 
as they expect the wealth to naturally spread. As Agata Mresi of the Beautiful Gate 
charismatic church put it: “It means that he [our pastor] is favored, and if you follow 
someone who is blessed with power like that, their favor will be your favor.”
But this view is rejected by many Ghanaians who do not believe in the prosperity 
gospel. As one bitter Sebrepor resident, whose wife had recently started going to a 
charismatic church, told me: “You know that in Ghana, the church has become a 
business? Pastors are always enriching themselves. Their shoes can cost more than 
your entire outfit. And the rest of their clothing is also very expensive!” A frequently 
heard complaint is also that this gospel is making the youth lazy. As one local politician 
put it, who had been on the path to becoming a charismatic preacher himself: “These 
days, the boys, you can’t get them to contribute to communal labour. You can’t get 
them to do any serious work. You can’t! All they want is to get rich quick. So they all 
try to become preachers. Yes. Yes, that is what I see happening. It’s bad!”
The prosperity gospel and the associated ‘giving’ drives are the main way these 
churches gather money. But they use other techniques, too. In a technique known 
as akwanchele, meaning ‘direction’, the dualist spiritual worldview is exploited by 
preachers for material gain. As Assemblyman Dubin explains:
“They will first frighten you. Your mother, your father, they are witch, 
they are wizard. Then, they will direct you. These preachers, because 
they need cash, they will tell you, “use this anointing oil, use this candle, 
use that thing”. They are selling those things. “Then,” they will tell you, 
“go and do A, B, C, D, travel to your hometown, and nobody can touch 
you. If you do ABCD, you will be protected.” Some of these people, they 
have a mouth, they can tálk, to convince you. Is it not a trade? Yes! They 
are traders. And getting a lot of money for it. But this is the problem, it 
is growing. 
So when they convince you, definitely, you can even go and bring your 
money, and give it to him. Because he has spoken about exactly that, 
which you were thinking about.”
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As for the pejorative label ‘one-man churches’, this is based on the fact that these 
churches generally center around a single charismatic leader. The church sometimes 
even carries his name, but more often, they are personal brands in the sense that he 
is the face of the church, and his trademark style of preaching, as well as his personal 
reputation for performing miracles, are what attracts people to the church. 
Sometimes, this notion of personal ownership of the church turns into a family affair. 
Churches often pass from parents to children, as personal property which can be 
inherited. This creates situations of conflict and instability, as the community aspect of 
the church is often subverted to the financial and status interests of the ‘inheritors’. In 
a way, these pastors are the quintessential new ‘big men’ (Sahlins, 1963). They are both 
spiritual and worldly leaders, highly respected and untouchable in their own domain. 
They hold together a larger social group around their person. They build religious 
social networks in which they concentrate and subsequently distribute wealth, in a 
highly public fashion. Finally, their movements create patronage-like payoff structures, 
which replicate the exchange of resources for loyalty central to big man rule (McCauley, 
2013). They train junior pastors, in whom they try to instill a fierce loyalty, to speak in 
their church, to attract new members, and to share in the rewards. 
In terms of institutional structure, these new churches create their internal 
organisation by picking and choosing from existing templates. Many of them do so 
quite consciously. One charismatic pastor I interviewed had created four “levels of 
maturity” in his church, from newcomer to church elder. Those on the higher levels 
were required to coach and teach the newer members. As he explained: “In churches 
where this structure is not present, the management of the flock is too much work for 
the preacher. This way, it frees my time to concentrate on more important affairs, like 
growing the church.”
Being centered around a single preacher does not prevent the churches from 
expanding. Successful charismatics generally use a franchise model, a somewhat more 
loose organisational model than the orthodox churches. As Junior Pastor Kwame 
Johnson explains: 
“If I belong to the Christian Action Faith Ministries [a charismatic church], 
and I’m in this area, I’ve been ordained a pastor, then it is up to me to build 
a church here. So I will go out in this area, find a place which is suitable 
for a church. Then I tell my bosses there, they come and inspect, yes, it’s 
okay, build your church. So when the church is established, they will only 
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be interested in 10-20% of the collection I get. The rest is for me. So the 
harder I work, the more money I get.” 
Production of collective amenities
These churches are innovative and grow quickly, they produce a serious turnover, their 
services create large and concentrated amounts of energy and often euphoria in the 
congregation. But the material results they produce for their flock are generally less 
impressive. Partly, this is because they focus on other things, like creating a spectacular 
Sunday service, and keeping energy high throughout the week with additional nightly 
and even all-night services (which congregants are often pressured to attend). Another 
part is because the internal structures of such churches often is not very developed and 
quite fickle, dependent as they are on the whims of the lead pastor. There is very little 
systematic effort at building up social services, in the way that almost all orthodox 
churches do. 
It is important to note here that, like all other churches in Ghana, the charismatics 
have a wide variety of active internal social groups. There are choirs, music bands, 
Prayer Warriors, Bible study groups, various ethnically based groups, sports groups, 
and specific groups for every age group: the Children’s Movement, the Young People’s 
Guild, the Men’s Fellowship, which is always much smaller and less active than 
the Women’s Fellowship. I have not put much emphasis on these, as they occur in 
both charismatic and orthodox churches with comparable frequency. In terms of 
neighbourhood build-up, these groups create a large amount of social ties, enabling 
self-organisation among the members. There are also welfare groups, organised by the 
church members, and there are sporadic, highly visible donations made by the church 
leadership to particularly needy church members. 
With respect to welfare, it is also important to make a distinction within the charismatic 
movement: between the single one-man churches and those who have built up a larger 
network, around preachers like Reverend Steve Mensah, Bishop Dag Heward-Mills 
and Archbishop Nicholas Duncan-Williams. As Mr Frempong, a Sebrepor resident 
who has repeatedly switched churches, explains:
“Well, here, if you think of the one-man churches, then you can say 
the welfare is rather for the one man himself. They are extracting the 
wealth, and then that’s it. But if you look at the bigger ones, the orthodox, 
charismatic and Pentecostals, then they are looking at the welfare, yes, 
primarily of the founder, but they also look at the entire congregation at 
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the same time. Still, maybe they extract more than they should. Some 
of these founders are incredibly rich. And they are proud about it. They 
feel very proud. So they make you look stupid. But they also have a 
welfare system, which to some extent encompasses the congregation. 
So at least, they are better than the one-man churches.”
They do have welfare. It is the systematic part which is lacking. If we look at the churches 
whose heads were the chairmen of Ghana’s National Association of Charismatic and 
Christian Churches (NACCC), the council of which most charismatic churches are 
members, a clear pattern emerges. Steve Mensah’s Charismatic Evangelistic Ministry, 
despite having reached a size of 15+ churches in Ghana and establishments in five 
other countries, has constructed no collective amenities besides its own church 
structures and a limited amount of schooling for its own junior pastors (Charismatic 
Evangelistic Ministry, 2018). Dag Heward Mills, who boasts having built over 
400 churches of his Lighthouse Chapel group (now split up in a variety of brands) 
worldwide, makes several contributions: an orphanage for 23 children, several well-
publicised operations for blind children, support for some homeless, and a fertility 
clinic (Heward-Mills).39 Nicholas Duncan-Williams, one of the wealthiest citizens 
of Ghana, whose Action Chapel International currently has some , has some more 
substantive collective amenities: an orphanage housing some 220 children, a detox 
clinic serving with space for some 45 patients, and several borehole projects (Action 
Chapel International, 2018). 
Although laudable accomplishments, work of this scale is not comparable to the 
sustained and systematic building work the orthodox churches engage in. In general, 
the tendency for charismatic churches appears to be to focus on mediagenic projects 
like one-off donations and child-related projects. A project description from the 
Action Chapel International website is typical in this regard: 
“We also take on special projects that are much needed in our community. 
One of our special projects was to help a little girl receive critical heart 
surgery by fund-raising. To date she has recovered from heart surgery 
and is happy, and healthy.” 
These churches do not have a doctrine of having a social mission to create collective 
amenities, as they came of age in a time when the state was actively engaged in such 
39 It is called a Hospital, but has almost no online presence, with the only few references being made to 
the fertility clinic, so this seemed a more fitting term.
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work, and when churches were competing fiercely for a slice of the ‘market’, which left 
no time for sustained nation-building initiatives. 
This doctrine shines through in other matters as well, such as the way the welfare 
fund is managed. In orthodox churches, this is generally treated as a form of social 
insurance, managed through the church. But in charismatic churches, it is treated and 
described as a business just like any other. As Kwame Johnson (of the charismatic 
Freedom Chapel) explains: “There is no constitution specifying who qualifies for 
welfare. Other churches have constitutions for that but we do not. We are a church 
and not an investment firm.” This lack of support from the church, however, does 
not mean that charismatic church members have no welfare. Many church-goers do 
organise their own welfare circles, so that even in charismatic churches, most people 
are members of one or more welfare circles. When we did a series of 50 resident 
interviews in the Sebrepor neighbourhood, 92% of the respondents indicated that 
they were members of a church welfare group, many of which were compulsory for all 
church members. 12% of the respondents indicated that they were (also) members of 
a secular welfare group. 
However, in the charismatic churches, these circles have to manage by peer pressure 
only, without the stable administrative backing of the church leadership. This means 
that payouts are more based on personal affinity, which means less popular members 
cannot count on the system very much. Such welfare systems do help, but they do not 
form as stable a financial safety net as the orthodox church welfare systems, which are 
generally based on fixed contributions, a constitution and fixed pay-outs in the case of 
life events or emergencies. 
Where the Presbyterian church has a Department of Social Services working to create 
jobs for the youth and a Department of Health Services keeping up an informal clinic 
for members, I have found very few charismatic churches that even attempted to work 
on such projects. They do proclaim that they are working on health care, but this is 
generally in terms of a one-off donation to an existing hospital. Even more unthinkable, 
in these feverishly spiritual churches, would be a Department of Secular Education, 
patiently gathering resources to construct a school, which would be run ecumenically, 
in close cooperation with the municipality. 
Some of the larger charismatic churches do have a small school, although this is mostly 
an internal training ground for new junior pastors. Some authors contend that this is 
a contributing factor to the rapid expansion of the charismatic movement (Sackey, 
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2001). Many charismatic church leaders are very much focused on expanding their 
church. To this end they train a large number of potential successors. But since the 
expansion of their church does not go as fast as hoped for, those junior pastors find 
themselves without work, and start their own church instead. At any rate, it should be 
clear that most of the schools run by charismatic churches are not secular schools, but 
training facilities for junior pastors. 
Overview
All in all, these charismatic churches are far more growth-driven, fluid, agile and 
individualistic than their orthodox counterparts, with an emphasis on energy rather 
than diligence, a focus on spectacle rather than substance, and a reliance on miracles 
rather than on organisation. Other authors have argued that their worldview generally 
does not attribute worldly accomplishments or (mis)fortune to hard work, as much 
as to spiritual factors (cf Marshall, 1991). As Hunt (2000) puts it, in many charismatic 
churches, “health and wealth can be demanded and enjoyed immediately through the 
‘currency’ of faith”. But as I have shown in this chapter, these organisations also lack 
the capacity for collective action towards local development, which is generated so 
effectively in the mission churches. In their worldview, community service has been 
replaced by a business outlook, an unquenchable thirst for growth, and the prosperity 
gospel.
6.6 Transition from orthodox to charismatic in the suburbs
The introduction to this chapter has shown at the macro-level that the market share of 
charismatic churches is steadily increasing, to the detriment of orthodox churches. The 
previous two sections provided a detailed description of the two types of churches, and 
analysed what such a shift means for the production of collective amenities by churches. 
Building on the church profiles set out in the two case studies, this section further 
describes the dynamics of the shift from orthodox to charismatic. Subsequently, it goes 
specifically into the dynamics of this shift in newly developing neighbourhoods. In 
those areas, the shift is stronger than average and the consequences for the production 
of collective amenities are therefore more dire than in Ghana on average, because in 
the newly developing areas the orthodox churches are not entrenched in physical 
buildings and social networks. Finally, it describes a third, more subtle aspect of the 
transition: the internal culture of the orthodox churches is pressed to adapt, and is now 
incorporating charismatic practices.
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Charismatics capture the population growth
A major driving force in the shift from orthodox to charismatic churches is the 
prosperity gospel. This particularly draws in younger generations. As Mr Quarshie, a 
member of the local Baptist Living Grace church, explains: 
“When you come to my church, the members are more...elderly. You 
know, 50 years and above. If you go to a Charismatic church, the 
congregation is younger. Twenty-something, thirty-something. People 
around 50-60, you find one or two. But the point is, the younger ones 
have just started life. They want everything in life. They want success, 
they want promotion, they want big, big cars, houses, they want these 
things. So if you are preaching prosperity to him, it makes sense. Because 
that’s what he wants! So the Charismatics, they are growing, they are 
exploding! But if you come to tell me this prosperity nonsense, when my 
life is already over, what am I going to do with that?”
Apart from the arguments presented above, one possible additional factor driving this 
shift may be the fact that church congregations consist overwhelmingly of women 
today. In colonial times this appears to have been exactly the reverse (Meyer, 1999, 
p. 13). It is hard to precisely pinpoint the transition. But it certainly did happen. It 
was surprisingly hard to find good reasons for this, and I have found no literature 
on the phenomenon. Many of my respondents came no further than explaining that 
Ghana’s population, in fact, consists mainly of women, which they really seemed to 
believe. Some put it down to women being more emotional and more susceptible to 
superstition. 
Another reason might be that church membership no longer confers the same institutional 
advantages as it did in colonial times, which has driven out the often more career-focused 
men (Meyer, 1999, p. 11). The charismatic churches generally have a culture emphasising 
personal independence and either preach gender equality or completely leave the topic 
open, whereas many of the orthodox churches continue to reproduce the highly unequal 
gender roles that were common in 19th century Europe. One other possibility is that the 
culture of near-worship for the big men leading these churches may be off-putting for 
men, who might perceive themselves as being emasculated in such a spectacle. The final, 
and most convincing reason I have heard is that women simply run the organisations of 
this country, just as they run the families, and the church is still one of the best avenues 
to provide the social relations relevant to the well-being of a family. As one pastor put 
it: “Every sector, every organisation, every society, everywhere women are more. In my 
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church, there are about 3 times more female members than men. If you go to Pentecost, 
the same. If you go to Presbyterian, the same.” 
But whatever its cause, this dominance of women may well be a factor driving the 
shift from conservative (orthodox) to open and liberal (charismatic), because in the 
orthodox churches, women are quite repressed.40 They generally cannot serve as pastors, 
they have to wear long skirts and are quickly censured for ‘dressing inappropriately’, 
they are told that they are naturally subservient to men in the marriage and they should 
keep to their position in society. In most of the orthodox churches, women are very 
much the second sex (De Beauvoir, 1949). In many charismatic churches, on the other 
hand, traditional gender roles are routinely attacked. During a service we attended 
in the charismatic Royal House Church, the preacher encouraged his audience to 
resist the image of women as “baby machines” and to cut their ties with the village, 
renouncing family obligations. 
Charismatics benefit from move to the suburbs
In newly growing urban areas like Sebrepor, the first thing settlers will build, after 
their own houses, is often a church. Mrs. Ayele, the mother of one of the first families 
that settled in the area, tells how it all started in Sebrepor. Now at the respectable age 
of 74 and nearly blind, she spends her days sitting with the TV, in the family house. 
This stands in the center of a messy plot without a compound wall, surrounded by 
small shacks, long-time sub-renters who have built their own structures. The house is 
a remnant of the chaotic settling process of the area, and feels old - 40 years is a long 
time in neighbourhoods like this, and the walls show their age. 
Mrs. Ayele’s story provides a glimpse into what the settler life must have been like. It 
started, she tells, with a Pentecost elder gathering some people. At first it was really 
only seven or eight settlers, who simply started praying on a field somewhere, to mark 
the Sundays and to bring a first glimpse of community to the new, unsettled land. 
As more people joined them, collections were started, and the funds were used to 
build a small wooden structure. This became the first church of Sebrepor. Later, there 
were enough people to form separate congregations, and as people got their ‘original’ 
churches built up in the new land, they left the Pentecostal for those. But the first one 
was a cooperative effort – no town without a church.
40 It should be noted that this difference in terms of gender roles between orthodox and charismatic 
churches is not universal either. In the methodist church of Accra New Town, the head pastor was a 
woman. I have not found the same situation in any other orthodox church, but it does indicate that none 
of the ideal-type differences described in this paper should be interpreted as absolute differences.
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In such suburbs, the charismatic movement is gaining ground even more quickly 
than in other areas. The orthodox churches do also appear here, as described above, 
but their congregation consists mostly of people who were already in that church 
and simply decided to build or join it again when they moved to the new suburb. In 
fact, the growth of the charismatic movement is even stronger in these new suburbs 
than among the population in general. In these previously empty areas, the orthodox 
churches do not have the advantage of being pre-established, having buildings and 
social networks in place already, as they do in the older parts of the city.
In addition, the charismatic churches have a different expansion model. One 
enterprising person is enough to start a new church. This person needs to be affiliated 
with the mother church, but this does not necessarily require an in-house training of 
years, like in the orthodox churches. In fact, many charismatic churches are started 
from scratch, not as offshoots from existing churches. In such cases, the ‘entry costs’ are 
really limited to almost nothing, as preachers can start under a tree somewhere, or rent 
a building by the week. For instance, in the heart of the Sebrepor neighbourhood stands 
a long, whitewashed wooden building, which once housed the first (Presbyterian) 
church in the neighbourhood. Since that church moved out to a more permanent 
location, the building has become somewhat of a religious incubator. New religious 
entrepreneurs come in every year, with some keeping their lease for no more than 
two weeks. At most times, several starting preachers use the building in parallel, each 
preaching in different time slots alongside each other throughout the week. Orthodox 
churches have a much more centralised expansion model, and there are no grass 
orthodox churches springing up out of nowhere in these new neighbourhoods. 
In Sebrepor, on the three kilometre long thoroughfare road from Michel Camp Gate 
to Barrier, there are 93 different churches. Only five of these churches were identifiable 
by name as orthodox churches. Of course, one stretch of road is quite a limited sample, 
but it does provide an indication of the degree to which the religious field of Accra’s 
suburbs is dominated by the new wave of charismatic churches. Although our data 
is really too limited to say anything definite in this regard, the same appears to go, 
to a lesser degree, for Muslims. These too appear to regularly switch to charismatic 
Christian churches, and the reverse also occurs. Though a change between Islam and 
Christianity may seem like a big step, Ghana’s ecumenical and highly tolerant religious 
landscape is not forbidding in this sense, and the theology of the charismatic churches 
is sufficiently relaxed for people with very different backgrounds to feel at home. 
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The interviews we have done with Sebrepor’s residents indicate that a large majority of 
them has changed their church at least once in their life, most of these moving from an 
orthodox church to a charismatic one. Those who have spent their entire life in a single 
church are generally orthodox believers, whilst among the charismatic churchgoers, 
there seems to be a limited degree of loyalty to any single church. But once people have 
switched from an orthodox or older Pentecostal church to a charismatic one, they 
rarely go back. 
Such switches occur most frequently at the time when people move house, making 
the suburbs even more of a religious switchboard. In many of our resident interviews, 
people indicated that at the time of their move to a new neighbourhood, they had taken 
the opportunity to try out a different church, especially when their previous church did 
not have a franchise in Sebrepor. That means that here in the newly growing suburbs, 
the orthodox churches are even more effectively out-competed by the charismatics, 
whose culture, theology and promises seem to resonate so much more with most of 
Ghana’s population. 
Orthodox churches adopt charismatic practices
The third dimension of the shift from orthodox to charismatic churches is that orthodox 
churches are changing their ways, becoming more like the charismatics: establishing 
prayer groups and organising internal charismatic renewal in other ways (Gifford, 
2004, pp. 38-39; Meyer, 2004; Omenyo, 2005). This happens in almost every orthodox 
and AIC/older Pentecostal church (Kwabena Asamoah-Gyadu, 1997; Sackey, 1996). 
As Mr Achampong, a member of the Baptist Living Grace Church, explains:
“In fact, what worries me nowadays is that some of the orthodox 
churches are starting to copy them. Yes! We used to hold what we call 
revival crusades. In those days, when we were holding revivals, we don’t 
even advertise them. We only advertise them to our members. We are 
holding a crusade here, or there. When the Pentecostals came, and then 
the charismatics, they would advertise it, even in the radio. They would 
have billboards all over the place, and then posters of their leaders. 
Serious marketing. Now our people have started doing that too. So even 
in our own things, we are following their ways now.”
The fixed and stable welfare systems, too, are coming under pressure. In Sebrepor’s 
Methodist church, Pastor Akyele explains that they have had to change the welfare 
system. 
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“There used to be a welfare fund that people paid into. But if somebody 
contributes to a fund, usually he expects returns. And the returns are 
sometimes not very very adequate. So we changed that. So now we 
have been told that, from time to time, we should take an offering, and 
keep it. We put it all together, so that the fund can be bigger, so that 
when there is a special need, we go and meet that bill, rather than letting 
them pay small-small. As for the amount people receive in such cases, 
there used to be a constitution to determine that. But that constitution 
has been dissolved. Now the leaders of the church simply sit down and 
decide it case by case on its merits.”
Their welfare system used to be based on a constitution similar to the Presbyterian 
one, but this was leading to disappointments. These days, the collection happens 
through regular offering sessions where the contributions are not fixed. The pay-out, 
too, is now done ad hoc. If any particularly needy church members are identified, the 
Presbytery, which governs the church, will decide on a charitable donation. 
Finally, the relentless drive for growth, that fundamental tenet of a market economy, 
is also gripping the orthodox churches, as well as the accompanying tendency towards 
ballooning pay for the top brass. As Mr Quarshie, member of the local Methodist 
church in Accra New Town, complains: 
“So you see, here, I was saying that, eh, even the orthodox churches, 
the reverend ministers are not working for the pay they earn. They earn 
far more, and they are doing far less. And that is why I was telling you 
about the statistics of our church membership. If my own reverend 
minster is working hard, then the question is, why is the membership 
not growing? And then also, if you look at it carefully too, her work as 
a reverend minister, her number 1, key task, is evangelism. What does 
she do to evangelise? I don’t see it. Not much. That’s why the number is 
even going down. But every day, her salary, her allowances are going up. 
And now, if you attend a meeting, where you have reverend ministers 
attending, if you look at the cars they use, they are all driving four-wheel 
drives. They are extremely highly compensated, compared to the work 
they do. Even in the orthodox churches.”
But shifting in the direction of the charismatics does not appear to help the orthodox 
churches much to increase the size of their congregation. As the comparison between 
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the two below billboards in figure 6.4 shows, they are only doing it halfway. Where the 
Charismatic poster has the look and feel of a Hollywood poster, complete with a vision 
of a utopian city and a threatening devil in the background, a title exuding the urgency 
of impending doom or great bliss, and a picture of the head preacher with what looks 
like an aureola of holiness around his head, the Orthodox poster simply shows two 
friendly, if somewhat complacent church functionaries in their uniforms. Apparently, 
the doctrine of these churches is not easily shifted, even if their survival depends on it. 
Their identity depends on their internal culture, their discipline, their commitment to 
Scripture as it was interpreted by the missionaries. While severely irritating their older 
membership, the steps Orthodox churches take towards the Charismatic movement 
are thus only managing to slow the hemorrhage of their congregations, not to stop it.  
 
Figure 6.4: Comparison of the visual styles of charismatic and orthodox churches. On the left, 
a poster advertising a charismatic (Spiritlife Revival Ministries) church event, on the right, a 
poster advertising an orthodox (Methodist) church.
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 283
6.7 Conclusion
Ghana’s religious landscape evolved with the formation of the Ghanaian state. The 
first missionaries were invited by the colonial regime. Their function, in the colonial 
state, was to pacify, and to make the natives more obedient and more fit to work in the 
colonial project. As the state formation progressed, church membership increasingly 
became an entrance pass to the higher spectrum of positions natives could attain in 
the colonial regime. At the same time, the churches brought an ethos of community 
service and development, constructing schools, hospitals and boreholes throughout 
the country, and setting up sturdy welfare systems for their congregations.
Abram de Swaan (1988) describes the process of creating a welfare state in western 
European countries, which has some notable parallels with what happened in Ghana. 
The same churches which had sent missionaries to Ghana had, in their European 
origin regions, built up a patchwork of local collective action regimes, creating welfare 
systems and other collective amenities. In Ghana, the churches were able to impose 
their local regimes of collective action because that at the time, they possessed sufficient 
coercive powers to do so, being regional monopolist gatekeepers for the access to the 
world of colonial administrative positions.
With the general African independence movement of the early- and mid-20th century 
came a religious independence movement, the AICs, and Pentecostalism. Together 
with the increasing geographic and social mobility of Ghanaians, this opened up the 
religious field to voluntarism. From the 1980s, the religious landscape was shaken 
up by a second revolution, in the form of charismatic churches. This movement was 
distinguished by its focus on growth and expansion, its loose theological foundations, 
its individualism, its focus on material wealth, its expansionary tendency, its dualistic 
spiritual outlook and the energy of its services. Within 40 years, the charismatic 
movement has managed to become the dominant religious sector in seven out of 
Ghana’s ten regions, and it is still rapidly growing, especially in the major cities (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014).
A religious landscape organised as a marketplace has advantages for the ‘consumers’. 
It liberates people from potential tyranny, it liberates them from a fixed, often petty 
morality. It forces church leaders to listen more actively, and adapt to the needs of their 
congregation. But a market where switching ‘product’ (church) is easy also means that 
the focus of ‘suppliers’ (church leaders) shifts to the short term. It makes churches 
spend much more time on marketing, and less time on building long-term institutions 
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and civil society. This environment can also drive the church leaders to manipulate 
their congregation into psychological dependency relations, in order to make them 
stay in the church, and spending on donations as quickly as possible, because they 
might be gone soon.
It also narrows the focus of church leaders to the immediate needs of their congregation, 
rather than the development of the broader community around it. Where the orthodox 
churches have a self-image as a quasi-statal institution, providing collective amenities 
such as schools and medical services, as well as creating an effective organisational 
level between state and individual, most charismatic churches do not feel obliged to 
take on such functions. To be clear, charismatic churches may often create a strong 
local social fabric, or an intense religious experience for individuals. But they put little 
energy into creating further collective amenities, and have less potential for sustained 
collective action. In other words, for the purposes of this chapter, it does not matter 
that people spend a lot of time in churches, experiencing collective effervescence and 
creating intense bonds, if it does not cause them to create collective resources.
The orthodox churches are more like unified ideological and material bodies, which 
strengthens their potential for collective action, but at the same time makes them more 
culturally rigid and socially oppressive. The charismatic churches form far more loose 
webs of connection, and are far more agile. As institutions, religious voluntarism was 
their habitat from birth, and their leaders are sharply attuned to the desires of their 
potential flock. As these churches experiment, grow and shrink, replacing each other 
in rapid succession, an evolutionary selection process akin to institutional Darwinism 
makes sure of their fitness in the religious marketplace. 
Nonetheless, church remains, as in so many societies, a natural avenue of social 
organisation. It is one of the few places where people meet more or less regularly and 
more or less without a very clear pre-existing motive (such as work - making money, 
keeping a job), which creates a potential community setting. This allows for all kinds 
of social organisation to spring up much more easily than out of a vacuum or as a self-
sustaining activity. As one resident put it: “Churches in Ghana are basically self-help 
societies.”
But where the orthodox churches fulfiled a quasi-statal function in several ways, the 
charismatic churches are less focused on the ‘help’ part, and more on the ‘self ’. They 
are more focused on marketing and growth, spending less attention and resources on 
building schools, hospitals and other public amenities. Their internal welfare systems 
are more ad-hoc, less of a social safety net. They are more self-focused, less focused on 
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building a broader civil society and playing a role in the state and semi-state figuration. 
Finally, their individualist ideology and internal organisation is less suitable for the 
collective action required to produce public goods. These are the disadvantages of a 
free marketplace for religious institutions, as compared to the prior, semi-coercive 
situation, which allowed for trajectories akin to local state formation.
In Western Europe, the state formation process continued, and slowly the state took 
over many of the social functions of the churches. 
“By the turn of the century, only the state appeared to possess the 
administrative potential, the scope and the robustness over time to 
accomplish the task. It alone could overcome the dilemmas of voluntary 
action by its coercive powers to levy taxes and impose membership.” 
(Swaan, 1988, p. 217). 
This takeover from the churches did not happen without a struggle, as churches 
were reluctant to release their societal functions to the state. In particular, they were 
reluctant to relinquish their hold on education, seeing the mental and moral shaping of 
every next generation as the best single way to safeguard their institutional continuity. 
In Ghana, the state developed much less administrative potential, and is still leaving 
large gaps in providing collective amenities, especially in medical and educational 
terms. Nonetheless, the orthodox churches are losing their grip on the religious 
landscape. Having lost their basis of power as gatekeepers to much desired positions, 
and being overtaken by a new religious movement, more attuned to the desires of the 
Ghanaian public, their potential for collective action has begun to unravel. Slowly but 
surely, they start to become more like the charismatic churches. This shift is perhaps 
necessary for survival, but it takes them even further away from their previous position 
as quasi-statal providers of public amenities. The decline of the orthodox churches also 
means the breakdown of a system of intergenerational solidarity, which used to be 
implicit in their welfare arrangements.
Today, very few orthodox churches emerge in the newly growing suburbs of cities 
like Accra. Their established networks of schools, hospitals and other amenities will 
not disappear, especially as it still forms a conduit for substantial sums of western aid 
money. But they are no longer growing, while the population is exploding in size. The 
21st century appears to be the century of the charismatic churches, which bring people 
together in fundamentally different ways, with different moral foundations. 
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A final note. Although they do not focus it on building collective amenities at present, 
the charismatic churches do create and bundle a lot of energy. In Nigeria, some of the 
charismatic pastors leading these churches have concentrated sufficient material means 
to build entrepreneurial empires, sometimes the size of small cities (Ukah, 2016). At 
this scale, public services do seem to emerge again from the charismatic churches. It 
remains to be seen whether something similar will happen in Ghana’s cities.
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Water: 
Expansion patterns of 
connective goods
This chapter describes the interaction between grassroots and centralized organization in the development of Accra’s water pipe network. Section 7.1 provides an exposition of the theory, 
methodology and data sources. Section 7.2 sets out the historical and 
contemporary collectivisation dynamics in the network. In 7.3, we see 
how the rapid and increasingly decentralized expansion of the network 
led to shortages and breakdowns, and how the Ghana Water Company 
responds to its predicament.
Section 7.4 shows how these dynamics of rapid collectivisation 
evoke their counterpart, individualisation dynamics, by tracing 
the development of various alternative water provision industries 
that have sprung up as a response to the poor performance of the 
collective network. This provides us with a system-wide picture of the 
collectivisation and individualisation dynamics of the sector. Section 
7.5 provides a robustness and generalisation check on the entire 
analysis, by adding the electricity sector as a minor comparative case 
study. 
I conclude that there are indeed important generalisable dynamics 
across the two sectors. However, the ways these dynamics work out 
are importantly mediated by the technological circumstances in the 
respective sectors7
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7.1 Introduction
On the morning of 28 January 2018, large excavators were cutting up and leveling 
the ground at Sebrepor, a neighbourhood to the north of Ghana’s port city, Tema. The 
excavator crews were building the new railroad from Tema to Akosombo. As they 
plowed the machine through the dusty red soil, it suddenly crashed through a PVC 
water distribution pipeline, causing serious leakages. How could this have happened? 
The construction crew was hardly to blame for this. As there is no map of the water pipe 
network in this area, they had no way of knowing they would burst through pipes here. 
Nevertheless, some 7.000 people had suddenly been cut off from their water supply. There 
was a crisis to be resolved. 
Nearby residents quickly noticed the water gushing out of the building site. Strikingly, 
their first calls did not go to the Ghana Water Company (GWC) but to a fellow resident, 
Jacob Milehu (see figure 7.1). Known to all as ‘Mr Jacob’, Milehu is a local plumber who 
had founded the Sebrepor Water Committee some 40 years ago, extending the first water 
pipeline to the area as it was being settled by farmers and retired soldiers. From there, he 
had gone on to build the water network for three adjacent neighbourhoods, with only the 
help of neighbours and the local chief. Rushed to the railroad construction site, he quickly 
closed a number of valves at crucial nodes throughout the neighbourhood, taking care to 
close only the ones that were vital to stop the water spillage and leaving as many valves as 
possible open. After all, the residents in Sebrepor already complained plenty about their 
water flow being inconsistent. When finally the team from the Ghana Water Company 
also arrived on the scene, they asked Mr Jacob to stay on and help them in planning the 
repairs of the network. In fact, it would have been nearly impossible to do this without 
him. As he explained to us: “The network in this entire area, we never mapped it. We did 
the construction ourselves. So the lay-out is in my head, that’s all.”
Several kilometres north from Sebrepor, people didn’t have such worries. In the wealthy 
neighbourhood of Bulasu, the newly settled civil servants and wealthy businessmen have 
plenty of other means to get their water. Although several residents of this area had initially 
connected to the GWC pipe network, they soon got annoyed by the inconsistent supply 
and the lack of reliability. So they drilled private boreholes, installed giant polyester water 
tanks in their backyard, and ordered tankers to regularly bring water to refill them. Yes, 
Mrs Angela admitted, it did cost a little more. “We probably spend some 300 cedi (€60) 
per month on water. But we’re not complaining, we can easily afford this, so we’ve been 
doing it for years. It works just fine for us.”
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Figure 7.1: Mr Jacob, a local plumber who drummed up a neighbourhood initiative to get piped 
water into the community. Without having any formal affiliation to the Ghana Water Company, 
he ended up building and managing a complex system of water distribution lines supplying 
some 3 km2 of dense urban area. 
As in other cities around the world, the piped water network in Accra has grown 
tremendously since its inception at the beginning of World War I, trailing the 
continuous growth of the city’s geographical footprint and its population. However, 
the growth of Accra is and has been so rapid that state operations have been grossly 
incapable of laying all the required infrastructure at a pace even approaching the 
growth of the residential footprint. As the above vignettes illustrate, this leads to 
system weaknesses and incoherent network development, potentially resulting in elite 
abandonment of the system. I investigate how such dynamics function, through tracing 
the development of the network, its challenges and responses of various institutional 
levels and analysis of the alternative industries springing up in the wake of its failures. 
The central research question for this chapter is: what dynamics of collectivisation and 
individualisation are at play in Ghana’s urban piped water network today? Analysing 
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a single collective amenity (tap water) in this way helps us to shed light on larger 
themes of this thesis. For instance: how, in such a context of rapid urbanisation, does 
infrastructure get built? What roles do residents play, what dynamics emerge between 
the central and the local level, what tensions emerge? 
Theory and analytical framework
The institutional and political settlement in Greater Accra has undergone several (r)
evolutions over the past century, driven by large demographic and political changes. 
Other big shifts have been in terms of the technology available in both the piped water 
network and in its potential (more individually based) replacement industries, which 
has progressed tremendously over the past century. Finally, the network is not simply 
built by the state utility company. Individual residents and local collectives play a large 
role in the development of the network, both in the form of physical construction 
initiatives, and as a political force working through the democratically accountable 
elements in the state apparatus. Specifically, I found that there has been a consistent 
struggle between forces pushing for rapid extension of the network and forces pulling 
towards limitation of growth and consolidation of the network.
We thus require a process sociological perspective, which incorporates technological 
change and its effects on the figuration of human organisation. The perspective should 
also accommodate and analyse the tensions and interdependencies inherent in any 
figuration, from the grassroots level to the headquarters of companies and state. 
The figurational sociology of Elias (1978a, 1978b) provides such a perspective. This 
perspective is based on change, focusing its analytical lens on shifts in institutional 
structure and in the interdependency relations between the various groups involved. 
In this perspective, local dynamics are directly connected to the developments in the 
central elements of the networks, a historical perspective is assumed, and the dynamics 
between centralised and local or grassroots elements are core elements of the analysis. 
Finally, the state of the available technology plays an important role in this frame of 
analysis (Elias, 1995).
The core process under analysis in this chapter is the growth of Accra’s piped water 
network. I conceptualise the piped water network itself as consisting of three types of 
components: backbone components, formally constructed service lines and informally 
constructed service lines. The term backbone refers to the water purification facilities 
and the major distribution lines from there towards and throughout the city. Formal 
service lines are smaller water pipes laid by the GWC or its subcontractors, in coherent 
projects or as paid extensions to individual homes. Informal service lines are auto-
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constructed extensions of the service lines, built by residents without the permission 
or indeed the knowledge of the GWC. In practice, the division between formal and 
informal service lines is not always clear, but it is a useful analytical point of departure. 
The most important driver of the network growth consists of more or less coordinated 
initiatives by residents of newly developing areas to stretch the network to their locality 
and to create further subdivisions to serve individual households. I term such initiatives 
‘resident-driven network expansion’. As this drive tends to stretch the network beyond 
its carrying capacity, it stands in constant tension with the drive by the GWC’s 
bureaucrats to control and consolidate the piped water network, in order to keep up 
the quality of service. This is coupled with our use of the term ‘institutionalisation’, by 
which I mean the development of more structured and formalised processes, practices 
and roles, largely at the neighbourhood level. The figurational framework again serves 
well here, as it allows us to show the connection between local network growth, the 
ensuing stresses on the citywide backbone system, GWC’s incorporation and control 
of these local expansion processes and their resulting institutionalisation, changing 
local behaviours and norms with regard to the construction of new pipe network 
extensions. 
To understand the GWC, the concept of ‘figuration’ provides a useful lens. We should 
not see the GWC as a discrete organisation, but rather as a set of components in a 
larger figuration, which also includes residents, formal government and its political 
institutions, and international donors.  There is a constant effort by various elements 
of the GWC, especially the bureaucrats at its headquarters, to limit the amount of 
the network that is outside their control. They do so by working to preclude and 
discourage informal extensions, by incorporating them into their network or at least 
institutionalising them in some form or other, and by mapping the network through 
various technologies. This is part of a larger dynamic of long-term planning. I find that 
the planning horizon of the central and city government are important factors in the 
quality of upkeep and expansion of the backbone infrastructure. Figure 7.2 below is an 
attempt to pin down the current figuration. 
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Figure 7.2: a theoretical model of the GWC and wider figuration around the expanding piped 
water network. 
As the GWC has not managed to adequately keep pace with the expanding urban 
fabric, a number of alternative water provision industries have cropped up, supplying 
residents with more individualised water solutions. The interaction between the 
collective network and the individualised sectors, which can be roughly characterised 
as ‘communicating vessels’ is set out in figure 7.3 below. Throughout the chapter, I use 
the piped water system as a lens to identify the ways in which dependency relations 
between various residential, political and bureaucratic groups shift. I continuously 
interlink these interdependencies with the state of the collective and individual supply 
systems. 
I find that the dynamics of the piped water system are more or less stable, both 
across the historical period under analysis and across the two sectors I investigate. 
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However, how such dynamics play out is mediated importantly by the state of available 
technology. The state of the available technology is a driving factor behind structural 
shifts in the ways people are dependent on one another (Elias, 1995). This applies both 
to the purposes of individualisation and to support drives towards collectivisation. I 
therefore pay attention to the role of technologies in my analysis of the data and in my 
interviews. Figure 7.3 below provides a schematic representation of the dynamics I 
find. Figures 7.9 and 7.14 later in the chapter work out this basic theoretical model for 
the water and the electricity respectively. 
General framework
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Figure 7.3: a theoretical model of the dynamics of collectivisation and individualisation analysed 
in this chapter. 
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Methodology and overview
Below, I set out the chapter structure in brief in a single paragraph and subsequently 
in more detail. The chapter is built on a variety of empirical material, gathered during 
fieldwork in 2015-2018. As the chapter rests on a wide range of different data points, 
I including the data sources used in each section and the analytical lens applied to 
them in the summary of that specific section, rather than discussing data sources in a 
separate paragraph.
As a prelude, two notes on the empirical strategy, which perhaps seems somewhat 
eclectic. First, on the wide range of data sources. Since this chapter spans a wide range 
of (water and other) sectors and technologies, as well as a long time period, it was 
not expedient to work towards a systematic overview from a single data source. Data 
from a variety of sources were collated and where possible checked against each other, 
to form a necessarily complex and incomplete whole. In theory, it would have been 
possible to center the research on a single, standardised data source, such as the GSS 
census or the GWC customer file, but that would not have allowed our current focus 
on the wider historical patterns. 
Second, on the equally wide range of analytical geographic levels. The analysis of this 
chapter moves from the resident-driven network expansion at the neighbourhood 
level to the local and city-wide utility companies, and even up to the state-level 
historical governance situation. Such scale-jumping is somewhat unusual, but in the 
end, these levels are strongly interconnected. Working from figurational sociology, I 
do not assume the primacy of any single level. And in fact, our analysis finds that 
each of these levels is crucial to understanding the functioning of the whole system, as 
figures 7.2 and 7.3 above show. 
Structure, data sources and core variables of the analysis
Section 7.2, the first empirical section, looks at network expansion dynamics. That is, 
processes of collectivisation of water provision. It starts by setting out the historical 
background of the piped water network development, from its colonial origins until 
today. Historical documentation on the colonial and earlier post-colonial period was 
drawn from the Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD). 
For the period from the 1960s forward, GWC officials were kind enough to supply us 
with a number of historical master plans and reports, highlighting the change in the 
water supply network over time. These historical records allowed us to understand 
the differences between the modes of network expansion that prevailed in various 
periods. I combine this material with other sources to understand how different types 
of regimes produced different network expansion dynamics. 
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I understand these partly as a result of the GWCs technological and organisational 
capacity. An additional factor in the analysis is the time horizon of the dominant actors 
within the state, which is largely determined by the stability of the state figuration itself. 
This determines the state’s priorities in terms of utilities such as water or electricity: 
does the focus lie on rapid extension of the service lines, to quickly serve as large a 
population as possible, or is there more attention for consolidating the system and 
strengthening the backbone? I also look at the prevalent means of network expansion: 
does this happen under strict central control, or is citizen initiative allowed, perhaps 
even encouraged? What forms of decentralisation are there in practice, and how are 
these institutionalised? 
I then come to the empirical fieldwork core of the chapter: a neighbourhood-level 
study of the water pipe network’s development trajectory. This section is primarily 
built on a single long-term, historically grounded project tracing the development of 
the piped water network in an area called Sebrepor, where I gathered data between 
2015 and 2018. The Sebrepor case is contrasted and supplemented with research in 
eight other neighbourhoods. In studying these neighbourhoods, I tried to figure out 
the ways in which locals cooperated to work towards collective amenities, the way 
they interact with utility companies and politicians, and to identify other modes of 
network expansion. As set out in the theoretical chapter of this thesis, starting from 
the neighbourhood perspective allows us to see forms of local organisation which 
would remain invisible in a view starting from centralised, formalised institutions. 
Sebrepor is an extreme case in terms of citizen initiative: its piped water network is 
entirely self-built, with minimal involvement of the state utility company. This makes 
it a strategic case to analyse: the self-organisation which plays an important role in 
the development of the network is highly visible and relatively easy to analyse in this 
neighbourhood. Sebrepor provided the central case study for this entire thesis, and 
chapter 3 details the full fieldwork methods applied there. For this chapter, I mostly 
used interviews with residents on their water supply, interviews with neighbourhood 
activists involved in the expansion of the piped water network and field observations. 
Letters and meeting notes regarding the developments of Sebrepor’s water network 
were drawn from the archive of the Divisional Council of the Sebrepor chief, who is the 
main traditional authority in the area and a focal point for residents’ self-organisation 
efforts. I contrast and augment the extreme case study offered by Sebrepor with 
examples from other neighbourhoods. 
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In section 7.3, I turn to the consequences of this rapid expansion. In a fast-growing 
city, there easily arises a discrepancy between the growth of the service lines network 
and the development and maintenance of the backbone infrastructure. This can result 
in capacity and delivery problems, which in Accra’s contemporary water sector have 
become quite severe. The Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) provided much-needed 
census and other quantitative data, which enabled us to show several tables and maps 
highlighting the spatially uneven city-wide patterns of water provision and the way this 
is currently evolving. To better understand the driving forces behind these challenges 
rapid network expansion in terms of technical issues, supply capacity and network 
deterioration, I conducted a study of the GWC organisation itself. The company 
graciously allowed us to interview employees at all levels throughout the organisation, 
and to study their internal reports from the past 20 years. 
We then turn to the various responses of the GWC to these challenges. Our material 
here consists of the same set of interviews and reports, coupled with field observations 
from the neighbourhoods and additional interviews with (Ghanaian and Dutch) 
employees of Witteveen & Bos, a water sector engineering firm with extensive 
experience in Greater Accra. Additional data for this section are drawn from GWC and 
national archives. These interviews served to clarify the capacities and organisational 
structure of the GWC, to illuminate the internal logics of the GWC, the way they view 
the various modes of expansion, to understand the power relations and conflicts of 
interest within the GWC between political appointees, long-term employees and the 
GWC district managers, as well as the dynamics between GWC district management 
and residents. In this, I pay particular attention to the GWC’s internal relations of 
power and control, the role of changing technology, and to the variety of ways the 
GWC tries to preclude, discipline and incorporate informally constructed parts of the 
network, as these processes provide a clear lens on the tension between center and 
periphery. 
In section 7.4, I contrast our account of collectivisation dynamics (section 7.2-7.3) 
with an overview of the counter-movement: individualisation dynamics. As a response 
to the poor delivery of the piped water system, a plethora of alternative water provision 
industries has developed in Greater Accra. I study the main three of these industries: 
sachet water, tanker water and private boreholes. For each of these sectors, I provide 
a brief overview of its historical development and its current status. The empirical 
material for this section is drawn from our neighbourhood profiles, coupled with 
interviews with actors in these sectors and secondary literature. 
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A particular focus of this section is how technological progress has changed the 
viability of these various alternative water sectors over the years. For instance, the 
pre-packaged water industry took off in a major way once heat-sealing machinery 
began to be imported from China. A secondary focus is their political dynamics: 
which socio-economic segments of society are served by the various replacement 
industries, and what implications does that have for the development of the network 
as a whole, through the political pressure applied by the various population segments? 
This section allows us to complete the overview of collectivisation/individualisation 
dynamics for the water sector. 
To facilitate further generalisation of the findings on the water network and its 
collective-individual dynamics, section 7.5 adds a minor secondary case study: the 
electricity sector. This sector is comparable to the water sector in terms of having large 
advantages of scale, requiring a physical distribution network and having a collective 
utility company competing with individualised alternatives. However, its technological 
aspects are very different. This makes it an ideal candidate for a comparative case study. 
The electricity case study is based on a set of interviews with Electricity Company of 
Ghana (ECG) officials, including both headquarters staff and officials at the Region/
District levels, conducted between 2016 and 2018. This material is supplemented 
with the same set of neighbourhood studies as I used for the water sector analysis, 
and supported by archival materials and secondary literature. However, it was much 
more limited in terms of interviewing, both at the neighbourhood level and at the 
state utility company level. I apply the same analytical model as I applied to the water 
sector, in order to see in what ways it can be generalised. This comparative case study 
helps us to understand how the different technological circumstances lead to different 
outcomes in terms of network growth dynamics, degree of central control over the 
network, and ultimately collectivisation dynamics.
7.2 History and modes of expansion
This section provides an overview of historical and contemporary dynamics of growth 
in Accra’s piped water network. The historical analysis focuses on two regime-specific 
variables. First, the time horizon of regimes determined their investment in the 
backbone infrastructure. Regimes which did not expect to stay in place for long did 
not invest make this kind of long-term investments. Second, the degree of populism 
determined to what degree they grew the distribution network, either by constructing 
new service lines or by simply allowing people to extend these on their own. The 
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section then zooms in on the main phenomenon that makes the distribution side of 
the network grow these days: resident-driven service line expansion. Here, it sets out 
the main processes by which residents extend the network, showing the dominant role 
of auto-construction in the contemporary network extension.
Historical background of network expansion as a whole
The first public water supply system in Accra, and in fact all of Ghana, was established 
just before World War I (GWC, 2016, p. 1). In subsequent years, the network was 
expanded at a steady pace. By the 1920s, there were functioning systems in several 
cities, including the colonial capital of Cape Coast, missionary center Winneba, and 
Kumasi, capital city of the powerful Ashanti tribe. These pipe-borne water networks 
were small but reliable, limited to the colonial quarters and selected indigenous areas. 
Every resident in such areas was required to pay a water tax, and residents expected to 
have a good and functioning water connection (PRAAD, 1931). 
These were the high days of the colonial regime. Although the groundwork for the 
independence movement was laid in these days, it was very much underground, and 
it appeared that colonial rule would be around for a very long time indeed. Thus, the 
time horizon was long, as we can see in archival materials. Plans were laid for projects 
like the Akosombo Dam, and the accompanying expansion of the Kpone Water Works, 
the largest water purification plant of Ghana. 
The following decades would show markedly less such long-term focused activity. As 
the Great Depression ravaged European economies, the authorities in London decided 
to economise on all financial and material flows to the colonies. When World War II 
broke out, this effect became even more pronounced; wartime rationing led to an bare-
bones maintenance regime for both the pipe network and the water treatment plants. 
When it became clear after the war that there was a serious struggle for independence, 
the time horizon of the colonial regime became far shorter. No more master plans were 
produced, no more major maintenance was undertaken, and only the most urgent 
repairs were carried out (Director of Public Works, 1939). 
After Ghana became the first sub-Saharan African country to gain its independence in 
1957, the time horizon for infrastructure development again changed completely. As 
Nkrumah’s nationalist regime geared up in a highly ambitious effort to modernise the 
nation, several of the major projects which had been planned in the 1920s and 1930s 
were built. The Akosombo Dam was constructed, with as primary purpose to provide 
power for an aluminum factory. The Tema harbor city was built from scratch, with a 
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full water pipe distribution system which was completed even before residents moved 
in. However, the Kpone Water Works lagged behind. Perhaps it was not industrial 
enough to be high on the list of priorities, perhaps there were other reasons. 
Whatever lay behind it, in 1959 the newly independent Ghana found itself in a water 
crisis. Severe droughts had drained many of the surface waters, and several decades 
of neglect had led to a deterioration of the water supply and distribution network. 
The World Health Organisation came in and helped the new government to draft a 
Masterplan for its water sector (WHO/UNDP/GoG, 1963). Large investments were 
made, with donor money flowing in from a number of countries and the World Bank. 
And this time, the geographical scale was radically different. Especially the network 
coverage continued to be expanded at breakneck speed. While the colonial government 
had concentrated its infrastructural efforts in a number of colonial centers, developing 
a total of 35 pipe-borne water supply systems throughout Ghana, the nationalist 
regime and its successors increased this to 194 pipe-borne systems, and added 2.500 
hand-pumped borehole systems for the rural areas (GWC, 2016, p. 3). Ghana’s new 
leaders wanted to show the people of their newly independent country that wealth and 
amenities were now for everyone, not just for the (colonial) elite. 
In 1966, Nkrumah was ousted during a visit to Vietnam. Over the fifteen years that 
followed, Ghana would see a total of six different regimes, in an increasingly rapid 
alternation of military and civil rule. This was followed by twelve years of military 
rule under Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings’ Provisional National Defense Council 
during the 1980s. All this time, the water distribution network continued to grow, as 
many of these regimes had grand ambitions of nation-building, and often also had to 
placate their supporters with amenities. Some, especially Acheampong’s and Rawlings’ 
regimes, were mostly focused on the rural areas. In Operation Feed Yourself (OFY) 
Acheampong encouraged people to move out and farm, extending electricity and 
water pipes to farming areas (Lemmenmeier, 2012). Rawlings’ Provisional National 
Defense Council, in a push to develop the countryside, added 3.000 rural boreholes 
during his first few years in power (GWC, 2016, p. 3). 
Taking an overview, the following picture emerges. The first nationalist governments 
were focused on distributing access to public utilities. However, their structure was 
still highly centralist, an organisational heritage from a colonial state which was really 
only present in a small number of cities, leaving the rest of the country to the rule of 
local chiefs. Subsequent governments started to slowly decentralise more and more 
responsibilities. An important transition in this respect occurred under Rawlings’ 
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regime. Although his Provisional National Defense Council was autocratic in nature, it 
took practical shape as a decentralised structure of local Peoples’ Defense Committees 
and Workers’ Defense Committees. This government also explicitly aimed to shift 
the popular attitude from a ‘government will provide’-position to a proactive stance 
in nation-building, based on local initiative by the people themselves (Danso-Boafo, 
2014). The formal institutionalisation of local government in the form of Assemblies 
(municipalities) was followed several years later by a comparable decentralisation in 
the water-sector. This meant that the de facto de-central expansion of the network was 
now also formally sanctioned and institutionalised.
Resident-driven service line expansion
Through what modalities does the pipe-borne water network expand these days? The 
processes vary, but the driver is nearly always the same: citizen initiative among the 
pioneer residents. Electricity and water are important for the quality of life in an area, 
and as such are big attractors for potential new residents looking for a plot of land 
to build their own home. More people, in turn, attract more shops, more services 
and form a bigger group to share initial costs of other amenities. Additional settlers 
also provide safety in numbers against robbers, land guards and other dangers of the 
urban frontier.41 This means that first movers in a newly settled area are often eager to 
connect to utility networks not only for their own use, but also as a way to get more 
people in. As Auntie Yaa put it in the introduction chapter: “Now we have water, now 
we have lights. Come and live here!”
One way citizens can get water in their area is by lobbying their elected representatives 
and the local GWC District office. These offices have a limited amount of internally 
generated funds at their disposal, to do small distribution line extensions. They 
sometimes get additional money allotted from the central GWC coffers, but this too is 
not much against the rate of spatial expansion of the built environment. However, since 
the head of the GWC and his two deputies are political appointees, there is a constant 
struggle in the GWC head office between the financial department (which periodically 
comes under pressure from the IMF to economise and fully balance the books) and the 
company leadership. The political pressure causes the GWC to build extensions well 
beyond what both their backbone infrastructure and their budget can carry, leaving 
debts outstanding to the national electricity company and other suppliers (Musah, 2018). 
41 Land guards are thugs employed by land speculators, chiefs and others trying to claim a portion 
of unoccupied land. They tend to be particularly present in the early stages of a settlement, when 
population density is low. At this stage, intimidation of those few individuals who have moved in can 
be quite profitable, as it can potentially win an entire stretch of land for the land guards’ unscrupulous 
employers.
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Still, it appears from our field research that people in most neighbourhoods had to do 
more than lobby to get their water: they had to act for themselves. Sebrepor, the main 
case study area of this research project, provides an extreme example of such resident-
driven service line expansion. The first residents settled there in the 1970s as farmers, 
encouraged by Operation Feed Yourself. One of them was a retired army plumber, 
Jacob Milehu, locally known as “Mr Jacob” (who appeared in the introduction to this 
chapter). His last job before retirement had been to construct the water distribution 
network in much of the new port city, Tema. Using his connections in the military 
and the GWC, he got permission to connect the newly growing hamlet of Sebrepor to 
the water network of the nearby army base, Michel Camp. The GWC drew a pipeline 
under the busy road separating Michel Camp and Sebrepor, and connected a standpipe 
there, at the roadside. 
Dissatisfied with a mere standpipe, several kilometres walking distance from his home, 
Mr Jacob enlisted the help of the local chief and a number of active neighbours and got 
to work. Through the incipient Sebrepor Settler Society, they collected money, bought 
pipes and put the area’s boys to work digging trenches, and extended the pipeline the 
first few hundred meters, into the village. From this point onward, everyone who 
wanted a personal connection to the GWC network had to literally pay it forward. 
The price of a home connection: material for his personal service connection, labour 
costs of Mr Jacob, and four additional lengths of pipeline (about 120 meters), which 
were used to expand the distribution network. Under Mr Jacob’s energetic supervision 
and shepherding, the network was thus extended, branched out, upgraded to bigger 
pipelines and even stretched to include neighbouring neighbouring villages. Today, 
the self-help pipeline network of Mr Jacob’s Water Committee includes Sebrepor, 
Mlitsakpo, Saki Uptown, Bediako and even parts of neighbouring Golf City. All 
in all, this comprises an area of around three square kilometres of dense urban 
neighbourhoods. 
In organisational terms, Sebrepor’s water network started with solo initiative from Mr 
Jacob and an initial connection granted by the GWC. From here, it quickly spun into 
informal group formation, when Mr Jacob enlisted the help of his neighbours. This led 
to the successful autoconstruction of the first part of the network. The affiliation with 
the chief provided the group with an additional measure of legitimacy, both among 
local residents (who had all gotten their land grant from that chief, a highly significant 
relationship in Ghana) and towards outside organisations, who tend to see the chief as 
the natural head of the neighbourhood community. As Mr Jacob standardised the cost 
of a connection, got official stationary, and got local big men together in the Sebrepor 
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Water Committee to oversee the local group, the drive was further institutionalised. 
When the work started to become too much for one person, he enlisted local young 
men to help build and maintain the network, professionalising the division of labour, 
which enabled them to cover a large area of urban fabric. 
It should be noted here that Sebrepor’s case is not quite standard. It required the 
confluence of several factors. First, a usable mainline at the nearby army base. Second, 
a public-spirited, well-connected plumber with a lot of time and energy on his hands. 
Third, a well-organised community of retired soldiers, willing and able to support his 
efforts. And fourth, a strong spirit of self-help. This spirit, laudable as it is, was mainly 
a deeply practical one, grounded in the community’s certain knowledge that while the 
GWC might help them across that road and grant them a standpipe, “government will 
not come and build your water for you” (McKenzie, 2015). 
Clearly, Sebrepor’s case is exceptional. However, the same principles form the basis 
of most pipe-borne water networks in neighbourhoods being built still today. Table 
7.1 below summarises the development process of the piped water network in eight 
other Greater Accra neighbourhoods which were started in the last 50 years. In each of 
these neighbourhoods, we interviewed several elders about the development history of 
the area and systematically noted the physical state of amenities like water, electricity, 
street lights, street paving and drainage systems (see Appendix 2). These data do not 
form a qualitative comparative analysis. Rather, they are exploratory and shed more 
light on the diversity of pathways towards a piped water network, as well as identifying 
some potentially core variables.
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Neighborhood
Afienya
Bulasu
Christian Village
Community 25
Dawhenya
Gbetsile
Golf City
Kpone
Sbrepor
Socio-economic 
profile
Lower middle class
Upper middle class
Middle class
Middle class
Lower middle class
Poor
Middle class
Lower middle class
Middle class
Resident 
Association 
active
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Est.
1998
2013
1995
2010
1960
1985
2000
1950
1975
Water pipe 
network
Self-built
Self-funded
Self-built
Self-built
Government-built
Government-funded, 
self-built
Self-built
Self-built
Self-built
Electricity 
network
Self-funded
Self-funded
Self-funded
Self-funded
Government-built
Government-built
Government-built
Self-built
Self-built
Description
Village core on the northern 
edge of the urban fringe area.
Relatively new neighborhood, 
clearly delineated plots.
Part of the older Ashiaan 
agglomeration, no pre-existing village.
Relatively new neighborhood, 
clearly delineated plots.
Older village on the urban fringe, 
established in 1970s for farming,
Dense neighborhood within the 
urban fabric. 
Older, but organized, quite 
centrally positioned neighborhood. 
Old village core, dense, messy, a lot of 
communal housing.
Mixed buildings, somewhat older than 
surrounding neighborhoods, no village.
Table 7.1: The eight other neighbourhoods included as additional case studies, besides the main 
case study of Sebrepor. For each neighbourhood, we denoted whether water, electricity and 
street lights were funded and constructed by the locals or through a government project. Self-
built indicates that locals did both the funding and construction themselves. Self-funded means 
locals gathered money and asked the ECG/GWC to construct the network.
An almost universal factor in the neighbourhoods which successfully got a water 
pipe network appears to be local organisation of some kind. However, there is 
quite some diversity in the type of organisation that residents form. In Sebrepor, a 
single, determined group dedicated specifically to the water network created a way 
to progressively fund expansion, and built the entire network bit by bit. Grassroots 
organisation in other areas was more general-purpose, frequently taking the form 
of a Residents Association (RA, see also chapter 4). Where in Sebrepor, the process 
happened very slowly because the residents were relatively poor farmers but was 
made possible by dogged local organising and strong networking, villa residential 
area Bulasu represents the other end of the self-help scale. Here, the RA is extremely 
effective and well-funded, and has paid for the connection towards their area and the 
full distribution network inside it. However, our interlocutors reported that the area 
has little internal social cohesion: this RA is purely functional. 
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While such wealth is rare, resident contributions do form the driver in the majority of 
the neighbourhoods we investigated. In outlying Afienya, residents contributed money 
for the pipes to be drawn up to the border of their settlement, but that’s where the 
organisation ran out of money and steam. From that point on, everyone had to pay their 
own extensions. This is also a more frequently observed pattern: initial connections 
generally get the pipe network only just far enough to provide water to the first few 
dwellings of a settlement. From here, most neighbourhood’s developmental trajectory 
runs a little bit different from Sebrepor’s, as there is generally no Water Committee and 
no planned network extension. Instead, individual households subsequently arrange 
their own connections from the settlement’s edge. Others build forward from those 
connections, and so on. In streets were nobody can afford this investment, residents 
wait for a ‘big man’ on the other side of the neighbourhood to pay for a connection 
which will pass near enough to their own houses for them to finally connect as well.
Community 25, on the other hand, represents the ideal-typical successful RA in a 
middle class neighbourhood. The community was helped by the fact that a farmer 
in the area had already gotten a connection, decades ago, so they only had to do 
the distribution within the neighbourhood. Over a number of years, a few women 
and men organised monthly RA meetings, gathered contributions and spread the 
network along the streets throughout the area, with individuals building their personal 
connections and buying the water meters when they could afford it. 
Political networks, too, often play a role in this development. In Gbetsile, a dense 
and relatively poor area, the local NDC party leader played a central role, acquiring 
funding for the materials, pushing and paying the local youth to provide labour for 
digging the trenches and so on. However, the area lies uphill and water does not flow 
reliably. What is more, most residents cannot afford to get a personal connection as 
the cost of a water meter and the required plumbing is still prohibitively high for most 
residents in Accra. But in more affluent areas such as Golf City, government provision 
of distribution lines does work. The Member of Parliament for the area secured 
funding to lay distribution lines along all the streets of the area, and a large majority of 
the households then installed their own connection. 
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We also know of other neighbourhoods, not included in this dataset, which were 
connected through international development projects, generally channeled through 
the local Assemblies (municipalities).42 In some cases, real estate developers building 
‘estates’ or gated communities directly strike a deal with the local GWC District 
Manager to connect them, with or without the explicit permission of his superiors. 
Chiefs and early settlers are often especially motivated to get such infrastructure 
projects off the ground. They want to quickly draw more people into the settlement, 
so as to collectively decrease the risk of robbery, speed up the development of the area 
and allow for the densification necessary for more advanced amenities to arrive.
In short, we see a broad spectrum of grassroots organisation forms working to establish 
piped water networks, some more specialised than others, in various configurations 
with political networks, various configurations with the GWC citywide network, 
and with various degrees of affluence and social cohesion. Quite notable throughout 
the data is the dogged incrementalism and the degree to which residents manage to 
build (parts of) the network for themselves. However, it should also be clear that this 
does not happen in every area: Dawhenya and Mataheko do not have access to the 
piped water network. Dawhenya has had standpipes for the past 40 years, since the 
area became a farming hub under president Acheampong’s Operation Feed Yourself, 
and no effective grassroots organising has managed to transform these to a network 
of household water connections. Mataheko has simply not yet gotten the grassroots 
organisation or sufficient funding off the ground to construct a local network. 
Not unlike the process of growing tree roots, the network thus slowly expands 
throughout the neighbourhood in a decentralised growth process that is quite frankly 
a miracle to behold (in slow motion). However, there are some important differences 
with the growth process of tree roots. Trees naturally develop an efficient system, 
optimising the width of their branches for the circulation of water and nutrition. De-
centrally built pipe networks like Accra’s water network do not necessarily lead to an 
optimal structure, and often include strange twists, large and demanding networks 
built onto narrow initial pipe connections, and all sorts of bottlenecks. In addition, 
they are not self-sustaining and self-upgrading, like organic tissues such as tree roots 
are, and thus require constant maintenance and frequent upgrading of size and quality. 
42 A recent example is the World Bank GAMA project, currently being implemented, which will lay 150 
km of new distribution network, creating some 5.000 new connections and standpipes, improving 
water supply to 143.000 households (World Bank, 2018). This project is not only exceptional in its 
magnitude, but also in the fact that it includes considerations of the backbone infrastructure and 
includes investments there. Most NGO connection projects are not that system-minded.
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Since independence, the expansion of the water network has increasingly originated in 
the neighbourhoods, not as design from a headquarter. Whether expansions happen 
for political reasons, or more frequently, through the independent constructive labour 
of many, many communities each slowly overcoming the challenges of collective action 
in different ways, the network is expanded in ever further offshoots. This process 
and the resulting network structure can hardly be said to be planned, except on a 
very general level. This is an effective, relatively rapid and rather locally autonomous 
method of expansion. But as the next section shows, it also leads to some severe 
practical problems and weaknesses.
7.3 Failure to deliver and GWC response
The previous section set out the process of resident-driven expansion of the piped 
water network at the local level, which is a very effective process of network expansion 
in contemporary Accra. One might expect such successful self-help to be celebrated by 
the state and the utility company. However, this is far from the case, and there are in fact 
good reasons for this. This section sets out the consequences of such distribution line 
expansion for the backbone infrastructure. It then turns to the response of the GWC. 
This is also a matter of collective action or collectivity, but at a different level. GWC is 
effectively the main agent representing a larger collective than all these neighbourhood 
activists: Greater Accra as a whole. 
The section first zooms in on the interconnection between the development of the 
distribution network and the backbone infrastructure over the past half-century, 
focusing on the institutional reforms that were implemented as a response. It then sets 
out the current backbone-distribution interconnection and its practical consequences, 
before going into a detailed overview of the way the contemporary GWC is responding 
to its challenges. When studying this response, it mainly looks at the narratives used 
by GWC employees to understand their perspective on the collectivisation process, 
and the practical challenges accompanying rapid large-scale network expansion. Thus, 
this section seeks to understand how local collective action for network expansion 
affects the central collective, and the accompanying array of responses (and their 
effectiveness) of the central collective.
Discrepancy between network growth and backbone development
Throughout our investigation of Accra’s newly grown suburban area, one nearly constant 
finding was problems with the water flow. In five out of the nine neighbourhoods we 
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profiled, water pressure in the pipes was either low or irregular, or simply nonexistent. 
The same pattern appeared from anecdotal evidence in other neighbourhoods 
throughout the city. The major reason for this is that the network was simply stretched 
far beyond the carrying capacity of its backbone systems, and in many places is also 
quite ill-designed, causing further local shortages. 
Several years after independence in 1957, major investments were made in the 
treatment plants. It is very hard to trace when exactly this happened. But while capacity 
in 1939 stood at some 5.000 m3 per day (Director of Public Works, 1939), a report 
from 1981 shows a daily capacity of 85.000 m3 (Engineers, 1981). However, although 
the first decade after independence clearly produced substantial increases in the water 
capacity, in the following decades very little expansion or even major maintenance 
would be done on the water treatment plants and the major distribution lines. As a 
World Bank report from 1998 noted: “The water supply systems in Ghana deteriorated 
rapidly during the economic crises of the 1970s and early 1980s when Government’s 
ability to adequately operate and maintain essential services was severely constrained.” 
(World Bank, 1998). Various batches of donor money in 1970, 1981 and 1988 brought 
some relief, but not much  (GWC, 2016, p. 3). In 1997, a report found that water 
production capacity had remained practically unchanged since the year 1980 (OTUI, 
1997, p. 71). Eight years later, there was still only a capacity increase of altogether some 
20% (Denys N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012, p. 16). 
Meanwhile the urban population had explosively increased in that same period. 
Between 1980 and 2003, Accra’s population grew by 172%, from 1,1 million to nearly 
3 million people (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). And the pipe network had grown 
alongside, at breakneck speed. Although there are no exact data on the growth of the 
network in this period, an indication can be found in the increase of water usage meters. 
In the chaotic years of alternating governments leading up to Rawlings’ second coup, 
the amount of new domestic connections had shown a growth rate of 8,6% per year 
(OTUI, 1997, p. 71). Within just those five years between 1975 and 1980, that amounted 
to an increase in the number of water customers of more than 50%, “corresponding 
to 400 new connections every month”. Although this was an extraordinary episode, 
the growth of GWC’s customer base did not exactly abate afterwards. The number of 
registered GWC customers in Greater Accra would continue to keep pace with the 
metropolis’ population growth, going from roughly 80.000 in 1980 (calculation based 
on Tahal (1981)) to more than 250.000 in 2015 (GWC, 2015). 
The backbone infrastructure (water treatment plants, mainline infrastructure 
and booster stations) had in no way kept pace with this rapid development of the 
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distribution network and the user base. In fact, the first major overhaul of the backbone 
system since the 1960s would not occur until the late 2000s and early 2010s, when 
additional capacity was installed roughly doubling the capacity of the network (Denys 
N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012, p. 15).
In response to this prolonged crisis, the institutional structure of water delivery was 
thoroughly reformed in the 1990s, based on the Water Sector Restructuring Project 
(WSRP), supported by $140 million of international donor money (around $210 million 
in today’s terms). Through this program, the organisational structure of the GWSC 
(Ghana Water and Sanitation Company) was revamped. Started as a local colonial 
utility company, with a small area of operation, it had grown to cover the country, 
following the independence and the accompanying notion that not only certain (white) 
elite quarters must be served, but the whole country. However, its organisational 
structure had never been updated to reflect this new widely expanded role.  
Now, the GWC was split into the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) 
and the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWC). The GWC would provide water to 
urban population centers of at least 50.000 people, supervised on quality and tariff 
setting by the newly established Public Utilities Regulatory Commission (PURC). The 
CWSA took over coverage in the rest of the country, mainly running one-off borehole 
striking and water supply improvement programs through the local District Assemblies. 
To safeguard the increasingly scarce water resources, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and  the Water Resources Comission (WRC) were established, with 
the WRC receiving authority to manage all of Ghana’s natural water resources and 
overseeing (GWC and other) extraction practices. The division between the CWSA 
and the GWC left the peri-urban areas in a difficult spot, in between the responsibility 
of these two organisations.  
Internally, the now purely urban GWC was also revamped, as it was found increasingly 
unable to cope with the growing demand for new extensions. In 1997, only two 
offices with a combined staff of 26 people (Accra Central District Office and Tema 
Central District Office) were responsible for the establishment of all new connections 
throughout the Accra-Tema metropolitan area. Able to connect just over 1.000 
households a year, they had accumulated an estimated backlog of 30.000 households 
(OTUI, 1997, p. xiv). To improve this situation, the GWC was decentralised into 3 
regions, each containing a number of districts. Furthermore, the workforce was 
rationalised, the technical knowledge base increased by hiring more professionals and 
providing training for staff. Finally, a program was started for the reduction of water 
leakages and illegal connections. 
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Today, the water governance and provision organisational structure implemented 
in the 1990s under Rawlings is still in place.43 The Accra-Tema metropolitan area is 
covered through the regions Accra East, Accra West and Tema, and the expansion of 
the network is now managed by teams in all 25 districts. This has enabled the company 
to mostly catch up with the demand for new connections.44 
Despite all these reforms, water delivery today is not stable in many parts of Greater 
Accra, and an enormous amount of connected customers receive almost no water 
at all. If anything, the increased local office effectiveness resulting from the GWC’s 
decentralisation has exacerbated the problem of its network being stretched in an 
unplanned fashion, beyond its central control and beyond its backbone systems’ 
capacity to deliver. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 below show the scale of the problem in April 
2012. On figure 7.4, green areas receive water 70-100% of the time, yellow/orange 
areas 30-70% of the time, and the red areas have water flow during 0-30% of the 
time. However, a green or yellow indication on figure 7.4 does not indicate that the 
quantities received are adequate. Figure 7.5 depicts the flow rate, showing that some 
60% of Accra has a flow rate (when water flows at all) of less than 10 m3/hour. In 
particular the supply to the south-eastern and northern parts of Accra, that is, the 
areas where most newly developing neighbourhoods are, is woefully inadequate. 
The contrast with the early days of the network is striking. In 1931, a disruption of 
water supply to some customers of ‘up to four hours a day’ was seen a good reason 
for complaint. It was found important enough to be mentioned in a letter by the Gold 
Coast Governor to the UK, urgently asking for additional funds and materials to 
resolve the situation (Slater, 1931). Today, a large number of GWC customers have 
flow interruptions which continue for several days, sometimes even months. Even 
when water does flow, the pressure is often inadequate. The most recent estimates 
indicate that slightly over 50% of GWC’s customers receive significantly less water 
than they need (Denys N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012).
43 In 2006-2011, a World Bank-led consortium organized the privatization of Ghana’s water supply, in 
attempt to improve reliability, financial sustainability and customer service. After five years, the new 
management was judged to be a failure on nearly every evaluation criterion, and the GWC was re-
nationalized. In the 2010s, a series of internal shake-ups and strict performance-based monitoring of 
GWC management has been organized to achieve the same goals.
44 GWC also has operations in other urban areas throughout Ghana, but 62% of its customers live in the 
Greater Accra Metropolitan Area (Nunoo, 2018).
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Figure 7.4: An overview of the percentage of time that taps flow in each part of Greater Accra. Dark 
green means constant flow, dark red means almost never (Denys N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012).
Figure 7.5: An overview of the rate of flow in each area. Blue and green areas have sufficient 
pressure, orange and red areas have insufficient pressure (Denys N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012).
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GWC response
How is GWC responding to this predicament? One method is rationing. In colonial 
times, rationing was used on a racist and extremely unequal basis. During a wartime 
meeting in 1942, J. Balfour Kirk, President of the Gold Coast Central Board of Health, 
noting the severity of the water crisis, determined the following rations. For the 
European population, 300-500 UK imperial gallons (1.300-2.200 liter) per compound 
per day (Director of Public Works, 1945). For the African population, 7-10 gallons 
(31-45 liter) per head per day. In the 1980s, this method was reintroduced (Stoler, 
Fink, et al., 2012), this time on a rotation basis. In this system first neighbourhood 
A receives water for a day, then neighbourhood B, and so on, until it’s A’s turn again. 
Since increasingly many people have 5.000-20.000 liter polytanks in their backyard, the 
intermittent dry spells can be coped with. Unfortunately this is also means that those 
living at the end of a pipeline frequently find that water never reaches them, as during 
their neighbourhood’s turn, the flow is continuously diverted into the polytanks of 
their preceding neighbours. These often take all day to fill up, at which point the flow 
turns away again, to the next neighbourhood in line. 
But rationing, of course, is merely a method of coping. It neither improves the level 
of knowledge and control the GWC has over the existing network, nor does it stop 
further uncontrolled expansion and dilution of the network’ carrying capacity. So how 
does the GWC respond to their root predicament, the cause of the problem, which is 
the uncontrolled expansion of their network? At first, generally, with flat-out denial. 
When we asked GWC personnel at several levels throughout the organisation about 
the frequent, nearly standard practice of house-to-house network expansion through 
citizen initiative, the response was always the same: denial. As a District Manager 
firmly put it: 
“It is the sole mandate of GWC to lay lines to customers premises. Of 
course, I will not rule out the fact that there are some of them who will 
want do their own things. But when they come to our notice, we don’t 
take it friendly. We don’t entertain it at all, you can trust me for that”. 
(Interview Amoatuy, 2018)
While the District Manager noted that network expansion through unsanctioned 
citizen initiative does happen, he made it a point to show he was on top of such 
‘illegal efforts’. In this effort, he stretches his limited resources to the limit, using the 
company car to drive around on weekends to spot the construction of unsanctioned 
extensions. To discourage such activity further, he seises culprits’ equipment whenever 
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possible. As he proudly noted: “…most of them don’t come to get it back, because they 
know very well what they were doing.” He also uses his private phone as a hotline for 
anonymous tips of illegal pipe construction activity. “I don’t need to know who you 
are, I don’t need to see you, it’s just about the information. I don’t disclose where I get 
my information from”. “You have to put fear into the system.” As he noted, the means 
to keep the quality up during the rapid network expansion, and to instill discipline into 
the process, are still highly inadequate. “The management they don’t look at resources, 
they want results. (…) If you don’t strategise, you die.” 
The vignette at the start of this chapter makes very clear to which degree this projected 
level of control over the network is a goal rather than a reality. The GWC has no 
detailed overview of their network, and often relies on local leaders to assist in running 
the network. As Mr Jacob later explained, the GWC field team frequently calls him 
to find out how exactly the pipe network runs in certain parts of Sebrepor, and how 
to best improve the flow. I had several conversations with Mr Jacob over the course 
of 2015-2018 and he always said that he had been in the process of handing over 
the management to Ghana Water but so far that had not happened. Instead, he was 
training a new cohort of plumbers – “my boys” – who worked on the pipes in the 
neighbourhood next to their regular work for individual households. It is clear that 
Mr Jacobs’ case may be an extreme example, but it is by no means unique, and in many 
ways stands for a larger pattern. In many places, the GWC have no idea how exactly 
their network looks, making it very difficult to manage water flows and ensure equal 
spreading, or indeed any preferred distribution pattern at all. However, the GWC has 
begon to effectively use social media platforms to gather information on bursts and 
leaks directly from citizens.
In areas where residents are less organised with regard to the water pipe network 
than in Sebrepor, the GWC also finds ways to bring the practice of connecting to 
neighbours into their system. In fact, they have developed a specific procedure for it. 
Anyone coming to register a new connection is asked to submit a written permission 
note from the owner of the pipeline from which he wants to connect his own house 
(see figure 7.6 below). In most neighbourhoods, this is simply one’s neighbour. In 
Sebrepor, the formal owner of the water network is the Sebrepor Water Committee, 
although this Committee does not have any legal status or formal existence otherwise. 
For the neighbouring towns of Golf City and Mlitsakpo, Mr Jacob has delegated that 
responsibility to the respective chiefs.
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Figure 7.6: An ‘Authority Note’ signed by Mr Jacob Milehu, founder of the Sebrepor Water 
Committee, and Nartey Caesar, representative of Sebrepor’s chief and formal chairman of the 
Sebrepor Water Committee. The GWC requires customers to bring such a note if they want to 
connect to the water network via an existing customer service line. 
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In analytical terms, what is the relationship between the residents’ organisation 
around water and the GWC? Sebrepor’s piped water network has grown historically 
through auto-construction. Along with that process the local organisation around 
water institutionalised and professionalised itself. We can read this as a response to 
the continued absence of effective action on the part of the GWC. But the GWC is 
not completely absent; it does set the institutional framework. That is, it precludes 
the Sebrepor Water Committee from formalising completely, since the GWC does not 
admit that residents play a serious role in building and maintaining the network. That 
would presumably undermine the GWC’s status too much and amount to an open 
admission that they do not have control over the network. But since the GWC does not 
have the capacity to keep track of everything that happens at the neighbourhood level, 
they have established the system of permission notes for connecting to one’s neighbour’s 
pipeline. For the Sebrepor Water Committee, this provides a partial formalisation of 
their control over the local pipe network, and they have locally further formalised the 
permission note system (see figure 6). Where it mostly amounts to a handwritten note 
from a neighbour, they have created a standardised form which must be signed by the 
entrepreneurial resident who set up the system, Mr Jacob, and by the chief, who thus 
further strengthens his authority over the residents (see also chapter 5). 
In order to get back control over their network and flows, GWC is taking a number 
of other steps. As the last comprehensive map of Accra’s water pipe network was 
drawn up almost half a century before, through the WHO project in 1966, their first 
step now is to create an up-to-date map of the network. In 2012, a first version was 
completed, although it was limited to transmission lines of 150mm and larger. As the 
digital information officer explains, they would prefer to map everything, but practical 
problems preclude this. 
“For asset management, we ideally want [to map] everything, but 
we will probably go for 75mm and bigger. (…) When you have these 
small pipes, they may run through the community without any properly 
planned route. They just move through, and people just connect from 
them. So we only want to measure the ones we can easily control.” 
(Interview Nunoo, 2018)
In terms of the larger pipes, this map covers 80-90% of the network, omitting for 
instance all of Sebrepor (see figure 7.7 below). Hence, the railroad builders had no way 
to know that they would break through the water pipe network with their excavators. 
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Figure 7.7: the GIS map of the GWC network. Source: GWC data team, 2018. According to the 
GWC data team, this map omits most of the service lines below 150mm thickness, including 
not only all 4-inch distribution lines in Sebrepor, but all such lines throughout almost the entire 
city. In addition, some of the transmission lines in Tema West are not yet included. However, the 
geographic extent of the network is accurately represented. 
Other predicaments of the citywide collective level have little to do with the informal 
extension method, and more with the rapid urban growth and basic level of technology 
in general. Until recently, the GWC had only a rudimentary overview of who their 
customers were, where their customers were, and how much water their customers 
used. A big reason behind this is that until recently, most of this knowledge was not 
well stored, or even storable. As the digital information officer explains: 
“Let’s say, if I am the new billing representative in an area where there are 
100 people on the books, but my predecessor has passed away or fallen 
sick, there is no way to trace where he was going to collect bills from. So I 
may only be able to find about 60 or 70 of them. The rest are somewhere 
I can’t find, or don’t exist anymore.” (Interview Akosa-Kusi, 2018) 
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The other customers might never get billed again, despite the fact that of course, they 
continue to use water. To solve this, one of the current programs is to add a geotag to 
all customers in the database. Especially in rapidly developing countries like Ghana, 
where street naming frequently happens several decades after the initial construction 
of a settlement, having the exact coordinates of your customers is not an unnecessary 
luxury.
In order to improve the financial situation, the GWC is also trying to better track and 
accurately bill customer’s water use. Currently, only 74% of active customers have a 
functioning meter, and the others are billed on (generally quite low) estimates, based 
on their last water bill. Why are so many customers without meters? Although every 
new customer connection starts with a meter, over time, the meters wear out, get stolen 
(they contain a brass element which is melted and sold on), are tampered with by 
customers in a Latourian cat and mouse game to reduce the water bill, or simply break 
down (Akosa-Kusi, 2018a). The new meters installed today are especially designed to 
solve such problems. They are made of otherwise worthless plastic, so theft is pointless. 
They are readable at a distance, to improve billing practices. Finally, they have a one-
way flow channel, to prevent people from flipping the meter around during part of the 
month to reverse the flow, lowering the meter reading and their subsequent bill.
A final response to the inability of the network to deliver a constant flow is strengthening 
the backbone itself, and planning for future development. This is happening, but the 
pace is still below par. In 2003, the water supply stood at 320.000 m3/day, against 
a demand of 450.000, meaning that 71% of demand was being met (Adank et al., 
2011; Denys N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012, p. 15). In 2012, the available supply had 
increased to 420.000, but demand had risen faster, to 640.000, pushing the demand-
supply ratio down to 66%. A further 100% increase in the demand is estimated to occur 
within 15 years. If supply continues to expand at the same rate as it has in the past 
10 years, the ratio of supply to demand will further deteriorate, and Accra’s available 
water supply will be less than 50% of what is required.45
Furthermore, it is not only the production of clean water which is falling behind the 
need. The distribution mains and pumping installations are also starting to crack under 
the strain of delivering ever more water through a network designed for a smaller city 
and a smaller population. As the GWC’s most recent evaluation report stated: 
45 Notably absent from such estimates is the fact that distribution problems further lower the amount of 
water that effectively reaches customers, as well as making an equitable distribution of the available 
water almost impossible.
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“From the various scenarios discussed, it was identified that the system 
suffers from inadequate pumping, bottlenecks within distribution, lack 
of pressure separation in addition to growing demand. Any attempt to 
increase production capacity must as a matter of necessity consider 
solving these hurdles as a foremost attempt. (…) In the distribution 
network, a lot of the DN 200 [200mm diameter] lines and below have 
become bottlenecks.” (Denys N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012, p. 36)
An additional factor in this may be the geographic location of Ghana’s industrial base, 
in Tema Industrial Area: that area does receive adequate water, so there is no industrial 
lobby for better water provision (see figure 5). Despite the fact that Ghana’s industry has 
not historically enjoyed a particularly strong lobbying influence (Whitfield, 2011), this 
may well have further lessened the pressure on the government to improve water supply.46
Meanwhile planning, as and when it is attempted, remains very difficult (Sedafor, 
2018). Spatial urban expansion patterns are hard to predict and too quick to follow or 
adapt to. And the haphazard expansion patterns of the water pipe network in Accra’s 
environment of urban sprawl, driven at the meso-level by impatient politicians and at 
the granular level by house-to-house self-help, continue to stretch the network. 
After noting all these problems with their service, I feel it is important to note that the 
GWC crews are doing their utmost in a highly challenging environment, quite apart 
from the rapid and uncoordinated expansion that is taking place. They really do work 
in a rough environment. Even the mainlines are susceptible to public interference and 
plundering. As one staff officer explains, discussing the main transmission line from 
the Kpone Water Works to the Tema urban areas: 
“We have installed a parallel one to serve the communities along that line, 
because otherwise, they will sabotage our main [line]. That’s how it goes all 
throughout Ghana. Anywhere we have a big pipe or catchment area, we try 
to satisfy the communities around it as well.” (Interview Akosa-Kusi, 2018).
46 Notably, there are also important interactions between the electricity and the water sector. The erratic 
power supply affects the water treatment plants, interrupting service for up to 20 hours a day (Denys 
N.V. & The GIS Company, 2012, p. 24). This points to a subtle difference between the two amenities: 
while water supply is arguably more vital to the functioning of human life than electricity, uninterrupted 
electricity supply is clearly more important than uninterrupted water supply, as electricity cannot 
effectively be stored at this point. This was also one of the major sources of complaint of the infamous 
Dumsor Report, which infamously ranked neighborhoods on who had the most “disco lights” (on-off 
continuously).
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7.4 Alternative water technologies
The previous two sections have set out respective the dynamics of collectivisation 
at the local and the citywide level, the accompanying technical and organisational 
difficulties and the resulting weak service at the citywide level. This section analyses 
how these circumstances have propelled the development of several alternative water 
provision systems, as more and more residents choose (and can afford to) arrange their 
water provision through more privatised means. The main technologies here are water 
tanker trucks, borehole drilling companies, sachet water providers, polytank water 
selling points and other informal business lines. This includes many residents who are 
in fact connected to the GWC network but do not wish to depend on it. I use these 
sectors as a lens to understand the dialectic between collective and individual systems, 
moderated through technology, and to gauge its current development. 
Data from 2014 (see table 7.2 below) show the following pattern of water usage. Although 
71% of residents are still connected to the GWC network, sachets have mostly replaced this 
as a source of drinking water, and are now the primary source of drinking water for the 
majority (70.9%) of Accra’s residents. Especially in Greater Accra, the tanker and vendor 
industry is making increasing inroads, providing 17.4% of households with their regular 
water supply. Unfortunately this is a tricky category, which lumps two very different 
supply technoligies together. Vendors often operate their own borehole and sell part of its 
produce to their neighbours, which makes them a very different enterprise from tankers. 
 1996  2000 2010 2010 2014 2014
 drinking drinking drinking other drinking other
Pipe-borne water connection 49% 48% 55% 72% 14% 35%
Pipe-borne water private conne 50% 51% 10% 12% 13% 37%
Pipe-borne water standpipe/bou 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Private bulk sources 0% 0% 3% 8% 1% 7%
Private borehole or well 1% 0% 3% 0% 1% 17%
Tanker supply  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
(“Vendor” for 2010/2014) 
Private packaged sources 0% 0% 1% 7% 1% 0%
Bottled water 0% 0% 26% 1% 71% 2%
Sachet water 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 7.2: Sources of residents’ drinking water and other water, from the 2000 and 2010 census 
for the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area, including Tema and its surrounding urban areas. 
Results for 1996 and 2014 for the same area except for Tema and its surrounding urban areas. 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2000, 2013; 2014, pp. 89-92; OTUI, 1997, pp. 53-54).
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Other urban areas in Ghana do not have such a dominant sachet water industry, seeing 
instead an expanding use of wells, with over 1/3 of people now relying on those for 
their non-drinking water supply, and 20.2% for their drinking water. Notably, in Accra 
wells are hardly used for drinking water, because the groundwater so near the ocean is 
generally somewhat salty.
In short, the dominant or rising alternative water industries are boreholes, tankers 
and sachets. In fact, the most recent dominant trend appears to be the replacement 
of both pipe-borne and well water by sachets, at least for drinking purposes. How do 
these auxiliary industries work, and what characteristics have made especially these 
solutions rise so steeply recently? In the next section, I go into each one briefly. 
The Greater Accra urban area has a serious industry of boreholes. This is a technology 
that has advanced in large strides over the past decades. Where in the past, relatively 
rudimentary technologies were used to dig boreholes, first Chinese and later Indian 
machinery was brought in which pushed Ghana’s borehole industry forward (Agbeka, 
2018). Today Ghana’s borehole drilling industry is dominated by Indian entrepreneurs, 
who own most of the productive capital. Through technological advances, the costs 
for a simple but professionally built borehole for domestic use have fallen to 8.000-
13.500 cedi (€1.500 - 2.500) (Agbeka, 2018).47 In comparison, a connection to the 
GWC network comes in at around 700 cedi (€140) on average (Musah, 2018), but 
the price steeply rises depending on one’s distance to the network, with a cost around 
10.000 (€1.800) and beyond for distances from 100 meters upwards (Akosa-Kusi, 
2018a). Coupled with the unreliability of the GWC network pressure, this has severely 
changed the calculus for individual homeowners.
Although the cost calculus between boreholes and GWC connections is shifting, this 
option still remains quite restricted to the wealthy and the well-established. Civil 
servants make up a large part of the industry’s customer base, in addition to politicians 
who often get the borehole for a sachet water production plant. Other customers are 
wealthy businesspeople and gated communities or ‘estates’ (Agbeka, 2018). Especially 
in the wealthier communities now developing in Accra’s outskirts, this is increasingly 
becoming an alternative to the GWC network. In our research, we encountered areas 
where almost every single house had its own borehole, such as Bulasu. 
47 An unrelated note: our interviewee indicated that for a government tender, he would charge 3-4 that 
amount. Most likely the additional money would go to a politician’s front company. The engineering 
company itself would receive roughly the same price as they would for a private drilling job.
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However, it is clear that the borehole industry does not provide a reliable and sustainable 
option for water provisioning. For one, the groundwater in much of Accra’s urban 
area is too salty (Agbeka, 2018). Additionally, ground water levels do not replenish 
quickly enough. Estimated water demand in 2012 stood at 234 million m3 per year, 
and was expected to double before 2030. Meanwhile, calculations from Switch (Adank 
et al., 2011, p. 15) estimate the replenishing capacity of Accra’s groundwater reservoirs 
to be around 38 million m3/year. The infiltration rate (rainwater filtering down to 
become groundwater) is also falling as more and more of the city is covered in concrete 
(Interview Schut, 2018). This means that around the year 2020, only 10% of Greater 
Accra’s water supply could sustainably be drawn from the groundwater (assuming 
this to be optimally distributed throughout the city, which it is not), and this number 
would continue to fall. Coupled with the fact that much of this groundwater is salty, 
this makes boreholes at best a partial replacement for the collective water provision 
network. 
Another prominent alternative water supply system is the water tanker industry. This 
term refers to a truck with a water tank mounted on it, generally with a capacity of 
5.000-20.000 liters. Although the option has been around for as long as motorised 
transport was available, a drastic expansion in use of tanker water took place in late 
‘80s and early ‘90s. At first, these tankers got their water by tapping the GWCL fire 
hydrants illegally (Odai & Andam, 2002, p. 3), but as the industry grew, this was not a 
tenable practice. So in 1992, government pushed the tanker operators to get organised 
in order for them to be regulated effectively. The tanker owner-operators formed the 
Private Water Tanker Owners Association (PWTOA), and special depots were created 
to supply these tankers. 
At the time of formation of the PWTOA around 1990 (sources differ on the exact 
year), some 30-40 tanker wagons were active (Odai & Andam, 2002). However, the 
industry quickly took off at a larger scale. In 1996, Accra had ten hydrants filling 
points (so-called ‘giraffes’) for water service trucks (OTUI, 1997, p. 102). One of these 
was GWC-owned, but the others were run by private associations, either within the 
PWTOA or within similar structures. A 2002 investigation found some 1.000 tanker 
wagons to be active throughout Greater Accra (Odai & Andam, 2002, p. 4). At the 
time, 5 depots were designated especially for this work in Greater Accra. Since then, 
the industry appears to have decreased somewhat again (though estimates differ 
wildly), but membership of the PWTOA still stood at 400 in 2009 (GWP, 2009, p. 6). 
It should be noted that these members are generally owners, not driver-owners, so 
they may well own more than one truck each (Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006, p. 57). It is 
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unclear how many tankers are in operation today. GWC personnel estimated that the 
industry is not a growing one (Akosa-Kusi, 2018b). 
These tankers serve an important role in bringing treated water to those residents who 
are living outside the GWC network range and who cannot afford boreholes, or whose 
area has salty groundwater. However, the business is a rather informally structured 
one, and as such the tankers are often seen as a nuisance, especially by those who 
are connected to the GWC mainlines. Tanker companies are depicted as leeches who 
take scarce water from the mainlines, caused taps to run dry even sooner. In times of 
scarcity, this has led to political pressure on GWC to temporarily disconnect vendors 
and trucks from the network (Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006, p. 83), in effect rationing 
in favor of those holding a physical connection rather than a resale connection. First 
reported by Odai and Andam (2002), we also find later instances of this in Sarpong and 
Abrampah (2006, p. 83) and Rouse (2013). Private ownership of the water company 
appeared to have no significant impact on this tug-of-war, as the same occurred again 
under the management of AquaVitens, in 2010 (GNA, 2010). 
The tanker owners and operators naturally resist this frame. As one driver put it: “We 
are not mere charlatans selling water to unfortunate needy households for money. Far 
from that, we are performing a critical social role of giving access to water to needy 
communities and helping the government to meet a critical social responsibility.” 
(Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006, p. 46) On this, the tankers receive support from water 
governance expert Rouse (2013, pp. 175-176), who notes that Ghana’s management 
of water tankering operations through the structure of the PWTOA (Agyemang-
Mensah, 2015) and other such associations, coupled with a system of dedicated filling 
hydrants, “could have provided a model for the world”. As he notes: “Tankers will be 
necessary to reach the un-served until the distribution systems have been refurbished 
and extended.” It should be noted that this system of filling hydrants, even when it was 
fully active, was quite insufficient to supply all tankers. Wagons had to wait for up to 6 
hours, in order to be served (Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006, p. 58) 
Who are the primary customer base for these tankers? There is a popular perception 
that they mainly serve the wealthier strata. This is also what we found in our fieldwork 
of Accra’s newly developing suburbs, where we found several upper-class communities 
which had been disappointed by the GWC’s ability to deliver, and had opted to source 
their water from tankering operations instead. On the other hand, the rich are certainly 
not their only customer base. It should be noted that piped water is still not ubiquitous, 
and not readily available to the urban poor. A 2005 report found that only 15% of the 
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poor have access to piped water either directly or via yard taps (Sarpong & Abrampah, 
2006).
How do these groups deal with the high price of tanker water? They simply buy less. 
The research found that the poorer residents without connections consumed around 
25% of the amount that pipe-connected citizens receive, (PURC, 2005, p. 8) but pay 
approximately the same total monthly amount of money for their water supply (PURC, 
2005, p. 18). Tankered water was found to be, on average, nine times more expensive 
than piped water (PURC, 2005, p. 18). It is unlikely that this has changed radically 
since then. During fieldwork, we found that wealthier households paid around 300 
cedi (€60) per month for their tankered water, which with the average consumption of 
a well-off household would come down to approximately 10x the water price of pipe-
borne water. 
In general though it appears that even for the poor, the price of a liter of water is 
less of an issue than its availability. Research consistently finds that connecting is the 
prohibitory cost (Akosa-Kusi, 2018a; Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006, p. 37; World Bank, 
2018), and that the water bill itself is a relatively small expenditure in every household 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2014, p. 143). However, this finding is not undisputed either. 
Sarpong and Abrampah (2006, p. 41) find from focus group that poor households in 
non-GWC-networked areas frequently spend >20% of their income on water. And in 
all likelihood, this is still the majority of poor households. As a recent EU report found: 
“Because of the legal and financial barriers faced by the poor, it is mostly the wealthier 
strata of the population that is connected to the GWCL network, which enables them 
to profit from the considerably lower rates per unit of water than people who are not 
able to connect. The majority of people in the GAMA (Greater Accra Metropolitan 
Area), especially the poor, depend on alternative water service providers.” (Adank et 
al., 2011, p. 44)
In short, the tankering industry is part of a rich tapestry of alternative water supply 
systems, an industry which is rapidly maturing, certainly in Greater Accra.
A final alternative to pipe-borne water is the sachet water industry. This technology has 
emerged from the practice during the 1970s and 1980s to sell water by the cup along 
the road, which in the 1990s developed into little plastic bags, tied up by hand. In the 
late 1990s, the industry got another technological upgrade when the Chinese brought 
in heat-sealing machines (Stoler, Weeks, & Fink, 2012). Nowadays, sachets typically 
consist of 500 ml plastic bags, heat-sealed on either end, and sold in batches of 20 for 
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home use or individually along the road. In fact, the sachet industry has spawned an 
entire new line of employment for low-skilled women, who sell refrigerated sachet 
water directly to car drivers and passengers at traffic lights for 0,20 cedi (€0,04) from 
plastic bowls carried on their heads. 
These sachets are cheap to produce, extremely easy to transport and perfectly suitable 
for sale in bulk or as individual packages. Colloquially known as ‘pure water’, they 
are also generally perceived as higher quality than pipe-borne water and borehole 
water (Stoler, Fink, et al., 2012). This has caused the consumption of water sachets to 
rise exponentially in Greater Accra over the past years. Estimates of the percentage 
of Accra’s population using this as their primary source of drinking water range from 
26% to 71% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013, 2014).
In Accra’s popular discourse, sachets are primarily discussed in terms of their negative 
environmental impact, as they constitute a major part of Accra’s enormous plastic waste 
problem. Discarded everywhere by its users throughout the year, these little plastic 
bags lump together to clog Accra’s water ways and drains by the millions, through 
which these hygienic water storage tools ironically causes water-borne diseases. 
During the rainy season these blockages often lead to flooding, in particular in the 
lower-lying areas of the city such as the extremely dense Old Fadama slum area next 
to Jamestown. However, they have potential health benefits as well, as they interrupt 
the bacterial chain of infection. Stoler et al. (2012) find that sachet use is associated 
with higher levels of self-reported overall health in women, and lower likelihood of 
diarrhea in children. 
In short, there is a proliferation of alternatives to the GWC network. See figure 7.8 
below for an overview of the current system. 
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Figure 7.8: An overview of the patchwork of water sources used by Greater Accra’s residents. 
(WASH coalition, 2014, p. 35). N.B.: the numbers given here are for a single municipality in 
Greater Accra. For a better numerical overview of the system, see table 7.2 above, at the start 
of empirical section 4. 
What does the growth of these sectors of individualised water provision mean for the 
dynamics in and around the collective sector? Until recently, there was no question 
that the GWC pipe network was the dominant and indeed universally preferred option 
of water supply. In 2005, a survey found that the near universal reply to “What is your 
preferred water source?” was: GWC (PURC, 2005, p. 13). Today, people still like to get 
GWC water, as this water source is still safer than borehole and protected well water 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2014, p. 98).48 However, the balance is shifting. Whilst in 
48 It should be noted that, while the relative quality of water is shifting, customers may not immediately 
pick up on this. Research on user perceptions of drinking water quality showed that people mostly 
assess water by looking at its color (80%), smelling for chlorine (10%) or simply tasting the water 
(10%) (Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006, p. 44).
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2006, it was still the case that sachet water was generally inferior to pipe-born water 
(Sarpong & Abrampah, 2006), today sachet and bottled water is generally of far better 
quality than piped water. So the question arises: for how long will the GWC network 
be the generally preferred option? For drinking water, people have already switched 
massively to other sources. And certainly in the suburbs, residents are increasingly 
using tankers and wells for other water needs as well.
One clue to the future of the network may be provided by a neighbourhood meeting 
I attended during the most recent fieldwork round. The meeting in question was the 
Residents Association of Okatabanman, a neighbourhood located about halfway 
between the Accra city center and the northern urban fringe. The topic of debate was 
whether the neighbourhood should attempt to secure a connection to the GWC water 
network. Like in most of the newly growing neighbourhoods in the outer parts of 
Greater Accra, Okatabanman’s residents had largely been left to its own devices in 
terms of connecting to utility networks. In general, the enthusiasm for the proposal 
was sub-par, as the costs were seen as very high, and participants saw no reliable way 
to transcend the inevitable collective action problems associated with the funding and 
construction of such a piece of infrastructure. 
At that point, unexpectedly two of the most prominent association members stepped 
forward, saying: 
“Even though we ourselves already have boreholes ourselves, we 
feel that treated water should be available for all. This is a civilised 
neighbourhood. So we are putting up 1.000 cedi each as a seed 
investment, to be repaid once other contributions are added.” 
Such citizen initiative is laudable, and I have heard of similar actions in other 
neighbourhoods. But in the larger scheme of things, it appears to be rather the 
exception than the rule. More and more of those settling on Accra’s outskirts appear 
to decide that a pipe-borne water connection, nice as it would be to have, is just not 
worth the trouble, and rely on boreholes and tankers instead. 
It remains to be seen where this will end. Is piped water going to go the way of 
telephone landlines, a technological relic of physical connectedness replaced by a web 
of individual solutions? All in all, we have seen over the past century a historical reversal 
in the water sector. While pipe-borne water used to be a provision for a small (colonial) 
elite, with boreholes serving the hoi polloi, the situation is now largely reversed. More 
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than half of Accra’s 5 million residents are in one way or another connected to the 
GWC pipe network. This rapid and on-going expansion of the user base has caused 
its service to become rather unreliable and increasingly sparse. Consequently the 
wealthier strata, especially in Accra’s burgeoning peri-urban areas, are opting out of 
the GWC network as a primary water supply, constructing private boreholes and using 
tanker water instead. 
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Figure 7.9: an analytical view on the collectivisation and individualisation dynamics in the water 
sector. 
Figure 7.9 above shows this dynamic in an analytical framework. Its basic dynamics 
are positive feedback loops within both the collectivisation and the individualisation 
sectors. As the collective amenity grows, more and more people are included in it, 
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strengthening it with their money and their political support. But the same dynamic 
works for the individual provision sectors: as more and more people opt for a borehole, 
the drilling industry matures, becomes cheaper and more omnipresent, etc., with the 
same dynamics applying to sachets, water tankers and other privatised solutions. 
Throughout this entire dynamic, we see the effects of changing technology shifting 
the balance. As the technologies for private solutions improve, they rise. But as smart 
meters, online payment systems and GIS monitoring systems help the GWC to track 
its customers and its network, the collective solution becomes more feasible.
7.5 Comparison with electricity
To better understand the decentralising expansion dynamics of the water network 
and its associated challenges for the backbone, as well as its social consequences, it is 
instructive to make the comparison with a somewhat similar utility: electricity. In this 
section, I briefly set out the expansion dynamics of the electricity network, following 
the same analytical pathway as in the preceding three sections for the water sector. It 
is important to note here that this is a minor comparative case, with fewer interviews, 
fewer field observations, and therefore a briefer treatment in this chapter. It is, in 
fact, a kind of ‘robustness check’ of the theory established in the previous sections. 
Time-strapped readers could therefore elect to skip this section and get straight to the 
conclusions.
The first electricity supply in Ghana appeared during the colonial era (Kumi, 2017). 
The Gold Coast Railway Administration established the first public electricity 
generation system in 1914, to supply electricity for the operations of the railway sector 
in Sekondi (ISSER, 2005). Subsequently, other spots appeared, as factories, hospitals 
and schools installed the first diesel generators. At first, the network grew in a slow, 
measured manner, with the governor giving specific permission for every extension to 
the network as late as the 1940s (Director of Prisons, 1947). 
Just before independence, electricity had been extended to major population centers 
including Kumasi, Tema, Accra, Nsawam, Tamale and Bolgatanga under the auspices 
of the Public Works Department (PWD) (Kumi, 2017). However, at this juncture the 
reach of electricity networks was still very limited. Archival files of the Ministry of 
Works and Housing show that in the early 1960s, the electricity mains were only just 
being extended into much of central Accra, let alone the (then) outskirts of the city. 
A major juncture occurred in 1972, when the Akosombo Dam came online, bringing 
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massive new capacity (912 MW) to the network. Several decades later, the network 
had grown much in the urban area, but almost the entire countryside was still off-grid 
(Kumi, 2017). In 1989, Rawlings’ government committed to achieve universal access 
to electricity, at a time when only 15-20% of the population was connected. 
How can we couple this back to the analysis of the water network expansion in terms of 
regime type, political time horizon and the accompanying investment interconnection 
between investment in the backbone or in the distribution network? The regime type is 
the same for both utilities, and we see roughly the same pattern of expansion: regimes 
which did not expect to stay in place for long did not make this kind of long-term 
investments, and their degree of populism determined to what degree they grew the 
distribution network, either by constructing new service lines or by simply allowing 
people to extend these on their own. 
Today, Ghana’s electricity networks are run by an independent state company: the 
Electricity Company of Ghana. Unlike water, there is a single company which runs 
electricity throughout the country, both in urban and in rural areas. As it is relatively 
cheap and straightforward to extend power lines compared to water or roads, electricity 
is often one of the first amenities to reach a newly developing neighbourhood.  In 
most cases, the electricity lines arrive in newly developing areas ahead of the water 
pipe network. In fact, the two are closely related: GWC managers generally try to lay 
their mainlines along the exact same routes as the electricity wiring to ease planning 
(Interview Amoatuy, 2018). The main reason behind this is that it is far simpler and 
cheaper to build new electricity lines. A 100-meter stretch costs around 2.500 cedi, 
compared to 10.000 cedi for 100 meters of water piping, which costs far more material, 
and requires digging and burying at a meter depth along the entire length. 
Recent modalities of network expansion
So by what processes does the network expand? Much like in the water sector, the 
main driving force is citizen initiative. But this manifests itself in very different ways, 
in different configurations with other parties. I found four main ways: organised 
development projects, legal private initiative, illegal private initiative, and politically 
driven expansions. I discuss each of these in turn. 
The first one, directly mentioned by ECG officers in interviews, is in the form of a 
planned Development Project. Every district manager has funding for a limited 
amount of ECG-funded geographical expansion, which is planned year by year. 
This is generally funded through local taxes, through the government budgets like 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below340
Rural Electrification Program, the Urban Electrification Program, and using money 
from international donors. Such projects are run through the Regional and Head 
offices, which assist with the planning and procurement of materials. These are the 
Development projects, where an entire new area is connected, and residents afterward 
only have to pay for the connection to their front door. 
There are, however, several other methods of expansion, since the pace of Development 
projects is generally too slow for many residents. The first one of these, like in the 
water sector, is by resident initiative, which can take several different forms. Those 
with enough impatience and money can apply to the ECG District office to get a self-
funded extension to their home, where the main cost is adding a few electricity poles 
(including all the wiring) to the end of the line, to reach their home. As Mary Liabor, 
Maintenance Engineer in the ECG Afienya District, explains: “Community members 
come together, write to us, “we need power in this area”. Then quickly the District 
Engineer takes it up, write a proposal, does drawings for approval, and then gives them 
a quote.  In these cases, customers pay for the full cost of the extension to their home.” 
Within neighbourhoods, I found that the most common method is the same as in the 
water sector: residents organise through an RA, pool their resources, and build the 
network bit by bit. 
Every new extension benefits others around that house, who can also connect once 
their neighbour has paid for the poles to be set up, without paying such a prohibitive 
cost. This often also happens by citizen initiative. In 6 out of the 9 neighbourhoods 
we studied, the electricity network came in through lobbying and funds collection by 
a Residents Association. In 7 out of those 9 neighbourhoods, residents subsequently 
also funded and put up streetlights themselves, to prevent break-ins and robberies 
during the otherwise pitch-black nights. 
However, not all communities follow such proper procedures. Liabor continues: 
“In some places without network, the community decides to extend it 
without coming to the ECG. They call the so-called goro boys, people 
who have just a little knowledge of electricity. These guys find an area 
which has no electricity, and tell people: oh, we work for ECG, we can 
extend power to you. That is why you see the users getting just any 
[type of] pole at all, to pull it in from far away, and then they extend low 
voltage to them. Which is dangerous.” (Interview Liabor, 2018)
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Often, these connections go unnoticed for long periods, as there may be some 
distance or thick vegetation between the known urban area and the newly developing 
settlement. These illegal connections often also happen without the full awareness of 
the residents in question. Although this seems rather incredible, our interlocutors at 
the ECG explained how it might happen. Many of the so-called goro boys, who illegally 
connect people, also work for bona fide companies. In their spare time, they go door-
to-door, wearing their uniforms, and offer to connect people to the network. When 
the power then dysfunctions, or voltage is too low, residents actually go to the ECG to 
complain about poor service. The ECG discovers many newly connected households 
this way.
As electric wires are far cheaper than water pipes, extensions to the ECG network are 
frequently also built by the very poor, who often occupy uncompleted structures in 
the peri-urban areas. The construction of a new dwelling in Ghana’s suburbs is often a 
process of several years, as the owner slowly scrapes the funds together for each next 
step. In the meantime, he will generally ask a poor relative or acquaintance to live in 
the structure, rent-free, as a caretaker. Often, though, these caretakers get friends or 
relatives in without the owner’s knowledge, often even catching rent from them. In 
many other cases, structures are simply squatted, especially in urban fringe districts 
where building density is low and social control is limited. Polythene bags are used 
to cover the windows, to avoid visibility, and any number of people might be staying 
inside an uncompleted structure. Such squatters or semi-squatters often cannot afford 
a regularised connection, so they just reconnect illegally whenever possible.
A final way of network growth is through politically driven projects. Where the 
Development Projects are planned by the ECG District itself, politicians often have 
personal budgets which they use to connect additional communities to electricity. This 
often happens especially close to election time, and in a haphazard fashion. With limited 
budgets, politicians push the ECG personnel to connect as many people as possible. 
This leads to a poorly planned network structure, and inadequate materials for the 
larger network, such as 10-meter wooden poles, leading through a thickly grown forest 
where trees touch the lines. As soon as there is a storm, the network breaks down. But 
the alternative, using taller metal pylons, is doubly as expensive, which means that the 
politician only gets to boast half as much community service for the same money. And 
while engineers rush out to connect as many communities as possible, the backbone 
infrastructure is neglected. Untreated poles are used for the connection lines, which 
in Ghana’s tropical climate get rotten within a few years. Under-sized conductors are 
installed, hampering further extension of the network.
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At a smaller scale, such politically driven expansion happens in purely illegal fashions 
as well. Often, the local Assembly Member will use electricity as a campaigning issue. 
In Liabor’s words: 
“He can tell them [the residents] anything. ‘I will give you power, I will pay 
your bills.’ Meanwhile, he is simply getting goro boys to connect them 
and nobody is paying at all. But the people don’t realise this. Because the 
Assemblyman is from government, they think it’s correct, and then they 
are angry when we come to disconnect them. Because the hinterlands, 
the villages, most of them are not enlightened [educated]. They think 
you can just get power [without paying].” 
As election time draws nearer, there is an additional dynamic which complicates 
the ECG manager’s work. Although the most expensive part of getting electricity is 
extending the mains, getting a metered private connection is also not cheap, even once 
the lines are near enough. Through the Rural Electrification projects, government 
provides free meters to those who cannot afford their own. However, in election time 
these are handed out at a crash pace, leading to more chaos in the system. Eduful 
explains, from his experience in a peri-urban district: 
“…election is very close. So you get meters all over the place. They call 
some of them “political meters”. They just install them, install them, 
around elections. (…) you don’t even know where those are, who are 
holding those political meters. At the end of the day, we are supposed 
to go and capture [register] them. They are normally supplied by the 
government. We have our meters, but if it is the Rural Electrification 
project, then government supports and supplies their own meters. 
Those ones, the meters are all free. But because of the chaos when the 
meters are distributed, it takes a loooong time to go around and find 
out who actually got the meters. So in my view, these are some of the 
reasons why power is very unstable sometimes. Because, no mistake, 
the communities deserve it! But we should also look at the reliability of 
the network. And then it’s on and off, on and off, that kind of thing.”49
49 These “political meters”, produced and distributed as part of the rural electrification project, are also 
frequently traded on the black market (Interview Tweneboah-Kodua, 2016)
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Problems resulting from a sprawled-out network
This wide diversity of network expansion dynamics has led to a network which is even 
more sprawled-out than GWC’s water pipe network. In Greater Accra, it is estimated 
that a full 93% of residences are now connected to the electricity network (Ghana 
Statistical Service, 2014, p. xix). Obviously, this has lead to a number of problems.
The most visible of these problems is a very simple backbone problem: there is not 
enough electricity to serve all those connected to the network. As I first visited Ghana 
in 2014, the very first local word I learned was dumsor.50 Composed of the Twi words 
dum and so, meaning ‘off ’ and ‘on’, ‘dumsor dumsor’ is generally used to refer to the 
recurrent phenomenon of power outages and load shedding. Ghana suffered severe 
power rationing in the years 1983–1984, 1997–1998, 2003, 2006–2007 and from 2011 
to date (Kumi, 2017). The phenomenon has been getting more severe since 2001, when 
lower water levels at the Akosombo Dam caused its electricity generation capacity to 
drop drastically. The energy crisis was particularly severe in the years around 2010, 
and was used extensively in political campaigning at the time. At the time of writing, 
the issue was still unresolved.
Figure 7.10: The ECG’s published schedule of rolling blackouts, grouping Greater Accra into three 
zones which should receive power by rotation. (Aidoo, 2015)
Although the outages were planned as a rolling blackout, with equal allocations for all 
neighbourhoods (see figure 7.10 above), research clearly showed that this was not the 
50 Far from being an obscure piece of local jargon, the word has its own Wikipedia page and is used in 
official documents. The word also provided a rallying flag for several high-profile citizen initiatives, 
including the detailed and well-researched Dumsor Report (Aidoo, 2015).
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case (see figure 7.11 below). A combination of routing problems, network failures and 
corruption meant that the delivery to Ministries, for instance, was 95% of the time, and 
even the scheduled rolling blackouts did not happen.
Figure 7.11: The actual power supply schedule (Aidoo, 2015). Note that several areas received 
more than the alotted power, such as the Ministries neighbourhood.
Some suggested commercial motivations for the unequal delivery patterns. For 
instance, industry expert dr. Charles Wereko-Brobby said that: “the only schedule 
that matters is where ECG thinks it will get paid.” (quoted in Aidoo, 2015) However, 
this seems unlikely to be the main driver. Given that we know from ECG District 
managers (Interviews Liabor, Eduful, 2018) that the wealthy are often among the most 
difficult to convince to pay, it seems unlikely that the ECG coffers benefit much from 
serving Ridge better than Odorkor. And given that we know from officers at the GWC 
(Interview Musah, 2018) that state and semi-state organisations frequently do not pay 
each other, it seems far more likely that corruption is the main driver of this unequal 
delivery.
A final challenge the ECG faces is that of cost recovery. As is the case for the GWC, 
many of its clients are connected illegally. Many others were once connected legally but 
have slipped out of the books, one way or another. In addition, much power is simply 
lost in transmission, because of the poor construction and outdated materials used in 
many parts of the network. Currently, transmission and distribution losses account for 
some 22% of total electricity consumption annually (Kumi, 2017). 
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ECG Response
So how does the ECG work to keep control over its network, to keep the massively 
sprawled-out network more or less functioning, and to prevent it from over-stretching 
the backbone infrastructure too much? 
The initial narrative the organisation projects, just like the GWC, is one of strict control: 
from the district over its geographical area, and from the head office control over the 
district units. George Eduful, former District Manager and current Research Manager 
in the ECG’s R&D Division, described to us how the ECG Districts are kept on a short 
leash. “The Region, they oversee the Districts. So the Districts handle the minor-minor 
things, but even for those the Region has to give them approval. If somebody says that 
they want a power line extended to his house, then the District can handle it only up to 
2 poles.” The Regions, in turn, are overseen by the organisation’s national headquarters, 
where Eduful himself works. 
But although HQ insists on tight control of the regions, the network appears to be in 
fact quite decentralised. In fact, there is not even a central map of the whole network 
at HQ. The only network maps exist in local District offices, which in case of larger 
projects are pieced together to form an overview picture. And while it seems likely that 
ECG district managers have a tighter control over their supply lines and distribution 
patterns, because everything is above-ground and flows can be easily and precisely 
measured, this did not appear to be the case. As Mrs Liabor explained, it can take 
years to find an illegal connection, and often involves stumbling upon entire new 
settlements. 
Another major difference with the water sector is found in how the ECG handles 
resident-built connections to their network. Recapitulating, the GWC de facto leaves 
ownership and management of resident-built distribution lines to those residents 
themselves, demanding only that people get permission from their neighbours when 
they connect onward from their previous self-built lines. The ECG takes a different 
approach, quite a pragmatic one. When they find improvised or illegal connections 
to their network, they generally try to legalise these and straighten them out. Often, 
people might not be fined for connecting illegally, although in high-profile cases 
the ECG may take a stricter approach. This is a major dynamic of urban electricity 
network expansion: the ECG simply adopts resident-built extensions into their own 
network. In the process, they upgrading the quality of the lines, poles and conductors 
to their own standards. From that point forward the extension forms an integral part 
of the network. 
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This forms a sharp contrast with the water sector, where the GWC is faced with 
similarly resident-built extensions. The best the GWC can do to institutionalise these, 
is to require permission notes and try to enforce quality standards. In general, it is 
much harder for the GWC to keep its network in hand than for the ECG, quite simply 
because water pipes are buried. This makes it harder to observe wear and tear, to 
check their quality more generally, to measure flow rates, and to even just observe new 
connections. Put more bluntly, the GWC is stuck with an enormous jumble of (often 
low quality) resident-constructed and resident-managed distribution lines everywhere 
in the city, especially in the rapidly sprawling outskirts. Now, after decades of barely-
controlled network expansion, they are at least regaining an overview of the entire 
network and its quality. But the ECG situation, of owning and effectively controlling 
the entire network, is a distant dream.
Notably, some residents do not accept the regularisation, and simply reconnect their 
illegal line as soon as the ECG officials have walked away. This does not only apply to 
the very poor, who simply cannot afford a proper connection and an electricity bill. 
It also applies to a group of very wealthy electricity users. As Liabor explains, in a 
surprisingly gentle manner: 
“There are places, you serve them a document, disconnect them, and 
the very next day, they are connected again. They don’t care, they are 
not prepared to regularise anything. (…) Many of these people feel that 
whenever anyone might take them to court, they can simply pay their 
way out.” 
In such cases, the ECG eventually does scale up its response. 
“The ones who refuse us, who don’t want to do business, the really 
stubborn ones, we make an example of them. So those people, you go 
there, and they release their dog to you. Sometimes they can bring out 
guards with guns to chase you. Some of them are very rough. (…) [For 
such situations] we have a Directorate of Legal Services. Because I’m 
thinking, the way the city grows, and if a lot of people are doing this 
through tricky means… We tend to prefer to regularise them, though.”
To further counter the illegal expansion through goro boys and other illicit means, 
the ECG also puts significant resources into public education through posters, social 
media and outdoor campaigns, urging people not to connect through middle men, but 
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always to communicate directly with the ECG District Office (see figure 7.12 below). 
Figure 7.12: A poster in the ECG District Office of Afienya, an agglomeration on the northeastern 
fringe of Greate Accra, encouraging residents to only do business with the ECG directly. 
Unfortunately, I do not have sufficient insight into the ECG organisation to know 
exactly what measures they are taking at the central level to improve their overview 
of the network51. It was our impression that this overview does not exist at a highly 
centralised level, but rather at the district level, where digitised AutoCAD images 
of the local network are kept. However, two important technological factors make 
it easier for the ECG to control their network. First, electricity flow throughout the 
network is far more easily monitored than water flow, so the ECG does not have to 
worry about where their electricity is going: they can read the usage and/or loss of 
each district, and leave the internal monitoring to that district’s management. Second, 
as the ECG actually incorporates resident-built connections into their network, they 
51 We found it harder to access the ECG than to conduct interviews at the GWC, where we were welcomed 
with open arms. Then again, the ECG is a much bigger organization.
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have a far more complete overview of their network than the GWC. That is not to say 
the ECG has a complete grip on their network; one district operative told us that it 
sometimes takes years before illegal connections are discovered. But they do not have 
the problem of controlling a structurally unknowable underground pipe network, laid 
in many cases primarily by residents and invisible ever after. 
Besides countering illegal network extensions, improving cost recovery and limiting 
the unplanned and uncontrolled growth of the network, the ECG has also worked 
very hard in recent years to expand the capacity of the network’s backbone. In a 
crash project initiated in 2009 and finished in 2013, a major hydro-electric dam came 
online at the Bui national park in the north-east of the country. Various other smaller 
electricity plants were installed during the same period, in a bid to catch up with the 
rapidly growing demand. 
Heavy political pressure and the accompanying funds also led the ECG to use several 
less conventional, and less sustainable, ways to quickly raise their power generating 
capacity. In a last-ditch effort to shore up electricity supply before the 2016 election, 
the ruling government rented several Turkish vessels with massive power generators 
installed on them. This effort did not tip the scales; the opposition won. But these 
vessels, shown in figure 7.13, continue to float offshore and provide Ghana with the 
requisite additional power, at considerable expense. In the same package of emergency 
measures was a modular mobile power generating station from the Texan company 
Ameri, which is also still running, and still causing political rifts (Daily Graphic, 2018). 
Figure 7.13: The Osman Khan, one of the Turkish generator ships which has been temporarily 
relieving Ghana’s power crisis since 2015. 
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Finally, the ECG is currently being partially privatised. Following a contested and 
politically troubled bidding process (Gadugah, 2018; Ghanaweb, 2018), a consortium 
including the Philippine and Angolese state electricity companies has taken over 
49% of the ECG, for a period of 20 years. Such a privatisation effort also occurred 
in the water sector, when management of the GWC was handed over to Aqua Vitens 
Rand Ltd., a consortium of Dutch and South African companies. In that instance, the 
outcomes were below par on almost every metric, and the experiment was blown off 
after five years. As for the prospects in the ECG case, that remains a big question mark. 
Our interlocutors at the company itself were skeptical.
Privatisation dynamics
Section 4 of this chapter described a widespread proliferation of alternative industries 
for water provision. In the electricity sector, there are certainly alternatives available, 
but they are not nearly as widespread. The latest census showed that in no region of 
the country more than 1% of the households had their own generator. That does not 
mean that everyone is connected to the electricity network, but in Greater Accra, 87% 
of households use electricity from the ECG mains as their primary source of lighting. 
Electricity is still seen as somewhat expensive: many people use the ECG pre-payment 
system to keep control over their electricity bills, and cooking happens predominantly 
using charcoal or gas. But we do not see the kind of widespread proliferation of 
alternative industries as in the water provision sector. 
Why? Apparently, the alternative is simply not attractive at this point. One solution is 
to use a generator, but that is expensive and requires constant spending on fuel, not to 
mention the noise and the fact that these machines are often stolen. Other technologies 
such as solar or wind are simply not strong enough yet. A final problematic factor is 
the lack of storage options for electricity. For water, it is possible to store enough water 
for a week or more in a ubiquitous available 10.000-liter polytank. But there are no 
affordable batteries on the market yet, in which one can store enough electricity for a 
few days of residential use. 
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Figure 7.14: an analytical overview of the collectivisation and individualisation dynamics in the 
electricity sector.
Summing up, the electricity network expands in a fashion which is at least as 
haphazard as the water network. And compared to water, there is an equal amount of 
citizen initiative. Similarly, both the legal and the illegal connections are often laid in a 
haphazard fashion, putting pressure on the mainline, drawing power as well as causing 
leakages and transformer overloads. These dynamics are moderated importantly 
by the different technology for the two sectors. It is easier to monitor an electricity 
network than a water network, because electricity is transported above ground and 
flows are easily measured. Hence, the ECG is able to keep almost their entire network 
in their own hands However, there is an important difference in terms of privatisation 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 351
dynamics. For water, wealthy residents are increasingly finding their own, off-grid 
solutions. In electricity, this is not happening, because the technology for private 
supply (including storage) is not affordable and effective enough compared to drawing 
electricity from the grid. This also changes the political dynamic, shown in figure 7.14 
above: where improvement of the water backbone infrastructure is lagging behind, the 
electricity sector is getting serious emergency funding for capacity expansion, because 
it is impossible to do without the collective amenity.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the collectivisation-individualisation dynamics which are 
at work in the Greater Accra water provision sector. The analysis is based in a figurational 
sociology perspective, with a focus on the historical shifting of interdependency 
relations between various groups within the larger urban figuration, and the 
consequences this has for the development of the drinking water infrastructure. In 
this analysis, there is a conceptual separation within the piped water network between 
the distribution network, formally or informally constructed and managed, and the 
backbone infrastructure. I especially pay attention to the ways these interdependency 
relations are moderated by technological progress, driving individualisation by 
making groups less dependent on each other for their water provision, or in the reverse 
direction, making larger-scale collective schemes more feasible. 
The analysis consists of five parts. First an overview of the historical expansion 
patterns of the networks, which are understood through the regime types and degree 
of grassroots activity of the residents. Second, an exposition of the contemporary 
expansion patterns, seen from the neighbourhood perspective, in order to effectively 
highlight the central role of residents in the network expansion. Third, an overview of 
the challenges this local collective action produces at the central level, and the responses 
to these of the central collective, the GWC. Fourth, an analysis of the alternative water 
provision sectors that sprung up to supplement the defective water provision, which 
also threaten to undermine the broad support for the collective network. Fifth, a 
comparative study of the electricity sector, to test the robustness of our theoretical 
model of collectivisation-individualisation dynamics. 
We find that initially, pipe-borne water was a luxury in Accra and other major population 
centers, available only to the colonial elite and select indigenous neighbourhoods. The 
rest of the population was served, at best, with boreholes. The subsequent expansion 
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of the GWC network happened within a relatively short period of time, going in a few 
decades from a handful of local utility networks to coverage of an ever-expanding city 
of millions, under difficult economic circumstances. The expansion of the collective 
network happened in an ever more democratised and decentralised way. First, after 
independence, there was a wave of rapid expansions more or less organised by the 
government. Following this, water coverage expansion became a politically driven 
issue, as various parties attempted to gain the upper hand by providing more benefits 
for their followers. As Accra’s growth really started to go strong, citizens increasingly 
started to build their own networks, as happened in Sebrepor. Finally, in the 1990s, the 
GWC was formally decentralised, which enabled even more rapid expansion under 
the auspices of each local district. From this point onward, expansion was again driven 
by political motivations, but now also increasingly by citizen initiative. 
With some delay, this caused a historical reversion. These decades of rapid and 
decentralised expansion stretched the Ghana Water Company (GWC) far beyond 
its carrying capacity, both as an organisational entity and as a physical network. The 
result was a network which is not only sprawled too widely for the control and quality 
assurance of the GWC head office, but which is also very hard to trace and map, and 
therefore to manage. A connection to pipe-borne water became less and less exclusive, 
and consequently less reliable as the user base and geographical scope increased 
drastically. Meanwhile, the elite strata of the user base turned to more individualised 
supply technologies, such as boreholes and tanker water supply. The main drivers of 
this process were forces outside the purview and power of the GWC’s leadership and 
engineering team. 
Analysing the GWC figuration, what patterns emerge? GWC’s headquarters (HQ) is 
most concerned with keeping up the quality of service, focusing on factors like the 
treatment plants and the main transmission lines. As the GWC has never in its history 
been financially independent, it negotiates with government and international donors 
to get the required funds. Meanwhile, HQ tries to keep a grip on the decentralised 
parts of the organisation. That is, the Districts and the physical distribution network. 
At the end of the distribution network are Accra’s residents, who as they move into 
an ever expanding geographic area struggle to expand the network along with the 
inhabited space. The residents use whatever means they have available to promote 
this expansion, including pressure on politicians up for election, pressure on their 
local GWC District, and private initiative in physically expanding the network. This 
tends to stretch the network beyond its carrying capacity, both at the meso- and the 
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micro-level. At the meso-level, as wealthy developers or Residents’ Associations get 
new distribution lines laid with their own or central government money. And at the 
micro-level, as the local residents near-independently subdivide every sanctioned 
connection several times more. The GWC Districts, then, are caught in the crossfire 
between on one side their HQ, which tries to control and limit the network and to keep 
a clear sight on customers, and on the other side the residents, who demand and force 
network expansion. 
The Ghanaian state apparatus turns out to take a very particular position in this 
figuration. In principle, it is even more ‘central’ and removed from the field than 
the GWC HQ, concerned with the bigger picture. However, Ghana is a functioning 
democracy with vigorously contested elections, and this makes all the difference. 
Around election time, the politicians holding sway over that central government 
apparatus use their influence to push GWC’s management to extend coverage to 
as many areas and residents as they possibly can, even to the point of creating a 
situation of financial insolvency, and to the neglect of the backbone infrastructure. 
Finally, the whole issue is complicated one more stroke by the fact that both backbone 
infrastructure and the smaller offshoots of the network cannot be reliably planned, 
since nobody knows where the next decade of urban expansion will take place. So far, 
the pattern has been rather erratic (Doan & Oduro, 2012). 
Coupled with the rise of borehole, tanker and water storage technology, this has resulted 
in a historical reversal in the sector. Pipe-borne water used to be a provision for a small 
(colonial) elite, with boreholes serving the hoi polloi. Today, however, more than half 
of Accra’s 5 million residents are in one way or another connected to the GWC pipe 
network. This rapid and on-going expansion of the user base has caused its service 
to become rather unreliable and increasingly sparse. Consequently the wealthier 
strata, especially in Accra’s burgeoning peri-urban areas, are opting out of the GWC 
network as a primary water supply, constructing private boreholes and using tanker 
water instead. As wealth and political influence are very much aligned in Ghana, this 
means that the politically influential class is decreasingly personally invested in the 
GWC network, which may be one of the reasons why the pace of improvement in the 
company has been halting at best.
The GWC leadership is well aware of the challenges posed by the unrelenting 
stretching of their network. It employs several lines of defense, both against the public 
perception of problems, and against the problems themselves. This starts with a public 
projection of control, emanating both from HQ and from the districts. Additional 
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measures include the creation of a detailed map of their pipe network, upgrading 
metering technology, digitising, cleaning and geo-tagging their customer database to 
improve traceability and revenues, commercialising standpipes and cutting off non-
paying customers, reducing leakages and upgrading water quality. Finally, measures 
also include upgrading the backbone infrastructure whenever possible, preferably 
with international donor money, which is generally more reliable than GoG funds. 
Despite their best efforts, the forces working against collectivisation of the water sector 
are powerful, and alternative industries proliferate. 
All in all, we find strong feedback loops both in the collectivisation dynamic and in the 
individualisation dynamics. The dialectic between these is not just dependent on the 
time horizon and degree of populism in the government of that time, but also crucially 
moderated by the availability of technologies of individual amenity provision.52 
Here, the comparison with electricity proves illuminating. The electricity is like the 
water sector in a number of important aspects. First, like clean water, the production 
of electricity is also characterised by large advantages of scale, making it a natural 
candidate for being a collective amenity. Second, electricity as a collective amenity also 
depends on the presence of a physical distribution network. Third, in both of these 
sectors, we find a collective utility competing with a number of more individualised 
alternatives. All in all, the two sectors are quite comparable, and we find that the same 
core analytical model applies to its collectivisation/individualisation dynamics (see 
figure 7.15 below).53
52 For instance, the colonial regime would undoubtedly have used bottled water if it had been practicable 
at the time, leaving the locals to their own devices. Indeed, this is what many in the current expat 
community do, including private boreholes and filtering machines.
53 Several interesting puzzles remain unanswered in this framework, such as: why is there no ethnic 
profiling in the routing of service delivery, such as we find in India and other developing nations where 
demands on the public network are greater than the available supply? The fact that GWC has such 
poor control over their systems due to their uncontrolled expansion patterns may be one reason: they 
simply cannot effectively discriminate, because they don’t know exact enough how the water flows. 
However, here the comparison with electricity again proves illuminating. Electricity networks are above-
ground, and though small extra connections are often tacked on illegally, the main lines, nodes and 
connections can be easily traced. This makes it possible for an active District Manager to keep track 
of the network in his District and to manage distribution in a way that is far more active and targeted 
than would be possible in the water network. Yet even during the “dumsor dumsor” times of erratic 
and sparse delivery in the 2000s and early 2010s, there were few complains of ethnic favoritism. 
The only complaint we heard in that regard was that government ministers make good neighbors, as 
their lights were always on, as well as similar complaints about wealthy neighborhoods being treated 
better (Aidoo, 2015). This is most likely a consequence of the personal political connections of their 
inhabitants, as well as their ability to pay. But no party or other group picture emerged.
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Figure 7.15: a comparison between the water and electricity sector in terms of collectivisation-
individualisation dynamics.
However, in terms of technology, electricity is a very different sector. The technology 
for the production and storage of electricity, both at large scale and in a private home 
operation, is very different from that for water. Furthermore, the electricity network 
is far easier to build, since it requires less material, at least for its service lines, and in 
addition is completely above-ground, making digging unnecessary. This also makes it 
easier to track the network, especially since electricity flows are easier to monitor than 
water flows, granting the electricity utility company a greater degree of control over its 
network. Hence, we find that the pressures towards collectivisation or individualisation 
in the electricity sector end up completely different from the water sector, leading to 
more political support coupled with a higher degree of collectivisation.
The electricity network is, if anything, even more sprawled out than the water 
network, and delivery was severely hampered for over a decade starting around 2001. 
Still residents did not, as a rule, go off-grid, because in electricity, off-grid is still a 
far poorer option than connecting to the network. Both diesel-fueled generators and 
solar panels are expensive and prone to breakdowns, and large-capacity storage of 
electricity is all but impossible. This technological calculus and the resulting dynamics 
of individualisation create a feedback effect in the residents-utility-state figuration. 
Because in the electricity sector, it was nearly impossible to bypass the collective good, 
pressure on the government to improve the situation was far greater than the same in 
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the water sector. As a consequence, the Ghanaian state organised rapid expansion of 
electricity generation capacity. Meanwhile, capacity issues and delivery bottlenecks in 
the water sector were left languishing.
Technological advances may help to drive elites off-grid, but they are certainly not a 
one-way street to more individualism in utilities. As the use of GPS and GIS technology 
at GWC mature, company engineers will increasingly be able to trace and thus manage 
their own network, reducing losses and pollution during transmission, as well as quickly 
tracing leaks and illegal taps. Additionally, a clear and geo-referenced customer file and 
automatic measure-taking and billing, coupled with electronic payments, is currently 
strengthening their financial position, since it eliminates a large amount of practical 
hurdles towards billing and invoicing, as well as many opportunities for arbitrage and 
corruption from the system.54 Thus, the available technology moderates the social 
developments in both directions, enabling on the one hand effective collectivisation 
and on the other hand detachment from the collective amenity.
Finally, a (speculative) note on the future. Currently, the water sector is individualising, 
while the electricity sector remains almost completely collectivised. However, if we 
follow this analytical framework into the future, it looks like this trend may well be 
reversed completely. Private water solutions either depend on the collective network 
(sachets are largely filled with piped water, tanker trucks load up at GWC loading 
points), or on groundwater. And Accra’s groundwater aquifers are quite likely to be 
depleted in the near future, both because of increasing drainage through private 
boreholes and because of decreasing infiltration of rain water in a city covered with 
concrete. This would make boreholes a less likely source of water. As for electricity, the 
biggest hurdles for further individualisation are private energy production and private 
energy storage. But solar panel prices have been dropping like a stone over the past 
decade, and are likely to continue doing so. Similarly, home electricity storage systems 
are currently arriving at the mass-market stage. Once those two technologies mature, 
support among the wealthy and powerful for the collective electricity provision may 
well start declining rapidly.
54 Still, this effect should not be overestimated. Maintenance does not happen automatically, and 
sources both inside and outside the company agree that GWC has a rather poor maintenance culture 
(Interviews GWC employees, Schut, Sedafor). The same goes for electricity. For both of these utilities, 
the poor maintenance culture surrounding the collective amenity is also an important factor in driving 
individualization.
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 357








Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below366 8
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 367
Conclusion
This chapter concludes. Section 8.1 summarises and comments on the methodology developed through this thesis. Section 8.2 then lays out the findings per empirical chapter, accompanied 
by a description of how this specific methodology was necessary 
to reach those conclusions. Section 8.3 answers the main research 
question, as well as setting out the more theoretical findings of the 
study with regard to forms of organization for collective amenities. 
Section 8.4 provides some suggestions for further research. 
In addition, Appendix 1 provides a number of suggestions for 
development workers, policy makers and other practitioners. These 
are based on this research, but build also on my personal impressions 
of ten months of fieldwork in Accra. As practical recommendations, 
they lack the safe, careful wording and hedging that is an inherent and 
necessary aspect of academic research. Rather, they are expressed 
bluntly and formulated somewhat provocatively, in order to come 
across clearly and provoke discussion. Hence, they are not part of this 
conclusion, but stand outside the research thesis itself, in an appendix.8
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We are currently in the midst of an unprecedented growth of urban areas worldwide, 
with the highest rates of growth being in Sub-Saharan African cities. The new urban 
fabric is coming into being in a rather haphazard way, with residents moving far ahead 
of government planners and infrastructure. Hence, resident activity in creating roads, 
water, electricity and other collective amenities is a crucial formative factor for these new 
stretches of urban fabric. Their successes and failures in developing infrastructure in the 
early days of settlement in these areas will lock in the future development path for quality 
of life in these cities. In this thesis, I have attempted to shed light on that development 
process of new urban fabric, through the lens of grassroots organization for collective 
amenities. This chapter brings together the results of the research project and suggests 
ways forward.
8.1 Methodology: mapping the city from below
As noted in the introduction, the vantage points one takes during research greatly 
affects what one can see. Interviews with civil servants produce a totally different image 
of reality than interviews with residents, even if the topic is the same. Ethnographic 
fieldwork produces another image still, and quantitative work can add or solidify 
insights in completely different ways again. Together, such activities (or ‘methods’) 
form a larger approach: a methodology. And though this is generally the most 
enthusiastically skipped chapter of a research report, it is quite vital to understand 
where findings come from. In the below section, I briefly discuss the methodology that 
was developed through this thesis, and the way it affects the findings and conclusions 
of the project.
One day during fieldwork in early 2018, as we woke up in the outskirts of Accra, we 
found our water taps dry and our toilet flush tank empty.55 This was not an extraordinary 
event, in and of itself. But as a brief inquiry revealed, this time the issue was not with 
our household plumbing. A construction crew had accidentally crashed their bulldozer 
through some underground 4” distribution pipes, and the entire neighborhood had been 
affected. Only those with large polyester tanks in their backyard still had water; everyone 
else was buying from them by the bucket. 
We asked our hosts whether the state utility Ghana Water Company (GWC) had been 
called in. They said no, that this would take too long or, that they might not come at 
all. Instead, a local plumber had been called out of bed: Jacob Milehu, known to all as 
55 At the time I was conducting fieldwork together with my supervisor, dr. Uitermark.
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Mr Jacob. We had interviewed him before, because he had played a large role in the 
construction of the local piped water distribution network during the previous decades. 
During that interview, he had also explained that he was still the main person maintaining 
the network in the neighborhood. But such claims are hard to verify, until this kind of 
practical experience proves them to be true. 
We quickly organized an appointment with the GWC district manager and asked 
him to tell us about the origins of the water pipe network in the area. He responded 
enthusiastically and went into various technical explanations. When we pushed a little 
and asked whether citizens might also have been involved in the construction of the 
network, he vehemently denied this. Perhaps a few illicit lengths of pipe here and there, 
he said, but nothing more. And could any citizens still be involved in the upkeep of the 
network? No, that was all his job, and his team was extremely efficient- one of the fastest 
district teams in the city, he was proud to tell us. 
Later that day, we passed by Mr Jacob’s house again. We found him sitting in his 
garden, surrounded by lengths of the broken 4” pipes which he had salvaged from the 
construction site. He patiently explained to us how he had been called out of bed to hear 
of the wreckage, quickly closed valves at strategic points throughout the neighborhood 
to limit spillage, while keeping the water flowing in as much of the network as possible, 
and set in some new material to at least keep the network operational. For the GWC, 
he only had kind words: without them, no drinking water. When asked why they would 
paint such a different picture of the situation, he shrugged. “Perhaps they don’t like to talk 
about it too much,” he said, “it’s a big district after all. They have a hard job, but we are 
in good contact.”
After these neighborhood-level interviews, we also went all the way up the GWC hierarchy, 
interviewing regional managers and various officials at the GWC national headquarters. 
These, too, were very productive interviews, which produced a host of new insights. But 
an important part of the reason that they were so productive is that we had arrived there 
with a practical knowledge from our experience on the ground. If we had gone in the 
other direction, from top-to-bottom, we would have never arrived at Mr Jacob, and we 
would have never learned that most of the neighborhood’s water network was built by its 
residents and is still being maintained by its residents, today. 
The everyday events described above occurred in Sebrepor, an unremarkable 
neighbourhood on the outskirts of Accra, which is the empirical core and analytical 
point of departure of this research project. What is the point of this story? It is not 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below 371
to claim that formal institutions fail, or lie, and that grassroots organizations are the 
real deal. Quite the opposite. This story shows that the two are complementary, and 
the district manager had good reasons to portray the situation as he did (see section 
2 below). The main point, though, is rather a methodological one: if you start an 
inquiry from ‘below’, from the neighborhood level, the practical level, you will see 
different things than if you start from ‘above’, with statistics, government documents 
and officials, or NGO workers.
What does this approach entail, starting an inquiry from below? It starts with an 
ethnographic lens on grassroots organization, asking what residents themselves do for 
the development of their neighborhood, and tries to understand the factors driving 
or hampering such local organization. The pioneers who form the new urban fabric 
are faced with a host of challenges: how to connect to the piped water network and 
electricity lines, to stay safe from robbers, to prevent their houses from flooding and to 
have a school for the kids. Especially in such a situation of weak collective institutions 
– both organizational and cultural – it is the local relations that make all the difference. 
‘Neighborhood’ is the most effective term to refer to this local level of analysis, a level 
where social bonds between non-professionals, in general, form to improve physical 
and social infrastructure and where local power relations play an important role.
Starting at this neighborhood level is beneficial as it allows for an analysis of the social 
structures which enable resident collaboration to gather contributions, apply political 
pressure to formal organizations, and to do all those other things that are needed to get 
the necessary collective amenities. Using a relatively small and geographically specific 
sliver of space as an entry point into relations has the advantage that the focus is not 
limited to the (formal) institutions, but starts with the practically existing relations 
and organization on the ground. Since these larger structures do appear more often in 
research and have their own dedicated officials, making them much more visible and 
straightforward to work from, they would too easily come to overshadow the intricacies 
of the social network explored in this work and so, I do not use them as a starting point. 
This investigation of the social relations in the neighborhood took place over a total 
period of 10 months of fieldwork, spread over four separate visits to Accra between 
2014 and 2018. I investigate these neighborhood relations primarily through interviews 
with: ethnic leaders, civil servants, church workers, local politicians, a variety of 
organizers and of course, a good many ordinary residents. These interviews consist 
of open questions and are informed by my personal experiences and observations in 
these areas.
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From there, the methodology branches out in scope. It explores more formal 
institutions, larger geographical scales and takes on an historical perspective. The 
range of sources expands to include the study of government documents and archives, 
adding in quantitative data, interviews with a broader spectrum of officials and other 
larger-scale actors, and drawing on secondary sources regarding the history of the city 
and country. The methodology developed in this thesis is thus a cross between, on the 
one hand, a relational ethnography which draws on the methodological registers of 
anthropologists and human geographers, and on the other hand, the type of historical, 
large-scale perspective typically taken by figurational sociologists. I believe this to be a 
fruitful approach, as I set out below.56
Topics emerging throughout the research project
Having developed this methodology, how and why was it used? In other words, how 
were the concrete subtopics of this research project carved out from the wide scope 
covered by its central question? The general technique for finding research topics used 
in this project could be summarized as follows: ask suburban residents what they 
considered infrastructural deficits in their environment, then ask them “who should 
fix that” or “who does fix that” and then find those people or institutions. This relatively 
simple inquiry yielded surprisingly productive results: it led to several important 
questions and topics which were not previously covered well in the literature. Below, I 
briefly describe the literature gaps addressed by each of the analytical chapters.
Residents Associations (RAs) are one of the groups that are underrepresented in 
the literature. Although they drive the development of a vast amount of urban 
infrastructure every year, and are an important factor in making sure government 
and externally funded development projects have the intended effect, they have hardly 
been discussed in the literature (with the notable exception of Gough, 1999). I have 
found no research on the question of when and whether RAs successfully manage 
to further development, and when and why they falter. This work is, therefore, an 
important contribution to the body of work on urban development which addresses 
the role of RAs. 
56 To be clear, this is not to say that all research subjects are best addressed through the relational 
ethnography. Many larger-scale research subjects, such as states, large corporations, dynamics of 
globalization etc. benefit from an approach which starts at the large-scale level of those dynamics. 
Rather, the methodology is a fruitful technique for so-called ‘bottom-up’ research, which is all the more 
productive since it extends from that mundane, contemporary, directly observable ‘bottom’ all the way 
to the larger geographical scales and longer historical timeframes, thus allowing for a welding of the 
various scale perspectives which are so often artificially separated in research projects.
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The picture is similarly incomplete for traditional authorities. Although there is a 
substantial body of literature on chiefs in Ghana (Odotei & Awedoba, 2006), there 
is little to no material about chiefs’ positions in the urban fabric, or urban chiefs 
more generally. This again is a serious omission: chiefs have a highly respected and 
influential position in Ghanaian society. In addition, chiefs are economically powerful; 
they are important conduits in the allocation of development funds (Ubink, 2008) and 
control the most important resource of a city: the land. Furthermore, they are middle 
men between a variety of government agencies and the local population, making them 
indispensable to an investigation such as this one. 
Churches have been central factors in building up education and medical infrastructure 
in Ghana but the literature ignores their role in the process of development. Religious 
communities are among the first and most important drivers of collective amenities, 
and there is a large and well-developed body of research on Ghana’s religious field 
(Meyer, 2004). The literature has, however, by and large neglected the question why, 
how, and under what conditions religious communities develop amenities and how 
they function internally in an economic sense (Iannaccone, 1995; Ukah, 2007). These 
are important questions considered in this work which add depth to the body of 
research on development.
This work importantly addresses the gaps in the literature by providing a new 
framework for investigation. The chapter on water provision infrastructure creates a 
bridge between two separate strands of research. In the literature, currently, on the 
one hand are theoretical approaches focusing on grassroots infrastructure production, 
the insurgent, the self-empowered, the incremental (Silver, 2014) and the improvised 
(Cleaver, 2017). On the other hand are more traditional top-down development 
theories, such as Rouse (2013) and Adank et al. (2011). The reality, as this work shows, 
is more complex than just a combination of the two opposing approaches: it is in the 
interactions of their subjects of study that important effects are produced. These effects 
are currently being ignored by research, to the detriment of development work and 
policy making more broadly. 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below374
8.2 Answer to sub-research questions
This section provides the empirical findings of the four empirical chapters. For 
each of these chapters, I provide the following. First, a brief re-introduction of the 
topic and question of that chapter. Secondly, the empirical findings of the chapter. 
Thirdly, a brief exposition of why the methodology developed through this thesis was 
specifically helpful in uncovering these findings. Finally, an indication of the more 
general theoretical fields to which the chapter’s findings contribute.
Chapter 4: The rise and fall of resident organizations
Chapter 4 starts with the most local relations; those between neighbors. It analyzes 
the way in which purely local grassroots organization leads to concrete collective 
amenities, such as roads, water pipe networks and public security. It centers on 
Residents Associations; secular, task-specific organizations at the neighborhood level 
that work to organize local infrastructure development. More generally, the chapter 
investigates how residents organize themselves in the early stages of neighborhood 
development and how this changes as thicker strands of organizational connection 
develop between the neighborhood and the wider urban fabric. These bodies form 
the platform through which a surprising amount of neighborhood-level amenities are 
developed. The chapter’s contribution to the larger project is threefold. It starts by 
introducing the central case study neighborhood: Sebrepor. Following on, it provides 
a rare empirical case study of evolving resident organization in a newly growing 
neighborhood, from the start. To continue, this chapter helps us to understand the 
conditions under which Residents Associations and similar organizations flourish and 
break down. 
The chapter finds that residents actively organized themselves from the very beginnings 
of the neighborhood, quickly forming a developmental association and constructing 
initial infrastructure. This started when the first settlers found themselves confronted 
with shared material hardship and threats of expulsion, to which they responded by 
organizing in a Settler Society. This society became instrumental in gradually building 
up basic infrastructure in the neighborhood. This is the first finding of the chapter: 
purely local residential organization can build up vital infrastructure, with very 
little support from government organizations (see also chapter 7). Since most of the 
residents were far from wealthy, however; the networks for electricity and water spread 
through the area haltingly. A complicating factor here, was that the neighborhood 
was in a legal gray zone, on land that had been expropriated by government but was 
again being sold by its traditional owners. Such land ownership issues are common 
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in neighborhood build-up histories and are further analyzed in chapter 5. Hence, 
the residents did not want to be too visible, which complicated their efforts to create 
infrastructure in the area. Therefore, while it may seem that little was achieved, it does 
not follow that residents were passive.
In the face of risk, residents sought active partnerships and collaborations to move 
towards a common goal. As inhabitation of the area had sufficiently densified to risk 
‘opening up’ in the early 1990s, co-production with a distant but responsive local 
government provided the impetus for a further build-up of local infrastructure. The 
municipality supplied the machinery for street grading, while residents fueled the 
machine and guided its operator through their area. Similar patterns of co-financing 
and co-production resulted in the first secondary school, the piped water network, the 
area’s streetlights and its first electricity network. Residents built the first two-classroom 
blocks of the Ebenezer Hill Secondary School and ran it during the first year, while 
the state supplied a teacher and picked the project up afterward. The Ghana Water 
Company put out the initial standpipe, for residents to build out its network into the 
area. The Tema Assembly provided bulldozers for road clearances, but residents had to 
buy the fuel. Streetlights are still mostly bought and home-mounted by residents, while 
the electricity to light them is provided by government. 
These instances show local organization in its most effective constellation: rooted 
and strongly networked. Independent local organizing enables residents to effectively 
harness government resources to further local development (cf. Nicholls & Uitermark, 
2016). This is a broader phenomenon: it is very common that infrastructure is built in 
cooperative projects between residents and government agencies. Often, residents will 
supply the simple physical labor, supply part of the funding through contributions, 
or even completely kick-start the project, while the state comes in to complete 
the project. In fact, the co-production approach is built into the local government 
bureaucracy. Municipal planning officers also expect residents to help with monitoring 
the contractors working on municipal projects and will often provide them with the 
technical specifics required to do so (Interview Ofori, 2015). 
As the neighborhood grew, these successful and organic means of cooperation between 
residents and government bodies became harder to maintain. As the population further 
densified and became more heterogeneous, its relations with formal state institutions 
intensified and the general-purpose, solidarity-based Residents Associations 
dwindled. Political parties started to form local branches in the area, which brought 
in a wave of mutual suspicions among erstwhile cooperating residents. Being more 
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closely connected to government institutions and its resources, residents started 
organizing to have a municipality established locally, and to have the administrative 
area of the Assembly Member split up, since many government resources are divided 
by administrative areas. They succeeded but the arrival of more formal government 
organizations did precipitate a further decline in independent local organization.
There appears to be a ‘sweet spot’ of highly effective infrastructure production at 
the time when government resources become available but local networks are not 
yet undermined by the anonymization of the community and politicization and 
formalization of local organization. Some politicization is not necessarily harmful, as 
this allows residents to demand resources from politicians who compete for election. 
It appears, however, that as political networks become more densely developed and 
government organizations increasingly promise/appear to take up the development 
and maintenance of infrastructure development and upkeep, independent local 
organizational efforts like the Residents Associations fall apart. A similar pattern can 
be noticed when it comes to neighborhood security; residents tried to organize their 
own watchdog and vigilante organizations, but as the police became more present, 
such projects started to crumble. In the years following the establishment of the 
municipality, neighborhood involvement of local government agencies continuously 
increased. Meanwhile, resident organization gradually died down, to a point where 
it was nearly non-existent. It appears, therefore, that the sweet spot of effective co-
production between residents and government agencies could only last so long. 
In what ways has the specific methodology of a historical relational ethnography, as 
developed in this thesis, contributed to reaching these findings? The ethnographic 
aspect was central to this study. Grassroots organization in a neighborhood like 
Sebrepor is not easily visible from the outside, as it is generally not grounded in 
formally registered organizations, and thus is best explored through spending a lot of 
time in the area and interacting with as many people as possible. The relational aspect, 
too, was essential. Local organization in Sebrepor cannot be understood separate from 
the area’s relations with, and spatial location within, the larger urban area. Both the 
rise and the fall of local grassroots organization in the area were precipitated by the 
approach of the urban frontier and all its institutional offshoots. The historical aspect, 
which looks at historical precursors of the involved organizations and plays a large role 
in the other three chapters, was not very relevant for this chapter. The simple method 
of historical analysis, however, tracing 50 years of local organization and development, 
was crucial to see how the arc of grassroots organization unfolded over the decades, as 
conditions within and related to the neighborhood shifted. 
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In summary, this chapter analyzes the dynamics of the relationship between 
grassroots organizational efforts and government provision of infrastructure in more 
detail. Looking from a perspective of local organization, it shows how government 
can both supplement and undermine such organizational efforts. More generally, it 
shows how through processes of anonymization, politicization and establishment of 
formal institutions in the area, the autonomous forms of local organization were being 
overshadowed. Beyond providing empirical understanding of local phenomena in 
urbanizing Ghana, the findings of this chapter might form a contribution to several 
more general theoretical fields. First, it adds to the study of resident organization in 
(informal) neighborhoods growing on the urban fringe worldwide (Holston, 2009; 
Karpat, 1976). This chapter of the thesis also contributes to the field of study of co-
production of collective amenities or club goods, between citizens or residents and 
the state. As such, it feeds into research on the emergence and forms of collective 
organization more generally (E. Ostrom, 1990; Elinor Ostrom, 2010; Swaan, 1988). 
Chapter 5: Traditional authorities in the city
Chapter 5 analyzes how the deeply embedded, yet strangely undefined institution 
of chieftaincy has gained strength in the urban neighborhood network through the 
process of state formation. This topic was included not because all chiefs necessarily 
contribute to the organization of local development, but because theirs is almost 
always a central position in the web of local power relations, and therefore, it affects the 
extent to which organization can occur in the neighborhood. The chapter serves two 
purposes. Firstly, it empirically analyzes the change in position of a chief whose area is 
urbanizing by tracing how his role evolves as areas on the urban fringe settle, densify 
and become part of the urban fabric. Secondly, the chapter takes a more historical and 
large-scale figurational tack to analyze how the (contemporary, urban) institution of 
chieftaincy was shaped through Ghana’s historical process of state formation. Besides 
Elias, the chapter builds on Weberian notions of authority (Weber, 1968, p. 215) and 
Ananya Roy’s work regarding informality and the state (Roy, 2009b). 
To begin, the chapter analyzes the shifting role of a chief whose area is urbanizing. 
This analysis is based on the various roles of the chief: as traditional leader, as lower-
level bureaucrat plugged into the formal state, and as landlord. His prominence in the 
various roles associated with original chieftaincy weakened over time. His traditional 
leadership role declined, most notably its cultural and ‘soft leadership’ components, 
as did his position as a local strongman and as a clientelist patron. At the same time, 
however, new bureaucratic roles emerged through the expansion of the formal state 
in its initially informal arrangement of government, where bureaucratic relations are 
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still mediated by the chief. The chieftaincies, therefore, are increasingly embraced by 
a state-sponsored fabric of bureaucratic organization, changing the nature of their 
position. While their discretion is circumscribed, the chiefs also derive a new power 
and security from their immersion into the expanding state. 
The chiefs are no longer all-powerful in any one domain, but this is compensated by 
the fact that their position is now undergirded by laws, vested in institutions, and 
recognized by the array of organizations that have expanded their operations in areas 
that were virtually unpopulated until recently. In the process, while the chief ’s claim 
to the land is decreasingly sustained through his reputation and relations within the 
neighborhood, the expanding bureaucratic and legal apparatus casts him into a key 
position as land manager and furnishes him with entitlements to individual and 
tradeable plots. As a consequence, the chief is increasingly able to extract resources 
from the neighborhood, as his traditional authority is buttressed with legal-rational 
authority. The commodification and registration of land are thus transforming the 
role of the chief from that of a conflict manager into that of a gentry. The chiefs are 
circumscribed and domesticated, confined but strengthened.
Having described the trajectory of the chief ’s position during the urbanization 
of his area, this chapter raises a series of puzzling questions concerning the chief. 
Sebrepor’s chief is pointed out by residents as the most powerful figure in the area, 
held responsible for (lack of) local development and, despite his apparent failure 
in this respect, he is criticized by most only with careful hesitance. No grassroots 
organization of any significance flourishes in the area without his seal of approval. 
Yet for the last ten years, this man has lived in another part of the city, more than an 
hour drive away from Sebrepor. He rarely appears there, even though he is chief of 
only this one neighborhood and has no other work. It transpires that he is an exile - 
driven out of Sebrepor by a conflict with his extended family. This leads us to a set of 
larger questions about the institution of chieftaincy. For one, how is it possible that 
this man is still considered Sebrepor’s chief, and so retains such a significant influence 
on the area’s grassroots organizational figuration? And more widely, why are all chiefs 
in Greater Accra of the Ga-Dangbe ethnicity, when many of its areas have majority 
populations from other ethnicities (Sebrepor, for instance, is approximately 60% Ewe)? 
In fact, why do all of Accra’s neighborhoods have chiefs in the first place? After all, 
there is no pre-existing community in the localities of most new neighborhoods, no 
traditional roots. So, why is there a traditional authority tied to each part of that land, 
which prior to its urbanization was largely empty?
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A complete understanding of the chieftaincy-government figuration requires a foray 
into the history of Ghana’s state formation process, and the historical interdependency 
between chiefs and the formal state. Chiefs were woven into the nation’s fabric at a 
formative stage. When the British first brought together the current Ghana as a colony, 
they did so through indirect rule, relying on a web of traditional authorities stretching 
across the country, whom they endowed with a high degree of local autonomous rule.57 
It is true that their position was subservient to British authority. In other respects, 
however, their power was often far more absolute than what chiefs had previously 
enjoyed. In the late 19th and early 20th century, this arrangement hardened into law, 
making chiefs the de facto ‘informal’ spokespeople for their areas and granting them 
the formal custodianship over the land they ruled. This arrangement remained in place, 
with minor changes and power tussles, throughout Ghana’s struggle for independence 
and the democratization process of the 20th and 21st century, until today. This helps 
to explain the continued significance of the role of the chief.
The chieftaincy system is still deeply ingrained in the state, through an old deal: the 
original ‘locals’ were granted everlasting control over their land, represented by their 
chief. This also explains why it is possible that Sebrepor’s chief is absent, does not live 
in his area, or appear there with any regularity, and yet is granted formal control over 
all its land by government agencies like the Lands Commission (cadastre). In short, the 
historical aspect is vital to understand the position of the chiefs. Not only do they play a 
large role in structuring a neighborhood during the early stages of urbanization, when 
the state is still far away, they are permanently interwoven with the state apparatus and 
in fact, with the very idea of ‘Ghana’ (B. Anderson, 1983). And while many of the chiefs 
may fail to play their role effectively, especially in the areas where they are not rooted 
in a pre-existing community, the institution of chieftancy continues to survive, and 
therefore, it survives nation-wide. Since the entire chieftaincy system is co-dependent, 
existing in an asymmetrical figuration with the state, the continuing prominence of 
some more effective Ghanaian chiefs ensures that the weaker ones remain in place 
as well. This also means that in the continuing urbanization of the country, empty 
chieftaincy stools will continue to be created in all new neighborhoods. After all, the 
various local-level forms of chieftaincy are all folded into the same national-level state.
To summarize: firmly institutionalized as traditional local leaders, with roots in the 
pre-colonial and colonial era, the chiefs hold sway over the land and often also have 
57 As chapter 5 sets out, many of Ghana’s original ethnic groups were not governed by chiefs prior to the 
arrival of the European colonists. These were the so-called acephalous, or ‘head-less’ groups (Abotchie 
et al., 2006). They too were squeezed into the mold of chiefly rule by the British colonial regime.
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a powerful position within the political arena. Appointed as the default custodians of 
all land that is not otherwise registered in the cadastral system, that is some 80% of 
Ghana’s land, the chiefs have a central position in the process of settlement and area 
development. This includes planning of zoning and infrastructure, and the transition 
from a complex and largely informal system of land rights to a modern structure of 
freehold ownership. In addition, they are widely seen, addressed and expected to 
speak as the natural leaders of (assumed) local communities at the neighborhood 
scale, to keep the peace and to lead local organizational efforts. As such, they have 
great influence on the grassroots organizational patterns that can grow in such 
neighborhoods, on the shape of the local ‘civil society’, and on the amenities that are 
developed, campaigned for, realized and maintained. 
A note on methodology: our faith in the developed research methodology was repeatedly 
affirmed by the fact that these findings turned out to be highly counterintuitive insights. 
In most settings where we presented this research, a common response was: ‘Surely, 
that man would not remain chief if he did not somehow earn or fight for that position; 
if he depended on the state for his power, government could replace him’. Such a 
response, logical as it seems, fundamentally misunderstands the nature of traditional 
authority embedded in a modern state structure. As the above shows, the chieftaincy 
position is not crucially based on a position of natural leadership (although it is very 
often accompanied by such), nor is it a position that can easily be locally abolished. 
Like European monarchs today, Ghanaian chiefs can hardly be expelled from their 
position, even if they turn out to be less than capable. Yet, even more so than for 
European monarchs, this does not mean that their position is a purely ceremonial one. 
In traditional institutions embedded in legal-rational nation-states, you can hold a 
traditional position of power without having to work or fight for it, while still enjoying 
a serious amount of power from that position. This discovery was only made possible 
by a relational focus and an understanding of the historical roots which stabilize 
chieftaincy as a national institution. The ethnographic element, finally, was essential in 
understanding his contemporary role, his importance as neighborhood-level ‘informal 
leader’ and the multiplicity of that role.
To conclude, this chapter builds on Weberian ideal types of bureaucratic and traditional 
authority embedded in the figurational perspective. It shows how these state formation 
and urbanization processes have led to a more complex figuration, where traditional 
authority (chieftaincy) is embedded in a larger legal-rational authority (the modern 
state). It also illustrates where traditional authorities across the country mutually 
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benefit each other by becoming more embedded in the state (see also Baldwin, 2015; 
Vaughan, 2006). Apart from providing a rich empirical study of the role of a traditional 
authority in contemporary Accra, this chapter thus contributes to research on the 
position of royalty and nobility in modern (democratic) constitutional states. It also 
contributes to larger debates about the interweaving of various forms of Weberian 
authority in a single, stable figuration, and to our understanding of state formation 
processes, more generally (cf. Gorski, 2003; Scott, 1998).
Chapter 6: Collective effervescence, collective amenities?
Chapter 6 discusses churches in their role as developers of neighborhood infrastructure. 
Churches are collective amenities in their own right; providing a structure for 
community building and spiritual purposes. But beyond that, they are a special type 
of collective amenity: they also spawn the development of further collective amenities. 
Ghana’s churches historically channeled the energies of residents quite effectively 
towards infrastructure development, particular in medical and educational fields. This 
function, though, appears to be dwindling in recent years. This chapter asks, what 
factors determine whether churches successfully channel the collective energy gathered 
in their services and their congregations into durable collective amenities? It locates, 
as crucial variables, the internal organisation and doctrine of the churches. These, in 
turn, are shaped by the form of the religious field and its relations to the larger state 
figuration in the era when the church developed (Swaan, 1988). Besides building on 
work of De Swaan (1988), the chapter makes use of the religious marketplace metaphor 
(Stark & Bainbridge, 1987), to illustrate the role of the church within its societal context
The landscape of Ghana’s organised religion co-evolved with the formation of the 
Ghanaian state. The first missionaries were invited by the colonial regime. Their 
function in the colonial state was to pacify the newly colonialized subjects; to make 
them more obedient and fit to work in the colonial project. As the state began 
to take shape, church membership increasingly became an entrance pass to the 
higher spectrum of positions natives could attain in the colonial regime. Abram de 
Swaan (1988) describes the creation process of welfare states in western European 
countries, which has some interesting parallels with what happened in Ghana. The 
same churches that sent missionaries to Ghana had, in their European origins, built 
up a patchwork of local collective action regimes, creating welfare systems and other 
collective amenities. In Ghana, the churches imposed local regimes of collective action 
in order to concretise and enforce their ethos of community service and development. 
They possessed sufficient coercive powers to do so because at that time, they were 
effectively the regional gatekeepers to the world of colonial administration. Through 
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coercive regimes of collective action, they constructed schools, hospitals and boreholes 
throughout the country, and set up sturdy welfare systems for their congregations. 
So, these sorts of recognizable stately institutions began to take form, as a result of 
European religious organisation becoming more firmly established in Ghana. 
In the early 20th century, the first cracks began to appear in the patchwork of religious 
monopolies of colonial missionary churches, with the rise of a new religious movement. 
The arrival of the Pentecostal movement in Ghana, at this time, precipitated the rise 
of the African Independent Churches (AICs), which quickly gathered momentum. 
Concurrent with their growth, Ghana became increasingly oriented towards the 
more enterprising religious field of the USA. This Pentecostal movement eventually 
evolved into the charismatic pentecostal movement, which was further propelled by 
the prosperity gospel (Bowler, 2013). To this day, this vibrant movement has not only 
taken West Africa by storm but also the rest of the world, gathering over 300 million 
followers worldwide by 2010 (cf. Meyer, 2004; Pew, 2011; Sweeney, 2005, p. 150). 
Within 40 years, this charismatic movement has managed to become the dominant 
religious sector in seven out of Ghana’s ten regions, overshadowing the following of 
earlier, colonial religious organisations. It is still rapidly growing, especially in the 
major cities (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014).
The chapter uses a unique framework to illustrate how the charismatic churches, which 
increasingly dominate Ghana’s religious landscape, play a much smaller role in the 
provision of material collective amenities than the orthodox churches did and still do. 
This market competition analytic approach takes into consideration the larger story of 
state formation and the accompanying church-state relationship, which is necessary 
to understand the emerging dynamics in the religious field between churches with 
different types of internal organisation and doctrine. This framework helps describe 
the atmosphere of religious competition in present-day Ghana. A sharp increase in 
religious voluntarism has radically shifted the conditions for survival and expansion 
of churches, which was previously based on coercion. Under these new conditions, 
the charismatic church movement, a growing religious group whose doctrines and 
internal organisation differ radically from the previous generation of churches, is 
taking over the field. 
The novel structure of these charismatic churches resembles business enterprises, 
organised for survival, expansion and financial profit in a competitive religious 
marketplace. This becomes apparent in the discourse of the church leaders, both 
in personal conversations and in preaching, and in the large branding and event 
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campaigns that take place in the public space. Organisationally, these churches are 
geared toward rapid expansion, using a wide range of franchising structures and a 
strongly internalised start-up culture. They work on a much shorter time-scale, with a 
strong focus on the competition for potential believers. Their internal welfare systems 
are more ad-hoc, providing less of a structural social safety net. They are seldom 
focused on building a broader civil society and playing a role in the state and semi-
state figuration. Finally, their individualist ideology is less suitable for the collective 
action required to produce public goods. In short, they are remarkably different to 
their predecessors and are more aptly considered as part of a marketplace.
How has the historical relational ethnographic approach, developed in this thesis, 
helped reach these findings? Once again, ethnography is required to understand the 
detailed workings of these churches; one simply needs to get up close to properly 
see what happens. Furthermore, the relational aspect is quite important here. We 
need to see the churches as part of a religious field at the level of the city, not just 
the neighbourhood. This larger perspective is necessary because well-established 
churches in the existing city send their entrepreneurs to start new churches in budding 
neighbourhoods, seeing fertile ground there to grow, and this affects the religious 
composition of these new neighborhoods. It is the entrepreneurial churches that 
gain ground, in these cases. This, in turn, has a large effect on the infrastructure that 
develops in those neighbourhoods. The faster and more entrepreneurial churches are 
the Charismatics, which quickly gain ground but are far less involved in educational 
and health infrastructure than the so-called Orthodox churches, the descendants of 
the old mission churches. Finally, the historical analysis of the interweaving between 
church and colonial state helped to understand why the orthodox churches historically 
had such a strong position and were able to construct so much, as well as why they 
have been losing ground since independence. Without this framework, it would be 
impossible to truly appreciate the varying roles of churches in the development of 
Ghanaian neighborhoods. 
What does this new business-like structure look like? Abstracting from the Ghanaian 
case, we find the following: A religious landscape organised as a marketplace has 
advantages for the ‘consumers’ (congregants), since it liberates people from potential 
tyranny and from a fixed, often petty morality. This new structure forces church 
leaders to listen more actively and adapt to the needs of their congregation. The highly 
competitive market where switching ‘product’ (church) is easy, however, also means 
that the focus of ‘suppliers’ (church leaders) shifts to the short-term. It makes churches 
spend much more time on short-term and the visible goals, which hinders the type 
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of sustained energy, resource and organisational investments required to construct 
and maintain schools, clinics, and the type of dense local institutional network which 
is conducive to neighbourhood development. This competitive environment can also 
drive the church leaders to use manipulatation strategies with their congregation, 
creating psychological dependency relations in order to make members stay in the 
church, and donate as quickly as possible, in fear that they might soon move on to the 
next church. 
Besides shifting the focus of the church to the short-term, this new structure also 
narrows it to the immediate needs of the church and its congregation, rather than the 
development of the broader community around it. Whereas the orthodox churches 
have a self-image as a quasi-state institution, providing collective amenities such 
as schools and medical services, as well as creating an effective organisational level 
between state and individual, most charismatic churches do not feel obliged to take 
on such functions. In short, an overly active free marketplace for religious institutions 
does not appear to lead to the provision of more and higher quality collective amenities 
(cf. Gallego & Woodberry, 2010; Lankina & Getachew, 2013; Trejo, 2009). This also 
supplements De Swaan’s (1988) analysis, showing that the state and the religious field 
are not necessarily communicating vessels. In the Western European case the rise of 
state schools and hospitals swallowed up or crowded out church initiative against 
active resistance from churches. In Ghana, the churches are moving away from the 
provision of collective amenities despite the lack of such an active state, because of an 
overly competitive religious field.
Chapter 7: Expansion patterns of connective goods
Chapter 7 takes on a different form from the other three, in that it does not focus on 
an organizational form, but rather on a particular amenity: water. It interrogates the 
assumption of collectiveness of amenities, by providing an analysis of how the water 
supply of Accra’s neighbourhoods moves between processes of individualisation and 
collectivisation. Specifically, it focuses on the dynamics of that infrastructure between 
local, more or less informal, collective action, and the larger, citywide collective 
represented by the Ghana Water Company. This chapter is also unique in that it not 
only investigates the conditions that affect neighborhood level resident organisation 
but also explicitly asks how this ultimately impacts on the citywide conditions for 
collectivisation.
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This chapter takes the piped water network as a window to explore the way that 
infrastructure is developed in such a context of rapid urbanisation. The urban fabric 
consists not only of organisations and broader social figurations, it is also held together 
by physical networks for the transportation of people and goods. As Accra’s spatial 
extent has become 50 times bigger than it was during World War I, its physical network 
infrastructure has also progressively expanded and diffused, connecting ever greater 
numbers of people and adding layers of complexity and interrelation to the urban 
fabric that binds them. This chapter provides a broader lens on the development of 
this new urban fabric, by bridging the literature gap that exists between descriptions of 
development through “incremental infrastructure” (Silver, 2014) and more traditional 
theory of development which focuses on centrally organised expansion of such facilities 
(Rouse, 2013). The reality, as shown here, is in a combination of these two, and it is 
in the investigation of their interplay that this chapter makes its largest contribution. 
On a local level, the investigation revealed that Sebrepor is a clear-cut case of ‘self-
help’ development, whereby residents built the entire neighborhood water network 
with very little involvement of the state utility company. Zooming out from the local 
empirical case, this chapter develops an analysis of the larger socio-political figuration 
surrounding the piped water system. It importantly maps how various parties interact 
in the production of the same amenity, both on a collective and individualized 
level. It specifically addresses the role of local residents, the state, utility companies 
and the political class, in this process. There is a dialectic of collectivization and 
individualization here. Shifting political and organizational dimensions, as well as 
technological progress affect the form and dissemination of collective amenities. 
While, at the same time, individualized solutions arise and change the degree to 
which various groups within the city are interdependent in terms of this network and 
amenity. Broadening the scope, here, provides a more nuanced appreciation of the 
various players involved in this process. 
Water provisions for different groups of residents in Accra seem to have turned upside 
down over the past century. Initially, pipe-borne water was a luxury in Accra and other 
major population centres, available only to the colonial elite and select indigenous 
neighborhoods. The rest of the population was served, at best, with boreholes. Over 
the subsequent decades, with a drastic increase at the time of independence, the 
mechanisms for network expansion became more and more democratised. With some 
delay, this caused a historical reversion. The drastic increase in users and geographic 
scope caused systemic weaknesses in Accra’s piped water network. I show how the 
state utility company responds to the uncontrolled expansion of the system; it attempts 
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to combat the public perception of uncontrolled sprawl, to control the network, to 
prohibit or incorporate informal extensions, and work to expand the backbone. 
However, the poor service could potentially lead to an abandonment of the system by 
the wealthier elite, who can afford to choose individual provision technologies such 
as boreholes, tankers and sachet water. These means of access to water that were once 
the only option for non-elites, are now a privatized luxury for the wealthier residents. 
The process is mediated by the technological advances and to a degree, by natural 
circumstances such as the availability of drinkable groundwater. In terms of 
technological advances, I find that as individualised solutions become more available, 
affordable and reliable, elites increasingly turn away from the network. I find that 
in collectivisation-individualisation dynamics, such as this one, technology plays 
a particularly large role. On the one hand, modern technology such as PVC pipes, 
better water treatment systems and improved GIS technology significantly aid the 
effectiveness of the piped water distribution network in a rapidly sprawling urban area. 
On the other hand, technological progress in the borehole industry and in individually 
packaged water solutions invites elites to abandon the overstretched communal 
provisions, in favor of individual solutions. Thus, these technological developments 
have important consequences for the dynamics of collectivisation-individualisation, 
which has further important feedback effects in the residents-utility-state figuration, 
as we will see. 
To further explore these dynamics, I add a comparative case study of the electricity 
network. This network is even more expansive and unreliable than the water network. 
Successful delivery of electricity was severely hampered for over a decade starting 
around 2001. Still, whereas in the water sector, a large supply chain for individual 
solutions has grown, in electricity, the available individualised solutions are not yet 
preferred over a network connection. This is partly because the latter is far more 
affordable than in the water sector, and because the technology for home-based energy 
generation and storage is simply not yet at the stage of mass-market production. Both 
diesel-fueled generators and solar panels are expensive and prone to breakdowns, 
while storage of electricity is all but impossible. As both solar capture and electricity 
storage are rapidly becoming more affordable and practical, this calculus may well 
change in the near future, shifting the dynamics in the electricity network as well. 
 Contrasting dynamics of collectivization-individualization and technologies between 
the water and electricity sectors are the main factors impacting state investment in 
these infrastructures. In the electricity sector, it is nearly impossible to bypass the 
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collective good, so pressure on the government to improve the situation is far greater 
than in the water sector. As a consequence, the Ghanaian state organized rapid (and 
expensive) expansion of electricity generation capacity. Meanwhile, capacity issues 
and delivery bottlenecks in the water sector are more or less left to languish. Thus, the 
available technology moderates the social developments in both directions, enabling 
on one side, an effective collectivisation and, on the other, a detachment from the 
collective amenity.
It is only once we look at the neighborhood as a relational entity, embedded in 
a wider context, that we understand these puzzles, such as the behaviour of the 
district manager in the vignette that started this chapter. He has been given the near 
impossible assignment of controlling the rapid expansion of the water network, from 
his regional headquarters and to stay on top of any developments in the area. In light 
of this assignment, it would not look good if he were to depend on a composite and 
somewhat messy model of cooperation, with a rag-tag network of local residents and 
plumbers for the upkeep of his section of the water distribution network. Still, he does 
depend on them and he does cooperate with them. In this context, starting the analysis 
from the ‘bottom’ of the system provided important clues: starting from residents like 
Mr Jacob, we get a picture of the practical situation of water provisions on the ground 
and were directed towards to the Ghana Water Company. If we had started from the 
Ghana Water Company, however, we would have never found out about Mr Jacob and 
so, would have had a warped view of the whole situation.
In short, chapter 7 provides a broader lens on the development patterns of 
infrastructural development in the suburbs, by tracing a single network amenity 
from the household to the national level. There are two main schools of thought that 
appear the literature. On the one hand, theoretical approaches focus on the grassroots, 
the insurgent, the self-empowered and the improvised, such as development through 
bricolage (Cleaver, 2017) and incremental infrastructure (Silver, 2014). On the other 
hand, more traditional top-down development theories are provided by Rouse (2013) 
and Adank et al. (2011). The reality, as this work shows, is a combination of the two. 
But it is more than just the sum of them. 
It is in the interaction between bottom-up and top-down that important dynamics 
are currently ignored, to the detriment of development work. Development through 
bricolage is frequent, substantial and highly effective but it never stands alone and 
has important effects on the network as a whole. Thus, the chapter also provides a 
counterpoint to larger debates about elite capture (cf. Matous, 2013; Özerol, Tacer, & 
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Islar, 2013), showing a case where the decline of elitism in a collective amenity may 
lead to declining investment in the network’s backbone infrastructure. To reiterate, 
as this work illustrates, these dynamics only become visible if we start off our 
investigation at the grassroots levels, and carefully work our way up to a birds-eye 
historical perspective from there.
8.3 Main research question and theoretical findings
After discussing the results of this thesis in the various separate chapters, we 
can now consider the work, as a whole and see how it addresses the central 
research question. The central question was: how do residents of Accra’s newly 
developing neighbourhoods organise to create collective amenities for their area? 
This section of the conclusion discusses four larger themes which emerge from asking 
that central question. It first reviews the most important condition affecting each 
form of collective organisation at the grassroots level: the form and degree of activity 
of the formal state. Second, the focus turns to the overlapping of collectivities, each 
having different rules, geographical scales and driving forces. Third, the urban growth 
process, described in the most abstract terms of subdivision and boundary struggles, is 
considered. Fourth and finally, this section explores the institutional drift that occurs 
when institutions extend themselves to the suburbs and how they, themselves, are also 
changed in the process. 
Interdependence with the formal state
Anderson (1983) provides the first anchoring point for theoretical conclusions: the 
fact and belief that there is a central state enormously shapes the organisational 
landscape as a whole. Even in a relatively weak state like Ghana, the fate of all types 
of organisation working for collective amenities, however informal they may be, is 
strongly intertwined with the form of the formal state. The form of interdependence, 
though, varies widely which impacts on their survival. Some organisations are like 
communicating vessels, becoming weaker as the state becomes stronger. Other groups 
rise and fall together with the state; while many are tied to the state in yet more complex 
ways. In fact, if we look closely, in nearly every case the relationship is a combination 
of these.
As chapter 4 shows, the grassroots and purely local Residents Associations (RAs) 
flourish only in a situation of weak state capacity. They reach their peak effectiveness 
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at the beginnings of state involvement when co-production takes place. The RAs 
subsequently decline as the state gets a firmer footing in the area in the form of political 
parties, municipalities and other state bodies. These bodies function as a kind of quasi-
statal agency in the practical realms of physical infrastructure and security, while also 
providing a social safety net. There appears to be little tension between the formal 
state and the RAs, as the two do not compete for any sort of power. But although there 
is a brief period of fruitful co-production, eventually government crowds out local 
grassroots organisation. As the state starts taxing Sebrepor, for example, contributions 
to the RAs dried up. As political parties started organising in the area, moreover, RA 
meetings withered. Thus, as state involvement grew here, these local organizations lost 
their place. 
The traditional chiefs that are described in chapter 5, have a different relationship 
with the formal state. There were chiefs in Ghana before there was a central state, and 
they were woven into the state form as informal rulers from its colonial inception. 
Present-day chiefs also have a quasi-statal role, especially in the rural areas and in 
the early stages of urban development, but also in fully urbanised areas due to their 
custodianship over the land. Again, however, the situation is more complex than it 
appears. Especially in areas like Sebrepor, where there was no pre-existing local 
community (just like in the majority of Accra’s newly growing neighbourhoods), the 
chief ’s power very much depends on that of the state and moves along with it. The 
chiefs’ constitutional hold over the land is transformed by the shift from traditional, 
unspecific communal land ownership to private, state-registered freehold, in ways that 
provide the chief with great local power, quite independent from the strength of his 
ties to the residents. So, the chief ’s role is evolutionary, changing shape along with the 
formation of the state. 
The churches, described in chapter 6, have a different relationship with the formal 
state yet again. Brought -or, allowed- in by colonial powers as complements to their 
military- and trade-focused outposts, they set up much of the medical and educational 
facilities in the early days of Ghana’s state formation. In this, they were aided by their 
strong cultural and institutional connections with the colonial state: their schools and 
places of worship were positioned as gatekeepers of the colonial apparatus of power. 
Later, as the post-colonial state renounced this intimate connection with the churches, 
briefly bringing the educational apparatus under its own watch, and as the religious 
field diversified, the churches’ ability to provide these collective amenities dwindled. 
The growth of the state, therefore, lead to a decline in the role of the church as a 
provider of amenities in its original, colonial form. 
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The focus of chapter 7, finally, is not centred on a single collective, instead covering a 
range of local bodies in their roles in the provision of water. From local figurations of 
neighbours getting together to fix a bit of pipeline, to well-organised but unrecognised 
neighbourhood collectives, to the state utility company and the larger political 
formations in which it is embedded. It shows how resident organisation interacts 
with the formal state on the very local level: residents do more for themselves, if they 
expect the state to do less. At the same time, they latch on to nearby state agencies for 
help, whether it is a municipality, an army barracks or, simply a water pipe from the 
mainline of the state utility company. 
This chapter also shows the reverse relationship: how micro-level resident actions 
affect large-scale state structures. In the water and electricity networks, both the 
uncontrolled self-help extension of the network at the street level and the decisions 
of individual households to drop out of the collective system, have systemic effects on 
the quality of the state network as a whole. There is no straightforward relationship 
when it comes to the state, residents and amenities. Rather, there exists a complex and 
interactive web of relationships which is constantly in transformation. 
Hence, although the formal state is in no way a single entity and might also best be 
conceived of as a figuration of organisational forms, rules and entities, separating it 
as an analytical construct is certainly useful, as it provides much insight into the way 
non-state organisations have developed historically, and behave today. 
Clashing levels of collectivity
If we step away for a moment from the state/non-state dichotomy, a bewildering array 
of different organisations and collectives comes into view, which Ostrom disentangles 
in her work (2010). Some of these groups are highly formalised, such as state utility 
companies or District Assemblies. Others, such as the neighbors who get together 
to construct a shared drain, are completely informal and never even write anything 
down. Some have the legal power to claim contributions from a certain sector of the 
population, although this ‘hard’ legal power must always be enforced and involves a 
staggering amount of human interaction, too. Others depend on solidarity, a shared 
ethos, or on informal enforcement techniques, such as the threat of ostracism or even 
violence. Ostrom notes that all depend to some degree on the public-spiritedness of 
their central organisers. In this scenario, who is the public, and which collectivity is 
the relevant level for an organisation? Some organisations understand the public in 
a broad scope: the entire urban area of Greater Accra, and sometimes even its future 
inhabitants. For other providers of collective amenities, the public consists of fellow 
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loyal party members, their direct neighbours, their church congregation members, 
or their ethnicity. This book shows how such different forms and logics of collective 
organisation both interlink and compete as the context changes.
Each of these collectives carry with them a set of different logics and moralities, which 
co-exist in the same space: co-producing, contradicting or replacing one another or, 
sometimes simply overlapping. This is true for the religious sphere but also in the 
domain of land ownership, where traditionally flexible relations have been squeezed 
into a more formalised, ethnically based custodianship held by the chiefs. This, in 
turn, is being replaced hand over fist by freehold private land ownership, as the urban 
frontier moves outward from the city centre. The advent of freehold land ownership 
does not make the traditional ethnic claims on the land disappear. Rather, it layers on 
top of them. Such co-existence of norms and logics is also a highly complicating factor 
in the organisation of collective amenities, where voluntary residential, political party-
based and bureaucratic organising conspire to form complex figurations. Chapter 
4 shows how clashing norms are even visible within resident organisation, as the 
relatively horizontal social norms of early settler solidarity are confronted with a more 
hierarchical logic of ‘big men’ dominating local structures. So, the reality of collectives 
of any kind is fluid and can only truly be appreciated within its specific context. 
Growth: subdivision and boundary struggles
Clashes between collectives are part of the process of deepening and diversifying ties 
between the newly growing area and the rest of the city. In a sense, they provide a 
clear window onto the various strands of the urban fabric and the way these enter 
such newly developing spaces. For many of Accra’s organisations, subdivision and 
upgrading is the most common mode of spreading geographically. Church members, 
who used to live in central Accra and find themselves in a new suburb without their 
church, get together and found a new church, first in a backyard or unfinished building 
and later by building their own structure. Similarly, formal democratic structures start 
with a local Assembly member, whose electoral area is subdivided as the population 
grows. Later, the area gets its own municipality. Police stations, water and electricity 
district offices and all sorts of other government structures grow in the same way: their 
spatial units swell in population, are subdivided and then upgraded. Chieftaincies, 
too, expand through this logic. As a fallow area receives its first settlers, the nearest 
chieftaincy sends over a representative to act as caretaker chief. Later, when the 
settlement balloons, this new position is cemented and formalised as a divisional 
chieftaincy. Subdivision and upgrading, subdivision and upgrading. 
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Thus, the new urban fabric is woven, as strands of the existing organisations extending 
outward to this densifying space on the fringes of the city. Elegant as this process may 
sound, the creation and demarcation of new space is marked by extensive conflicts. 
As is often the case, the majority of these conflicts are between organisations, or 
people of the same grouping. Chieftaincy candidates fight over the new chief ’s stools, 
for example; established chiefs fight each other over the boundaries between their 
traditional areas, while districts conduct legal battles over their tax base. The process is 
far from peaceful and streamlined. 
Competition in one arena often has far-reaching consequences for other areas. Chapter 
6 shows how the orthodox churches, which were based on lifelong membership and 
a strict and unchanging morality of self-discipline and community loyalty, are being 
pushed out by a new type of church. These are based on personal liberation, spiritual 
faith healing and have commercial-like expansion dynamics. These developments in 
the religious field are highly relevant for local infrastructure development, as these 
processes are causing the partial breakdown of the churches’ role in educational and 
medical infrastructure development, in the newly growing neighbourhoods. So, 
developments in one field cannot be isolated from those in another. 
At the more local level, residents fight over their plot boundaries, often indeed over 
the entire plot, as pieces of land are sold twice or thrice, often by different ‘chiefs’. 
These kinds of conflicts are very hard to prevent, as there is no historical ‘just’ or even 
commonly accepted distribution. The space is new. The resources in it are largely 
new: although the land was always there, it was not valuable, accessible land. Even the 
agencies who should guide this process are to a large degree also newly established, 
themselves, and are jousting with each other over their sphere of influence. Such are 
the struggles of a society that is rapidly expanding and becoming more complex, both 
geographically and institutionally. 
Institutional drift
The collectivity-related churches, chiefs, political parties and other organisations that 
fill this new space originate from the existing urban fabric, but they are not simple 
copies of earlier iterations, nor do they remain unchanged over time (see also Hacker 
et al., 2015). The chiefs are perhaps the most striking example here: their institution 
is by definition not transferable in space, as its entire raison d’etre is the chiefs’ local 
rootedness in the land and the local people. Yet, the institution does travel. It is extended 
into newly settled areas, where newly appointed chiefs from a nearby village try to 
govern urban migrants from far away, even though they speak a different language 
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and have different traditional customs. Naturally, these chiefs end up having a rather 
different position in the community than do the locally ‘rooted’ chiefs, as chapter 5 sets 
out. The strange position of these chiefs shows how an institution that seems purely 
local and deeply rooted may in fact be quite mobile. 
The religious institutions are changed by their spatial travel, in a different way. They 
are more easily copied and franchised in newly growing urban fabric. In this shift, 
though, many people change their church. In an area where everything is built from 
scratch, it is easier to try something different. Thus, the growth of the suburbs allows 
new religious models to increasingly break through the old gridlock of the religious 
field, through outright replacement and more subtle emulation. Again, the institution 
changes in the process of transplantation. 
As chapter 7 shows, sometimes the change in spatial scale drives a change in the form of 
the network or institution itself. As the city expands, the water and electricity networks 
become ever harder to manage. As their inherited structure becomes untenable, 
they are forced to reorganise. Such internal reorganisations of collectivities are not 
exclusively caused by their extension into the suburbs but they are accelerated by it. 
In summary, the institutions and organisations that are re-created in these new 
neighbourhoods may seem like simple extensions or copies of existing organisations, 
but they are in fact frequently transformed through their travel to the newly emerging 
space that these growing suburbs constitute. 
8.4 Looking forward: suggested research
This section offers suggestions for further research, building on this thesis and beyond. 
To begin, I briefly recapitulate the method developed in this thesis to locate research 
topics, to serve researchers looking for relevant research topics. I then discuss a number 
of areas which are relatively clearly defined research topics already and I believe warrant 
further research. These are organised in several research categories: the general urban 
social fabric, collective amenities, organisations for collective amenities, quantitative 
and/or GIS work, and intra-urban trajectories of social emancipation.
Methodology
First, a brief note on methodology. The general technique for finding fruitful research 
topics used in this project could be summarised as follows: first, ask people what they 
considered infrastructural deficits in their environment, then ask them “who should 
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fix that” or “who does fix that”. Following this, find those people or institutions. If they 
indeed appear to play an important role, the analysis would then consist of tracing the 
network of social connections, historical roots and other lines flowing outward from 
these people or institutions, slowly working towards larger geographical and historical 
scales. Find out how they tick, what the figuration around them looks like, what their 
power or ability to act rests on and what moral or social obligations or desires drive 
them.
In my view, the kind of approach described above is not used as frequently as it might 
be in research. Perhaps, this is because the end results tend to look somewhat messy 
and do not have clear boundaries – to some, it may feel and look like unfinished work. 
Even so, having several such charts of understanding that originate from several 
different small starting points, can provide more understanding of a city, or other 
system, than any amount of systematic mapping of that system. Having said that, 
even such open-ended research methodology requires distinct and bounded research 
methods. In the methodology chapter of this book, I described the methods used, 
which I believe form a good set of tools to start from. With the benefit of hindsight, 
here, I only reiterate my favourite among these: the systematic block of house-to-house 
interviews which I conducted to inquire about people’s social networks, basic world 
view issues, and mundane issues in the neighbourhood and among neighbours. Such 
interviews form an excellent starting point for locating relevant research themes and 
for conducting subsequent historical relational ethnographies, as they give you access 
to real life situations as case studies.
General urban social fabric research
In this section, I will make two suggestions for starting points to better understand 
the general social fabric of the city, especially tailored to Ghanaian (and possibly other 
West-African) cities: welfare or savings circles, and WhatsApp networks. 
In the first place, welfare funds or savings clubs are the key to understanding more 
deeply how Ghana’s contemporary urban society is organised. Such groups exist 
at every socio-economic level, with contributions ranging from 1 cedi per week to 
1000 cedi per week. Pay-outs correspondingly range from a package of soft drinks to 
celebrate a newborn, to a raffle of a new V8 SUV among the members every month, 
or even collective holiday trips to Dubai. These clubs are interesting in the narrow 
economic sense of providing a ‘safety net’ for resident, as the vast majority of them are 
small-scale and provide modest payouts in the face of adversity. They also carry more 
general interest as a social networking phenomenon, forming the social networks that 
determine the social fabric of the city. As such, these could be part of a broader look 
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at Old School groups and other social networks under the question: how do Accra’s 
citizens network, attain jobs, contracts and valuable information?
Secondly, a way to investigate this broader question would be to conduct a WhatsApp 
network analysis. This would provide enormous insight; if one could see what 
WhatsApp groups people are in and further still, spend some time in these groups as 
a fly on the wall. As a rather open-ended research method, this could provide insights 
into political organisation, the overlap of social circles, organisation for development 
at a neighbourhood-level as well as information relevant for many other questions, 
some of which are discussed below. 
Collective amenities
With regards to collective amenities, in this section, I make four suggestions. The 
first one directly builds on chapter 7 of this thesis. The second and third proposals 
are for investigating two other collective amenities. The last one is to investigate the 
conspicuous lack of collectivity in the housing market. 
To begin with, there is valuable work to be done in directly building on the findings of 
chapter 7 of this thesis regarding the water and electricity networks. A central question 
could explore whether the exit of the wealthy residents from collective networks leads to 
a decrease of government investments in them. This would involve taking a closer look 
at how ‘Bourdieu-ian’ mechanisms function in water supply sources, differentiating 
social classes from one another. The sort of trend exemplified in the following attitude: 
if everyone drinks tap water, then we prefer bottled water; if everyone drinks bottled 
water, we prefer a particular brand of bottled water, and so on. What effect does this 
have on the more basic forms of water supply that are ‘left behind’, such as sachet 
water and pipe water? Does it erode support for them, and does this lead to a quality 
decrease, therefore? Or, is it merely a harmless game of one-upmanship? Historical 
state budgets and comments from ministerial officials would be fruitful sources here, 
as well as interviews with parliamentarians. This kind of research would give a greater 
insight into the relationship web that exists between amenities, the population and the 
state, surrounding sub-urban development. 
To follow, in an analysis of neighbourhood-level amenities, garbage collection and 
sewage infrastructure are promising candidates for comparative analysis with water 
and electricity. Sewage infrastructure is interesting as a collective action problem 
at street level, since it is expensive to construct drains but it is also highly network-
dependent, which means it would be ineffective to construct drains if they are not 
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continued down the line. Garbage collection has several other fascinating dimensions 
to it. The collection system is a complex mixture of private and public operators. On a 
local level, it is run by individually owned and operated tricycle aboboyaas. Contracts 
for larger areas are awarded to operators like Zoomlion, which was described to me 
by one respondent as an effective monopolist throughout West Africa. In addition, 
it would be interesting to note where and how this system fares, both geographically 
and in terms of types of waste. Finally, there is the moral aspect of trash collection: in 
most places, people are expected pay per bag to have their trash picked up, which they 
do. What social pressures make people pay to have their trash picked up, rather than 
disposing it nightly in a drain somewhere? How do these pressures arise and what 
form do they take? And in what contexts do they fail to arise? The answers to these 
questions would say something more general about social organisation and attitudes 
of responsibility for order and development in an area. 
Thirdly, physical security is another collective amenity which would provide a 
promising window into study of local development.To a large degree, this amenity 
is again created from the ground up, in a co-production between eyes on the street, 
local vigilantes and formal state agencies. In several areas, we found that residents 
paid police officers and sometimes even soldiers from a nearby army base to patrol. In 
other cases, such as the vignette at the start of the introduction chapter, police officers 
were quartered in with residents, or residents gave away (part of) their house to create 
a police station. Vigilante or watchdog groups also appear to play a large role but they 
face challenges. On the one hand, they need to remain somewhat secret, to create the 
illusion of omnipresence and to evade detection by potential thieves. On the other 
hand, they need to be very visible, to encourage residents to donate money towards 
their upkeep. Such co-production of a complex amenity like security also warrants 
further investigation, to understand the dynamics of the growing neighborhood and 
its services.
Fourth, a lack of collectivity in housing would be another important area of development 
research. Accra is sprawling at breakneck speed, causing all sorts of transportation 
andenvironmental problems, among others. A major reason for this appears to be that 
everyone wants to have their own piece of land, build a house on this, and keep it in the 
family forever. This kind of horizontal, single-family sprawl is not a sustainable way of 
life for the urban system as a whole and is passionately argued against by agencies like 
UN Habitat, the World Bank and many government officials. If we want to make the city 
healthier in this regard, however, we need to understand why people are so attached to 
having their own land and sitting on it, and then try to see whether anything can be done 
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about those root causes. I do not know of any research that investigates this question, 
thus far, but I believe it would be a provide fruitful results concerning development. 
Organizations that produce collective amenities
Building on the work in chapters 4-6 of this thesis, additional research on organisations 
that produce collective amenities would also provide a valuable contribution to the 
knowledge on the subject . What follows, here, are suggestions to further probe the 
positions of churches and politicians. 
From the research, it is clear that orthodox churches are being replaced by charismatic 
churches. Whereas chapter 6 of this thesis pits these two against each other in a 
dichotomy, it would be valuable to investigate the conditions under which the new 
churches also organise the production of structural, as opposed to one-off, collective 
amenities. More concretely, such research could build upon the framework set out 
in chapter 6, and ask: to what extent are strands of the community service morality, 
characteristic of orthodox churches, present in these new churches? And, how might 
they have evolved? It would be highly valuable, in terms of research findings, to develop 
an effective research instrument to somehow ‘measure’ the morality and worldview 
of such churches, both of their staff and of their congregants., Such an enterprise is 
fraught with risks, however; and will almost certainly be accused of ethnocentrism, 
or worse. Churches, nonetheless, provide a unique insight into community values and 
neighborhood workings and are, therefore, worthy subjects of further study. 
As well as churches, the Assembly member as part of the local political apparatus, 
is a topic of interest for greater research. The position was introduced in the local 
government reforms by Rawlings’ government in the early 1990s, as a middle man 
between residents and the municipality. In a sense, the position was designed as 
the modern and more democratic replacement for the chief; not party-aligned, he 
would simply be a local, grassroots leader. As such, Assembly members are generally 
overworked and underpaid. They are held accountable for their efforts through 
elections every four years and yet, are also expected to play a patron-like role by 
appearing at funerals and weddings, as well as making small donations all around 
them. Since this is hard to afford for an independent citizen, the Assembly members are 
increasingly, in many municipalities now exclusively, party-backed, and the position 
has become a stepping stone in a political career. Yet, at the same time, they form a 
crucial node in the development of neighbourhoods, throughout the city. It would be 
worthwhile to investigate this position further, as it could lead to valuable practical 
policy recommendations. 
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Quantitative and GIS work
I also have two suggestions in terms of quantitative and/or GIS studies, which 
could serve to anchor much of the work suggested above and much of the work in 
this thesis as well, by providing a more robust basis for extrapolation of conclusions 
and uncovering broader patterns in the city’s growth process. For the first, stages of 
urbanisation, half the research paper was already written for this project. It focuses on 
the growth patterns of physical urban fabric, trying to find patterns of sequentiality. 
What comes first, paved roads or water pipes? Does it take a certain density of 
population, before electricity lines are extended? In Ghana’s cities, as quite possibly in 
many other Sub-Saharan urban areas, such basic infrastructure is built and expanded 
without much central planning, evolving organically. It often only comes to areas long 
after the processes of settlement and densification have begun. The question is, in what 
order do these various components of infrastructure development emerge, and what 
connection do they have to each other? 
A suitable basis of data for this project could be found in the 2010 census and in a variety 
of other sources, as well as raw satellite imagery. My suggestion is that the methodology 
could be a spatial regression, for which I have already worked out a proposal, available 
on request. Such quantitative work can form an important addition to existing work 
on the emergence of civil society organisation, neighbourhood development and the 
growth process of public amenities in a decentralised and organically evolving urban 
environment. The work can also enable comparative urban studies, and furthermore, 
provide insight to policy makers and development workers to help them set priorities 
in their urban development policies. 
 Additionally, in a more basic sense: a good GIS-based mapping of the degree of social, 
ethnic and religious mixing in Accra’s neighbourhoods also does not currently exist, 
to my knowledge. This could be done on the basis of the census, which is very fine-
grained, geographically speaking. This would serve as a solid quantitative basis to 
determine how the mechanisms found through the kind of qualitative work described 
above could be generalised and tested in studies elsewhere. 
Arrival city
Finally, building upon the point raised in the previous section on ‘slum improvement,’ 
it would be valuable to gain a better understanding of the way people flow through 
the city throughout their lives. That question has been one of the main purposes of 
this project, from the beginning, which, sadly, also fell by the wayside due to capacity 
constraints. ‘Stepping stone migration,’ which investigates how people arrive from 
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villages into cities, used to be a central focus for research. But this should be an intra-
urban topic as well. My understanding is that villagers, especially from Northern 
Ghana, generally start out by renting a mattress in Old Fadama or Madina and working 
as day labourer or hawker. They then make the step up to a slightly more fixed labour 
position and perhaps share a room with a few friends. Next, they move into a bigger 
‘hall & chamber’, and continue upgrading , until the final goal of owning their own plot 
of land and building a house on it. That is just a sketch of the scenario, based on the 
impressions I gathered while focusing on other topics. If we truly want to understand 
how the city works, and certainly if we want to intervene in it, we need to understand 
these types of flows. 
In general, such research on population flow through cities would look at economic 
factors in terms of infrastructure, financial and other resources, organisations which 
effectively use these, as well as elements in the urban figuration which affect this space 
by wielding power in it. It would look at these elements neither as constituting an 
‘economy’ that needs to be ‘grown,’ nor as possible resources for ‘community development 
programs’ by the state or external NGOs, but rather in their own right. We need to first 
understand the city as it is, as it currently works, and accept it as such, before we can 
effectively intervene for the better. I believe this type of academic research can do much 
to inform the work of all those who work so hard to make Accra a better place to live. 
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We bevinden ons middenin een eeuw van ongekende stedelijke groei. Volgens de 
VN zal tussen 1950 en 2045 de wereldwijde stedelijke bevolking acht maal zo groot 
worden, tot uiteindelijk een totaal van zes miljard stedelingen. Afrika is het minst 
verstedelijkte continent, maar haar steden groeien het hardst. Sub-Sahara Afrika heeft 
momenteel zo’n 424 miljoen stedelingen; naar verwachting is dat aantal over twintig 
jaar verdubbeld. Ghana loopt voorop in deze ontwikkeling. Daarbinnen is de Accra-
Tema agglomeratie de voornaamste groeikern; zijn bevolking groeit jaarlijks met vier 
procent, zijn oppervlakte met vijf procent.
Er is een rijke academische literatuur over het Afrikaanse urbanisatieproces. Grotendeels 
richt die literatuur zich op de meest spectaculaire aspecten: de hogedrukpan van centraal 
gelegen sloppenwijken, de ultra-rijken in hun luxe wijken, wiens hoge veiligheidsmuren 
de stad doorsnijden, en de langzaam ontrafelende sociale verbanden in de oude 
dorpskernen waar de stad overheen groeide. Het buitengebied, de uitgestrekte, eentonige 
laagbouw van Afrika’s buitenwijken, heeft beduidend minder aandacht gekregen. 
Deze gebieden vormen geen centraal element in de grote theorieën, noch in het publieke 
debat. Toch is dit waar de meerderheid van Afrika’s nieuwe stedelingen woont. De 
huidige urbanisatiegolf is vooral sub-urbanisatie. Per jaar begint zo’n vijftig vierkante 
kilometer aan ruraal gebied rondom Accra aan de decennia durende transformatie tot 
stedelijk gebied. Deze vorm van stedelijk gebied vormt het onderzoeksobject van dit 
proefschrift. 
Specifieker kijkt dit proefschrift naar de bewoners van deze gebieden, en vraagt hoe zij 
omgaan met het feit dat hun wijken vanaf de grond moeten worden opgebouwd, in de 
context van een zwakke overheid. 
De centrale onderzoeksvraag is:
Hoe organiseren bewoners van Accra’s nieuw groeiende buitenwijken zich, om collectieve 
voorzieningen te creëren voor hun wijk?
Met andere woorden, dit boek bestudeert vormen van lokale organisatie voor collectieve 
voorzieningen, in het ontstaansproces van stedelijk weefsel. Om te begrijpen hoe 
mensen in deze context van elkaar afhankelijk zijn gebruik ik de figuratiesociologie, 
opgericht door Norbert Elias. Zijn relationele en procesmatige benadering maakt 
het makkelijker om te zien hoe het stedelijk weefsel groeit, om te begrijpen wat voor 
sociale verbanden bepaalde vormen van lokale organisatie mogelijk maken, en om 
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te doorzien via welke relaties met de rest van de stad de bewoners erin slagen om 
voorzieningen te realiseren. Zo maakt bijvoorbeeld het concept van de ‘figuratie’ het 
mogelijk om verbanden te zien voorbij het spectrum van afgebakende organisaties: 
tussen bewoners, (delen van) formele instanties, politieke netwerken, en allerlei 
elementen van het maatschappelijk middenveld. 
De methodologie van dit proefschrift is de historische relationele etnografie. Daarbij 
wordt een lokale casus onderzocht, als vertrekpunt voor een bredere institutionele 
en historische analyse. De etnografie draait om een wijk genaamd Sebrepor, die ik 
voornamelijk onderzoek via semi-gestructureerde en open interviews: met etnische 
en religieuze leiders, ambtenaren, lokale politici, activisten en gewone wijkbewoners. 
Deze interviews zijn aangevuld met informele gesprekken en observaties, over een 
totale periode van tien maanden veldwerk. De wijkstudie is gecontextualiseerd met 
onderzoek naar historische ontwikkelingen en (staats-)instituties en andere elementen 
van het stedelijk weefsel, die de wijk mede vormgeven. Zo gebruik ik de wijk als een 
lens op grotere figuraties en lange termijnontwikkelingen. 
De vier empirische hoofdstukken van het proefschrift gaan respectievelijk in op 
buurtverenigingen, stamhoofden, kerken en de waterleiding. 
Het eerste van de vier empirische hoofdstukken richt zich op wijkverenigingen. Dit 
zijn seculiere, praktisch georiënteerde organisaties op wijkniveau, gevormd door 
vrijwilligers uit de wijk, die werken aan concrete collectieve voorzieningen zoals 
straten, waterleidingen en veiligheid. Met de wijkverenigingen als focus onderzoek 
ik hoe bewoners zich organiseren in de vroege stadia van wijkontwikkeling, en 
hoe dit verandert naarmate grotere organisaties als kerken, politieke partijen en 
overheidsinstanties actiever worden in de wijk. Hierbij besteed ik specifiek aandacht 
aan de dynamische relatie tussen enerzijds organisatie van onderaf, en anderzijds 
inspanningen van de overheid, om infrastructuur te realiseren. 
Ik concludeer dat wijkverenigingen een substantieel aandeel van de collectieve 
voorzieningen organiseren. Vooral in de vroege stadia van wijkontwikkeling zijn 
er maar weinig andere organisaties aanwezig in het gebied. Bewoners moeten 
dan wel het heft in eigen handen nemen. In latere stadia kan de gemeente hun 
opbouwwerkzaamheden versterken met geld en zware machinerie, maar de bulk van 
het werk blijft op de schouders van de wijkvereniging liggen. Vervolgens, als de lokale 
overheid meer gevestigd raakt, worden door ambtenaren en politici steeds meer beloftes 
gedaan over ontwikkelingsprojecten, en wordt de lokale belastingheffing opgezet. 
Dit leidt vaak tot de ondergang van burgerorganisaties zoals de wijkverenigingen. 
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Naarmate de wijk anoniemer wordt, de partij-politieke organisatiegraad stijgt en de 
overheidsinstanties binnenkomen, ontrafelen de autonome burgerorganisatievormen 
zoals wijkverenigingen. 
De bevindingen van dit hoofdstuk dragen bij aan verscheidene onderzoeksterreinen. 
Ten eerste, de studie van bewonersorganisatie in (informele) wijken die aangroeien 
aan de stedelijke buitenrand, wereldwijd. Ten tweede, de studie van co-productie van 
collectieve voorzieningen tussen bewoners en de overheid. En ten derde, de studie van 
het ontstaan en de verschillende verschijningsvormen van collectieve organisatie in 
het algemeen. 
Het tweede empirische hoofdstuk onderzoekt traditionele stamhoofden. Het traceert 
de veranderingen in de rol van een stamhoofd, naarmate zijn gebied de eerste stedelijk 
georiënteerde bewoners ontvangt, verdicht en zodoende langzaam van ruraal naar stedelijk 
transformeert. Hoewel er een substantiële hoeveelheid onderzoek is naar stamhoofden 
in Ghana is er weinig tot geen materiaal over hun positie in steden. Dit is een omissie, 
want de stamhoofden zijn cruciale factoren in stedelijke ontwikkelingsvraagstukken. 
Niet omdat alle stamhoofden per se actief bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van hun wijk, 
maar omdat ze meestal een centrale machtspositie in de wijk hebben, en daarom grote 
invloed hebben op elke vorm van (burger-)organisatie die binnen de wijk plaatsvindt. 
Ik concludeer dat de positie van stamhoofden in de loop van Ghana’s historische 
staatsvormingsproces is geëvolueerd tot een punt waar de stamhoofden, los van 
hun persoonlijke capaciteiten en sociale leiderschapspositie, standaard een sterke 
machtspositie in de wijken hebben. Ze werden door de koloniale autoriteiten ingezet als 
tussenpersonen, en hebben veel van die rol weten te behouden onder de post-koloniale 
regimes. Vanuit hun positie als traditionele, lokaal gewortelde leiders controleren zij 
het meest waardevolle goed van de stad: het land. Formeel vanuit een positie van 
rentmeesterschap, maar in de praktijk vaak als privébezit. Daarnaast hebben ze een rol 
als tussenpersoon tussen een verscheidenheid aan overheidsorganisaties en de lokale 
bevolking. In het bijzonder tijdens de fase waar overheidsinstanties zich nog in de wijk 
aan het vestigen zijn is dit een cruciale spilfunctie.
Dit hoofdstuk is gebaseerd op een Weberiaanse benadering van autoriteit; het laat zien 
hoe het traditionele gezag van de stamhoofden historische verweven is geraakt met 
het legaal-rationele gezag van de staat. Het biedt daarmee niet alleen een empirische 
studie van de rol van een traditionele autoriteit in hedendaags Accra, maar draagt 
ook bij aan het onderzoek naar de positie van adel en koningshuizen in hedendaagse 
constitutionele monarchieën. 
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Het derde empirische hoofdstuk gaat in op de rol van kerken in de wijkopbouw; 
specifieker, het verband tussen de interne structuur van kerken en hun bijdrage aan 
publieke voorzieningen. Kerken hebben historisch een centrale rol gespeeld in het 
opbouwen van onderwijs- en medische infrastructuur in Ghana. Er is een grote 
hoeveelheid onderzoek naar Ghana’s religieuze instellingen, maar  er is tot nog toe 
weinig aandacht besteed aan de vraag waarom, hoe en onder welke voorwaarden 
religieuze gemeenschappen collectieve voorzieningen ontwikkelen, en hoe ze intern 
functioneren in economische zin. 
De interne organisatie en denkwijze van kerken blijken hier cruciale variabelen te zijn. 
Deze worden op hun beurt gevormd door het religieuze veld en de relaties van dat 
veld met de bredere staatsfiguratie, op het moment dat die specifieke kerk ontstond. 
Een scherpe toename van keuzevrijheid en diversiteit in het religieuze landschap 
sinds de tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw heeft de context voor kerken veranderd, 
en geleid tot een andere logica wat betreft overleven, continuïteit en expansie van 
het instituut. De ‘charismatische’ kerken, een groeiende groep religieuze instellingen 
wiens doctrines en interne organisatie radicaal afwijkt van de voorgaande generatie, 
de missiekerken, neemt in hoog tempo het veld over. 
Deze charismatische kerken lijken veel meer op commerciële bedrijven, georganiseerd 
om te overleven, te groeien en financiële winst te boeken in een competitieve religieuze 
marktplaats. Hun interne zorgstructuren zijn meer ad-hoc, waardoor ze minder een 
betrouwbaar vangnet kunnen bieden. In tegenstelling tot de missiekerken zijn ze 
nauwelijks gericht op het opbouwen van een breder maatschappelijk middenveld en 
het spelen van een rol in de (semi-)staatsfiguratie, in scholing en gezondheidszorg. 
Bovendien is hun individualistische ideologie minder geschikt voor de collectieve 
actie die is vereist voor het opbouwen van publieke goederen. Kortom, in tegenstelling 
tot wat veel van de literatuur stelt: een actievere ‘religieuze marktplaats’ leidt niet 
automatisch tot meer en betere collectieve voorzieningen. 
Het vierde empirische hoofdstuk onderzoekt niet een vorm van organisatie maar een 
specifieke voorziening: drinkwater. Ik bevraag hierbij de aanname van collectiviteit 
van voorzieningen, door een analyse van hoe de watervoorzieningsmechanismen 
van Accra’s wijken zich bewegen tussen processen van individualisering en processen 
van collectivisering. Specifieker kijk ik naar de dynamiek tussen lokale, min of 
meer informele, collectieve actie, en het grotere, stadsbrede collectief dat wordt 
gerepresenteerd door de Ghana Water Company. 
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In de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw was Ghana’s water-infrastructuur beperkt 
tot enkele centrale stadsdelen, en strikt in handen van het waterleidingbedrijf. In de 
decennia na onafhankelijkheid groeide het netwerk steeds sneller. Dat gebeurde eerst 
primair door overheidsprojecten van bovenaf, maar in toenemende mate door (al dan 
niet legale) zelfhulpprojecten van burgers. De halsbrekend snelle expansie leidde tot 
systemische zwakke plekken in Accra’s waterleidingnetwerk. Er ontstonden fyieke 
bottlenecks door gebrekkige planning, de productie schoot tekort, en de GWC verloor 
het overzicht over haar eigen leidingnetwerk - dat ze nu voor het eerst in decennia 
weer integraal in kaart brengt. 
Het waterleidingbedrijf reageert op de ongecontroleerde expansie met repressie 
jegens doe-het-zelf-projecten van burgers, een narratief van controle, pogingen om de 
informeel gebouwde extensies te incorporeren, en werk aan de centrale infrastructuur 
van zuiveringsinstallaties en grote leidingen. Desondanks leidt de slechtere service 
ertoe dat rijkere bewoners het systeem verlaten wanneer ze kunnen. Zij kiezen 
voor individuele voorzieningen: eigen putten, watertrucks, flessen en plastic zakjes 
met gezuiverd water. Zo wordt de politieke en financiële basis van deze publieke 
voorziening ondergraven. 
Dit hoofdstuk slaat een brug tussen twee literatuurstromingen: enerzijds theoretische 
benaderingen die zich richten op burgerinitiatieven in de bouw van infrastructuur, en 
anderzijds de meer traditionele top-down ontwikkelingstheorie. 
Welke bredere conclusies kunnen worden getrokken uit dit proefschrift als geheel, 
met betrekking tot de centrale vraag Hoe organiseren bewoners van Accra’s nieuw 
groeiende buitenwijken zich, om collectieve voorzieningen te creëren voor hun wijk? Eén 
belangrijke bevinding is dat elke vorm van organisatie voor collectieve voorzieningen, 
hoe informeel ook, sterk wordt gevormd door de overheid. Dit geldt zelfs in een relatief 
zwakke staat als Ghana. Echter, de vorm van verwevenheid varieert sterk. Sommigen 
zijn als communicerende vaten, die zwakker worden als de staat sterker wordt. 
Anderen, zoals de stamhoofden, rusten voor hun macht deels op de staat, hoewel ze er 
tegelijkertijd mee concurreren voor macht en hulpmiddelen. 
Een tweede bevinding gaat over de manier waarom veel collectieven zijn georganiseerd 
in Accra’s groeiende buitenwijken. Voor veel van de organisaties daar is splitsing en 
promotie het standaardproces. Politiebureau’s, water- en elektriciteitsdistrictkantoren, 
en allerhande instanties groeien op dezelfde manier: hun ruimtelijke eenheden groeien, 
krijgen een steeds grotere populatie, en worden gesplitst en gepromoveerd tot een 
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hogere rang. Dit geldt ook voor kerken en politieke partijen, voor wijkverenigingen, 
en zelfs voor gemeentes. 
Een derde bevinding gaat over institutionele verandering. Veel bestaande instituties 
krijgen deels opnieuw vorm als ze arriveren in de nieuw groeiende wijken. De kerken 
zijn een goed voorbeeld hiervan. Veel mensen die naar de buitenwijken verhuizen, 
worden gedwongen om van denominatie te veranderen; even zoveel pakken de kans 
zelf met beide handen aan. Dit maakt deze nieuwe wijken een bijzonder vruchtbare 
grond voor opkomende vormen van religieuze organisatie, zoals de charismatische 
kerken. In een gebied waar alles van de grond af aan moet worden opgebouwd is het 
makkelijker om iets echt nieuws op te zetten. Zo voedt de groei van de buitenwijken 
de ontwikkeling van nieuwe religieuze ondernemingen en praktijken, en stelt ze in 
staat het religieuze veld te betreden, waar ze de oude kerken vervangen of hun kant 
op trekken. 
Tot slot biedt de conclusie van het proefschrift nog enkele aanbevelingen voor verder 
onderzoek. Beleidsaanbevelingen staan in Appendix 1, niet in de tekst van het 
proefschrift zelf, omdat ze verder strekken dan de academische bevindingen van het 
proefschrift.
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APPENDICES
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Appendix 1 provides policy recommendations and other practical applications based on this thesis. Appendix 2 contains the data sheet used to profile the additional case study neighborhoods, 
beyond Sebrepor, as described in section 3.3 of the methodology. 
Appendix 3 provides a sample door-to-door interview. Appendix 4 
provides two examples of expert interview questionnaires. Appendix 
5 provides information on the author.
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Appendix 1: Practical applications of the research findings
Is the rather abstract approach developed in this thesis also useful for development 
work, policy makers or other practitioners? I believe so, and hope to show that it is, by 
drawing a number of concrete recommendations from the different chapters. 
First, a more general note. Coming from a European perspective, as I did and as I 
expect the majority of my readers to do, it is important to realise that many institutions 
in Ghana have the same names and superficial structures as they do in Europe, but 
quite different roles in practice. Churches are perhaps the most extreme example in 
this regard. While in Ghana ‘churches’ may be buildings where people come together 
on Sunday to listen to a speaker discussing the divine, they can also be almost anything 
else, from a spontaneous spiritual gathering in a wooden shed or under a tree, to a hard-
core business or even a money-laundering operation (Ukah, 2016). Political parties 
are hardly policy-based; they mostly create private or club goods on an ad-hoc basis 
instead. Ethnic groups or ‘tribes’ (an offensive, essentialist term) are hardly organised, 
yet do importantly organise social life through the cultural and linguistic ties they 
provide, as well as through the old system of ‘traditional authorities’, which in today’s 
cities largely rests on constitutional law, rather than on tradition. Sport clubs might 
actually serve as political muscle crews, while what looks like a rowdy demonstration 
may well be a harmless ‘keep-fit club’. And so on, and so forth. That does not mean 
that Ghanaian institutions are all fundamentally different from Western institutions. It 
simply means that it pays to look more closely, because things might not be what they 
appear at first sight, often in subtle ways.
Chapter 4: The rise and fall of resident organizations
I start with three suggestions drawn from chapter 4, about Residents Associations and 
other such grassroots resident activism. 
First, Residents Associations are among the most democratic, grassroots and therefore 
actively citizen-monitored development institutions out there. They exist at a very 
small- scale level and are, by definition, run by people who personally live in the area, 
whose door people can knock on to discuss issues or question spending patterns. This 
makes them very effective and makes corruption far less likely than in more formal and 
distant organisations. So, they should be supported. If it is possible to strengthen their 
ability to levy contributions, whether by providing them with police assistance or with 
legal aid, that should be done. If NGOs want to work with grassroots organisations, 
these are very suitable partners. Cooperating with Residents Associations would also 
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make NGOs less likely to be tricked by fraudsters with fake ‘grassroots organisations’ 
(something I saw happening quite frequently during my fieldwork), as a single 
neighborhood generally has only one such organisation and everyone will know who 
is on the board. However, it should also be realised that these organisations are not 
administratively strong. They are volunteer-led and much of the time overworked. 
And it requires a very fine-grained local distribution and communication network 
to effectively work with them. But in my view, it would be worth the hassle and cost-
effective to try this. 
Second, co-production is a very effective mechanism and one that is implicitly built 
into Ghana’s local government institutions. This should be made more explicit and 
drawn upon more actively. I can imagine two ways to do so. One is to simply demand 
that residents co-pay for amenities, that a school will not be built until half of the 
money is gathered by the residents (for instance, through the Residents Association), 
and so forth. Co-payment amounts could be scaled based on an assessment of the level 
of wealth in an area. The other is to make even more use of the ‘eyes in the community’ 
for government projects. That would be done by obliging local government to 
paste posters with clear information on the contract and the financial amounts on 
construction projects in the community, so that everyone can keep an eye on them. 
There is systematic corruption around local government projects: as people from 
both major parties repeatedly told me (also about their own party), the constituency 
chairman has to front much of the money for the campaign, and gets paid back 
through overpriced construction projects later. This costly dynamic could be partially 
undermined by putting financial figures literally out in the community, instead of 
forcing citizens to come to the municipal assembly for information.
Third, local government should not be rolled out in an area if it cannot yet deliver. 
This requires some explanation. The chapter found that Residents Associations and 
similar informal networks play an important role both in independently producing 
collective amenities and in making sure that politically driven or administratively 
ordered development projects actually ‘land’ effectively and get finished. At the same 
time, once local government gets rolled out into an area, grassroots organizations 
do not have much longer to live: they crumble as residents are told by civil servants 
and politicians that ‘government’ will fix things. Hence, the establishment of a dense 
local government fabric, especially one that cannot yet deliver, can actually slow down 
development of an area by undermining effective collective action.
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Chapter 5: Traditional authorities in the city
Then, from the chapter on chiefs, one recommendation about chiefs themselves and 
two about land. 
First, a practical recommendation for organizations which frequently work with 
local communities: create background material on the chieftaincy system, and build 
connections at the chieftaincy ministry. It is important to quickly understand who 
is the chief of an area (or if there are competing chiefs, who stands where) and to 
understand something about their position. And make sure your fieldwork officers 
realize the amount of power chiefs have in a community: primarily blocking power, 
but also constructive power. If the chief sends someone to beat the gongon in his 
community, people will come out. 
Second, a recommendation to Ghana’s national government: find a way to effectively 
tax land sales. The value of urban land is a giant resource which provides much of the 
development budget in cities worldwide. Currently, this resource is just spilling away 
to traditional authorities and their families. This is neither fair nor conductive to the 
development of Ghana’s cities. It is not fair, because the royal families did not make 
that land valuable; the entire city around it did. And it is not productive, because very 
little of that money gets spent on development. The laws for chiefs to pay tax on their 
sales are already there. Now enforce them, for all Ghanaians.
Third, again to Ghana’s government: legal cases about land are a drain on Ghana’s 
coffers and on the time, energy and money of its residents. They drag on for years, 
often decades, and in the end only enrich the lawyers and judges. This has to be limited. 
Of course, going from traditional communal land ownership to private freehold is an 
enormous transition for any society, so it is only natural that there are frequent disputes 
and attempts at land-grabbing. But nobody gains from the length of these disputes. I 
am not a legal scholar, but if a way could be found to change the legal system so that 
cases around land are decided sooner, this might spare people a great amount of tedious 
effort and suffering. The strange thing is, often times these cases are not fair anyway, so 
it might feel more satisfying to think that at least, we’ve gone to the bottom of a case, 
including all possible appeals to higher courts, etc.. But in fact, that just means the one 
with the longest staying power or the deepest pockets wins. Whereas, the sooner the 
cases are over, regardless of who wins, the sooner everyone can just continue with their 
lives. So, put your state lawyers on it, and find ways to systematically shorten those 
cases. You will relieve the country of a massive burden, and push people to get on with 
their lives rather than be stuck in an everlasting struggle. 
Organising New Neighborhoods: Understanding the Emergence of Amenities In Accra From Below422
Chapter 6: Collective effervescence, collective amenities?
From the chapter on churches, two practical development work recommendations for 
NGOs and other development agencies. 
First, if you want to work with ‘the community’, then work with the orthodox churches. 
Although shrinking in relative size and with an ageing congregation, they are still 
likely to be one of the best conduits to get money well spent in urban Ghana. They 
will multiply the effectiveness of your donation because they have a strong network 
of volunteers, and the moral orientations of their leadership and membership will be 
much to closer to something obruni (Europeans/Americans) will easily understand. 
It is important to note that that is not a value judgment of those moral orientations, 
although it may seem so. Indeed, my personal morality, as I come from (North-Western) 
Europe, is also much more closely aligned with those of orthodox church members, 
so I often found it easier to communicate with them than with other Ghanaians. We 
share more of a wavelength of ideas and thought patterns. But at the same time, those 
times that I managed to really listen, I learned much from members of all types of 
churches and believe that there is much value to be found in moral orientations which 
are significantly different from my own mindset. So, why do I recommend Western 
NGOs to cooperate specifically with these churches? Because I do believe that if you 
try to cooperate with someone whose values and thought patterns are aligned with 
yours, you will have a far more productive cooperation.
Second, it might be worthwhile if NGOs were to sponsor investigative journalism into 
phony pastors. There is an enormous eruption of religious enterprise in Ghana at the 
moment, and many of these new preachers and prophets provide spiritual liberation 
and a lot of positive energy for their congregants. That is great. But too many of the 
new churches are set up by skilled manipulators and tricksters, crossovers between a 
short-term capitalist operation and a quasi-spiritual puppet show. The fact that these 
places call themselves churches is offensive both to older, established organization 
religion and to the true Pentecostals, mystics and other movements that form the 
spiritually alive fringe. They are tricksters who skillfully give poor people hope (or 
worse, fear) only to then drain them of their money. That bubble should be popped as 
soon as possible, and while the state should not get involved in regulating spirituality, 
exposure through journalism is an effective way to do so.
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Chapter 7: Expansion patterns of connective goods
From the chapter on the water and electricity infrastructure, two points: one general 
advice to major donors and one more detailed remark about pro-poor policies. 
Major donors: invest in the backbone infrastructure. That is, the production facilities 
and main transmission lines throughout the city, and the organizational capacity of 
the state utility companies. Much of the rest of the network ‘builds itself ’, in the sense 
that the distribution lines at the local level are far more affordable for local politicians 
and wealthy residents, and the residents build much of the final stretch of distribution 
infrastructure. It is the backbone infrastructure that is underfunded and ever more 
overstretched. In addition, those parts are the most technically complex components 
of the system. So they could really use the expertise that nearly automatically comes 
along with most development aid projects, since these contracts are in practice mostly 
granted to firms from the donor countries themselves. In those contracts, an explicit 
cost component for skills transmission and training should be included, to facilitate 
knowledge transfer to the local utility companies. Finally, support projects that allow 
the state utility companies to get a better control over their systems, such as the GIS 
mapping project of the GWC. In the end, such projects are highly cost-effective. 
In terms of pro-poor policies, a direct approach does not seem warranted to me. It 
is very costly to provide water supply infrastructure for the poorest residents of the 
city. Local redistribution of water through home-based polytank sales operations and 
standpipes is a far more effective means for this end, and should be allowed to self-
organize. Another way to do this is to better facilitate the water tanker trucks. In the 
end, this is pipe water that manages to reach those who are not yet connected, and 
which is used quite efficiently and sparingly, because it is so expensive.
Arrival city
Finally, a piece of more general policy advice that I feel is most important of all, about 
Accra more in general and its position in Ghanaian society at large. The function of 
an arrival city (Saunders, 2011) is vital. But how can we ensure that pathways for poor 
villagers to enter the city remain open? Currently, the messy fringes of the city are the 
only places where they can go. Buffer zones around highways and waterways, spaces 
like Old Fadama and other, smaller squatter zones. These are the campsites of the city, 
and we should tacitly recognize that function. That is not to say that they should be 
permanent campsites: a highway buffer is there for a reason, and government should 
be able to use it when necessary. In fact, should there be no more eviction threat, that 
would drive the value of that land up dramatically and it would no longer be available 
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to the arrivals. Similarly, slum improvement projects don’t work. That is to say, they 
upgrade the neighborhood, not the residents’ lives.
It is as simple as this: a city like Accra, with a migratory function for those living in 
deprived rural areas, needs arrival spaces. And those arrival spaces are going to be 
ugly, otherwise they wouldn’t be left for the arrivals. 
So, my advice is: leave the messy places in the city. Tolerate them. They are vital 
stepping stones on the road to a better life, for many, many people.
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Appendix 2: Data sheet neighborhood profile
Neighborhood: …     Date:  …
Area description…
Block 1
Residential Buildings found in the block
Building type Amount of this type found in the are
Wooden shack
Rental hall & chamber row building, clay
Family luxury home, unfinished
Family luxury home, finished
Family standard home, unfinished
Family standard home, finished
Rental block building, unfinished
Rental block building, finished
Farm or open space
Other…
Non-residential buildings found in the block 
Business Building type & material* Comments (optional)
Lotto
Provisions
MTN credit
Hairdresser
Water depot
Tailor
Public toilet
Other…
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COMMENTS:
Amenities and other area characteristics
Street lights (choose the best fitting category, provide comments below)
(a) none  (b) main street only  (c) some side streets also 
(d) most side streets  (e) almost everywhere in the community
Comments:
Drains & sewerage (choose the best fitting category, provide comments below)
(a) no drains at all (b) main street only  (c) some side streets also
(d) most side streets  (e) almost everywhere in the community
Comments: 
Power (choose the best fitting category, provide comments below)
(a) no power lines  (b) power lines only along main street 
(c) power lines going into a few side streets  (d) power lines in many parts of the block 
(e) power in almost every house
Comments:
Building density (choose the best fitting category, provide comments below)
(a) scattered structures  (b) about half of all plots have at least some structures 
(c) majority of plots used  (d) majority of plots used intensively, at least some structures… 
…on almost every plot  (e) almost all plots are fully used
Comments:
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Street quality (choose the best fitting category, provide comments below)
(a) unmarked dirt roads (b) demarcated dirt roads (c) gravel roads 
(d) some tarred roads (e) all roads tarred
Comments:
Interview
Historical questions
1. When did you arrive in this area? How did the place look, when you first came 
here?
2. When and how did the first people settle in this area? Details?
3. When and how was the first church built? Details?
4. When and how was the first school built? Details?
5. When and how did you get water in this area? Self-help, by Assembly/MP 
project, in another way? Details?
6. When and how did you get electricity in this area? Self-help, by Assembly/MP 
project, in another way? Details?
7. When and how did you get the first street lights in this area? Self-help, by 
Assembly/MP project, in another way? Details?
8. When and how did you get open roads (suitable for car) in this area? Self-help, 
by Assembly/MP project, in another way? Details?
9. When and how did you get the first tarred roads (suitable for car) in this area? 
Self-help, by Assembly/MP project, in another way? Details?
10. Who contributed to pay for all these things? [only if the person has not 
explained this already, otherwise, you may skip this question]
11. Is there any Residents Association in this area? Is it active? Why (not)? Which 
projects is/was it most concerned with? 
12. When was the moment that there were too many residents in the area for you 
to know all of them? Details? When did people really start flooding in here?
13. What were the major challenges during the development of this area so far? 
14. …is there anything else you can teach me about the history of this town?
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Current situation in the area
1. What are the water sources for residents in this community? Standpipe, 
mainline, tanker, boreholes? Which ones do most people use?
2. Where is the nearest police station? When was it built?
3. What District/Municipal Assembly are you part of? Do you think they have 
enough time and attention for this community?
4. Where is the nearest bank? When was it built?
5. Is there any public toilet in this area? When was it built?
6. Are the various plots of land legally and securely owned by the residents? Or 
is there a conflict about the original ownership of the land somehow, between 
chiefs, government authorities, or others?
7. In what ways did the chief contribute to the development of the area?
8. What development is most needed now, at the moment, and what is holding 
it back?
N.B. Describe the person you conducted the interview with:
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Appendix 3: Sample door-to-door interview
General questions
What is your name?
(Name removed for privacy reasons)
How long have you lived in this area?
I moved in here 6 months ago. 
Do you own the structure or do you rent? What about the land? What is the rent?
I rent the selfcontained apartment (hall, chamber, kitchen, toilet and 
bath) from the landowner on 2 year pre-paid contract. The price is 120 
cedi per month, and the rent is paid up front. So I paid 4800 cedi when 
moving in. 
Where did you live before?
I was staying in a different part of this same community, but that house 
was too small.
Where is your hometown?
Offankor on the Hsawam Road by Pokuase. That means I’m from around 
here. 
Who are part of your household here? 
[all subsequent questions are asked about the entire household]
I am staying here with my wife and two children.
How old are you?
Myself, I am 56 years old. As for my wife I am not too sure. My children, 
one is now graduated from secondary school, one is still in that school. 
What job do you do? 
Formerly, I used to be a sealer for Shell petroleum. Now I’m retired since 
some few years.
What is your highest level of education?
Form 4, that is, secondary school. My wife has also finished Form 4. 
As I said, my daughter has completed Senior High School. My son is still 
schooling.
Which church do you attend?
I’m attending Anglican Church, in Tema near my former home. That one 
is a bit far from here, but I still travel there because I like it. It’s known 
to me and I have my friends there. As for my wife, she does the same 
but for Catholic church. My children, I don’t see them going to church 
honestly. 
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Do you have any place where you go to spend some free time and relax small?
In fact, there is a bar nearby, where I like to go. There are some usual 
friends of mine there, I can rely on them [laughs]. But it’s not only the 
bar. Some days I would rather go to Tema to visit some of my relatives. 
My wife, she doesn’t like to go anywhere. She just stays at home to take 
care of our grandchild. That is the child of our daughter. 
If you need to borrow some household item, who do you borrow it from?
Oh, me, I don’t borrow anything. If you borrow in this community people 
may be willing to lend stuff to you, but then they will talk about you 
behind your back. If I am in need of anything, no problem, I will just buys 
my own stuff. 
If you need to borrow money, who do you borrow it from?
Like I said, I wouldn’t borrow from people around. If anything I would 
borrow money from a bank rather than from my friends or neighbours. 
Do you have your own electricity meter?
Well, I share one with the two other rental apartments in the block. 
Everyone puts money together to pay the prepaid electricity meter. So 
we don’t really run into any trouble there. 
Do you have your own water connection / pipe?
Again, we are sharing one connection. That works just fine. 
Group questions
1 Are you part of any welfare groups, in church or otherwise?
Every member of my church is automatically member of the church 
welfare group, for this we each pay 1 cedi (€0,20) every Sunday. This 
money is used for when people have a funeral or birth or sickness. 
We can be pretty sure who should get money from that welfare fund, 
because it has a clear constitution. I also have my copy. Then apart from 
this there is my tithe, that one is rather meant for costs related to the 
church. I pay 12 cedi per month for that (€2,40). As for my wife, she has 
something similar in her church. Also a welfare system. We are both not 
part of any community welfare group. 
2 Are you part of any sports or game group, or is there a sport or game which you 
like to play – and do you play it with the same people or always different people?
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Yes! I am part of a keep-fit club. It’s just people going to a certain place to 
exercise, men and women together. Not based on any tribal what-what, 
or religious basis. Just people going to do some exercise and stay fit. 
As of now, we are not formally organised. But we are planning to get 
organised and get a welfare system in place, starting September. Then 
we are just going to start small. Maybe a monthly contribution of 1 cedi 
per person. If that turns out well, then we can tax ourselves a bit more. 
Apart from that club, I also like to play some handball, netball and 
volleyball. My wife? No, she does not join my group. But I have to say, 
she does sometimes go for games, sports, exercise within her church. 
3 Are you part of any Old School group? [alumni]
Oh, you know. Some people from my school started one and I even came 
to the first meeting. But there were only two other people there. After 
that I just gave up on it, even though they are telling me now that there 
are many people so I should come again. Well, maybe I will, we’ll see. My 
wife, she used to go for Old School meetings of her own place too. But 
she stopped all that when she gave birth.
4 Are you part of any reading/studying/educational group?
No, nothing like that. Nor is my wife. 
5 Are you part of any political group, party member, or pressure group?
Yes, he has a membership card for a political party, Which one? That is 
up to me, frankly. But I’m really not active in that party. I don’t go to their 
meetings, whether they are private or public. You know what, I probably 
won’t even go to vote next year for the president. Honestly, is there 
anything I can gain from supporting either party?
6  Are you part of any trade association?
Definitely, I used to be part of the union at my previous job. In fact, I 
was an executive of that union. The main function of the union was to 
press for better salaries and secondary benefits. My wife too. Formerly, 
she used to work as a hairdresser. She stopped that because of the 
grandchild she takes care of. But at the time when she was working, 
she was an active member of the Beautician’s Association, going for 
meetings too!
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7 Are you part of any other kind of group?
No, no. In fact, let me tell you. There are many different groups out there 
and I’m sure I could join them, but as for me, I prefer to stay out of 
trouble. 
8 Is there a group of which you previously were a member, which you have left or 
which has disbanded?
No. 
Area questions
1 When you arrived here, did anyone introduce you to the community?
Well, I came here because I heard through a friend that there was an 
apartment for rent here. So I hopped across and met the landowner. 
Of course he greeted me, I am renting his house. But apart from that, 
nobody welcomed me into the area or anything like that. 
2  Is there anything else you can teach me about how people form groups here or 
why some people like to join groups while others don’t?
Well, I know that a lot of people may not want to join groups around 
here. All it causes is gossiping and strife. To be honest I agree with them. 
3 What is the biggest problem in this area and who should work to fix it?
In this area? The place is fine ooh. The real problem is dumsor [power 
cuts]. But that one, the problem is national. So it should be the president 
and parliament who should work to fix it. As for this here area, there are 
no problems. I like the place. 
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Appendix 4: Examples of questionnaires
In this Appendix I show two examples of the questionnaires I used to conduct semi-
structured interviews with opinion leaders, neighbourhood activists, government 
workers and others who take up relevant positions in or related to the social of the 
neighbourhoods I investigated. I provide two examples: Hon. Allenge and Rev. Akey. 
Example 1: Honorable Samuelson Allenge, former Assembly member
Mr. Allenge was the first Assembly member of the electoral area under which Sebrepor 
fell at the time. Apart from this, I asked him about his past and the past of the area, 
and about the ways he and other prominent locals organised to achieve more numerous 
representation in democratic bodies. 
1. Can you tell me something about yourself, your personal story? Where did you 
come from, how did you come here? Why? What church do you go to, why that 
one?
2. What is it like to work as Assembly member?
3. Before you became Assemblyman for this area, there was no Assembly member 
here. Who worked for that, who pushed for that, how was that achieved? 
4. You were the first Assembly member in the area. As such, what were your 
functions? 
5. What are you most proud of? Your biggest achievement as Assembly member? 
6. Is there anything you regret, where you should have acted differently? 
7. How did the Kpone-Katamanso Assembly come into being? Who pushed for that? 
I know in Ashaiman they really had to fight for it, and people do, because it helps 
to have your own assembly. So how was that achieved here? 
8. How did you work to push for your electoral area to be split into five smaller ones? 
9. Who worked with you on that project? Youth clubs? And do you have any 
experience of how this normally happens, perhaps from other areas?
10. You now have a new role, as zonal chairman. What does that role involve? 
11. Youth clubs, what’s their function? What do they look like, always hanger-on’s or 
also clubs in their own right? And who else pushes? 
12. I did some interviews during elections, and people said the new Assembly member 
is very suitable for the job, because he has powerful sponsors, he can get things 
done. So what kind of things will be easier for him compared to his predecessor?
13. Is there any other way you can help me to understand how people organise in 
these new urban areas?
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Example 2: Reverend Francis Akey, church leader
Mr Akey is the head of one of the biggest churches in Sebrepor. This is the questionnaire for 
the first interview I conducted with him and with anybody at his church in general. As in 
every other interview, I started by asking him to tell me about himself, and ended with an 
open invitation to explain anything that I might have overlooked. Apart from this, I asked 
him about his church’s internal organisation and their relations with local government, 
and about the development trajectory and power relations of the neighbourhood more 
generally. 
1. Can you tell me something about yourself, your personal story? Where did you 
come from, how did you come here? Why? 
2. Please tell me something about your church: its age, its congregation, its character.
3. What organised groups exist within your church, and what do they do?
4. How are your church departments run? Employees full-time, or volunteers?
5. There is also a school founded and run by your church. As for that school, how do 
you liase and work together with the District?
6. The church welfare system seems to be a very important element for a lot of 
people. Can you go into detail about it?
7. How do new members come into your church?
8. In what languages do you preach, and why?
9. When you came to Sebrepor, what was there? And then, how did you see it grow? 
10. Who are the powerful actors in this area, what kind of people are they? Political 
leaders, business leaders, church leaders, youth clubs, residents associations? 
11. When there is a need for better schools, water/power/roads, or security, who can 
work to establish those?
12. I have heard that the chieftaincy palace is closed, and it is unknown when it will 
open again. How do you see this?
13. Is there any other way you can help me to understand how people organise in 
these new urban areas?
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Appendix 5: Portfolio of the PhD trajectory
Declaration of Scientific Integrity
Obtained during the workshop “Professionalism and integrity in research” coordinated 
by the Erasmus Graduate School of Social Sciences and the Humanities. 
Training
Association of Social Economics summer school in Bilbao, June 2016
Supervision of masters’ theses
Joris Tieleman was second assessor of the theses of:
•	 Yuxu	Doris	Lin	(2014-2015)
•	 Dorcas	Nthoki	Nyamai	(2014-2015)
Papers at conferences
8 July 2015 6th European Conference on African Studies, Paris
28 June 2017 7th European Conference on African Studies, Basel
11 September 2017 RC21, Leeds, UK
Papers at workshops
11 October 2017 Claiming Rights and Resources in the African City – Afrika 
 Studie Centrum, Leiden
13 December 2017 Workshop on informal brokers, Afrika Studie Centrum, Leiden
8 March 2018 University of Ghana, Legon, Accra
25 January 2019 The African City – Afrika Studie Centrum, Leiden
25-26 February 2019 Urban Political Ecology, University of Amsterdam
Published papers
Tieleman, J., & Uitermark, J. (2019). Chiefs in the City: Traditional Authority in the 
Modern State. Sociology, 53(4), 707–723.
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CV Joris Tieleman
Surinameplein 35
1058GM Amsterdam
E-Mail: joris.tieleman@gmail.com
Phone: +31 6 128 821 82
Nationality: Dutch
Date of birth: 15 November 1987
EDUCATION                                                                                            
11/2014 – 04/2020  PhD Candidate, Sociology Department, Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam. Project: “Mapping the city from 
below”, combining GIS and sociology, in collaboration with 
the Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies 
(IHS). 
09/2012 – 08/2013 M.Sc. Human Geography, Universiteit van Amsterdam. 
 Thesis: The Shifting Cityscape of Amsterdam (poster) – a 
quantitative analysis of the spatial expansion patterns of 
gentrification. Av. 7.9,  ESRI Young Scholar Award and NVM 
Thesis of the Year Award.
 
09/2011 - 08/2012 M.Sc. Spatial, Transport & Environmental Economics, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam. 
 Thesis: Bilateral Investment Treaties in South America – a 
quantitative analysis of costs and benefits. Av. 8.1, Cum Laude. 
09/2007 – 08/2011 B.A. Liberal Arts & Sciences, Universiteit Utrecht, The 
Netherlands. Major: Economics, Minors: Entrepreneurship 
and Urban Geography. Av. 7.3
09/2000 – 06/2006 Christelijk Gymnasium Utrecht. 
 Majors: Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry. 
 Final grade: 7.8
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WORKING EXPERIENCE                                                                                                                     
10/2013 – 09/2014 GIS Developer, VDP Research, Berlin. VDP is the 
Association of German mortgage banks. Tasks: digital 
mapping, real estate research using GIS, development of 
interactive GIS services for real-time valuation of objects. 
 
01/2011 – 09/2013 Freelance Researcher, SOMO, Amsterdam. SOMO is 
a socio-economic research institute. Tasks: research on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy and practice 
of multinational corporations. Average two days/week.
 Methods: Data banks, surveys, literature research. 
05/2008 - 04/2009 Board of the Atlas Student Union, Universiteit Utrecht, 
Treasurer. Tasks: budget preparation and oversight, 
coordination of several working groups. 
2007 – 2010 Atlas Student Union, Universiteit Utrecht. Tasks: 
Organisation of group travel to St. Petersburg and 
Strassburg, Organisation of an open air festival (as 
chairman), other organisational tasks. 
SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT 
01/2007-08/2007 Teacher, Phwezi Boys Secondary School, Malawi. Tasks: 
voluntary work as teacher for Math and English, teaching 
(solo) three classes of about 60 boys each, coaching the 
school football team. 
01/2014-12/2016 Co-founder and national chairman, Rethinking 
Economics NL. Tasks: campaigning for a modernized, 
pluralist curriculum in economics education. 20 hr/week. 
(www.rethinkingeconomics.nl)
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AWARDS                                                                             
09/2013 Winner of the NVM Thesis of the Year Award 2013. 
Presentation of Master’s Thesis at the Dutch Real Estate 
Broker Conference (main stage). 
07/2013 Winner of the ESRI Young Scholar Award 2013. 
Presentation of Master’s Thesis at ESRI Conference 2013, 
San Diego, USA.
04/2009 Rotary Young Leaders Program, The Netherlands
03/2004 Mathematics Olympiad, The Netherlands. Winner of the 
national schools contest with the CGU school team, top 10 
nationwide in the individual contest. 
OTHER                                                                                                    
Languages Dutch: Mother tongue
 English: Fluent (Studies were completely in English)
 German: Fluent (C2 level, Goethe Institute)
 French: Basic knowledge, sufficient for reading 
 Spanish: Basic knowledge, sufficient for reading
Travel Malawi, Ghana, Zambia, India, Australia, South-east-Asia, 
Morocco, Canada, U.S., Mexico, Israel, Jordan.
Software ArcGIS, Word, Excel, Stata, SPSS. 
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we are experiencing a century of 
unprecedented urban growth. while 
africa is still the least urbanised continent, 
its cities grow fastest of all. accra, the 
capital of ghana, is a frontrunner. given 
the limited capacity of government, the growth of all these 
new neighborhoods is a rough and chaotic process. how do 
the residents of these areas organise to create collective 
amenities, such as water, electricity, security and roads?
This thesis traces the development of a single neighborhood, 
from bush to city. in particular, it zooms in on residents 
associations, traditional chiefs, churches and the water 
infrastructure. it shows how deeply the early pioneers leave 
their marks in the urban shape, how contemporary institutions 
such as chieftaincy and the churches were shaped by their 
history, and how all these forces combine to weave the new 
urban fabric of a rapidly expanding city.
